x86/tdx: Add kexec support
v9 cover x86/tdx: Add kexec support
The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on TDX guest.
The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the target kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to booting 2nd kernel with single CPU.
Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/13356251.uLZWGnKmhe@kreacher
v9:
- Rebased;
- Keep page tables that maps E820_TYPE_ACPI (Ashish);
- Ack/Reviewed/Tested-bys from Sathya, Kai, Tao;
- Minor printk() message adjustments;
v8:
- Rework serialization of around conversion memory back to private;
- Print ACPI_MADT_TYPE_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP in acpi_table_print_madt_entry();
- Drop debugfs interface to dump info on shared memory;
- Adjust comments and commit messages;
- Reviewed-bys by Baoquan, Dave and Thomas;
v7:
- Call enc_kexec_stop_conversion() and enc_kexec_unshare_mem() after shutting down IO-APIC, lapic and hpet. It meets AMD requirements.
- Minor style changes;
- Add Acked/Reviewed-bys;
v6:
- Rebased to v6.8-rc1;
- Provide default noop callbacks from .enc_kexec_stop_conversion and
.enc_kexec_unshare_mem;
- Split off patch that introduces .enc_kexec_* callbacks;
- asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(): program CR3 directly from RSI, no MOV to RAX
required; - Restructure how smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() hooked up in crash_nmi_callback();
- kvmclock patch got merged via KVM tree;
v5:
- Rename smp_ops.crash_play_dead to smp_ops.stop_this_cpu and use it in
stop_this_cpu();
- Split off enc_kexec_stop_conversion() from enc_kexec_unshare_mem();
- Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free();
- Add explicit include for alternatives and stringify.
- Add barrier() after setting conversion_allowed to false;
- Mark cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled __ro_after_init;
- Print error if failed to hand over CPU to BIOS;
- Update comments and commit messages;
v4:
- Fix build for !KEXEC_CORE;
- Cleaner ATLERNATIVE use;
- Update commit messages and comments;
- Add Reviewed-bys;
v3:
- Rework acpi_mp_crash_stop_other_cpus() to avoid invoking hotplug state
machine;
- Free page tables if reset vector setup failed;
- Change asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() to pass reset vector and PGD as arguments;
- Mark acpi_mp_* variables as static and __ro_after_init;
- Use u32 for apicid;
- Disable CPU offlining if reset vector setup failed;
- Rename madt.S -> madt_playdead.S;
- Mark tdx_kexec_unshare_mem() as static;
- Rebase onto up-to-date tip/master;
- Whitespace fixes;
- Reorder patches;
- Add Reviewed-bys;
- Update comments and commit messages;
v2:
- Rework how unsharing hook ups into kexec codepath;
- Rework kvmclock_disable() fix based on Sean's;
- s/cpu_hotplug_not_supported()/cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining()/;
- use play_dead_common() to implement acpi_mp_play_dead();
- cond_resched() in tdx_shared_memory_show();
- s/target kernel/second kernel/;
- Update commit messages and comments;
Kirill A. Shutemov (17):
x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none x86/tdx: Account shared memory
x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback
x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free()
x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method
ACPI: tables: Print MULTIPROC_WAKEUP when MADT is parsed
arch/x86/Kconfig | 7 + arch/x86/coco/core.c | 1 - arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 99 ++++++++- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 9 +- arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 7 + arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile | 11 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 86 +------- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S | 28 +++ arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 6 + arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 7 + arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 18 ++ arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 73 +++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 59 ++++-- drivers/acpi/tables.c | 14 ++ include/acpi/actbl2.h | 19 +- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 10 - include/linux/cpu.h | 2 + kernel/cpu.c | 12 +- 29 files changed, 663 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 1/17 x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file
In order to prepare for the expansion of support for the ACPI MADT wakeup method, move the relevant code into a separate file.
Introduce a new configuration option to clearly indicate dependencies without the use of ifdefs.
There have been no functional changes.
--- arch/x86/Kconfig | 7 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 5 ++ arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile | 11 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 86 +----------------------------- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 101 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
arch/x86/Kconfig +7 -0
@@ -1119,6 +1119,13 @@ config X86_LOCAL_APIC depends on X86_64 || SMP || X86_32_NON_STANDARD || X86_UP_APIC || PCI_MSI select IRQ_DOMAIN_HIERARCHY +config X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP + def_bool y + depends on X86_64 + depends on ACPI + depends on SMP + depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC + config X86_IO_APIC def_bool y depends on X86_LOCAL_APIC || X86_UP_IOAPIC
arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h +5 -0
@@ -76,6 +76,11 @@ static inline bool acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address(void)#define acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address acpi_skip_set_wakeup_address +union acpi_subtable_headers ; + +int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake (union acpi_subtable_headers *header, +const unsigned long end); +/* * Check if the CPU can handle C2 and deeper */
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile +6 -5
@@ -1,11 +1,12 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 -obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += boot.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP) += sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o -obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI) += apei.o -obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB) += cppc.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += boot.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP) += sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o +obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI) += apei.o +obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB) += cppc.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP) += madt_wakeup.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR),) -obj-y += cstate.o +obj-y += cstate.o endif
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c +1 -85
110 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c new file +82 -0
82 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 2/17 x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as __ro_after_init
In reply to Kirill A. Shutemovacpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr and acpi_mp_wake_mailbox initialized once during ACPI MADT init and never changed.
--- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c +2 -2
@@ -6,10 +6,10 @@#include <asm/processor.h> /* Physical address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */ -static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr; +static u64 acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr__ro_after_init ;/* Virtual address of the Multiprocessor Wakeup Structure mailbox */ -static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox; +static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox__ro_after_init ;static int acpi_wakeup_cpu (u32 apicid,unsigned long start_ip) {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 3/17 cpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovThe ACPI MADT mailbox wakeup method doesn't allow to offline CPU after it got woke up.
Currently offlining hotplug is prevented based on the confidential computing attribute which is set for Intel TDX. But TDX is not the only possible user of the wake up method. The MADT wakeup can be implemented outside of a confidential computing environment. Offline support is a property of the wakeup method, not the CoCo implementation.
Introduce cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining() that can be called to indicate that CPU offlining should be disabled.
This function is going to replace CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED for ACPI MADT wakeup method.
--- include/linux/cpu.h | 2 ++ kernel/cpu.c | 13 ++++++++++++- 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
include/linux/cpu.h +2 -0
@@ -141,6 +141,7 @@ extern void cpus_read_lock(void);extern void cpus_read_unlock (void );extern int cpus_read_trylock (void );extern void lockdep_assert_cpus_held (void ); +extern void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining (void );extern void cpu_hotplug_disable (void );extern void cpu_hotplug_enable (void );void clear_tasks_mm_cpumask (int cpu);
@@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ static inline void cpus_read_lock(void) { }static inline void cpus_read_unlock (void ) { }static inline int cpus_read_trylock (void ) {return true; }static inline void lockdep_assert_cpus_held (void ) { } +static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining (void ) { }static inline void cpu_hotplug_disable (void ) { }static inline void cpu_hotplug_enable (void ) { }static inline int remove_cpu (unsigned int cpu) {return -EPERM ; }
kernel/cpu.c +12 -1
@@ -483,6 +483,8 @@ static int cpu_hotplug_disabled;DEFINE_STATIC_PERCPU_RWSEM (cpu_hotplug_lock); +static bool cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled__ro_after_init ; +void cpus_read_lock (void ) {percpu_down_read (&cpu_hotplug_lock);
@@ -542,6 +544,14 @@ static void lockdep_release_cpus_lock(void)rwsem_release (&cpu_hotplug_lock.dep_map, _THIS_IP_); } +/* Declare CPU offlining not supported */ +void cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining (void ) +{ +cpu_maps_update_begin (); + cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled = true; +cpu_maps_update_done (); +} +/* * Wait for currently running CPU hotplug operations to complete (if any) and * disable future CPU hotplug (from sysfs). The 'cpu_add_remove_lock' protects
@@ -1518,7 +1528,8 @@ static int cpu_down_maps_locked(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)* If the platform does not support hotplug, report it explicitly to * differentiate it from a transient offlining failure. */ -if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED )) +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED ) || + cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;if (cpu_hotplug_disabled)return -EBUSY ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 4/17 cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline CPU after it got woke up.
Currently CPU hotplug is prevented based on the confidential computing attribute which is set for Intel TDX. But TDX is not the only possible user of the wake up method.
Disable CPU offlining on ACPI MADT wakeup enumeration.
--- arch/x86/coco/core.c | 1 - arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 3 +++ include/linux/cc_platform.h | 10 ---------- kernel/cpu.c | 3 +-- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/core.c +0 -1
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@ static bool noinstr intel_cc_platform_has(enum cc_attr attr) {switch (attr) {case CC_ATTR_GUEST_UNROLL_STRING_IO : -case CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED :case CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT :case CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT :return true;
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c +3 -0
@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later #include <linux/acpi.h> +#include <linux/cpu.h> #include <linux/io.h> #include <asm/apic.h> #include <asm/barrier.h>
@@ -76,6 +77,8 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->base_address; +cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining (); +apic_update_callback (wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);return 0 ;
include/linux/cc_platform.h +0 -10
@@ -80,16 +80,6 @@ enum cc_attr {* using AMD SEV-SNP features. */ CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP, - -/** -* @CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED: Hotplug is not supported or disabled. -* -* The platform/OS is running as a guest/virtual machine does not -* support CPU hotplug feature. -* -* Examples include TDX Guest. -*/ - CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED, };#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_CC_PLATFORM
kernel/cpu.c +1 -2
@@ -1528,8 +1528,7 @@ static int cpu_down_maps_locked(unsigned int cpu, enum cpuhp_state target)* If the platform does not support hotplug, report it explicitly to * differentiate it from a transient offlining failure. */ -if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOTPLUG_DISABLED ) || - cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled) +if (cpu_hotplug_offline_disabled)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;if (cpu_hotplug_disabled)return -EBUSY ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 5/17 x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovTDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Use alternatives to keep the flag during kexec for TDX guests.
The change doesn't affect non-TDX-guest environments.
--- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +5 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -145,12 +147,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest. Clearing MCE is not allowed + * in TDX guests. */ movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax testq $X86_CR4_LA57, %r13 jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax 1: + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %eax), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST movq %rax, %cr4 jmp 1f
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against X86_FEATURE_MCE as well?
If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Quoted 40 lines
Use alternatives to keep the flag during kexec for TDX guests.
The change doesn't affect non-TDX-guest environments.
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Kai Huang <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Thomas Gleixner <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +5
-0@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>@@ -145,12 +147,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest. Clearing MCE is not allowed + * in TDX guests. */ movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax testq $X86_CR4_LA57, %r13 jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax 1: + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %eax), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST movq %rax, %cr4 jmp 1f
Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 9 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against
X86_FEATURE_MCEas well?If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Good point.
I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is allowed.
It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. We don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably future-proof the code at this point.
But let me think more.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 13 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against
X86_FEATURE_MCEas well?If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Good point.
Quoted 8 lines
I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is allowed.
It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. We don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably future-proof the code at this point.
But let me think more.
I think I will go with the variant below.
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +8 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup. */ movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax testq $X86_CR4_LA57, %r13 jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax +1: + testq $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13 + jz 1f + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %eax), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST 1: movq %rax, %cr4
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Huang, Kai
Reviewed-byRe: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 39 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against
X86_FEATURE_MCEas well?If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Good point.
Quoted 8 lines
I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is allowed.
It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. We don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably future-proof the code at this point.
But let me think more.
I think I will go with the variant below.
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup.
Nit: Perhaps we can just call out:
Clearing MCE is not allowed if it _was_ enabled before.
Which is always true I suppose.
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) · line 163
Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +4
-0*/ movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax testq $X86_CR4_LA57, %r13 jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax +1: + testq $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13 + jz 1f + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %eax), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST 1: movq %rax, %cr4
Anyway,
Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 49 lines · Kai
Quoted 38 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against
X86_FEATURE_MCEas well?If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Good point.
Quoted 8 lines
I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is allowed.
It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. We don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably future-proof the code at this point.
But let me think more.
I think I will go with the variant below.
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup.Nit: Perhaps we can just call out:
Quoted 3 lines
Clearing MCE is not allowed if it _was_ enabled before.
Which is always true I suppose.
It is true now. Future TDX will allow to clear CR4.MCE and we don't want to flip it back on in this case.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 50 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 49 lines · Kai
Quoted 38 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against
X86_FEATURE_MCEas well?If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Good point.
Quoted 8 lines
I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is allowed.
It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. We don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably future-proof the code at this point.
But let me think more.
I think I will go with the variant below.
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup.Nit: Perhaps we can just call out:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Clearing MCE is not allowed if it _was_ enabled before.
Which is always true I suppose.
It is true now. Future TDX will allow to clear CR4.MCE and we don't want to flip it back on in this case.
And yet v12 of the patch which became commit de60613173df does precisely that.
It uses the original contents of CR4 which are stored in %r13 (instead of building a completely new set of bits for CR4 as before). So it would never have *cleared* the CR4.MCE bit now anyway... what it does is explicitly *set* the bit even if it wasn't set before?
This is what got committed, and I think we can just drop the ALTERNATIVE line completely because it's redundant in the case that CR4.MCE was already set, and *wrong* in the case that it wasn't already set?
@@ -145,14 +147,15 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
* Set cr4 to a known state:
* - physical address extension enabled
* - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before
+ * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before.
+ * Clearing MCE might not be allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup.
+ *
+ * Use R13 that contains the original CR4 value, read in relocate_kernel().
+ * PAE is always set in the original CR4.
*/
- movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax
- testq $X86_CR4_LA57, %r13
- jz .Lno_la57
- orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax
-.Lno_la57:
-
- movq %rax, %cr4
+ andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d
+ ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST
+ movq %r13, %cr4 /* Flush the TLB (needed?) */
movq %r9, %cr3Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 66 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 50 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 49 lines · Kai
Quoted 38 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against
X86_FEATURE_MCEas well?If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Good point.
Quoted 8 lines
I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is allowed.
It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. We don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably future-proof the code at this point.
But let me think more.
I think I will go with the variant below.
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup.Nit: Perhaps we can just call out:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Clearing MCE is not allowed if it _was_ enabled before.
Which is always true I suppose.
It is true now. Future TDX will allow to clear CR4.MCE and we don't want to flip it back on in this case.
And yet v12 of the patch which became commit
de60613173dfdoes precisely that.It uses the original contents of CR4 which are stored in %r13 (instead of building a completely new set of bits for CR4 as before). So it would never have *cleared* the CR4.MCE bit now anyway... what it does is explicitly *set* the bit even if it wasn't set before?
Quoted 4 lines
This is what got committed, and I think we can just drop the ALTERNATIVE line completely because it's redundant in the case that CR4.MCE was already set, and *wrong* in the case that it wasn't already set?
But we AND R13 against $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57). We will lose MCE if drop the ALTERNATIVE.
And we don't want MCE to be enabled during kexec for !TDX_GUEST:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
I think we should patch AND instruction to include X86_CR4_MCE on TDX_GUEST:
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2 -2
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Use R13 that contains the original CR4 value, read in relocate_kernel(). * PAE is always set in the original CR4. */ - andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST + ALTERNATIVE __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d), \ + __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_MCE), %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST movq %r13, %cr4 /* Flush the TLB (needed?) */
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 67 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 66 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 50 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 49 lines · Kai
Quoted 38 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 13 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
Quoted 9 lines · Xiaoyao Li
Quoted 2 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests are not allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Will we consider making it more safe and compatible for future to guard against
X86_FEATURE_MCEas well?If in the future, MCE becomes configurable for TD guest, then CR4.MCE might not be fixed1.
Good point.
Quoted 8 lines
I guess we can leave it clear if it was clear. This should be easy enough. But we might want to clear even if was set if clearing is allowed.
It would require some kind of indication that clearing MCE is fine. We don't have such indication yet. Not sure we can reasonably future-proof the code at this point.
But let me think more.
I think I will go with the variant below.
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) · line 151
Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-0@@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup.Nit: Perhaps we can just call out:
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Clearing MCE is not allowed if it _was_ enabled before.
Which is always true I suppose.
It is true now. Future TDX will allow to clear CR4.MCE and we don't want to flip it back on in this case.
And yet v12 of the patch which became commit
de60613173dfdoes precisely that.It uses the original contents of CR4 which are stored in %r13 (instead of building a completely new set of bits for CR4 as before). So it would never have *cleared* the CR4.MCE bit now anyway... what it does is explicitly *set* the bit even if it wasn't set before?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
This is what got committed, and I think we can just drop the ALTERNATIVE line completely because it's redundant in the case that CR4.MCE was already set, and *wrong* in the case that it wasn't already set?
But we AND R13 against $(X86_CR4_PAE |
X86_CR4_LA57). We will lose MCE if drop the ALTERNATIVE.
Ah, yes.
Quoted 3 lines
And we don't want MCE to be enabled during kexec for !TDX_GUEST:
Actually now I've added proper exception handling in relocate_kernel perhaps we could rethink that. But that's for the future.
Review
Quoted 7 lines
I think we should patch AND instruction to include
X86_CR4_MCEonTDX_GUEST:
...(quoted diff) +2
-2- andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST + ALTERNATIVE __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d), \ + __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_MCE), %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST
Yeah... although the reason I'm looking at this is because I want to kill the ALTERNATIVE so that I can move the relocate_kernel() function into a data section:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241218212326.44qff3i5n6cxuu5d@jpoimboe/
So I think I'll do it like this instead:
arch/x86/include/asm/kexec.h +1 -0
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ extern gate_desc kexec_debug_idt[];extern unsigned char kexec_debug_exc_vectors[];extern uint16_t kexec_debug_8250_port;extern unsigned long kexec_debug_8250_mmio32; +extern uint32_t kexec_preserve_cr4_bits;#endif /*
arch/x86/kernel/machine_kexec_64.c +16 -0
@@ -353,6 +353,22 @@ int machine_kexec_prepare(struct kimage *image) kexec_va_control_page = (unsigned long )control_page; kexec_pa_table_page = (unsigned long )__pa (image->arch.pgd); +/* +* The relocate_kernel assembly code sets CR4 to a subset of the bits +* which were set during kernel runtime, including only: +* - physical address extension (which is always set in kernel) +* - 5-level paging (if it's enabled) +* - Machine check exception on TDX guests +* +* Clearing MCE may not be allowed in TDX guests, but it *should* be +* cleared in the general case. Because of the conditional nature of +* that, pass the set of bits in from the kernel for relocate_kernel +* to do a simple 'andl' with them. +*/ + kexec_preserve_cr4_bits =X86_CR4_PAE |X86_CR4_LA57 ; +if (cpu_feature_enabled (X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST )) + kexec_preserve_cr4_bits |=X86_CR4_MCE ; +if (image->type ==KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT ) kexec_pa_swap_page =page_to_pfn (image->swap_page) <<PAGE_SHIFT ;
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +4 -8
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ SYM_DATA(kexec_pa_swap_page, .quad 0) SYM_DATA_LOCAL(pa_backup_pages_map, .quad 0) SYM_DATA(kexec_debug_8250_mmio32, .quad 0) SYM_DATA(kexec_debug_8250_port, .word 0) +SYM_DATA(kexec_preserve_cr4_bits, .long 0) .balign 16 SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(kexec_debug_gdt)
@@ -183,17 +184,12 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) movq %rax, %cr0 /* - * Set cr4 to a known state: - * - physical address extension enabled - * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before - * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. - * Clearing MCE might not be allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup. + * Set CR4 to a known state, using the bitmask which was set in + * machine_kexec_prepare(). * * Use R13 that contains the original CR4 value, read in relocate_kernel(). - * PAE is always set in the original CR4. */ - andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST + andl kexec_preserve_cr4_bits(%rip), %r13d movq %r13, %cr4 /* Flush the TLB (needed?) */
Re: [PATCHv9 05/17] x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
Quoted 6 lines · David Woodhouse
Quoted 3 lines
And we don't want MCE to be enabled during kexec for !TDX_GUEST:
Actually now I've added proper exception handling in
relocate_kernelperhaps we could rethink that. But that's for the future.
There still going to be a gap once the new kernel is started until it gets proper exception handling in place.
Quoted 13 lines
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped)
Quoted 7 lines
I think we should patch AND instruction to include
X86_CR4_MCEonTDX_GUEST:
...arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +2
-2- andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d - ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST + ALTERNATIVE __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57), %r13d), \ + __stringify(andl $(X86_CR4_PAE | X86_CR4_LA57 | X86_CR4_MCE), %r13d), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUESTYeah... although the reason I'm looking at this is because I want to kill the ALTERNATIVE so that I can move the
relocate_kernel()function into a data section:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241218212326.44qff3i5n6cxuu5d@jpoimboe/
Quoted 1 line
So I think I'll do it like this instead:
Looks good to me. Thanks for the cleanup you are doing!
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
PATCH v9 5/17 x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovDepending on setup, TDX guests might be allowed to clear CR4.MCE. Attempt to clear it leads to #VE.
Use alternatives to keep the flag during kexec for TDX guests.
The change doesn't affect non-TDX-guest environments.
---
v9.1:
- Preserve CR4.MCE instead of setting it unconditionally.
--- arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S +8 -0
@@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ */ #include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <linux/stringify.h> +#include <asm/alternative.h> #include <asm/page_types.h> #include <asm/kexec.h> #include <asm/processor-flags.h>
@@ -145,11 +147,17 @@ SYM_CODE_START_LOCAL_NOALIGN(identity_mapped) * Set cr4 to a known state: * - physical address extension enabled * - 5-level paging, if it was enabled before + * - Machine check exception on TDX guest, if it was enabled before. + * Clearing MCE might not allowed in TDX guests, depending on setup. */ movl $X86_CR4_PAE, %eax testq $X86_CR4_LA57, %r13 jz 1f orl $X86_CR4_LA57, %eax +1: + testq $X86_CR4_MCE, %r13 + jz 1f + ALTERNATIVE "", __stringify(orl $X86_CR4_MCE, %eax), X86_FEATURE_TDX_GUEST 1: movq %rax, %cr4
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 6/17 x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovTDX is going to have more than one reason to failenc_status_change_prepare().
Change the callback to return errno instead of assuming -EIO; enc_status_change_finish() changed too to keep the interface symmetric.
--- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 9 +++------ arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +11 -9
@@ -798,28 +798,30 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)return true; } -static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, -bool enc) +static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, +bool enc) {/* * Only handle shared->private conversion here. * See the comment in tdx_early_init(). */ -if (enc) -return tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc); -return true; +if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc)) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; } -static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, +static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages,bool enc) {/* * Only handle private->shared conversion here. * See the comment in tdx_early_init(). */ -if (!enc) -return tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc); -return true; +if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc)) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; }void __init tdx_early_init (void )
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +3 -6
@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static bool hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc* with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility() * with memory base and size. */ -static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility (unsigned long kbuffer,int pagecount,bool enc) +static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility (unsigned long kbuffer,int pagecount,bool enc) {enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE :VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE ;
@@ -544,7 +544,6 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bophys_addr_t paddr;void *vaddr;int ret =0 ; -bool result = true;int i, pfn; pfn_array =kmalloc (HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );
@@ -568,10 +567,8 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, boif (pfn ==HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount -1 ) { ret =hv_mark_gpa_visibility (pfn, pfn_array, visibility); -if (ret) { - result = false; +if (ret) goto err_free_pfn_array; - } pfn =0 ; } }
@@ -589,7 +586,7 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, boif (set_memory_p (kbuffer, pagecount)) result = false; -return result; +return ret; }static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required (bool private)
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +2 -2
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {* @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status */ struct x86_guest { -bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc); -bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc); +int (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc); +int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void ); };
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +2 -2
@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {static void default_nmi_init (void ) { }; -static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return true; } -static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return true; } +static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return 0 ; } +static int enc_status_change_finish_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return 0 ; }static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop (bool enc) {return false; }static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop (void ) {return false; }static bool is_private_mmio_noop (u64 addr) {return false; }
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +4 -4
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)#endif } -static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) +static int amd_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {/* * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, boolif (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP ) && !enc)snp_set_memory_shared (vaddr, npages); -return true; +return 0 ; }/* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */ -static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) +static int amd_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {/* * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool eif (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT ))enc_dec_hypercall (vaddr, npages <<PAGE_SHIFT , enc); -return true; +return 0 ; }static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc (pte_t *kpte,int level,bool enc)
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +5 -3
@@ -2156,7 +2156,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)cpa_flush (&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required ());/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */ -if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare (addr, numpages, enc)) + ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare (addr, numpages, enc); +if (ret) goto vmm_fail; ret =__change_page_attr_set_clr (&cpa,1 );
@@ -2174,7 +2175,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)return ret;/* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */ -if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish (addr, numpages, enc)) + ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish (addr, numpages, enc); +if (ret) goto vmm_fail;return 0 ;
@@ -2183,7 +2185,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)WARN_ONCE (1 ,"CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=%p, numpages=%d) to %s.\n" , (void *)addr, numpages, enc ?"private" :"shared" ); -return -EIO ; +return ret; }static int __set_memory_enc_dec (unsigned long addr,int numpages,bool enc)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCHv9 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno
Quoted 9 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX is going to have more than one reason to fail
enc_status_change_prepare().Change the callback to return errno instead of assuming
-EIO;enc_status_change_finish()changed too to keep the interface symmetric.Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Dave Hansen <[email protected]>
PATCH v9 6/17 x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovTDX is going to have more than one reason to failenc_status_change_prepare().
Change the callback to return errno instead of assuming -EIO; enc_status_change_finish() changed too to keep the interface symmetric.
---
v9.1:
- Fix build error in Hyper-V code after rebase;
--- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 22 ++++++++++------------ arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +11 -9
@@ -798,28 +798,30 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc)return true; } -static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, -bool enc) +static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, +bool enc) {/* * Only handle shared->private conversion here. * See the comment in tdx_early_init(). */ -if (enc) -return tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc); -return true; +if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc)) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; } -static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages, +static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int numpages,bool enc) {/* * Only handle private->shared conversion here. * See the comment in tdx_early_init(). */ -if (!enc) -return tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc); -return true; +if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc)) +return -EIO ; + +return 0 ; }void __init tdx_early_init (void )
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +10 -12
@@ -523,9 +523,9 @@ static int hv_mark_gpa_visibility(u16 count, const u64 pfn[],* transition is complete, hv_vtom_set_host_visibility() marks the pages * as "present" again. */ -static bool hv_vtom_clear_present (unsigned long kbuffer,int pagecount,bool enc) +static int hv_vtom_clear_present (unsigned long kbuffer,int pagecount,bool enc) { -return !set_memory_np (kbuffer, pagecount); +return set_memory_np (kbuffer, pagecount); }/*
@@ -536,20 +536,19 @@ static bool hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc* with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility() * with memory base and size. */ -static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility (unsigned long kbuffer,int pagecount,bool enc) +static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility (unsigned long kbuffer,int pagecount,bool enc) {enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE :VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE ;u64 *pfn_array;phys_addr_t paddr; +int i, pfn, err;void *vaddr;int ret =0 ; -bool result = true; -int i, pfn; pfn_array =kmalloc (HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE ,GFP_KERNEL );if (!pfn_array) { - result = false; + ret = -ENOMEM ; goto err_set_memory_p; }
@@ -568,10 +567,8 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, boif (pfn ==HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount -1 ) { ret =hv_mark_gpa_visibility (pfn, pfn_array, visibility); -if (ret) { - result = false; +if (ret) goto err_free_pfn_array; - } pfn =0 ; } }
@@ -586,10 +583,11 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bo* order to avoid leaving the memory range in a "broken" state. Setting * the PRESENT bits shouldn't fail, but return an error if it does. */ -if (set_memory_p (kbuffer, pagecount)) - result = false; + err =set_memory_p (kbuffer, pagecount); +if (err && !ret) + ret = err; -return result; +return ret; }static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required (bool private)
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +2 -2
@@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ struct x86_init_acpi {* @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed before changing page encryption status */ struct x86_guest { -bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc); -bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc); +int (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc); +int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void ); };
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +2 -2
@@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit = {static void default_nmi_init (void ) { }; -static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return true; } -static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return true; } +static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return 0 ; } +static int enc_status_change_finish_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return 0 ; }static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop (bool enc) {return false; }static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop (void ) {return false; }static bool is_private_mmio_noop (u64 addr) {return false; }
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +4 -4
@@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long size, bool enc)#endif } -static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) +static int amd_enc_status_change_prepare (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {/* * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure
@@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, boolif (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP ) && !enc)snp_set_memory_shared (vaddr, npages); -return true; +return 0 ; }/* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV side */ -static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) +static int amd_enc_status_change_finish (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {/* * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it
@@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool eif (!cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT ))enc_dec_hypercall (vaddr, npages <<PAGE_SHIFT , enc); -return true; +return 0 ; }static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc (pte_t *kpte,int level,bool enc)
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +5 -3
@@ -2156,7 +2156,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)cpa_flush (&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required ());/* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */ -if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare (addr, numpages, enc)) + ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare (addr, numpages, enc); +if (ret) goto vmm_fail; ret =__change_page_attr_set_clr (&cpa,1 );
@@ -2174,7 +2175,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)return ret;/* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribute. */ -if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish (addr, numpages, enc)) + ret = x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish (addr, numpages, enc); +if (ret) goto vmm_fail;return 0 ;
@@ -2183,7 +2185,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)WARN_ONCE (1 ,"CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=%p, numpages=%d) to %s.\n" , (void *)addr, numpages, enc ?"private" :"shared" ); -return -EIO ; +return ret; }static int __set_memory_enc_dec (unsigned long addr,int numpages,bool enc)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCHv9 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno
In reply to Kirill A. Shutemovkernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
Hi Kirill,
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on rafael-pm/linux-next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v6.9-rc1 next-20240328] [cannot apply to tip/x86/core tip/x86/mm rafael-pm/acpi-bus rafael-pm/devprop] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Kirill-A-Shutemov/x86-acpi-Extract-ACPI-MADT-wakeup-code-into-a-separate-file/20240326-023510 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm.git linux-next patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325103911.2651793-7-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com patch subject: [PATCHv9 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno config: x86_64-rhel-8.3-bpf (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240329/[email protected]/config) compiler: clang version 17.0.6 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 6009708b4367171ccdbf4b5905cb6a803753fe18) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240329/[email protected]/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c:551:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'result'
551 | result = false;
| ^
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c:587:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'result'
587 | result = false;
| ^
>> arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c:662:47: error: incompatible function pointer types assigning to 'int (*)(unsigned long, int, bool)' (aka 'int (*)(unsigned long, int, _Bool)') from 'bool (unsigned long, int, bool)' (aka '_Bool (unsigned long, int, _Bool)') [-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types]
662 | x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = hv_vtom_clear_present;
| ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3 errors generated.
vim +/result +551 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 530
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 531 /*
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 532 * hv_vtom_set_host_visibility - Set specified memory visible to host.
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 533 *
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 534 * In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encrypted from host and guest
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 535 * needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 536 * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 537 * with memory base and size.
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 538 */
f223946fdefa0e Kirill A. Shutemov 2024-03-25 539 static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 540 {
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 541 enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 542 VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE : VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 543 u64 *pfn_array;
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 544 phys_addr_t paddr;
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 545 void *vaddr;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 546 int ret = 0;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 547 int i, pfn;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 548
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 549 pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 550 if (!pfn_array) {
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 @551 result = false;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 552 goto err_set_memory_p;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 553 }
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 554
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 555 for (i = 0, pfn = 0; i < pagecount; i++) {
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 556 /*
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 557 * Use slow_virt_to_phys() because the PRESENT bit has been
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 558 * temporarily cleared in the PTEs. slow_virt_to_phys() works
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 559 * without the PRESENT bit while virt_to_hvpfn() or similar
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 560 * does not.
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 561 */
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 562 vaddr = (void *)kbuffer + (i * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 563 paddr = slow_virt_to_phys(vaddr);
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 564 pfn_array[pfn] = paddr >> HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 565 pfn++;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 566
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 567 if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 568 ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 569 visibility);
f223946fdefa0e Kirill A. Shutemov 2024-03-25 570 if (ret)
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 571 goto err_free_pfn_array;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 572 pfn = 0;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 573 }
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 574 }
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 575
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 576 err_free_pfn_array:
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 577 kfree(pfn_array);
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 578
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 579 err_set_memory_p:
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 580 /*
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 581 * Set the PTE PRESENT bits again to revert what hv_vtom_clear_present()
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 582 * did. Do this even if there is an error earlier in this function in
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 583 * order to avoid leaving the memory range in a "broken" state. Setting
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 584 * the PRESENT bits shouldn't fail, but return an error if it does.
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 585 */
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 586 if (set_memory_p(kbuffer, pagecount))
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 587 result = false;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 588
f223946fdefa0e Kirill A. Shutemov 2024-03-25 589 return ret;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 590 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 591
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 592 static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 593 {
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 594 /*
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 595 * Since hv_vtom_clear_present() marks the PTEs as "not present"
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 596 * and flushes the TLB, they can't be in the TLB. That makes the
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 597 * flush controlled by this function redundant, so return "false".
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 598 */
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 599 return false;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 600 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 601
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 602 static bool hv_vtom_cache_flush_required(void)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 603 {
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 604 return false;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 605 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 606
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 607 static bool hv_is_private_mmio(u64 addr)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 608 {
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 609 /*
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 610 * Hyper-V always provides a single IO-APIC in a guest VM.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 611 * When a paravisor is used, it is emulated by the paravisor
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 612 * in the guest context and must be mapped private.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 613 */
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 614 if (addr >= HV_IOAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS &&
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 615 addr < (HV_IOAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS + PAGE_SIZE))
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 616 return true;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 617
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 618 /* Same with a vTPM */
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 619 if (addr >= VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS &&
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 620 addr < (VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS + PAGE_SIZE))
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 621 return true;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 622
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 623 return false;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 624 }
846da38de0e822 Tianyu Lan 2021-12-13 625
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 626 void __init hv_vtom_init(void)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 627 {
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 628 enum hv_isolation_type type = hv_get_isolation_type();
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 629
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 630 switch (type) {
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 631 case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_VBS:
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 632 fallthrough;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 633 /*
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 634 * By design, a VM using vTOM doesn't see the SEV setting,
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 635 * so SEV initialization is bypassed and sev_status isn't set.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 636 * Set it here to indicate a vTOM VM.
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 637 *
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 638 * Note: if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is not set, sev_status is
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 639 * defined as 0ULL, to which we can't assigned a value.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 640 */
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 641 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 642 case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP:
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 643 sev_status = MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM;
da86eb96118407 Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-05-08 644) cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 645 break;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 646 #endif
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 647
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 648 case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX:
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 649 cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_INTEL;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 650 break;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 651
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 652 default:
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 653 panic("hv_vtom_init: unsupported isolation type %d\n", type);
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 654 }
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 655
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 656 cc_set_mask(ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary);
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 657 physical_mask &= ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary - 1;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 658
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 659 x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio = hv_is_private_mmio;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 660 x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = hv_vtom_cache_flush_required;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 661 x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 @662 x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = hv_vtom_clear_present;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 663 x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = hv_vtom_set_host_visibility;
c957f1f3c498bc Juergen Gross 2023-05-02 664
c957f1f3c498bc Juergen Gross 2023-05-02 665 /* Set WB as the default cache mode. */
c957f1f3c498bc Juergen Gross 2023-05-02 666 mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 667 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 668 Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCHv9 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno
In reply to Kirill A. Shutemovkernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
Hi Kirill,
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on rafael-pm/linux-next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v6.9-rc2]
[cannot apply to tip/x86/core tip/x86/mm rafael-pm/acpi-bus rafael-pm/devprop next-20240405] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note.
And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Kirill-A-Shutemov/x86-acpi-Extract-ACPI-MADT-wakeup-code-into-a-separate-file/20240404-032544 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/rafael/linux-pm.git linux-next patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240325103911.2651793-7-kirill.shutemov%40linux.intel.com patch subject: [PATCHv9 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno config: x86_64-rhel-8.3-rust (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/config) compiler: clang version 17.0.6 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 6009708b4367171ccdbf4b5905cb6a803753fe18) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c:551:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'result'
551 | result = false;
| ^
arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c:587:3: error: use of undeclared identifier 'result'
587 | result = false;
| ^
>> arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c:662:47: error: incompatible function pointer types assigning to 'int (*)(unsigned long, int, bool)' (aka 'int (*)(unsigned long, int, _Bool)') from 'bool (unsigned long, int, bool)' (aka '_Bool (unsigned long, int, _Bool)') [-Wincompatible-function-pointer-types]
662 | x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = hv_vtom_clear_present;
| ^ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~3 errors generated.
vim +/result +551 arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 530
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 531 /*
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 532 * hv_vtom_set_host_visibility - Set specified memory visible to host.
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 533 *
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 534 * In Isolation VM, all guest memory is encrypted from host and guest
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 535 * needs to set memory visible to host via hvcall before sharing memory
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 536 * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility()
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 537 * with memory base and size.
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 538 */
93c65513f71649 Kirill A. Shutemov 2024-03-25 539 static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecount, bool enc)
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 540 {
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 541 enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility = enc ?
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 542 VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE : VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 543 u64 *pfn_array;
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 544 phys_addr_t paddr;
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 545 void *vaddr;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 546 int ret = 0;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 547 int i, pfn;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 548
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 549 pfn_array = kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL);
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 550 if (!pfn_array) {
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 @551 result = false;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 552 goto err_set_memory_p;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 553 }
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 554
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 555 for (i = 0, pfn = 0; i < pagecount; i++) {
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 556 /*
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 557 * Use slow_virt_to_phys() because the PRESENT bit has been
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 558 * temporarily cleared in the PTEs. slow_virt_to_phys() works
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 559 * without the PRESENT bit while virt_to_hvpfn() or similar
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 560 * does not.
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 561 */
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 562 vaddr = (void *)kbuffer + (i * HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE);
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 563 paddr = slow_virt_to_phys(vaddr);
9fef276f9f416a Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 564 pfn_array[pfn] = paddr >> HV_HYP_PAGE_SHIFT;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 565 pfn++;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 566
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 567 if (pfn == HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i == pagecount - 1) {
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 568 ret = hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array,
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 569 visibility);
93c65513f71649 Kirill A. Shutemov 2024-03-25 570 if (ret)
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 571 goto err_free_pfn_array;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 572 pfn = 0;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 573 }
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 574 }
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 575
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 576 err_free_pfn_array:
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 577 kfree(pfn_array);
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 578
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 579 err_set_memory_p:
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 580 /*
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 581 * Set the PTE PRESENT bits again to revert what hv_vtom_clear_present()
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 582 * did. Do this even if there is an error earlier in this function in
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 583 * order to avoid leaving the memory range in a "broken" state. Setting
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 584 * the PRESENT bits shouldn't fail, but return an error if it does.
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 585 */
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 586 if (set_memory_p(kbuffer, pagecount))
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 587 result = false;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 588
93c65513f71649 Kirill A. Shutemov 2024-03-25 589 return ret;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 590 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 591
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 592 static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 593 {
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 594 /*
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 595 * Since hv_vtom_clear_present() marks the PTEs as "not present"
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 596 * and flushes the TLB, they can't be in the TLB. That makes the
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 597 * flush controlled by this function redundant, so return "false".
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 598 */
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 599 return false;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 600 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 601
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 602 static bool hv_vtom_cache_flush_required(void)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 603 {
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 604 return false;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 605 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 606
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 607 static bool hv_is_private_mmio(u64 addr)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 608 {
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 609 /*
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 610 * Hyper-V always provides a single IO-APIC in a guest VM.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 611 * When a paravisor is used, it is emulated by the paravisor
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 612 * in the guest context and must be mapped private.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 613 */
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 614 if (addr >= HV_IOAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS &&
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 615 addr < (HV_IOAPIC_BASE_ADDRESS + PAGE_SIZE))
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 616 return true;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 617
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 618 /* Same with a vTPM */
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 619 if (addr >= VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS &&
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 620 addr < (VTPM_BASE_ADDRESS + PAGE_SIZE))
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 621 return true;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 622
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 623 return false;
810a521265023a Tianyu Lan 2021-10-25 624 }
846da38de0e822 Tianyu Lan 2021-12-13 625
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 626 void __init hv_vtom_init(void)
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 627 {
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 628 enum hv_isolation_type type = hv_get_isolation_type();
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 629
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 630 switch (type) {
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 631 case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_VBS:
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 632 fallthrough;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 633 /*
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 634 * By design, a VM using vTOM doesn't see the SEV setting,
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 635 * so SEV initialization is bypassed and sev_status isn't set.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 636 * Set it here to indicate a vTOM VM.
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 637 *
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 638 * Note: if CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT is not set, sev_status is
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 639 * defined as 0ULL, to which we can't assigned a value.
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 640 */
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 641 #ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 642 case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_SNP:
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 643 sev_status = MSR_AMD64_SNP_VTOM;
da86eb96118407 Borislav Petkov (AMD 2023-05-08 644) cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_AMD;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 645 break;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 646 #endif
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 647
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 648 case HV_ISOLATION_TYPE_TDX:
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 649 cc_vendor = CC_VENDOR_INTEL;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 650 break;
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 651
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 652 default:
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 653 panic("hv_vtom_init: unsupported isolation type %d\n", type);
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 654 }
d3a9d7e49d1531 Dexuan Cui 2023-08-24 655
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 656 cc_set_mask(ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary);
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 657 physical_mask &= ms_hyperv.shared_gpa_boundary - 1;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 658
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 659 x86_platform.hyper.is_private_mmio = hv_is_private_mmio;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 660 x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = hv_vtom_cache_flush_required;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 661 x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required;
0f34d11234868d Michael Kelley 2024-01-15 @662 x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare = hv_vtom_clear_present;
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 663 x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish = hv_vtom_set_host_visibility;
c957f1f3c498bc Juergen Gross 2023-05-02 664
c957f1f3c498bc Juergen Gross 2023-05-02 665 /* Set WB as the default cache mode. */
c957f1f3c498bc Juergen Gross 2023-05-02 666 mtrr_overwrite_state(NULL, 0, MTRR_TYPE_WRBACK);
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 667 }
812b0597fb4043 Michael Kelley 2023-03-26 668 Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
PATCH v9 7/17 x86/mm: Return correct level from lookup_address() if pte is none
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovCurrently, lookup_address() returns two things:
1. A "pte_t" (which might be a p[g4um]d_t)
2. The 'level' of the page tables where the "pte_t" was found (returned via a pointer)
If no pte_t is found, 'level' is essentially garbage.
Always fill out the level. For NULL "pte_t"s, fill in the level where the p*d_none() entry was found mirroring the "found" behavior.
Always filling out the level allows using lookup_address() to precisely skip over holes when walking kernel page tables.
Add one more entry into enum pg_level to indicate the size of the VA covered by one PGD entry in 5-level paging mode.
Update comments for lookup_address() and lookup_address_in_pgd() to reflect changes in the interface.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 16 ++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h +1 -0
@@ -548,6 +548,7 @@ enum pg_level {PG_LEVEL_2M ,PG_LEVEL_1G ,PG_LEVEL_512G , +PG_LEVEL_256T , PG_LEVEL_NUM };
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +8 -8
@@ -657,7 +657,8 @@ static inline pgprot_t verify_rwx(pgprot_t old, pgprot_t new, unsigned long star/* * Lookup the page table entry for a virtual address in a specific pgd. -* Return a pointer to the entry and the level of the mapping. +* Return a pointer to the entry (or NULL if the entry does not exist) and +* the level of the entry. */ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd (pgd_t *pgd,unsigned long address,unsigned int *level)
@@ -666,32 +667,32 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,pud_t *pud;pmd_t *pmd; - *level =PG_LEVEL_NONE ; + *level =PG_LEVEL_256T ;if (pgd_none (*pgd))return NULL ; + *level =PG_LEVEL_512G ; p4d =p4d_offset (pgd, address);if (p4d_none (*p4d))return NULL ; - *level =PG_LEVEL_512G ;if (p4d_leaf (*p4d) || !p4d_present (*p4d))return (pte_t *)p4d; + *level =PG_LEVEL_1G ; pud =pud_offset (p4d, address);if (pud_none (*pud))return NULL ; - *level =PG_LEVEL_1G ;if (pud_leaf (*pud) || !pud_present (*pud))return (pte_t *)pud; + *level =PG_LEVEL_2M ; pmd =pmd_offset (pud, address);if (pmd_none (*pmd))return NULL ; - *level =PG_LEVEL_2M ;if (pmd_leaf (*pmd) || !pmd_present (*pmd))return (pte_t *)pmd;
@@ -704,9 +705,8 @@ pte_t *lookup_address_in_pgd(pgd_t *pgd, unsigned long address,* Lookup the page table entry for a virtual address. Return a pointer * to the entry and the level of the mapping. * -* Note: We return pud and pmd either when the entry is marked large -* or when the present bit is not set. Otherwise we would return a -* pointer to a nonexisting mapping. +* Note: the function returns p4d, pud or pmd either when the entry is marked +* large or when the present bit is not set. Otherwise it returns NULL. */ pte_t *lookup_address (unsigned long address,unsigned int *level) {
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 8/17 x86/tdx: Account shared memory
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovThe kernel will convert all shared memory back to private during kexec. The direct mapping page tables will provide information on which memory is shared.
It is extremely important to convert all shared memory. If a page is missed, it will cause the second kernel to crash when it accesses it.
Keep track of the number of shared pages. This will allow for cross-checking against the shared information in the direct mapping and reporting if the shared bit is lost.
--- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +7 -0
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@#define TDREPORT_SUBTYPE_0 0 +static atomic_long_t nr_shared; +/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */ noinstr void __noreturn __tdx_hypercall_failed(void) {
@@ -821,6 +823,11 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc))return -EIO ; +if (enc) +atomic_long_sub (numpages, &nr_shared); +else +atomic_long_add (numpages, &nr_shared); +return 0 ; }
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCHv9 08/17] x86/tdx: Account shared memory
Quoted 7 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
The kernel will convert all shared memory back to private during kexec. The direct mapping page tables will provide information on which memory is shared.
It is extremely important to convert all shared memory. If a page is missed, it will cause the second kernel to crash when it accesses it.
Quoted 6 lines
Keep track of the number of shared pages. This will allow for cross-checking against the shared information in the direct mapping and reporting if the shared bit is lost.
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>---
Looks good to me.
Quoted 28 lines
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +7
-0@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@#define TDREPORT_SUBTYPE_0 0 +static atomic_long_t nr_shared; +/* Called from __tdx_hypercall() for unrecoverable failure */ noinstr void __noreturn __tdx_hypercall_failed(void) {@@ -821,6 +823,11 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed (vaddr, numpages, enc))return -EIO ; +if (enc) +atomic_long_sub (numpages, &nr_shared); +else +atomic_long_add (numpages, &nr_shared); +return 0 ; }
Signature · 2 lines
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Linux Kernel Developer
Re: [PATCHv9 08/17] x86/tdx: Account shared memory
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovQuoted 7 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
The kernel will convert all shared memory back to private during kexec. The direct mapping page tables will provide information on which memory is shared.
It is extremely important to convert all shared memory. If a page is missed, it will cause the second kernel to crash when it accesses it.
Quoted 7 lines
Keep track of the number of shared pages. This will allow for cross-checking against the shared information in the direct mapping and reporting if the shared bit is lost.
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>---
PATCH v9 9/17 x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovAMD SEV and Intel TDX guests allocate shared buffers for performing I/O. This is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and then converting them to shared using set_memory_decrypted().
On kexec, the second kernel is unaware of which memory has been converted in this manner. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM. Accessing shared memory as private is fatal.
Therefore, the memory state must be reset to its original state before starting the new kernel with kexec.
The process of converting shared memory back to private occurs in two steps:
- enc_kexec_stop_conversion() stops new conversions.
- enc_kexec_unshare_mem() unshares all existing shared memory, reverting it back to private.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 6 ++++++ arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++++ 4 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +2 -0
@@ -154,6 +154,8 @@ struct x86_guest {int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc);bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc);bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void ); +void (*enc_kexec_stop_conversion)(bool crash); +void (*enc_kexec_unshare_mem)(void ); };/**
arch/x86/kernel/crash.c +6 -0
@@ -128,6 +128,12 @@ void native_machine_crash_shutdown(struct pt_regs *regs)#ifdef CONFIG_HPET_TIMER hpet_disable ();#endif + +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion (true); + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem (); + } +crash_save_cpu (regs,safe_smp_processor_id ()); }
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c +12 -0
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@#include <linux/delay.h> #include <linux/objtool.h> #include <linux/pgtable.h> +#include <linux/kexec.h> #include <acpi/reboot.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include <asm/apic.h>
@@ -716,6 +717,14 @@ static void native_machine_emergency_restart(void)void native_machine_shutdown (void ) { +/* +* Call enc_kexec_stop_conversion() while all CPUs are still active and +* interrupts are enabled. This will allow all in-flight memory +* conversions to finish cleanly. +*/ +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ) && kexec_in_progress) + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion (false); +/* Stop the cpus and apics */ #ifdef CONFIG_X86_IO_APIC /*
@@ -752,6 +761,9 @@ void native_machine_shutdown(void)#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 x86_platform.iommu_shutdown ();#endif + +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_GUEST_MEM_ENCRYPT ) && kexec_in_progress) + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem (); }static void __machine_emergency_restart (int emergency)
arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +4 -0
@@ -136,6 +136,8 @@ static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, boolstatic int enc_status_change_finish_noop (unsigned long vaddr,int npages,bool enc) {return 0 ; }static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop (bool enc) {return false; }static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop (void ) {return false; } +static void enc_kexec_stop_conversion_noop (bool crash) {} +static void enc_kexec_unshare_mem_noop (void ) {}static bool is_private_mmio_noop (u64 addr) {return false; }struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform__ro_after_init = {
@@ -159,6 +161,8 @@ struct x86_platform_ops x86_platform __ro_after_init = { .enc_status_change_finish = enc_status_change_finish_noop, .enc_tlb_flush_required = enc_tlb_flush_required_noop, .enc_cache_flush_required = enc_cache_flush_required_noop, + .enc_kexec_stop_conversion = enc_kexec_stop_conversion_noop, + .enc_kexec_unshare_mem = enc_kexec_unshare_mem_noop, }, };
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCHv9 09/17] x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec
Quoted 14 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
AMD SEV and Intel TDX guests allocate shared buffers for performing I/O. This is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and then converting them to shared using
set_memory_decrypted().On kexec, the second kernel is unaware of which memory has been converted in this manner. It only sees
E820_TYPE_RAM. Accessing shared memory as private is fatal.Therefore, the memory state must be reset to its original state before starting the new kernel with kexec.
The process of converting shared memory back to private occurs in two steps:
Quoted 8 lines
-
enc_kexec_stop_conversion()stops new conversions.-
enc_kexec_unshare_mem()unshares all existing shared memory, reverting it back to private.Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Nikolay Borisov <[email protected]>x---
PATCH v9 10/17 x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovTDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them to shared with set_memory_decrypted().
The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to unrecoverable TD exit.
On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it normally.
The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may access shared memory.
--- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 +++ arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 35 +++++++++++++-- 4 files changed, 112 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +72 -0
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@#include <linux/cpufeature.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/io.h> +#include <linux/kexec.h> #include <asm/coco.h> #include <asm/tdx.h> #include <asm/vmx.h>
@@ -14,6 +15,7 @@#include <asm/insn.h> #include <asm/insn-eval.h> #include <asm/pgtable.h> +#include <asm/set_memory.h> /* MMIO direction */ #define EPT_READ 0
@@ -831,6 +833,73 @@ static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages,return 0 ; } +/* Stop new private<->shared conversions */ +static void tdx_kexec_stop_conversion (bool crash) +{ +/* +* Crash kernel reaches here with interrupts disabled: can't wait for +* conversions to finish. +* +* If race happened, just report and proceed. +*/ +bool wait_for_lock = !crash; + +if (!stop_memory_enc_conversion (wait_for_lock)) +pr_warn ("Failed to finish shared<->private conversions\n" ); +} + +static void tdx_kexec_unshare_mem (void ) +{ +unsigned long addr, end; +long found =0 , shared; + +/* +* Walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private, +*/ + + addr =PAGE_OFFSET ; + end =PAGE_OFFSET +get_max_mapped (); + +while (addr < end) { +unsigned long size; +unsigned int level; +pte_t *pte; + + pte =lookup_address (addr, &level); + size =page_level_size (level); + +if (pte &&pte_decrypted (*pte)) { +int pages = size /PAGE_SIZE ; + +/* +* Touching memory with shared bit set triggers implicit +* conversion to shared. +* +* Make sure nobody touches the shared range from +* now on. +*/ +set_pte (pte,__pte (0 )); + +if (!tdx_enc_status_changed (addr, pages, true)) { +pr_err ("Failed to unshare range %#lx-%#lx\n" , + addr, addr + size); + } + + found += pages; + } + + addr += size; + } + +__flush_tlb_all (); + + shared =atomic_long_read (&nr_shared); +if (shared != found) { +pr_err ("shared page accounting is off\n" ); +pr_err ("nr_shared = %ld, nr_found = %ld\n" , shared, found); + } +} +void __init tdx_early_init (void ) {struct tdx_module_args args = {
@@ -890,6 +959,9 @@ void __init tdx_early_init(void) x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = tdx_cache_flush_required; x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = tdx_tlb_flush_required; + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion = tdx_kexec_stop_conversion; + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem = tdx_kexec_unshare_mem; +/* * TDX intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the parallel * bringup low level code. That raises #VE which cannot be handled
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h +5 -0
@@ -140,6 +140,11 @@ static inline int pte_young(pte_t pte)return pte_flags (pte) & _PAGE_ACCESSED; } +static inline bool pte_decrypted (pte_t pte) +{ +return cc_mkdec (pte_val (pte)) ==pte_val (pte); +} +#define pmd_dirty pmd_dirtystatic inline bool pmd_dirty (pmd_t pmd) {
arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h +3 -0
@@ -49,8 +49,11 @@ int set_memory_wb(unsigned long addr, int numpages);int set_memory_np (unsigned long addr,int numpages);int set_memory_p (unsigned long addr,int numpages);int set_memory_4k (unsigned long addr,int numpages); + +bool stop_memory_enc_conversion (bool wait);int set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long addr,int numpages);int set_memory_decrypted (unsigned long addr,int numpages); +int set_memory_np_noalias (unsigned long addr,int numpages);int set_memory_nonglobal (unsigned long addr,int numpages);int set_memory_global (unsigned long addr,int numpages);
arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +32 -3
@@ -2188,12 +2188,41 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc)return ret; } +static DECLARE_RWSEM (mem_enc_lock); + +/* +* Stop new private<->shared conversions. +* +* Taking the exclusive mem_enc_lock waits for in-flight conversions to complete. +* The lock is not released to prevent new conversions from being started. +* +* If sleep is not allowed, as in a crash scenario, try to take the lock. +* Failure indicates that there is a race with the conversion. +*/ +bool stop_memory_enc_conversion (bool wait) +{ +if (!wait) +return down_write_trylock (&mem_enc_lock); + +down_write (&mem_enc_lock); + +return true; +} +static int __set_memory_enc_dec (unsigned long addr,int numpages,bool enc) { -if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT )) -return __set_memory_enc_pgtable (addr, numpages, enc); +int ret =0 ; -return 0 ; +if (cc_platform_has (CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT )) { +if (!down_read_trylock (&mem_enc_lock)) +return -EBUSY ; + + ret =__set_memory_enc_pgtable (addr, numpages, enc); + +up_read (&mem_enc_lock); + } + +return ret; }int set_memory_encrypted (unsigned long addr,int numpages)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCHv9 10/17] x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
Quoted 22 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
TDX guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them to shared with
set_memory_decrypted().The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only sees
E820_TYPE_RAM.Accessing shared memory via private mapping is fatal. It leads to unrecoverable TD exit.
On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it normally.
The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may access shared memory.
Quoted 3 lines
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Rick Edgecombe <[email protected]>
PATCH v9 11/17 x86/mm: Make e820_end_ram_pfn() cover E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges
In reply to Kirill A. Shutemove820__end_of_ram_pfn() is used to calculate max_pfn which, among other things, guides where direct mapping ends. Any memory above max_pfn is not going to be present in the direct mapping.
e820__end_of_ram_pfn() finds the end of the ram based on the highest E820_TYPE_RAM range. But it doesn't includes E820_TYPE_ACPI ranges into calculation.
Despite the name, E820_TYPE_ACPI covers not only ACPI data, but also EFI tables and might be required by kernel to function properly.
Usually the problem is hidden because there is some E820_TYPE_RAM memory above E820_TYPE_ACPI. But crashkernel only presents pre-allocated crash memory as E820_TYPE_RAM on boot. If the preallocated range is small, it can fit under the last E820_TYPE_ACPI range.
Modify e820__end_of_ram_pfn() and e820__end_of_low_ram_pfn() to cover E820_TYPE_ACPI memory.
The problem was discovered during debugging kexec for TDX guest. TDX guest uses E820_TYPE_ACPI to store the unaccepted memory bitmap and pass it between the kernels on kexec.
--- arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/e820.c +5 -4
@@ -827,7 +827,7 @@ u64 __init e820__memblock_alloc_reserved(u64 size, u64 align)/* * Find the highest page frame number we have available */ -static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn (unsigned long limit_pfn,enum e820_type type) +static unsigned long __init e820_end_ram_pfn (unsigned long limit_pfn) {int i;unsigned long last_pfn =0 ;
@@ -838,7 +838,8 @@ static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_typeunsigned long start_pfn;unsigned long end_pfn; -if (entry->type != type) +if (entry->type !=E820_TYPE_RAM && + entry->type !=E820_TYPE_ACPI )continue ; start_pfn = entry->addr >>PAGE_SHIFT ;
@@ -864,12 +865,12 @@ static unsigned long __init e820_end_pfn(unsigned long limit_pfn, enum e820_typeunsigned long __init e820__end_of_ram_pfn (void ) { -return e820_end_pfn (MAX_ARCH_PFN ,E820_TYPE_RAM ); +return e820_end_ram_pfn (MAX_ARCH_PFN ); }unsigned long __init e820__end_of_low_ram_pfn (void ) { -return e820_end_pfn (1UL << (32 -PAGE_SHIFT ),E820_TYPE_RAM ); +return e820_end_ram_pfn (1UL << (32 -PAGE_SHIFT )); }static void __init early_panic (char *msg)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 12/17 x86/acpi: Rename fields in acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup structure
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovTo prepare for the addition of support for MADT wakeup structure version 1, it is necessary to provide more appropriate names for the fields in the structure.
The field 'mailbox_version' renamed as 'version'. This field signifies the version of the structure and the related protocols, rather than the version of the mailbox. This field has not been utilized in the code thus far.
The field 'base_address' renamed as 'mailbox_address' to clarify the kind of address it represents. In version 1, the structure includes the reset vector address. Clear and distinct naming helps to prevent any confusion.
--- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 2 +- include/acpi/actbl2.h | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c +1 -1
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header,acpi_table_print_madt_entry (&header->common); - acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->base_address; + acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->mailbox_address;cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining ();
include/acpi/actbl2.h +2 -2
@@ -1117,9 +1117,9 @@ struct acpi_madt_generic_translator {struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup {struct acpi_subtable_header header; -u16 mailbox_version; +u16 version;u32 reserved;/* reserved - must be zero */ -u64 base_address; +u64 mailbox_address; };#define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_OS_SIZE 2032
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 13/17 x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline a CPU after it was onlined. This limits kexec: the second kernel won't be able to use more than one CPU.
To prevent a kexec kernel from onlining secondary CPUs invalidate the mailbox address in the ACPI MADT wakeup structure which prevents a kexec kernel to use it.
This is safe as the booting kernel has the mailbox address cached already and acpi_wakeup_cpu() uses the cached value to bring up the secondary CPUs.
Note: This is a Linux specific convention and not covered by the
ACPI specification.
--- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c +28 -1
@@ -14,6 +14,11 @@ static struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox *acpi_mp_wake_mailbox __ro_aftestatic int acpi_wakeup_cpu (u32 apicid,unsigned long start_ip) { +if (!acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr) { +pr_warn_once ("No MADT mailbox: cannot bringup secondary CPUs. Booting with kexec?\n" ); +return -EOPNOTSUPP ; + } +/* * Remap mailbox memory only for the first call to acpi_wakeup_cpu(). *
@@ -64,6 +69,28 @@ static int acpi_wakeup_cpu(u32 apicid, unsigned long start_ip)return 0 ; } +static void acpi_mp_disable_offlining (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *mp_wake) +{ +cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining (); + +/* +* ACPI MADT doesn't allow to offline a CPU after it was onlined. This +* limits kexec: the second kernel won't be able to use more than one CPU. +* +* To prevent a kexec kernel from onlining secondary CPUs invalidate the +* mailbox address in the ACPI MADT wakeup structure which prevents a +* kexec kernel to use it. +* +* This is safe as the booting kernel has the mailbox address cached +* already and acpi_wakeup_cpu() uses the cached value to bring up the +* secondary CPUs. +* +* Note: This is a Linux specific convention and not covered by the +* ACPI specification. +*/ + mp_wake->mailbox_address =0 ; +} +int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake (union acpi_subtable_headers *header,const unsigned long end) {
@@ -77,7 +104,7 @@ int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake(union acpi_subtable_headers *header, acpi_mp_wake_mailbox_paddr = mp_wake->mailbox_address; -cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining (); +acpi_mp_disable_offlining (mp_wake);apic_update_callback (wakeup_secondary_cpu_64, acpi_wakeup_cpu);
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 14/17 x86/smp: Add smp_ops.stop_this_cpu() callback
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovIf the helper is defined, it is called instead of halt() to stop the CPU at the end of stop_this_cpu() and on crash CPU shutdown.
ACPI MADT will use it to hand over the CPU to BIOS in order to be able to wake it up again after kexec.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 7 +++++++ arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 6 ++++++ 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h +1 -0
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct smp_ops {int (*cpu_disable)(void );void (*cpu_die)(unsigned int cpu);void (*play_dead)(void ); +void (*stop_this_cpu)(void );void (*send_call_func_ipi)(const struct cpumask *mask);void (*send_call_func_single_ipi)(int cpu);
arch/x86/kernel/process.c +7 -0
@@ -835,6 +835,13 @@ void __noreturn stop_this_cpu(void *dummy)*/ cpumask_clear_cpu (cpu, &cpus_stop_mask); +#ifdef CONFIG_SMP +if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) { + smp_ops.stop_this_cpu (); +unreachable (); + } +#endif +for (;;) {/* * Use native_halt() so that memory contents don't change
arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c +6 -0
@@ -880,6 +880,12 @@ static int crash_nmi_callback(unsigned int val, struct pt_regs *regs)cpu_emergency_disable_virtualization ();atomic_dec (&waiting_for_crash_ipi); + +if (smp_ops.stop_this_cpu) { + smp_ops.stop_this_cpu (); +unreachable (); + } +/* Assume hlt works */ halt ();for (;;)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 15/17 x86/mm: Introduce kernel_ident_mapping_free()
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovThe helper complements kernel_ident_mapping_init(): it frees the identity mapping that was previously allocated. It will be used in the error path to free a partially allocated mapping or if the mapping is no longer needed.
The caller provides a struct x86_mapping_info with the free_pgd_page() callback hooked up and the pgd_t to free.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 3 ++ arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/init.h +3 -0
@@ -6,6 +6,7 @@struct x86_mapping_info {void *(*alloc_pgt_page)(void *);/* allocate buf for page table */ +void (*free_pgt_page)(void *,void *);/* free buf for page table */ void *context;/* context for alloc_pgt_page */ unsigned long page_flag;/* page flag for PMD or PUD entry */ unsigned long offset;/* ident mapping offset */
@@ -16,4 +17,6 @@ struct x86_mapping_info {int kernel_ident_mapping_init (struct x86_mapping_info *info,pgd_t *pgd_page,unsigned long pstart,unsigned long pend); +void kernel_ident_mapping_free (struct x86_mapping_info *info,pgd_t *pgd); +#endif /* _ASM_X86_INIT_H */
arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c +73 -0
79 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 16/17 x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovMADT Multiprocessor Wakeup structure version 1 brings support of CPU
offlining: BIOS provides a reset vector where the CPU has to jump to for offlining itself. The new TEST mailbox command can be used to test whether the CPU offlined itself which means the BIOS has control over the CPU and can online it again via the ACPI MADT wakeup method.
Add CPU offling support for the ACPI MADT wakeup method by implementing custom cpu_die(), play_dead() and stop_this_cpu() SMP operations.
CPU offlining makes is possible to hand over secondary CPUs over kexec, not limiting the second kernel to a single CPU.
The change conforms to the approved ACPI spec change proposal. See the Link.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 2 + arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile | 2 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S | 28 ++++ arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 184 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++- include/acpi/actbl2.h | 15 ++- 5 files changed, 227 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) create mode 100644 arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S
arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h +2 -0
@@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ union acpi_subtable_headers;int __init acpi_parse_mp_wake (union acpi_subtable_headers *header,const unsigned long end); +void asm_acpi_mp_play_dead (u64 reset_vector,u64 pgd_pa); +/* * Check if the CPU can handle C2 and deeper */
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) += boot.o obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_SLEEP) += sleep.o wakeup_$(BITS).o obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_APEI) += apei.o obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_CPPC_LIB) += cppc.o -obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP) += madt_wakeup.o +obj-$(CONFIG_X86_ACPI_MADT_WAKEUP) += madt_wakeup.o madt_playdead.o ifneq ($(CONFIG_ACPI_PROCESSOR),) obj-y += cstate.o
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S new file +28 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#include <linux/linkage.h> +#include <asm/nospec-branch.h> +#include <asm/page_types.h> +#include <asm/processor-flags.h> + + .text + .align PAGE_SIZE + +/* + * asm_acpi_mp_play_dead() - Hand over control of the CPU to the BIOS + * + * rdi: Address of the ACPI MADT MPWK ResetVector + * rsi: PGD of the identity mapping + */ +SYM_FUNC_START(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead) + /* Turn off global entries. Following CR3 write will flush them. */ + movq %cr4, %rdx + andq $~(X86_CR4_PGE), %rdx + movq %rdx, %cr4 + + /* Switch to identity mapping */ + movq %rsi, %cr3 + + /* Jump to reset vector */ + ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE + jmp *%rdi +SYM_FUNC_END(asm_acpi_mp_play_dead)
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c +182 -2
212 lines not on this page · raw message
include/acpi/actbl2.h +14 -1
@@ -1120,8 +1120,20 @@ struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup {u16 version;u32 reserved;/* reserved - must be zero */ u64 mailbox_address; +u64 reset_vector; }; +/* Values for Version field above */ + +enum acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_version { +ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_NONE =0 , +ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 =1 , +ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_RESERVED =2 ,/* 2 and greater are reserved */ +}; + +#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V0 16 +#define ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_SIZE_V1 24 +#define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_OS_SIZE 2032#define ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE 2048
@@ -1134,7 +1146,8 @@ struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup_mailbox {u8 reserved_firmware[ACPI_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP_MB_FIRMWARE_SIZE ];/* reserved for firmware use */ }; -#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP 1 +#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_WAKEUP 1 +#define ACPI_MP_WAKE_COMMAND_TEST 2/* 17: CPU Core Interrupt Controller (ACPI 6.5) */
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH v9 17/17 ACPI: tables: Print MULTIPROC_WAKEUP when MADT is parsed
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovWhen MADT is parsed, print MULTIPROC_WAKEUP information:
ACPI: MP Wakeup (version[1], mailbox[0x7fffd000], reset[0x7fffe068])
This debug information will be very helpful during bring up.
--- drivers/acpi/tables.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)
drivers/acpi/tables.c +14 -0
@@ -198,6 +198,20 @@ void acpi_table_print_madt_entry(struct acpi_subtable_header *header) }break ; +case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP : + { +struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *p = + (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header; +u64 reset_vector =0 ; + +if (p->version >=ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 ) + reset_vector = p->reset_vector; + +pr_debug ("MP Wakeup (version[%d], mailbox[%#llx], reset[%#llx])\n" , + p->version, p->mailbox_address, reset_vector); + } +break ; +case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_CORE_PIC : {struct acpi_madt_core_pic *p = (struct acpi_madt_core_pic *)header;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCHv9 17/17] ACPI: tables: Print MULTIPROC_WAKEUP when MADT is parsed
Quoted 8 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
When MADT is parsed, print
MULTIPROC_WAKEUPinformation:ACPI: MP Wakeup (version[1], mailbox[0x7fffd000], reset[0x7fffe068])
This debug information will be very helpful during bring up.
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Baoquan He <[email protected]>
Re: [PATCHv9 17/17] ACPI: tables: Print MULTIPROC_WAKEUP when MADT is parsed
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovQuoted 9 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
When MADT is parsed, print
MULTIPROC_WAKEUPinformation:ACPI: MP Wakeup (version[1], mailbox[0x7fffd000], reset[0x7fffe068])
This debug information will be very helpful during bring up.
Signed-off-by Kirill A. Shutemov <[email protected]>Reviewed-by Baoquan He <[email protected]>---
Looks good to me.
Quoted 28 lines
drivers/acpi/tables.c | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+)drivers/acpi/tables.c +14
-0@@ -198,6 +198,20 @@ void acpi_table_print_madt_entry(struct acpi_subtable_header *header) }break ; +case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_MULTIPROC_WAKEUP : + { +struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *p = + (struct acpi_madt_multiproc_wakeup *)header; +u64 reset_vector =0 ; + +if (p->version >=ACPI_MADT_MP_WAKEUP_VERSION_V1 ) + reset_vector = p->reset_vector; + +pr_debug ("MP Wakeup (version[%d], mailbox[%#llx], reset[%#llx])\n" , + p->version, p->mailbox_address, reset_vector); + } +break ; +case ACPI_MADT_TYPE_CORE_PIC : {struct acpi_madt_core_pic *p = (struct acpi_madt_core_pic *)header;
Signature · 2 lines
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Linux Kernel Developer
Hi Kirill,
Quoted 125 lines · Kirill A. Shutemov
The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on TDX guest.
The last patch implements CPU offlining according to the approved ACPI spec change poposal[1]. It unlocks kexec with all CPUs visible in the target kernel. It requires BIOS-side enabling. If it missing we fallback to booting 2nd kernel with single CPU.
Please review. I would be glad for any feedback.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/13356251.uLZWGnKmhe@kreacher
v9:
- Rebased;
- Keep page tables that mapsE820_TYPE_ACPI(Ashish);
- Ack/Reviewed/Tested-bys from Sathya, Kai, Tao;
- Minorprintk()message adjustments;
v8:
- Rework serialization of around conversion memory back to private;ACPI_MADT_TYPE_MULTIPROC_WAKEUPinacpi_table_print_madt_entry();
- Drop debugfs interface to dump info on shared memory;
- Adjust comments and commit messages;
- Reviewed-bys by Baoquan, Dave and Thomas;
v7:
- Callenc_kexec_stop_conversion()andenc_kexec_unshare_mem()after shutting down IO-APIC, lapic and hpet. It meets AMD requirements.
- Minor style changes;
- Add Acked/Reviewed-bys;
v6:
- Rebased to v6.8-rc1;
- Provide default noop callbacks from .enc_kexec_stop_conversion and.enc_kexec_unshare_mem; - Split off patch that introduces .enc_kexec_* callbacks; - asm_acpi_mp_play_dead(): program CR3 directly from RSI, no MOV to RAX required;- Restructure how
smp_ops.stop_this_cpu()hooked up incrash_nmi_callback();
- kvmclock patch got merged via KVM tree;
v5:
- Rename smp_ops.crash_play_dead to smp_ops.stop_this_cpu and use it instop_this_cpu();- Split off
enc_kexec_stop_conversion()fromenc_kexec_unshare_mem();
- Introducekernel_ident_mapping_free();
- Add explicit include for alternatives and stringify.
- Addbarrier()after settingconversion_allowedto false;
- Markcpu_hotplug_offline_disabled__ro_after_init;
- Print error if failed to hand over CPU to BIOS;
- Update comments and commit messages;
v4:
- Fix build for !KEXEC_CORE;
- Cleaner ATLERNATIVE use;
- Update commit messages and comments;
- Add Reviewed-bys;
v3:
- Reworkacpi_mp_crash_stop_other_cpus()to avoid invoking hotplug statemachine;- Free page tables if reset vector setup failed;
- Changeasm_acpi_mp_play_dead()to pass reset vector and PGD as arguments;
- Mark acpi_mp_* variables as static and__ro_after_init;
- Use u32 for apicid;
- Disable CPU offlining if reset vector setup failed;
- Renamemadt.S->madt_playdead.S;
- Marktdx_kexec_unshare_mem()as static;
- Rebase onto up-to-date tip/master;
- Whitespace fixes;
- Reorder patches;
- Add Reviewed-bys;
- Update comments and commit messages;
v2:
- Rework how unsharing hook ups into kexec codepath;
- Reworkkvmclock_disable()fix based on Sean's;
- s/cpu_hotplug_not_supported()/cpu_hotplug_disable_offlining()/;
- useplay_dead_common()to implementacpi_mp_play_dead();
-cond_resched()intdx_shared_memory_show();
- s/target kernel/secondkernel/;
- Update commit messages and comments;Kirill A. Shutemov (17):
x86/acpi: Extract ACPI MADT wakeup code into a separate file x86/apic: Mark acpi_mp_wake_* variables as__ro_after_initcpu/hotplug: Add support for declaring CPU offlining not supported cpu/hotplug, x86/acpi: Disable CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup x86/kexec: Keep CR4.MCE set during kexec for TDX guest x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno x86/mm: Return correct level fromlookup_address()if pte is none x86/tdx: Account shared memory
x86/mm: Adding callbacks to prepare encrypted memory for kexec x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec x86/mm: Makee820_end_ram_pfn()coverE820_TYPE_ACPIranges x86/acpi: Rename fields inacpi_madt_multiproc_wakeupstructure x86/acpi: Do not attempt to bring up secondary CPUs in kexec case x86/smp: Addsmp_ops.stop_this_cpu()callback
x86/mm: Introducekernel_ident_mapping_free()
x86/acpi: Add support for CPU offlining for ACPI MADT wakeup method
ACPI: tables: PrintMULTIPROC_WAKEUPwhen MADT is parsedarch/x86/Kconfig | 7 + arch/x86/coco/core.c | 1 - arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 99 ++++++++- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 9 +- arch/x86/include/asm/acpi.h | 7 + arch/x86/include/asm/init.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 5 + arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_types.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/set_memory.h | 3 + arch/x86/include/asm/smp.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 6 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/Makefile | 11 +- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/boot.c | 86 +------- arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.S | 28 +++ arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c | 292 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kernel/crash.c | 6 + arch/x86/kernel/e820.c | 9 +- arch/x86/kernel/process.c | 7 + arch/x86/kernel/reboot.c | 18 ++ arch/x86/kernel/relocate_kernel_64.S | 5 + arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/ident_map.c | 73 +++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 8 +- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 59 ++++-- drivers/acpi/tables.c | 14 ++ include/acpi/actbl2.h | 19 +- include/linux/cc_platform.h | 10 - include/linux/cpu.h | 2 + kernel/cpu.c | 12 +- 29 files changed, 663 insertions(+), 146 deletions(-)
Quoted 2 lines
create mode 100644
arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_playdead.Screate mode 100644arch/x86/kernel/acpi/madt_wakeup.c
The cover letter mention the inclusion of the following patch - Keep page tables that maps E820_TYPE_ACPI (Ashish)
But i don't this patch included in your patch-set.
Thanks, Ashish
Quoted 4 lines · Ashish
The cover letter mention the inclusion of the following patch - Keep page tables that maps
E820_TYPE_ACPI(Ashish)But i don't this patch included in your patch-set.
Ouch. My bad. Will fix in v10.
Signature · 1 line
Kiryl Shutsemau / Kirill A. Shutemov
v3 cover x86/snp: Add kexec support
In reply to Kirill A. ShutemovFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
The patchset adds bits and pieces to get kexec (and crashkernel) work on SNP guest.
v3:
- Rebased;
- moved Keep page tables that maps E820_TYPE_ACPI patch to Kirill's tdx guest kexec patch series.
- checking the md attribute instead of checking the efi_setup for detecting if running under kexec kernel.
- added new sev_es_enabled() function.
- skip video memory access in decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP systems to prevent guest termination as boot stage2 #VC handler does not handle MMIO.
v2:
- address zeroing of unaccepted memory table mappings at all page table levels adding phys_pte_init(), phys_pud_init() and phys_p4d_init().
- include skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() in case of kexec as part of this patch set.
- rename last_address_shd_kexec to a more appropriate kexec_last_address_to_make_private.
- remove duplicate code shared with TDX and use common interfaces defined for SNP and TDX for kexec/kdump.
- remove set_pte_enc() dependency on pg_level_to_pfn() and make the function simpler.
- rename unshare_pte() to make_pte_private().
- clarify and make the comment for using kexec_last_address_to_make_private more understandable.
- general cleanup.
Ashish Kalra (4):
efi/x86: skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() in case of kexec. x86/sev: add sev_es_enabled() function. x86/boot/compressed: Skip Video Memory access in Decompressor for
SEV-ES/SNP.
x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 6 +- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 5 + arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.h | 2 + arch/x86/include/asm/probe_roms.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c | 16 +++ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 3 + arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 23 +++- 10 files changed, 225 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH v3 1/4 efi/x86: skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() in case of kexec.
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
For kexec use case, need to use and stick to the EFI memmap passed from the first kernel via boot-params/setup data, hence, skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() during kexec.
Additionally during SNP guest kexec testing discovered that EFI memmap is corrupted during chained kexec. kexec_enter_virtual_mode() during late init will remap the efi_memmap physical pages allocated in efi_arch_mem_reserve() via memblock & then subsequently cause random EFI memmap corruption once memblock is freed/teared-down.
--- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c +20 -3
@@ -255,15 +255,32 @@ void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size)struct efi_memory_map_data data = {0 };struct efi_mem_range mr;efi_memory_desc_t md; -int num_entries; +int num_entries, ret;void *new; -if (efi_mem_desc_lookup (addr, &md) || - md.type !=EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA ) { +/* +* For kexec use case, we need to use the EFI memmap passed from the first +* kernel via setup data, so we need to skip this. +* Additionally kexec_enter_virtual_mode() during late init will remap +* the efi_memmap physical pages allocated here via memboot & then +* subsequently cause random EFI memmap corruption once memblock is freed. +*/ + + ret =efi_mem_desc_lookup (addr, &md); +if (ret) {pr_err ("Failed to lookup EFI memory descriptor for %pa\n" , &addr);return ; } +if (md.type !=EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA ) { +pr_err ("Skip reserving non EFI Boot Service Data memory for %pa\n" , &addr); +return ; + } + +/* Kexec copied the efi memmap from the first kernel, thus skip the case */ +if (md.attribute &EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ) +return ; +if (addr + size > md.phys_addr + (md.num_pages <<EFI_PAGE_SHIFT )) {pr_err ("Region spans EFI memory descriptors, %pa\n" , &addr);return ;
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 1/4] efi/x86: skip efi_arch_mem_reserve() in case of kexec.
Quoted 32 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
For kexec use case, need to use and stick to the EFI memmap passed from the first kernel via boot-params/setup data, hence, skip
efi_arch_mem_reserve()during kexec.Additionally during SNP guest kexec testing discovered that EFI memmap is corrupted during chained kexec.
kexec_enter_virtual_mode()during late init will remap theefi_memmapphysical pages allocated inefi_arch_mem_reserve()via memblock & then subsequently cause random EFI memmap corruption once memblock is freed/teared-down.Suggested-by Dave Young <[email protected]>[Dave Young: checking the md attribute instead of checking the efi_setup]Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c | 23 ++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c +1
-2@@ -255,15 +255,32 @@ void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size)struct efi_memory_map_data data = {0 };struct efi_mem_range mr;efi_memory_desc_t md; -int num_entries; +int num_entries, ret;void *new; - if (efi_mem_desc_lookup(addr, &md) ||
arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c void __init efi_arch_mem_reserve(phys_addr_t addr, u64 size) · line 269
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c +9
-1- md.type != EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA) { +/* +* For kexec use case, we need to use the EFI memmap passed from the first +* kernel via setup data, so we need to skip this. +* Additionally kexec_enter_virtual_mode() during late init will remap +* the efi_memmap physical pages allocated here via memboot & then +* subsequently cause random EFI memmap corruption once memblock is freed. +*/ + + ret =efi_mem_desc_lookup (addr, &md);
Since you are not using ret, why not directly use if (efi_mem_desc_lookup(..))?
Quoted 17 lines
arch/x86/platform/efi/quirks.c +10
-0+if (ret) {pr_err ("Failed to lookup EFI memory descriptor for %pa\n" , &addr);return ; } +if (md.type !=EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DATA ) { +pr_err ("Skip reserving non EFI Boot Service Data memory for %pa\n" , &addr); +return ; + } + +/* Kexec copied the efi memmap from the first kernel, thus skip the case */ +if (md.attribute &EFI_MEMORY_RUNTIME ) +return ; +if (addr + size > md.phys_addr + (md.num_pages <<EFI_PAGE_SHIFT )) {pr_err ("Region spans EFI memory descriptors, %pa\n" , &addr);return ;
Signature · 2 lines
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Linux Kernel Developer
PATCH v3 2/4 x86/sev: add sev_es_enabled() function.
In reply to Ashish KalraFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Add sev_es_enabled() function to detect if SEV-ES
support is enabled.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +5 -0
@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ bool sev_snp_enabled(void)return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ; } +bool sev_es_enabled (void ) +{ +return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED ; +} +static void __page_state_change (unsigned long paddr,enum psc_op op) {u64 val;
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.h +2 -0
@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT bool sev_snp_enabled (void ); +bool sev_es_enabled (void );void snp_accept_memory (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end);#else static inline bool sev_snp_enabled (void ) {return false; } +static inline bool sev_es_enabled (void ) {return false; }static inline void snp_accept_memory (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end) { }#endif
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 2/4] x86/sev: add sev_es_enabled() function.
Quoted 7 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Add
sev_es_enabled()function to detect if SEV-ES
support is enabled.Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>---
Looks good to me.
Quoted 38 lines
arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c | 5 +++++ arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.h | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+)arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c +5
-0@@ -134,6 +134,11 @@ bool sev_snp_enabled(void)return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_SNP_ENABLED ; } +bool sev_es_enabled (void ) +{ +return sev_status &MSR_AMD64_SEV_ES_ENABLED ; +} +static void __page_state_change (unsigned long paddr,enum psc_op op) {u64 val;arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.h +2
-0@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@#ifdef CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT bool sev_snp_enabled (void ); +bool sev_es_enabled (void );void snp_accept_memory (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end);#else static inline bool sev_snp_enabled (void ) {return false; } +static inline bool sev_es_enabled (void ) {return false; }static inline void snp_accept_memory (phys_addr_t start,phys_addr_t end) { }#endif
Signature · 2 lines
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Linux Kernel Developer
PATCH v3 3/4 x86/boot/compressed: Skip Video Memory access in Decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP.
In reply to Ashish KalraFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Accessing guest video memory/RAM during kernel decompressor causes guest termination as boot stage2 #VC handler for SEV-ES/SNP systems does not support MMIO handling.
This issue is observed with SEV-ES/SNP guest kexec as kexec -c adds screen_info to the boot parameters passed to the kexec kernel, which causes console output to be dumped to both video and serial.
As the decompressor output gets cleared really fast, it is preferable to get the console output only on serial, hence, skip accessing video RAM during decompressor stage to prevent guest termination.
Serial console output during decompressor stage works as boot stage2 #VC handler already supports handling port I/O.
--- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +4 -2
@@ -427,8 +427,10 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output) vidport =0x3d4 ; } - lines = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_lines; - cols = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_cols; +if (!sev_es_enabled ()) { + lines = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_lines; + cols = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_cols; + }init_default_io_ops ();
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +1 -0
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@#include <asm/desc_defs.h> #include "tdx.h" +#include "sev.h" #define BOOT_CTYPE_H #include <linux/acpi.h>
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] x86/boot/compressed: Skip Video Memory access in Decompressor for SEV-ES/SNP.
Quoted 16 lines · Ashish Kalra
From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
Accessing guest video memory/RAM during kernel decompressor causes guest termination as boot stage2 #VC handler for SEV-ES/SNP systems does not support MMIO handling.
This issue is observed with SEV-ES/SNP guest kexec as kexec -c adds
screen_infoto the boot parameters passed to the kexec kernel, which causes console output to be dumped to both video and serial.As the decompressor output gets cleared really fast, it is preferable to get the console output only on serial, hence, skip accessing video RAM during decompressor stage to prevent guest termination.
Quoted 6 lines
Serial console output during decompressor stage works as boot stage2 #VC handler already supports handling port I/O.
Suggested-by Thomas Lendacy <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>---
Looks good to me.
Quoted 33 lines
arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c | 6 ++++-- arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h | 1 + 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.c +4
-2@@ -427,8 +427,10 @@ asmlinkage __visible void *extract_kernel(void *rmode, unsigned char *output) vidport =0x3d4 ; } - lines = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_lines; - cols = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_cols; +if (!sev_es_enabled ()) { + lines = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_lines; + cols = boot_params_ptr->screen_info.orig_video_cols; + }init_default_io_ops ();arch/x86/boot/compressed/misc.h +1
-0@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@#include <asm/desc_defs.h> #include "tdx.h" +#include "sev.h" #define BOOT_CTYPE_H #include <linux/acpi.h>
Signature · 2 lines
Sathyanarayanan Kuppuswamy Linux Kernel Developer
PATCH v3 4/4 x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
In reply to Ashish KalraFrom: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
SNP guests allocate shared buffers to perform I/O. It is done by allocating pages normally from the buddy allocator and converting them to shared with set_memory_decrypted().
The second kernel has no idea what memory is converted this way. It only sees E820_TYPE_RAM.
Accessing shared memory via private mapping will cause unrecoverable RMP page-faults.
On kexec walk direct mapping and convert all shared memory back to private. It makes all RAM private again and second kernel may use it normally. Additionally for SNP guests convert all bss decrypted section pages back to private and switch back ROM regions to shared so that their revalidation does not fail during kexec kernel boot.
The conversion occurs in two steps: stopping new conversions and unsharing all memory. In the case of normal kexec, the stopping of conversions takes place while scheduling is still functioning. This allows for waiting until any ongoing conversions are finished. The second step is carried out when all CPUs except one are inactive and interrupts are disabled. This prevents any conflicts with code that may access shared memory.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/probe_roms.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h | 4 + arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c | 16 +++ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c | 169 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 3 + 5 files changed, 193 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/probe_roms.h +1 -0
@@ -6,4 +6,5 @@ struct pci_dev;extern void __iomem *pci_map_biosrom (struct pci_dev *pdev);extern void pci_unmap_biosrom (void __iomem *rom);extern size_t pci_biosrom_size (struct pci_dev *pdev); +extern void snp_kexec_unprep_rom_memory (void );#endif
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +4 -0
@@ -230,6 +230,8 @@ u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status);u64 sev_get_status (void );void kdump_sev_callback (void );void sev_show_status (void ); +void snp_kexec_unshare_mem (void ); +void snp_kexec_stop_conversion (bool crash);#else static inline void sev_es_ist_enter (struct pt_regs *regs) { }static inline void sev_es_ist_exit (void ) { }
@@ -260,6 +262,8 @@ static inline u64 snp_get_unsupported_features(u64 status) { return 0; }static inline u64 sev_get_status (void ) {return 0 ; }static inline void kdump_sev_callback (void ) { }static inline void sev_show_status (void ) { } +void snp_kexec_unshare_mem (void ) {} +static void snp_kexec_stop_conversion (bool crash) {}#endif #ifdef CONFIG_KVM_AMD_SEV
arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.c +16 -0
@@ -177,6 +177,22 @@ size_t pci_biosrom_size(struct pci_dev *pdev) }EXPORT_SYMBOL (pci_biosrom_size); +void snp_kexec_unprep_rom_memory (void ) +{ +unsigned long vaddr, npages, sz; + +/* +* Switch back ROM regions to shared so that their validation +* does not fail during kexec kernel boot. +*/ + vaddr = (unsigned long )__va (video_rom_resource.start); + sz = (system_rom_resource.end +1 ) - video_rom_resource.start; + npages =PAGE_ALIGN (sz) >>PAGE_SHIFT ; + +snp_set_memory_shared (vaddr, npages); +} +EXPORT_SYMBOL (snp_kexec_unprep_rom_memory); +#define ROMSIGNATURE 0xaa55static int __init romsignature (const unsigned char *rom)
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c +169 -0
187 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +3 -0
@@ -468,6 +468,9 @@ void __init sme_early_init(void) x86_platform.guest.enc_tlb_flush_required = amd_enc_tlb_flush_required; x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required = amd_enc_cache_flush_required; + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_stop_conversion = snp_kexec_stop_conversion; + x86_platform.guest.enc_kexec_unshare_mem = snp_kexec_unshare_mem; +/* * AMD-SEV-ES intercepts the RDMSR to read the X2APIC ID in the * parallel bringup low level code. That raises #VC which cannot be
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
Hi Ashish,
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on efi/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v6.9-rc2 next-20240405] [cannot apply to tip/x86/core tip/master tip/x86/mm tip/auto-latest] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Ashish-Kalra/efi-x86-skip-efi_arch_mem_reserve-in-case-of-kexec/20240405-071346 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git next patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/41db1ebbe58fb082dbe848f1c666ed23e83f1752.1712270976.git.ashish.kalra%40amd.com patch subject: [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec config: x86_64-allnoconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/config) compiler: clang version 17.0.6 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 6009708b4367171ccdbf4b5905cb6a803753fe18) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
>> ld.lld: error: duplicate symbol: snp_kexec_unshare_mem >>> defined at init.c >>> arch/x86/realmode/init.o:(snp_kexec_unshare_mem) in archive vmlinux.a >>> defined at extable.c >>> arch/x86/mm/extable.o:(.text+0x0) in archive vmlinux.a -- >> ld.lld: error: duplicate symbol: snp_kexec_unshare_mem >>> defined at init.c >>> arch/x86/realmode/init.o:(snp_kexec_unshare_mem) in archive vmlinux.a >>> defined at fault.c >>> arch/x86/mm/fault.o:(.text+0x0) in archive vmlinux.a -- >> ld.lld: error: duplicate symbol: snp_kexec_unshare_mem >>> defined at init.c >>> arch/x86/realmode/init.o:(snp_kexec_unshare_mem) in archive vmlinux.a >>> defined at amd.c >>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.o:(.text+0x0) in archive vmlinux.a -- >> ld.lld: error: duplicate symbol: snp_kexec_unshare_mem >>> defined at init.c >>> arch/x86/realmode/init.o:(snp_kexec_unshare_mem) in archive vmlinux.a >>> defined at common.c >>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.o:(.text+0x0) in archive vmlinux.a -- >> ld.lld: error: duplicate symbol: snp_kexec_unshare_mem >>> defined at init.c >>> arch/x86/realmode/init.o:(snp_kexec_unshare_mem) in archive vmlinux.a >>> defined at probe_roms.c >>> arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.o:(.text+0x0) in archive vmlinux.a -- >> ld.lld: error: duplicate symbol: snp_kexec_unshare_mem >>> defined at init.c >>> arch/x86/realmode/init.o:(snp_kexec_unshare_mem) in archive vmlinux.a >>> defined at nmi.c >>> arch/x86/kernel/nmi.o:(.text+0x0) in archive vmlinux.a -- >> ld.lld: error: duplicate symbol: snp_kexec_unshare_mem >>> defined at init.c >>> arch/x86/realmode/init.o:(snp_kexec_unshare_mem) in archive vmlinux.a >>> defined at head64.c >>> arch/x86/kernel/head64.o:(.text+0x0) in archive vmlinux.a
Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
In reply to Ashish Kalrakernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
Hi Ashish,
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on efi/next]
[also build test ERROR on linus/master v6.9-rc2 next-20240405] [cannot apply to tip/x86/core tip/master tip/x86/mm tip/auto-latest] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Ashish-Kalra/efi-x86-skip-efi_arch_mem_reserve-in-case-of-kexec/20240405-071346 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git next patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/41db1ebbe58fb082dbe848f1c666ed23e83f1752.1712270976.git.ashish.kalra%40amd.com patch subject: [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec config: x86_64-defconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/config) compiler: gcc-13 (Ubuntu 13.2.0-4ubuntu3) 13.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All error/warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
ld: arch/x86/kernel/head64.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
>> head64.c:(.text+0x110): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/kernel/nmi.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
nmi.c:(.text+0x820): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/kernel/probe_roms.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
probe_roms.c:(.text+0x370): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
common.c:(.text+0x530): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
amd.c:(.text+0x12b0): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/kernel/smpboot.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
smpboot.c:(.text+0xfa0): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/kernel/crash.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
crash.c:(.text+0xa0): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/mm/fault.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
fault.c:(.text+0x1ce0): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/mm/extable.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
extable.c:(.text+0x330): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: arch/x86/platform/efi/efi_64.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
efi_64.c:(.text+0x160): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
ld: drivers/iommu/amd/init.o: in function `snp_kexec_unshare_mem':
init.c:(.text+0x15e0): multiple definition of `snp_kexec_unshare_mem'; arch/x86/realmode/init.o:init.c:(.text+0x10): first defined here
--
In file included from arch/x86/realmode/init.c:12:
>> arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h:265:6: warning: no previous prototype for 'snp_kexec_unshare_mem' [-Wmissing-prototypes]
265 | void snp_kexec_unshare_mem(void) {}
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>> arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h:266:13: warning: 'snp_kexec_stop_conversion' defined but not used [-Wunused-function]
266 | static void snp_kexec_stop_conversion(bool crash) {}
| ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
kernel test robot
build botRe: [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec
In reply to Ashish Kalrakernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
Hi Ashish,
kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:
[auto build test WARNING on efi/next]
[also build test WARNING on linus/master v6.9-rc2 next-20240405] [cannot apply to tip/x86/core tip/master tip/x86/mm tip/auto-latest] [If your patch is applied to the wrong git tree, kindly drop us a note. And when submitting patch, we suggest to use '--base' as documented in
https://git-scm.com/docs/git-format-patch#_base_tree_information]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Ashish-Kalra/efi-x86-skip-efi_arch_mem_reserve-in-case-of-kexec/20240405-071346 base: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/efi/efi.git next patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/41db1ebbe58fb082dbe848f1c666ed23e83f1752.1712270976.git.ashish.kalra%40amd.com patch subject: [PATCH v3 4/4] x86/snp: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec config: x86_64-rhel-8.3-rust (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/config) compiler: clang version 17.0.6 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 6009708b4367171ccdbf4b5905cb6a803753fe18) reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20240405/[email protected]/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <[email protected]>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/[email protected]/
All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c:1006:14: error: call to undeclared function 'pte_decrypted'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
1006 | if (pte && pte_decrypted(*pte) && !pte_none(*pte)) {
| ^
arch/x86/kernel/sev.c:1035:16: error: call to undeclared function 'pte_decrypted'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
1035 | if (!pte || !pte_decrypted(*pte) || pte_none(*pte))
| ^
>> arch/x86/kernel/sev.c:1025:16: warning: variable 'size' set but not used [-Wunused-but-set-variable]
1025 | unsigned long size;
| ^ arch/x86/kernel/sev.c:1056:7: error: call to undeclared function 'stop_memory_enc_conversion'; ISO C99 and later do not support implicit function declarations [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
1056 | if (!stop_memory_enc_conversion(wait_for_lock))
| ^
1 warning and 3 errors generated.
vim +/size +1025 arch/x86/kernel/sev.c
1021
1022 static void unshare_all_bss_decrypted_memory(void)
1023 {
1024 unsigned long vaddr, vaddr_end;
> 1025 unsigned long size;
1026 unsigned int level;
1027 unsigned int npages;
1028 pte_t *pte;
1029
1030 vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
1031 vaddr_end = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted_unused;
1032 npages = (vaddr_end - vaddr) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
1033 for (; vaddr < vaddr_end; vaddr += PAGE_SIZE) {
1034 pte = lookup_address(vaddr, &level);
1035 if (!pte || !pte_decrypted(*pte) || pte_none(*pte))
1036 continue;
1037
1038 size = page_level_size(level);
1039 set_pte_enc(pte, level, (void *)vaddr);
1040 }
1041 vaddr = (unsigned long)__start_bss_decrypted;
1042 snp_set_memory_private(vaddr, npages);
1043 }
1044
Signature · 2 lines
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki