Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for kirkstone and have comments back by end of day Friday, August 2
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/typhoon/#/builders/83/builds/7193
The following changes since commit f6de96c9fa8d0b6c81c32016f342ad93c8940d9e:
uboot-sign: Fix index error in concat_dtb_helper() with multiple configs (2024-07-19 05:44:22 -0700)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/kirkstone-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/kirkstone-nut
Deepthi Hemraj (2):
llvm: Fix CVE-2023-46049
llvm: Fix CVE-2024-31852
Peter Marko (2):
wpa-supplicant: Patch CVE-2023-52160
gcc-runtime: remove bashism
Wang Mingyu (1):
wireless-regdb: upgrade 2024.01.23 -> 2024.05.08
...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ++++++++++++++++++
.../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb | 1 +
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-runtime.inc | 2 +-
.../llvm/llvm/CVE-2023-46049.patch | 34 +++
.../llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-1.patch | 85 +++++++
.../llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-2.patch | 117 ++++++++++
meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm_git.bb | 3 +
....01.23.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.05.08.bb} | 2 +-
8 files changed, 455 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2023-46049.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-1.patch
create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-2.patch
rename meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/{wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.05.08.bb} (94%)Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 1/5 wpa-supplicant: Patch CVE-2023-52160
From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements. Also see
https://www.top10vpn.com/research/wifi-vulnerabilities/
Patch is copied from scarthgap, the recipes differ too much for cherry-pick even if they have the same version.
--- ...te-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch | 213 ++++++++++++++++++ .../wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 214 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant/0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch new file +213 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +From f6f7cead3661ceeef54b21f7e799c0afc98537ec Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2023 19:55:32 +0300 +Subject: [PATCH] PEAP client: Update Phase 2 authentication requirements + +The previous PEAP client behavior allowed the server to skip Phase 2 +authentication with the expectation that the server was authenticated +during Phase 1 through TLS server certificate validation. Various PEAP +specifications are not exactly clear on what the behavior on this front +is supposed to be and as such, this ended up being more flexible than +the TTLS/FAST/TEAP cases. However, this is not really ideal when +unfortunately common misconfiguration of PEAP is used in deployed +devices where the server trust root (ca_cert) is not configured or the +user has an easy option for allowing this validation step to be skipped. + +Change the default PEAP client behavior to be to require Phase 2 +authentication to be successfully completed for cases where TLS session +resumption is not used and the client certificate has not been +configured. Those two exceptions are the main cases where a deployed +authentication server might skip Phase 2 and as such, where a more +strict default behavior could result in undesired interoperability +issues. Requiring Phase 2 authentication will end up disabling TLS +session resumption automatically to avoid interoperability issues. + +Allow Phase 2 authentication behavior to be configured with a new phase1 +configuration parameter option: +'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS +tunnel) behavior for PEAP: + * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication + * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate + (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was + not used (default) + * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + +Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2023-52160 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://w1.fi/cgit/hostap/commit/?id=8e6485a1bcb0baffdea9e55255a81270b768439c] + +Signed-off-by: Claus Stovgaard <[email protected]> +Signed-off-by: Peter Marko <[email protected]> +--- + src/eap_peer/eap_config.h | 8 ++++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c | 40 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c | 6 +++++ + src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h | 5 ++++ + wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf | 7 ++++++ + 5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +index 3238f74..047eec2 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_config.h +@@ -469,6 +469,14 @@ struct eap_peer_config { + * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + * 2 = require cryptobinding + * ++ * phase2_auth option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++ * tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++ * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++ * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++ * (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++ * not used (default) ++ * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases ++ * + * EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=Device_Password and + * uuid=Device_UUID + * +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +index 12e30df..6080697 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_peap.c +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ struct eap_peap_data { + u8 cmk[20]; + int soh; /* Whether IF-TNCCS-SOH (Statement of Health; Microsoft NAP) + * is enabled. */ ++ enum { NO_AUTH, FOR_INITIAL, ALWAYS } phase2_auth; + }; + + +@@ -114,6 +115,19 @@ static void eap_peap_parse_phase1(struct eap_peap_data *data, + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Require cryptobinding"); + } + ++ if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=0")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = NO_AUTH; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Do not require Phase 2 authentication"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=1")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for initial connection"); ++ } else if (os_strstr(phase1, "phase2_auth=2")) { ++ data->phase2_auth = ALWAYS; ++ wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Require Phase 2 authentication for all cases"); ++ } + #ifdef EAP_TNC + if (os_strstr(phase1, "tnc=soh2")) { + data->soh = 2; +@@ -142,6 +156,7 @@ static void * eap_peap_init(struct eap_sm *sm) + data->force_peap_version = -1; + data->peap_outer_success = 2; + data->crypto_binding = OPTIONAL_BINDING; ++ data->phase2_auth = FOR_INITIAL; + + if (config && config->phase1) + eap_peap_parse_phase1(data, config->phase1); +@@ -454,6 +469,20 @@ static int eap_tlv_validate_cryptobinding(struct eap_sm *sm, + } + + ++static bool peap_phase2_sufficient(struct eap_sm *sm, ++ struct eap_peap_data *data) ++{ ++ if ((data->phase2_auth == ALWAYS || ++ (data->phase2_auth == FOR_INITIAL && ++ !tls_connection_resumed(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && ++ !data->ssl.client_cert_conf) || ++ data->phase2_eap_started) && ++ !data->phase2_eap_success) ++ return false; ++ return true; ++} ++ ++ + /** + * eap_tlv_process - Process a received EAP-TLV message and generate a response + * @sm: Pointer to EAP state machine allocated with eap_peer_sm_init() +@@ -568,6 +597,11 @@ static int eap_tlv_process(struct eap_sm *sm, struct eap_peap_data *data, + " - force failed Phase 2"); + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; + ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; ++ } else if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { ++ wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, ++ "EAP-PEAP: Server indicated Phase 2 success, but sufficient Phase 2 authentication has not been completed"); ++ resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_FAILURE; ++ ret->decision = DECISION_FAIL; + } else { + resp_status = EAP_TLV_RESULT_SUCCESS; + ret->decision = DECISION_UNCOND_SUCC; +@@ -887,8 +921,7 @@ continue_req: + /* EAP-Success within TLS tunnel is used to indicate + * shutdown of the TLS channel. The authentication has + * been completed. */ +- if (data->phase2_eap_started && +- !data->phase2_eap_success) { ++ if (!peap_phase2_sufficient(sm, data)) { + wpa_printf(MSG_DEBUG, "EAP-PEAP: Phase 2 " + "Success used to indicate success, " + "but Phase 2 EAP was not yet " +@@ -1199,8 +1232,9 @@ static struct wpabuf * eap_peap_process(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv, + static bool eap_peap_has_reauth_data(struct eap_sm *sm, void *priv) + { + struct eap_peap_data *data = priv; ++ + return tls_connection_established(sm->ssl_ctx, data->ssl.conn) && +- data->phase2_success; ++ data->phase2_success && data->phase2_auth != ALWAYS; + } + + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +index c1837db..a53eeb1 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.c +@@ -239,6 +239,12 @@ static int eap_tls_params_from_conf(struct eap_sm *sm, + + sm->ext_cert_check = !!(params->flags & TLS_CONN_EXT_CERT_CHECK); + ++ if (!phase2) ++ data->client_cert_conf = params->client_cert || ++ params->client_cert_blob || ++ params->private_key || ++ params->private_key_blob; ++ + return 0; + } + +diff --git a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +index 9ac0012..3348634 100644 +--- a/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h ++++ b/src/eap_peer/eap_tls_common.h +@@ -79,6 +79,11 @@ struct eap_ssl_data { + * tls_v13 - Whether TLS v1.3 or newer is used + */ + int tls_v13; ++ ++ /** ++ * client_cert_conf: Whether client certificate has been configured ++ */ ++ bool client_cert_conf; + }; + + +diff --git a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +index 6619d6b..d63f73c 100644 +--- a/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf ++++ b/wpa_supplicant/wpa_supplicant.conf +@@ -1321,6 +1321,13 @@ fast_reauth=1 + # * 0 = do not use cryptobinding (default) + # * 1 = use cryptobinding if server supports it + # * 2 = require cryptobinding ++# 'phase2_auth' option can be used to control Phase 2 (i.e., within TLS ++# tunnel) behavior for PEAP: ++# * 0 = do not require Phase 2 authentication ++# * 1 = require Phase 2 authentication when client certificate ++# (private_key/client_cert) is no used and TLS session resumption was ++# not used (default) ++# * 2 = require Phase 2 authentication in all cases + # EAP-WSC (WPS) uses following options: pin=<Device Password> or + # pbc=1. + #
meta/recipes-connectivity/wpa-supplicant/wpa-supplicant_2.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://w1.fi/releases/wpa_supplicant-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf \ file://wpa_supplicant.conf-sane \ file://99_wpa_supplicant \ + file://0001-PEAP-client-Update-Phase-2-authentication-requiremen.patch \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "20df7ae5154b3830355f8ab4269123a87affdea59fe74fe9292a91d0d7e17b2f"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 2/5 llvm: Fix CVE-2023-46049
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]>
[Bitcode] Add some missing GetTypeByID failure checks
Print an error instead of crashing.
--- .../llvm/llvm/CVE-2023-46049.patch | 34 +++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm_git.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 35 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2023-46049.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2023-46049.patch new file +34 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +commit c2515a8f2be5dd23354c9891f41ad104000f88c4 +Author: Nikita Popov <[email protected]> +Date: Tue Sep 26 16:51:40 2023 +0200 + + [Bitcode] Add some missing GetTypeByID failure checks + + Print an error instead of crashing. + + Fixes https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/issues/67388. + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/c2515a8f2be5dd23354c9891f41ad104000f88c4] +CVE: CVE-2023-46049 +Signed-off-by: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]> + +--- a/llvm/lib/Bitcode/Reader/MetadataLoader.cpp 2022-01-20 13:31:59.000000000 -0800 ++++ b/llvm/lib/Bitcode/Reader/MetadataLoader.cpp 2024-07-28 21:35:31.062992219 -0700 +@@ -1235,7 +1235,7 @@ + } + + Type *Ty = getTypeByID(Record[0]); +- if (Ty->isMetadataTy() || Ty->isVoidTy()) { ++ if (!Ty || Ty->isMetadataTy() || Ty->isVoidTy()) { + dropRecord(); + break; + } +@@ -1277,7 +1277,7 @@ + return error("Invalid record"); + + Type *Ty = getTypeByID(Record[0]); +- if (Ty->isMetadataTy() || Ty->isVoidTy()) ++ if (!Ty || Ty->isMetadataTy() || Ty->isVoidTy()) + return error("Invalid record"); + + MetadataList.assignValue(
meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm_git.bb +1 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/llvm/llvm-project.git;branch=${BRANCH};protocol=http file://0007-llvm-allow-env-override-of-exe-path.patch;striplevel=2 \ file://0001-AsmMatcherEmitter-sort-ClassInfo-lists-by-name-as-we.patch;striplevel=2 \ file://0001-Support-Add-missing-cstdint-header-to-Signals.h.patch;striplevel=2 \ + file://CVE-2023-46049.patch;striplevel=2 \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "llvmorg-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 3/5 llvm: Fix CVE-2024-31852
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]>
--- .../llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-1.patch | 85 +++++++++++++ .../llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-2.patch | 117 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm_git.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 204 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-2.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-1.patch new file +85 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +commit b1a5ee1febd8a903cec3dfdad61d57900dc3823e +Author: Florian Hahn <[email protected]> +Date: Wed Dec 20 16:56:15 2023 +0100 + + [ARM] Check all terms in emitPopInst when clearing Restored for LR. (#75527) + + emitPopInst checks a single function exit MBB. If other paths also exit + the function and any of there terminators uses LR implicitly, it is not + save to clear the Restored bit. + + Check all terminators for the function before clearing Restored. + + This fixes a mis-compile in outlined-fn-may-clobber-lr-in-caller.ll + where the machine-outliner previously introduced BLs that clobbered LR + which in turn is used by the tail call return. + + Alternative to #73553 + +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project/commit/b1a5ee1febd8a903cec3dfdad61d57900dc3823e] +CVE: CVE-2024-31852 +Signed-off-by: Deepthi Hemraj <[email protected]> +--- +diff --git a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp +index 025e43444f9c..a9acf338ebf5 100644 +--- a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp ++++ b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.cpp +@@ -1236,9 +1236,6 @@ void ARMFrameLowering::emitPopInst(MachineBasicBlock &MBB, + // Fold the return instruction into the LDM. + DeleteRet = true; + LdmOpc = AFI->isThumbFunction() ? ARM::t2LDMIA_RET : ARM::LDMIA_RET; +- // We 'restore' LR into PC so it is not live out of the return block: +- // Clear Restored bit. +- Info.setRestored(false); + } + + // If NoGap is true, pop consecutive registers and then leave the rest +@@ -2292,6 +2289,33 @@ void ARMFrameLowering::determineCalleeSaves(MachineFunction &MF, + AFI->setLRIsSpilled(SavedRegs.test(ARM::LR)); + } + ++void ARMFrameLowering::processFunctionBeforeFrameFinalized( ++ MachineFunction &MF, RegScavenger *RS) const { ++ TargetFrameLowering::processFunctionBeforeFrameFinalized(MF, RS); ++ ++ MachineFrameInfo &MFI = MF.getFrameInfo(); ++ if (!MFI.isCalleeSavedInfoValid()) ++ return; ++ ++ // Check if all terminators do not implicitly use LR. Then we can 'restore' LR ++ // into PC so it is not live out of the return block: Clear the Restored bit ++ // in that case. ++ for (CalleeSavedInfo &Info : MFI.getCalleeSavedInfo()) { ++ if (Info.getReg() != ARM::LR) ++ continue; ++ if (all_of(MF, [](const MachineBasicBlock &MBB) { ++ return all_of(MBB.terminators(), [](const MachineInstr &Term) { ++ return !Term.isReturn() || Term.getOpcode() == ARM::LDMIA_RET || ++ Term.getOpcode() == ARM::t2LDMIA_RET || ++ Term.getOpcode() == ARM::tPOP_RET; ++ }); ++ })) { ++ Info.setRestored(false); ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++} ++ + void ARMFrameLowering::getCalleeSaves(const MachineFunction &MF, + BitVector &SavedRegs) const { + TargetFrameLowering::getCalleeSaves(MF, SavedRegs); +diff --git a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h +index 9822e2321bb4..266d642bb97b 100644 +--- a/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h ++++ b/llvm/lib/Target/ARM/ARMFrameLowering.h +@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ public: + void determineCalleeSaves(MachineFunction &MF, BitVector &SavedRegs, + RegScavenger *RS) const override; + ++ void processFunctionBeforeFrameFinalized( ++ MachineFunction &MF, RegScavenger *RS = nullptr) const override; ++ + void adjustForSegmentedStacks(MachineFunction &MF, + MachineBasicBlock &MBB) const override; + +
meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm/CVE-2024-31852-2.patch new file +117 -0
117 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-devtools/llvm/llvm_git.bb +2 -0
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/llvm/llvm-project.git;branch=${BRANCH};protocol=http file://0001-AsmMatcherEmitter-sort-ClassInfo-lists-by-name-as-we.patch;striplevel=2 \ file://0001-Support-Add-missing-cstdint-header-to-Signals.h.patch;striplevel=2 \ file://CVE-2023-46049.patch;striplevel=2 \ + file://CVE-2024-31852-1.patch;striplevel=2 \ + file://CVE-2024-31852-2.patch;striplevel=2 \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_GITTAGREGEX = "llvmorg-(?P<pver>\d+(\.\d+)+)"
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 4/5 wireless-regdb: upgrade 2024.01.23 -> 2024.05.08
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Wang Mingyu <[email protected]>
---
...ireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.05.08.bb} | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
rename meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/{wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb => wireless-regdb_2024.05.08.bb} (94%)meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2024.05.08.bb renamed from meta/recipes-kernel/wireless-regdb/wireless-regdb_2024.01.23.bb +1 -1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ LICENSE = "ISC" LIC_FILES_CHKSUM = "file://LICENSE;md5=07c4f6dea3845b02a18dc00c8c87699c" SRC_URI = "https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/network/${BPN}/${BP}.tar.xz" -SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "c8a61c9acf76fa7eb4239e89f640dee3e87098d9f69b4d3518c9c60fc6d20c55" +SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "9aee1d86ebebb363b714bec941b2820f31e3b7f1a485ddc9fcbd9985c7d3e7c4" inherit bin_package allarch
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
PATCH 5/5 gcc-runtime: remove bashism
In reply to Steve SakomanFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
Debian 12 no longer supports replacing dash with bash as default shell. Therefore to achieve compatibility with Debian 12, all bashisms need to be removed.
Shell comparison via == gives an error with dash and thus the condition is always false.
(From OE-Core rev: 3723b26f82219ff71823335d550dbf29086d63d4)
--- meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-runtime.inc | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-devtools/gcc/gcc-runtime.inc +1 -1
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ do_install:append:class-target () { ln -s ../${TARGET_SYS}/ext ${D}${includedir}/c++/${BINV}/${TARGET_ARCH}${TARGET_VENDOR_MULTILIB_ORIGINAL}-${TARGET_OS}/ext fi - if [ "${TARGET_ARCH}" == "x86_64" -a "${MULTILIB_VARIANTS}" != "" ];then + if [ "${TARGET_ARCH}" = "x86_64" -a "${MULTILIB_VARIANTS}" != "" ];then ln -sf ../${X86ARCH32}${TARGET_VENDOR}-${TARGET_OS} ${D}${includedir}/c++/${BINV}/${TARGET_ARCH}${TARGET_VENDOR}-${TARGET_OS}/32 fi
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1