Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of patches for dunfell and have comments back by end of day Tuesday.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/5239
The following changes since commit d1943e6a0ec00653c81cd4c0bb0d6b7e0909094c:
go: fix CVE-2023-24537 Infinite loop in parsing (2023-04-21 04:15:45 -1000)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/dunfell-nut
http://cgit.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/dunfell-nut
Christoph Lauer (1):
populate_sdk_base: add zip options
Nikhil R (1):
openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0464
Omkar Patil (2):
openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0465
openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0466
Shubham Kulkarni (1):
go: Ignore CVE-2022-1705
Vijay Anusuri (2):
sudo: Security fix for CVE-2023-28486 and CVE-2023-28487
curl: Security fix CVE-2023-27533, CVE-2023-27535 and CVE-2023-27536
Virendra Thakur (1):
qemu: Whitelist CVE-2023-0664
Vivek Kumbhar (1):
go: fix CVE-2023-24534 denial of service from excessive memory
allocation
meta/classes/populate_sdk_base.bbclass | 4 +- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch | 226 ++++++ .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch | 60 ++ .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch | 82 +++ .../openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb | 3 + meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc | 4 + .../go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-24534.patch | 200 ++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 5 + .../CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-1.patch | 646 ++++++++++++++++++ .../CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-2.patch | 26 + meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.8.32.bb | 2 + .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch | 59 ++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch | 236 +++++++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch | 170 +++++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch | 55 ++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb | 4 + 16 files changed, 1781 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-24534.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-2.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/9 sudo: Security fix for CVE-2023-28486 and CVE-2023-28487
From: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
import patches from ubuntu to fix
CVE-2023-28486
CVE-2023-28487
Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/sudo/tree/debian/patches?h=ubuntu/focal-security
Upstream commit https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/334daf92b31b79ce68ed75e2ee14fca265f029ca & https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/12648b4e0a8cf486480442efd52f0e0b6cab6e8b]
--- .../CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-1.patch | 646 ++++++++++++++++++ .../CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-2.patch | 26 + meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.8.32.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 674 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-2.patch
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-1.patch new file +646 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,646 @@ +Origin: Backport obtained from SUSE. Thanks! + +From 334daf92b31b79ce68ed75e2ee14fca265f029ca Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 18 Jan 2023 08:21:34 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] Escape control characters in log messages and "sudoreplay -l" + output. The log message contains user-controlled strings that could include + things like terminal control characters. Space characters in the command + path are now also escaped. + +Command line arguments that contain spaces are surrounded with +single quotes and any literal single quote or backslash characters +are escaped with a backslash. This makes it possible to distinguish +multiple command line arguments from a single argument that contains +spaces. + +Issue found by Matthieu Barjole and Victor Cutillas of Synacktiv +(https://synacktiv.com). + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/sudo/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-2848x-1.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security +Upstream commit https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/334daf92b31b79ce68ed75e2ee14fca265f029ca] +CVE: CVE-2023-28486 CVE-2023-28487 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + doc/sudoers.man.in | 33 +++++++-- + doc/sudoers.mdoc.in | 28 ++++++-- + doc/sudoreplay.man.in | 9 ++ + doc/sudoreplay.mdoc.in | 10 ++ + include/sudo_compat.h | 6 + + include/sudo_lbuf.h | 7 ++ + lib/util/lbuf.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + lib/util/util.exp.in | 1 + plugins/sudoers/logging.c | 145 +++++++++++-------------------------------- + plugins/sudoers/sudoreplay.c | 44 +++++++++---- + 10 files changed, 257 insertions(+), 132 deletions(-) + +--- a/doc/sudoers.man.in ++++ b/doc/sudoers.man.in +@@ -4566,6 +4566,19 @@ can log events using either + syslog(3) + or a simple log file. + The log format is almost identical in both cases. ++Any control characters present in the log data are formatted in octal ++with a leading ++\(oq#\(cq ++character. ++For example, a horizontal tab is stored as ++\(oq#011\(cq ++and an embedded carriage return is stored as ++\(oq#015\(cq. ++In addition, space characters in the command path are stored as ++\(oq#040\(cq. ++Literal single quotes and backslash characters ++(\(oq\e\(cq) ++in command line arguments are escaped with a backslash. + .SS "Accepted command log entries" + Commands that sudo runs are logged using the following format (split + into multiple lines for readability): +@@ -4646,7 +4659,7 @@ A list of environment variables specifie + if specified. + .TP 14n + command +-The actual command that was executed. ++The actual command that was executed, including any command line arguments. + .PP + Messages are logged using the locale specified by + \fIsudoers_locale\fR, +@@ -4882,17 +4895,21 @@ with a few important differences: + 1.\& + The + \fIprogname\fR +-and +-\fIhostname\fR +-fields are not present. ++field is not present. + .TP 5n + 2.\& +-If the +-\fIlog_year\fR +-option is enabled, +-the date will also include the year. ++The ++\fIhostname\fR ++is only logged if the ++\fIlog_host\fR ++option is enabled. + .TP 5n + 3.\& ++The date does not include the year unless the ++\fIlog_year\fR ++option is enabled. ++.TP 5n ++4.\& + Lines that are longer than + \fIloglinelen\fR + characters (80 by default) are word-wrapped and continued on the +--- a/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in ++++ b/doc/sudoers.mdoc.in +@@ -4261,6 +4261,19 @@ can log events using either + .Xr syslog 3 + or a simple log file. + The log format is almost identical in both cases. ++Any control characters present in the log data are formatted in octal ++with a leading ++.Ql # ++character. ++For example, a horizontal tab is stored as ++.Ql #011 ++and an embedded carriage return is stored as ++.Ql #015 . ++In addition, space characters in the command path are stored as ++.Ql #040 . ++Literal single quotes and backslash characters ++.Pq Ql \e ++in command line arguments are escaped with a backslash. + .Ss Accepted command log entries + Commands that sudo runs are logged using the following format (split + into multiple lines for readability): +@@ -4328,7 +4341,7 @@ option is enabled. + A list of environment variables specified on the command line, + if specified. + .It command +-The actual command that was executed. ++The actual command that was executed, including any command line arguments. + .El + .Pp + Messages are logged using the locale specified by +@@ -4550,14 +4563,17 @@ with a few important differences: + .It + The + .Em progname +-and ++field is not present. ++.It ++The + .Em hostname +-fields are not present. ++is only logged if the ++.Em log_host ++option is enabled. + .It +-If the ++The date does not include the year unless the + .Em log_year +-option is enabled, +-the date will also include the year. ++option is enabled. + .It + Lines that are longer than + .Em loglinelen +--- a/doc/sudoreplay.man.in ++++ b/doc/sudoreplay.man.in +@@ -149,6 +149,15 @@ In this mode, + will list available sessions in a format similar to the + \fBsudo\fR + log file format, sorted by file name (or sequence number). ++Any control characters present in the log data are formated in octal ++with a leading ++\(oq#\(cq ++character. ++For example, a horizontal tab is displayed as ++\(oq#011\(cq ++and an embedded carriage return is displayed as ++\(oq#015\(cq. ++.sp + If a + \fIsearch expression\fR + is specified, it will be used to restrict the IDs that are displayed. +--- a/doc/sudoreplay.mdoc.in ++++ b/doc/sudoreplay.mdoc.in +@@ -142,6 +142,16 @@ In this mode, + will list available sessions in a format similar to the + .Nm sudo + log file format, sorted by file name (or sequence number). ++Any control characters present in the log data are formatted in octal ++with a leading ++.Ql # ++character. ++For example, a horizontal tab is displayed as ++.Ql #011 ++and an embedded carriage return is displayed as ++.Ql #015 . ++Space characters in the command name and arguments are also formatted in octal. ++.Pp + If a + .Ar search expression + is specified, it will be used to restrict the IDs that are displayed. +--- a/include/sudo_compat.h ++++ b/include/sudo_compat.h +@@ -79,6 +79,12 @@ + # endif + #endif + ++#ifdef HAVE_FALLTHROUGH_ATTRIBUTE ++# define FALLTHROUGH __attribute__((__fallthrough__)) ++#else ++# define FALLTHROUGH do { } while (0) ++#endif ++ + /* + * Given the pointer x to the member m of the struct s, return + * a pointer to the containing structure. +--- a/include/sudo_lbuf.h ++++ b/include/sudo_lbuf.h +@@ -36,9 +36,15 @@ struct sudo_lbuf { + + typedef int (*sudo_lbuf_output_t)(const char *); + ++/* Flags for sudo_lbuf_append_esc() */ ++#define LBUF_ESC_CNTRL 0x01 ++#define LBUF_ESC_BLANK 0x02 ++#define LBUF_ESC_QUOTE 0x04 ++ + __dso_public void sudo_lbuf_init_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf, sudo_lbuf_output_t output, int indent, const char *continuation, int cols); + __dso_public void sudo_lbuf_destroy_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf); + __dso_public bool sudo_lbuf_append_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf, const char *fmt, ...) __printflike(2, 3); ++__dso_public bool sudo_lbuf_append_esc_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf, int flags, const char *fmt, ...) __printflike(3, 4); + __dso_public bool sudo_lbuf_append_quoted_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf, const char *set, const char *fmt, ...) __printflike(3, 4); + __dso_public void sudo_lbuf_print_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf); + __dso_public bool sudo_lbuf_error_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf); +@@ -47,6 +53,7 @@ __dso_public void sudo_lbuf_clearerr_v1( + #define sudo_lbuf_init(_a, _b, _c, _d, _e) sudo_lbuf_init_v1((_a), (_b), (_c), (_d), (_e)) + #define sudo_lbuf_destroy(_a) sudo_lbuf_destroy_v1((_a)) + #define sudo_lbuf_append sudo_lbuf_append_v1 ++#define sudo_lbuf_append_esc sudo_lbuf_append_esc_v1 + #define sudo_lbuf_append_quoted sudo_lbuf_append_quoted_v1 + #define sudo_lbuf_print(_a) sudo_lbuf_print_v1((_a)) + #define sudo_lbuf_error(_a) sudo_lbuf_error_v1((_a)) +--- a/lib/util/lbuf.c ++++ b/lib/util/lbuf.c +@@ -93,6 +93,112 @@ sudo_lbuf_expand(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf, + } + + /* ++ * Escape a character in octal form (#0n) and store it as a string ++ * in buf, which must have at least 6 bytes available. ++ * Returns the length of buf, not counting the terminating NUL byte. ++ */ ++static int ++escape(unsigned char ch, char *buf) ++{ ++ const int len = ch < 0100 ? (ch < 010 ? 3 : 4) : 5; ++ ++ /* Work backwards from the least significant digit to most significant. */ ++ switch (len) { ++ case 5: ++ buf[4] = (ch & 7) + '0'; ++ ch >>= 3; ++ FALLTHROUGH; ++ case 4: ++ buf[3] = (ch & 7) + '0'; ++ ch >>= 3; ++ FALLTHROUGH; ++ case 3: ++ buf[2] = (ch & 7) + '0'; ++ buf[1] = '0'; ++ buf[0] = '#'; ++ break; ++ } ++ buf[len] = '\0'; ++ ++ return len; ++} ++ ++/* ++ * Parse the format and append strings, only %s and %% escapes are supported. ++ * Any non-printable characters are escaped in octal as #0nn. ++ */ ++bool ++sudo_lbuf_append_esc_v1(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf, int flags, const char *fmt, ...) ++{ ++ unsigned int saved_len = lbuf->len; ++ bool ret = false; ++ const char *s; ++ va_list ap; ++ debug_decl(sudo_lbuf_append_esc, SUDO_DEBUG_UTIL); ++ ++ if (sudo_lbuf_error(lbuf)) ++ debug_return_bool(false); ++ ++#define should_escape(ch) \ ++ ((ISSET(flags, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL) && iscntrl((unsigned char)ch)) || \ ++ (ISSET(flags, LBUF_ESC_BLANK) && isblank((unsigned char)ch))) ++#define should_quote(ch) \ ++ (ISSET(flags, LBUF_ESC_QUOTE) && (ch == '\'' || ch == '\\')) ++ ++ va_start(ap, fmt); ++ while (*fmt != '\0') { ++ if (fmt[0] == '%' && fmt[1] == 's') { ++ if ((s = va_arg(ap, char *)) == NULL) ++ s = "(NULL)"; ++ while (*s != '\0') { ++ if (should_escape(*s)) { ++ if (!sudo_lbuf_expand(lbuf, sizeof("#0177") - 1)) ++ goto done; ++ lbuf->len += escape(*s++, lbuf->buf + lbuf->len); ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (should_quote(*s)) { ++ if (!sudo_lbuf_expand(lbuf, 2)) ++ goto done; ++ lbuf->buf[lbuf->len++] = '\\'; ++ lbuf->buf[lbuf->len++] = *s++; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (!sudo_lbuf_expand(lbuf, 1)) ++ goto done; ++ lbuf->buf[lbuf->len++] = *s++; ++ } ++ fmt += 2; ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (should_escape(*fmt)) { ++ if (!sudo_lbuf_expand(lbuf, sizeof("#0177") - 1)) ++ goto done; ++ if (*fmt == '\'') { ++ lbuf->buf[lbuf->len++] = '\\'; ++ lbuf->buf[lbuf->len++] = *fmt++; ++ } else { ++ lbuf->len += escape(*fmt++, lbuf->buf + lbuf->len); ++ } ++ continue; ++ } ++ if (!sudo_lbuf_expand(lbuf, 1)) ++ goto done; ++ lbuf->buf[lbuf->len++] = *fmt++; ++ } ++ ret = true; ++ ++done: ++ if (!ret) ++ lbuf->len = saved_len; ++ if (lbuf->size != 0) ++ lbuf->buf[lbuf->len] = '\0'; ++ va_end(ap); ++ ++ debug_return_bool(ret); ++} ++ ++/* + * Parse the format and append strings, only %s and %% escapes are supported. + * Any characters in set are quoted with a backslash. + */ +--- a/lib/util/util.exp.in ++++ b/lib/util/util.exp.in +@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ sudo_gethostname_v1 + sudo_gettime_awake_v1 + sudo_gettime_mono_v1 + sudo_gettime_real_v1 ++sudo_lbuf_append_esc_v1 + sudo_lbuf_append_quoted_v1 + sudo_lbuf_append_v1 + sudo_lbuf_clearerr_v1 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/logging.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/logging.c +@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@ + #include <syslog.h> + + #include "sudoers.h" ++#include "sudo_lbuf.h" + + #ifndef HAVE_GETADDRINFO + # include "compat/getaddrinfo.h" +@@ -940,14 +941,6 @@ should_mail(int status) + (def_mail_no_perms && !ISSET(status, VALIDATE_SUCCESS))); + } + +-#define LL_TTY_STR "TTY=" +-#define LL_CWD_STR "PWD=" /* XXX - should be CWD= */ +-#define LL_USER_STR "USER=" +-#define LL_GROUP_STR "GROUP=" +-#define LL_ENV_STR "ENV=" +-#define LL_CMND_STR "COMMAND=" +-#define LL_TSID_STR "TSID=" +- + #define IS_SESSID(s) ( \ + isalnum((unsigned char)(s)[0]) && isalnum((unsigned char)(s)[1]) && \ + (s)[2] == '/' && \ +@@ -962,14 +955,16 @@ should_mail(int status) + static char * + new_logline(const char *message, const char *errstr) + { +- char *line = NULL, *evstr = NULL; + #ifndef SUDOERS_NO_SEQ + char sessid[7]; + #endif + const char *tsid = NULL; +- size_t len = 0; ++ struct sudo_lbuf lbuf; ++ int i; + debug_decl(new_logline, SUDOERS_DEBUG_LOGGING) + ++ sudo_lbuf_init(&lbuf, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); ++ + #ifndef SUDOERS_NO_SEQ + /* A TSID may be a sudoers-style session ID or a free-form string. */ + if (sudo_user.iolog_file != NULL) { +@@ -989,119 +984,55 @@ new_logline(const char *message, const c + #endif + + /* +- * Compute line length ++ * Format the log line as an lbuf, escaping control characters in ++ * octal form (#0nn). Error checking (ENOMEM) is done at the end. + */ +- if (message != NULL) +- len += strlen(message) + 3; +- if (errstr != NULL) +- len += strlen(errstr) + 3; +- len += sizeof(LL_TTY_STR) + 2 + strlen(user_tty); +- len += sizeof(LL_CWD_STR) + 2 + strlen(user_cwd); +- if (runas_pw != NULL) +- len += sizeof(LL_USER_STR) + 2 + strlen(runas_pw->pw_name); +- if (runas_gr != NULL) +- len += sizeof(LL_GROUP_STR) + 2 + strlen(runas_gr->gr_name); +- if (tsid != NULL) +- len += sizeof(LL_TSID_STR) + 2 + strlen(tsid); +- if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL) { +- size_t evlen = 0; +- char * const *ep; +- +- for (ep = sudo_user.env_vars; *ep != NULL; ep++) +- evlen += strlen(*ep) + 1; +- if (evlen != 0) { +- if ((evstr = malloc(evlen)) == NULL) +- goto oom; +- evstr[0] = '\0'; +- for (ep = sudo_user.env_vars; *ep != NULL; ep++) { +- strlcat(evstr, *ep, evlen); +- strlcat(evstr, " ", evlen); /* NOTE: last one will fail */ +- } +- len += sizeof(LL_ENV_STR) + 2 + evlen; +- } +- } +- if (user_cmnd != NULL) { +- /* Note: we log "sudo -l command arg ..." as "list command arg ..." */ +- len += sizeof(LL_CMND_STR) - 1 + strlen(user_cmnd); +- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK)) +- len += sizeof("list ") - 1; +- if (user_args != NULL) +- len += strlen(user_args) + 1; +- } +- +- /* +- * Allocate and build up the line. +- */ +- if ((line = malloc(++len)) == NULL) +- goto oom; +- line[0] = '\0'; + + if (message != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, message, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, errstr ? " : " : " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "%s%s", message, ++ errstr ? " : " : " ; "); + } + if (errstr != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, errstr, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; +- } +- if (strlcat(line, LL_TTY_STR, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, user_tty, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; +- if (strlcat(line, LL_CWD_STR, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, user_cwd, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "%s ; ", errstr); ++ } ++ if (user_tty != NULL) { ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "TTY=%s ; ", user_tty); ++ } ++ if (user_cwd != NULL) { ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "PWD=%s ; ", user_cwd); ++ } + if (runas_pw != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, LL_USER_STR, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, runas_pw->pw_name, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "USER=%s ; ", ++ runas_pw->pw_name); + } + if (runas_gr != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, LL_GROUP_STR, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, runas_gr->gr_name, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "GROUP=%s ; ", ++ runas_gr->gr_name); + } + if (tsid != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, LL_TSID_STR, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, tsid, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; +- } +- if (evstr != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, LL_ENV_STR, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, evstr, len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, " ; ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; +- free(evstr); +- evstr = NULL; ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "TSID=%s ; ", tsid); ++ } ++ if (sudo_user.env_vars != NULL) { ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "ENV=%s", sudo_user.env_vars[0]); ++ for (i = 1; sudo_user.env_vars[i] != NULL; i++) { ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, " %s", ++ sudo_user.env_vars[i]); ++ } + } + if (user_cmnd != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, LL_CMND_STR, len) >= len) +- goto toobig; +- if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_CHECK) && strlcat(line, "list ", len) >= len) +- goto toobig; +- if (strlcat(line, user_cmnd, len) >= len) +- goto toobig; ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL|LBUF_ESC_BLANK, ++ "COMMAND=%s", user_cmnd); + if (user_args != NULL) { +- if (strlcat(line, " ", len) >= len || +- strlcat(line, user_args, len) >= len) +- goto toobig; ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, ++ LBUF_ESC_CNTRL|LBUF_ESC_QUOTE, ++ " %s", user_args); + } + } + +- debug_return_str(line); +-oom: +- free(evstr); ++ if (!sudo_lbuf_error(&lbuf)) ++ debug_return_str(lbuf.buf); ++ ++ sudo_lbuf_destroy(&lbuf); + sudo_warnx(U_("%s: %s"), __func__, U_("unable to allocate memory")); + debug_return_str(NULL); +-toobig: +- free(evstr); +- free(line); +- sudo_warnx(U_("internal error, %s overflow"), __func__); +- debug_return_str(NULL); + } +--- a/plugins/sudoers/sudoreplay.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/sudoreplay.c +@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ + #include "sudo_conf.h" + #include "sudo_debug.h" + #include "sudo_event.h" ++#include "sudo_lbuf.h" + #include "sudo_util.h" + + #ifdef HAVE_GETOPT_LONG +@@ -1353,7 +1354,8 @@ match_expr(struct search_node_list *head + } + + static int +-list_session(char *logfile, regex_t *re, const char *user, const char *tty) ++list_session(struct sudo_lbuf *lbuf, char *logfile, regex_t *re, ++ const char *user, const char *tty) + { + char idbuf[7], *idstr, *cp; + const char *timestr; +@@ -1386,16 +1388,32 @@ list_session(char *logfile, regex_t *re, + } + /* XXX - print rows + cols? */ + timestr = get_timestr(li->tstamp, 1); +- printf("%s : %s : TTY=%s ; CWD=%s ; USER=%s ; ", +- timestr ? timestr : "invalid date", +- li->user, li->tty, li->cwd, li->runas_user); +- if (li->runas_group) +- printf("GROUP=%s ; ", li->runas_group); +- printf("TSID=%s ; COMMAND=%s\n", idstr, li->cmd); +- +- ret = 0; +- ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "%s : %s : ", ++ timestr ? timestr : "invalid date", li->user); ++ if (li->tty != NULL) { ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "TTY=%s ; ", ++ li->tty); ++ } ++ if (li->cwd != NULL) { ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "CWD=%s ; ", ++ li->cwd); ++ } ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "USER=%s ; ", li->runas_user); ++ if (li->runas_group != NULL) { ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "GROUP=%s ; ", ++ li->runas_group); ++ } ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "TSID=%s ; ", idstr); ++ sudo_lbuf_append_esc(lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, "COMMAND=%s", ++ li->cmd); ++ ++ if (!sudo_lbuf_error(lbuf)) { ++ puts(lbuf->buf); ++ ret = 0; ++ } + done: ++ lbuf->error = 0; ++ lbuf->len = 0; + free_log_info(li); + debug_return_int(ret); + } +@@ -1415,6 +1433,7 @@ find_sessions(const char *dir, regex_t * + DIR *d; + struct dirent *dp; + struct stat sb; ++ struct sudo_lbuf lbuf; + size_t sdlen, sessions_len = 0, sessions_size = 0; + unsigned int i; + int len; +@@ -1426,6 +1445,8 @@ find_sessions(const char *dir, regex_t * + #endif + debug_decl(find_sessions, SUDO_DEBUG_UTIL) + ++ sudo_lbuf_init(&lbuf, NULL, 0, NULL, 0); ++ + d = opendir(dir); + if (d == NULL) + sudo_fatal(U_("unable to open %s"), dir); +@@ -1485,7 +1506,7 @@ find_sessions(const char *dir, regex_t * + + /* Check for dir with a log file. */ + if (lstat(pathbuf, &sb) == 0 && S_ISREG(sb.st_mode)) { +- list_session(pathbuf, re, user, tty); ++ list_session(&lbuf, pathbuf, re, user, tty); + } else { + /* Strip off "/log" and recurse if a dir. */ + pathbuf[sdlen + len - 4] = '\0'; +@@ -1496,6 +1517,7 @@ find_sessions(const char *dir, regex_t * + } + free(sessions); + } ++ sudo_lbuf_destroy(&lbuf); + + debug_return_int(0); + }
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo/CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-2.patch new file +26 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +Backport of: + +From 12648b4e0a8cf486480442efd52f0e0b6cab6e8b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 08:04:32 -0600 +Subject: [PATCH] Add missing " ; " separator between environment variables and + command. This is a regression introduced in sudo 1.9.13. GitHub issue #254. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/sudo/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-2848x-2.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security +Upstream commit https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/12648b4e0a8cf486480442efd52f0e0b6cab6e8b] +CVE: CVE-2023-28486 CVE-2023-28487 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + lib/eventlog/eventlog.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +--- a/plugins/sudoers/logging.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/logging.c +@@ -1018,6 +1018,7 @@ new_logline(const char *message, const c + sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL, " %s", + sudo_user.env_vars[i]); + } ++ sudo_lbuf_append(&lbuf, " ; "); + } + if (user_cmnd != NULL) { + sudo_lbuf_append_esc(&lbuf, LBUF_ESC_CNTRL|LBUF_ESC_BLANK,
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.8.32.bb +2 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://0001-Fix-includes-when-building-with-musl.patch \ file://CVE-2022-43995.patch \ file://CVE-2023-22809.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-28486_CVE-2023-28487-2.patch \ " PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sudo.pam"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/9 go: Ignore CVE-2022-1705
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Shubham Kulkarni <[email protected]>
The vulnerability was introduced in go1.15beta1 with commit d5734d4. Dunfell uses go1.14 version which does not contain the affected code.
Ref: https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2022-1705
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc +3 -0
@@ -87,3 +87,6 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-30630" # This is specific to Microsoft Windows CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-41716" + +# Issue introduced in go1.15beta1, does not exist in 1.14 +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2022-1705"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/9 openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0464
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Nikhil R <[email protected]>
Fix CVE-2023-0464 for openssl
A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service(DoS) attack on affected systems.
--- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch | 226 ++++++++++++++++++ .../openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 227 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0464.patch new file +226 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,226 @@ +From 879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Pauli <[email protected]> +Date: Wed, 8 Mar 2023 15:28:20 +1100 +Subject: [PATCH] x509: excessive resource use verifying policy constraints + +A security vulnerability has been identified in all supported versions +of OpenSSL related to the verification of X.509 certificate chains +that include policy constraints. Attackers may be able to exploit this +vulnerability by creating a malicious certificate chain that triggers +exponential use of computational resources, leading to a denial-of-service +(DoS) attack on affected systems. + +Fixes CVE-2023-0464 + +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <[email protected]> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20569) + +CVE: CVE-2023-0464 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=patch;h=879f7080d7e141f415c79eaa3a8ac4a3dad0348b] +Signed-off-by: Nikhil R <[email protected]> + +--- + crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h | 8 +++++++- + crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c | 12 +++++++++--- + crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------- + 3 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h +index 5daf78de45..344aa06765 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h ++++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_local.h +@@ -111,6 +111,11 @@ struct X509_POLICY_LEVEL_st { + }; + + struct X509_POLICY_TREE_st { ++ /* The number of nodes in the tree */ ++ size_t node_count; ++ /* The maximum number of nodes in the tree */ ++ size_t node_maximum; ++ + /* This is the tree 'level' data */ + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *levels; + int nlevel; +@@ -159,7 +164,8 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *tree_find_sk(STACK_OF(X509_POLICY_NODE) *sk, + X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data, + X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, +- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree); ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, ++ int extra_data); + void policy_node_free(X509_POLICY_NODE *node); + int policy_node_match(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *lvl, + const X509_POLICY_NODE *node, const ASN1_OBJECT *oid); +diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c +index e2d7b15322..d574fb9d66 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c ++++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_node.c +@@ -59,10 +59,15 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_find_node(const X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data, + X509_POLICY_NODE *parent, +- X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, ++ int extra_data) + { + X509_POLICY_NODE *node; + ++ /* Verify that the tree isn't too large. This mitigates CVE-2023-0464 */ ++ if (tree->node_maximum > 0 && tree->node_count >= tree->node_maximum) ++ return NULL; ++ + node = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*node)); + if (node == NULL) { + X509V3err(X509V3_F_LEVEL_ADD_NODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); +@@ -70,7 +75,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + } + node->data = data; + node->parent = parent; +- if (level) { ++ if (level != NULL) { + if (OBJ_obj2nid(data->valid_policy) == NID_any_policy) { + if (level->anyPolicy) + goto node_error; +@@ -90,7 +95,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + } + } + +- if (tree) { ++ if (extra_data) { + if (tree->extra_data == NULL) + tree->extra_data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_new_null(); + if (tree->extra_data == NULL){ +@@ -103,6 +108,7 @@ X509_POLICY_NODE *level_add_node(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *level, + } + } + ++ tree->node_count++; + if (parent) + parent->nchild++; + +diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c +index 6e8322cbc5..6c7fd35405 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c ++++ b/crypto/x509v3/pcy_tree.c +@@ -13,6 +13,18 @@ + + #include "pcy_local.h" + ++/* ++ * If the maximum number of nodes in the policy tree isn't defined, set it to ++ * a generous default of 1000 nodes. ++ * ++ * Defining this to be zero means unlimited policy tree growth which opens the ++ * door on CVE-2023-0464. ++ */ ++ ++#ifndef OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX ++# define OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX 1000 ++#endif ++ + /* + * Enable this to print out the complete policy tree at various point during + * evaluation. +@@ -168,6 +180,9 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, + return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; + } + ++ /* Limit the growth of the tree to mitigate CVE-2023-0464 */ ++ tree->node_maximum = OPENSSL_POLICY_TREE_NODES_MAX; ++ + /* + * http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.2, figure 3. + * +@@ -184,7 +199,7 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, + level = tree->levels; + if ((data = policy_data_new(NULL, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_any_policy), 0)) == NULL) + goto bad_tree; +- if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree) == NULL) { ++ if (level_add_node(level, data, NULL, tree, 1) == NULL) { + policy_data_free(data); + goto bad_tree; + } +@@ -243,7 +258,8 @@ static int tree_init(X509_POLICY_TREE **ptree, STACK_OF(X509) *certs, + * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise + */ + static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, +- X509_POLICY_DATA *data) ++ X509_POLICY_DATA *data, ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + { + X509_POLICY_LEVEL *last = curr - 1; + int i, matched = 0; +@@ -253,13 +269,13 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + X509_POLICY_NODE *node = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_value(last->nodes, i); + + if (policy_node_match(last, node, data->valid_policy)) { +- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, NULL) == NULL) ++ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + matched = 1; + } + } + if (!matched && last->anyPolicy) { +- if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) ++ if (level_add_node(curr, data, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + } + return 1; +@@ -272,7 +288,8 @@ static int tree_link_matching_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + * Return value: 1 on success, 0 otherwise. + */ + static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, +- const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache) ++ const X509_POLICY_CACHE *cache, ++ X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + { + int i; + +@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ static int tree_link_nodes(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + X509_POLICY_DATA *data = sk_X509_POLICY_DATA_value(cache->data, i); + + /* Look for matching nodes in previous level */ +- if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data)) ++ if (!tree_link_matching_nodes(curr, data, tree)) + return 0; + } + return 1; +@@ -311,7 +328,7 @@ static int tree_add_unmatched(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + /* Curr may not have anyPolicy */ + data->qualifier_set = cache->anyPolicy->qualifier_set; + data->flags |= POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS; +- if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree) == NULL) { ++ if (level_add_node(curr, data, node, tree, 1) == NULL) { + policy_data_free(data); + return 0; + } +@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ static int tree_link_any(X509_POLICY_LEVEL *curr, + } + /* Finally add link to anyPolicy */ + if (last->anyPolicy && +- level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, NULL) == NULL) ++ level_add_node(curr, cache->anyPolicy, last->anyPolicy, tree, 0) == NULL) + return 0; + return 1; + } +@@ -555,7 +572,7 @@ static int tree_calculate_user_set(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree, + extra->qualifier_set = anyPolicy->data->qualifier_set; + extra->flags = POLICY_DATA_FLAG_SHARED_QUALIFIERS + | POLICY_DATA_FLAG_EXTRA_NODE; +- node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree); ++ node = level_add_node(NULL, extra, anyPolicy->parent, tree, 1); + } + if (!tree->user_policies) { + tree->user_policies = sk_X509_POLICY_NODE_new_null(); +@@ -582,7 +599,7 @@ static int tree_evaluate(X509_POLICY_TREE *tree) + + for (i = 1; i < tree->nlevel; i++, curr++) { + cache = policy_cache_set(curr->cert); +- if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache)) ++ if (!tree_link_nodes(curr, cache, tree)) + return X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL; + + if (!(curr->flags & X509_V_FLAG_INHIBIT_ANY) +-- +2.34.1
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb +1 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://afalg.patch \ file://reproducible.patch \ file://reproducibility.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/9 openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0465
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Omkar Patil <[email protected]>
Add patch to fix CVE-2023-0465
--- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch | 60 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 61 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0465.patch new file +60 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 7 Mar 2023 16:52:55 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] Ensure that EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY is checked even in leaf + certs + +Even though we check the leaf cert to confirm it is valid, we +later ignored the invalid flag and did not notice that the leaf +cert was bad. + +Fixes: CVE-2023-0465 + +Reviewed-by: Hugo Landau <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20588) + +CVE: CVE-2023-0465 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=b013765abfa80036dc779dd0e50602c57bb3bf95] +Comment: Refreshed first hunk +Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <[email protected]> + +--- + crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c | 11 +++++++++-- + 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +index 925fbb5412..1dfe4f9f31 100644 +--- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c ++++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +@@ -1649,18 +1649,25 @@ + } + /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ + if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { +- int i; ++ int i, cbcalled = 0; + + /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ +- for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { ++ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { + X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); + + if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) + continue; ++ cbcalled = 1; + if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, + X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) + return 0; + } ++ if (!cbcalled) { ++ /* Should not be able to get here */ ++ X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ++ return 0; ++ } ++ /* The callback ignored the error so we return success */ + return 1; + } + if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb +1 -0
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://reproducible.patch \ file://reproducibility.patch \ file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-0465.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 5/9 openssl: Fix CVE-2023-0466
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Omkar Patil <[email protected]>
Add patch to fix CVE-2023-0466
--- .../openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch | 82 +++++++++++++++++++ .../openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 83 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl/CVE-2023-0466.patch new file +82 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +From 0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Tomas Mraz <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 21 Mar 2023 16:15:47 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] Fix documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() + +The function was incorrectly documented as enabling policy checking. + +Fixes: CVE-2023-0466 + +Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <[email protected]> +Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <[email protected]> +(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/20564) + +CVE: CVE-2023-0466 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff;h=0d16b7e99aafc0b4a6d729eec65a411a7e025f0a] +Comment: Refreshed first hunk from CHANGE and NEWS +Signed-off-by: Omkar Patil <[email protected]> + +--- + CHANGES | 5 +++++ + NEWS | 1 + + doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod | 9 +++++++-- + 3 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES +index efccf7838e..b19f1429bb 100644 +--- a/CHANGES ++++ b/CHANGES +@@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ + + Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] + ++ *) Corrected documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() to mention ++ that it does not enable policy checking. Thanks to ++ David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0466) ++ [Tomas Mraz] ++ + *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName. + + There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing +diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS +index 36a9bb6890..62615693fa 100644 +--- a/NEWS ++++ b/NEWS +@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ + + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1s and OpenSSL 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023] + ++ o Fixed documentation of X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() (CVE-2023-0466) + o Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName (CVE-2023-0286) + o Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF (CVE-2023-0215) + o Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex (CVE-2022-4450) +diff --git a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod +index f6f304bf7b..aa292f9336 100644 +--- a/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod ++++ b/doc/man3/X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags.pod +@@ -92,8 +92,9 @@ B<trust>. + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time() sets the verification time in B<param> to + B<t>. Normally the current time is used. + +-X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() enables policy checking (it is disabled +-by default) and adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set. ++X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() adds B<policy> to the acceptable policy set. ++Contrary to preexisting documentation of this function it does not enable ++policy checking. + + X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_policies() enables policy checking (it is disabled + by default) and sets the acceptable policy set to B<policies>. Any existing +@@ -377,6 +378,10 @@ and has no effect. + + The X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_hostflags() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0i. + ++The function X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add0_policy() was historically documented as ++enabling policy checking however the implementation has never done this. ++The documentation was changed to align with the implementation. ++ + =head1 COPYRIGHT + + Copyright 2009-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +-- +2.34.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.1.1t.bb +1 -0
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://www.openssl.org/source/openssl-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://reproducibility.patch \ file://CVE-2023-0464.patch \ file://CVE-2023-0465.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-0466.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_class-nativesdk = " \
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 6/9 qemu: Whitelist CVE-2023-0664
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Virendra Thakur <[email protected]>
This CVE is related to Windows.
--- meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-devtools/qemu/qemu.inc +5 -0
@@ -157,6 +157,11 @@ CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2018-18438" # the issue introduced in v5.1.0-rc0 CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2020-27661" +# As per https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-0664 +# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2167423 +# this bug related to windows specific. +CVE_CHECK_WHITELIST += "CVE-2023-0664" + COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn32 = "null" COMPATIBLE_HOST_mipsarchn64 = "null"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 7/9 curl: Security fix CVE-2023-27533, CVE-2023-27535 and CVE-2023-27536
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]>
Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/curl/tree/debian/patches?h=ubuntu/focal-security & https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/538b1e79a6e7b0bb829ab4cecc828d32105d0684 & https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/ed5095ed94281989e103c72e032200b83be37878 & https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/f18af4f874cecab82a9797e8c7541e0990c7a64c & https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/8f4608468b890dce2dad9f91d5607ee7e9c1aba1 & https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/cb49e67303dbafbab1cebf4086e3ec15b7d56ee5]
--- .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch | 59 +++++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch | 236 ++++++++++++++++++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch | 170 +++++++++++++ .../curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch | 55 ++++ meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb | 4 + 5 files changed, 524 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27533.patch new file +59 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@ +Backport of: + +From 538b1e79a6e7b0bb829ab4cecc828d32105d0684 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Daniel Stenberg <[email protected]> +Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:07:33 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH] telnet: only accept option arguments in ascii + +To avoid embedded telnet negotiation commands etc. + +Reported-by: Harry Sintonen +Closes #10728 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [import from ubuntu https://git.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/curl/tree/debian/patches/CVE-2023-27533.patch?h=ubuntu/focal-security +Upstream commit https://github.com/curl/curl/commit/538b1e79a6e7b0bb829ab4cecc828d32105d0684] +CVE: CVE-2023-27533 +Signed-off-by: Vijay Anusuri <[email protected]> +--- + lib/telnet.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+) + +--- a/lib/telnet.c ++++ b/lib/telnet.c +@@ -815,6 +815,17 @@ static void printsub(struct Curl_easy *d + } + } + ++static bool str_is_nonascii(const char *str) ++{ ++ size_t len = strlen(str); ++ while(len--) { ++ if(*str & 0x80) ++ return TRUE; ++ str++; ++ } ++ return FALSE; ++} ++ + static CURLcode check_telnet_options(struct connectdata *conn) + { + struct curl_slist *head; +@@ -829,6 +840,8 @@ static CURLcode check_telnet_options(str + /* Add the user name as an environment variable if it + was given on the command line */ + if(conn->bits.user_passwd) { ++ if(str_is_nonascii(data->conn->user)) ++ return CURLE_BAD_FUNCTION_ARGUMENT; + msnprintf(option_arg, sizeof(option_arg), "USER,%s", conn->user); + beg = curl_slist_append(tn->telnet_vars, option_arg); + if(!beg) { +@@ -844,6 +857,9 @@ static CURLcode check_telnet_options(str + if(sscanf(head->data, "%127[^= ]%*[ =]%255s", + option_keyword, option_arg) == 2) { + ++ if(str_is_nonascii(option_arg)) ++ continue; ++ + /* Terminal type */ + if(strcasecompare(option_keyword, "TTYPE")) { + strncpy(tn->subopt_ttype, option_arg, 31);
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch new file +236 -0
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meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27535.patch new file +170 -0
170 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-support/curl/curl/CVE-2023-27536.patch new file +55 -0
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meta/recipes-support/curl/curl_7.69.1.bb +4 -0
@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://curl.haxx.se/download/curl-${PV}.tar.bz2 \ file://CVE-2023-23916.patch \ file://CVE-2023-27534.patch \ file://CVE-2023-27538.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-27533.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-27535-pre1.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-27535.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-27536.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "ec5fc263f898a3dfef08e805f1ecca42"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 8/9 go: fix CVE-2023-24534 denial of service from excessive memory allocation
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Vivek Kumbhar <[email protected]>
A parsed MIME header is a map[string][]string. In the common case, a header contains many one-element []string slices. To avoid allocating a separate slice for each key, ReadMIMEHeader looks ahead in the input to predict the number of keys that will be parsed, and allocates a single []string of that length. The individual slices are then allocated out of the larger one.
The prediction of the number of header keys was done by counting newlines in the input buffer, which does not take into account header continuation lines (where a header key/value spans multiple lines) or the end of the header block and the start of the body. This could lead to a substantial amount of overallocation, for example when the body consists of nothing but a large block of newlines.
Fix header key count prediction to take into account the end of the headers (indicated by a blank line) and continuation lines (starting with whitespace).
Thanks to Jakob Ackermann (@das7pad) for reporting this issue.
Fixes CVE-2023-24534
For #58975
Fixes #59267
--- meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc | 1 + .../go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-24534.patch | 200 ++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 201 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-24534.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14.inc +1 -0
@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@ SRC_URI += "\ file://CVE-2022-41722-2.patch \ file://CVE-2020-29510.patch \ file://CVE-2023-24537.patch \ + file://CVE-2023-24534.patch \ " SRC_URI_append_libc-musl = " file://0009-ld-replace-glibc-dynamic-linker-with-musl.patch"
meta/recipes-devtools/go/go-1.14/CVE-2023-24534.patch new file +200 -0
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Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 9/9 populate_sdk_base: add zip options
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Christoph Lauer <[email protected]>
Add SDK_ZIP_OPTIONS to remove symbolic link creation in zip archive or add options, e.g. for encryption of the zip archive.
(From OE-Core rev: 04b62f9459b401c276255f166d0738b6f902a576)
--- meta/classes/populate_sdk_base.bbclass | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/classes/populate_sdk_base.bbclass +3 -1
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@ TOOLCHAIN_OUTPUTNAME ?= "${SDK_NAME}-toolchain-${SDK_VERSION}" SDK_ARCHIVE_TYPE ?= "tar.xz" SDK_XZ_COMPRESSION_LEVEL ?= "-9" SDK_XZ_OPTIONS ?= "${XZ_DEFAULTS} ${SDK_XZ_COMPRESSION_LEVEL}" +SDK_ZIP_OPTIONS ?= "-y" + # To support different sdk type according to SDK_ARCHIVE_TYPE, now support zip and tar.xz python () {
@@ -58,7 +60,7 @@ python () { d.setVar('SDK_ARCHIVE_DEPENDS', 'zip-native') # SDK_ARCHIVE_CMD used to generate archived sdk ${TOOLCHAIN_OUTPUTNAME}.${SDK_ARCHIVE_TYPE} from input dir ${SDK_OUTPUT}/${SDKPATH} to output dir ${SDKDEPLOYDIR} # recommand to cd into input dir first to avoid archive with buildpath - d.setVar('SDK_ARCHIVE_CMD', 'cd ${SDK_OUTPUT}/${SDKPATH}; zip -r -y ${SDKDEPLOYDIR}/${TOOLCHAIN_OUTPUTNAME}.${SDK_ARCHIVE_TYPE} .') + d.setVar('SDK_ARCHIVE_CMD', 'cd ${SDK_OUTPUT}/${SDKPATH}; zip -r ${SDK_ZIP_OPTIONS} ${SDKDEPLOYDIR}/${TOOLCHAIN_OUTPUTNAME}.${SDK_ARCHIVE_TYPE} .') else: d.setVar('SDK_ARCHIVE_DEPENDS', 'xz-native') d.setVar('SDK_ARCHIVE_CMD', 'cd ${SDK_OUTPUT}/${SDKPATH}; tar ${SDKTAROPTS} -cf - . | xz ${SDK_XZ_OPTIONS} > ${SDKDEPLOYDIR}/${TOOLCHAIN_OUTPUTNAME}.${SDK_ARCHIVE_TYPE}')
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1