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PATCH New Steve Sakoman 1 participant 9 messages Jan 23, 2025

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Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Friday, January 24

Passed a-full on autobuilder:

https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/869

The following changes since commit 660e00469f9c99fe733cc8b37f67438a96ff2e97:

libgfortran: fix buildpath QA issue (2025-01-21 12:33:25 -0800)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut

Archana Polampalli (6):
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12084
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12085
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12086
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12087
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12088
rsync: fix CVE-2024-12747

Harish Sadineni (1):
rust-target-config: Fix TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH with correct size

Jiaying Song (1):
boost: fix do_fetch error

 .../classes-recipe/rust-target-config.bbclass |  10 +-
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch     | 156 ++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch     |  43 ++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch          |  32 +++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch     |  42 ++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch     | 108 ++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch     | 108 ++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch     |  41 ++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch     |  49 +++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch     |  31 +++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch     |  40 ++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch          | 141 +++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch          | 192 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |  12 ++
 meta/recipes-support/boost/boost-1.84.0.inc   |   2 +-
 15 files changed, 1001 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/8 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12084

From: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>

A heap-based buffer overflow flaw was found in the rsync daemon. This issue is due to improper handling of attacker-controlled checksum lengths (s2length) in the code. When MAX_DIGEST_LEN exceeds the fixed SUM_LENGTH (16 bytes), an attacker can write out of bounds in the sum2 buffer.

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch     | 156 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch     |  43 +++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |   2 +
 3 files changed, 201 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch new file +156 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d654067fab
@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+From 0902b52f6687b1f7952422080d50b93108742e53 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wayne Davison <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 29 Oct 2024 22:55:29 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] Some checksum buffer fixes.
+
+- Put sum2_array into sum_struct to hold an array of sum2 checksums
+  that are each xfer_sum_len bytes.
+- Remove sum2 buf from sum_buf.
+- Add macro sum2_at() to access each sum2 array element.
+- Throw an error if a sums header has an s2length larger than
+  xfer_sum_len.
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-12084
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=0902b52f6687b1f7952422080d50b93108742e53]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ io.c     | 3 ++-
+ match.c  | 8 ++++----
+ rsync.c  | 5 ++++-
+ rsync.h  | 4 +++-
+ sender.c | 4 +++-
+ 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/io.c b/io.c
+index a99ac0ec..bb60eeca 100644
+--- a/io.c
++++ b/io.c
+@@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ extern int read_batch;
+ extern int compat_flags;
+ extern int protect_args;
+ extern int checksum_seed;
++extern int xfer_sum_len;
+ extern int daemon_connection;
+ extern int protocol_version;
+ extern int remove_source_files;
+@@ -1977,7 +1978,7 @@ void read_sum_head(int f, struct sum_struct *sum)
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+	}
+	sum->s2length = protocol_version < 27 ? csum_length : (int)read_int(f);
+-	if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > MAX_DIGEST_LEN) {
++	if (sum->s2length < 0 || sum->s2length > xfer_sum_len) {
+		rprintf(FERROR, "Invalid checksum length %d [%s]\n",
+			sum->s2length, who_am_i());
+		exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+diff --git a/match.c b/match.c
+index cdb30a15..36e78ed2 100644
+--- a/match.c
++++ b/match.c
+@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
+				done_csum2 = 1;
+			}
+
+-			if (memcmp(sum2,s->sums[i].sum2,s->s2length) != 0) {
++			if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0) {
+				false_alarms++;
+				continue;
+			}
+@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
+					if (i != aligned_i) {
+						if (sum != s->sums[aligned_i].sum1
+						 || l != s->sums[aligned_i].len
+-						 || memcmp(sum2, s->sums[aligned_i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
++						 || memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, aligned_i), s->s2length) != 0)
+							goto check_want_i;
+						i = aligned_i;
+					}
+@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
+						if (sum != s->sums[i].sum1)
+							goto check_want_i;
+						get_checksum2((char *)map, l, sum2);
+-						if (memcmp(sum2, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length) != 0)
++						if (memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length) != 0)
+							goto check_want_i;
+						/* OK, we have a re-alignment match.  Bump the offset
+						 * forward to the new match point. */
+@@ -290,7 +290,7 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
+			 && (!updating_basis_file || s->sums[want_i].offset >= offset
+			  || s->sums[want_i].flags & SUMFLG_SAME_OFFSET)
+			 && sum == s->sums[want_i].sum1
+-			 && memcmp(sum2, s->sums[want_i].sum2, s->s2length) == 0) {
++			 && memcmp(sum2, sum2_at(s, want_i), s->s2length) == 0) {
+				/* we've found an adjacent match - the RLL coder
+				 * will be happy */
+				i = want_i;
+diff --git a/rsync.c b/rsync.c
+index cd288f57..b130aba5 100644
+--- a/rsync.c
++++ b/rsync.c
+@@ -437,7 +437,10 @@ int read_ndx_and_attrs(int f_in, int f_out, int *iflag_ptr, uchar *type_ptr, cha
+   */
+ void free_sums(struct sum_struct *s)
+ {
+-	if (s->sums) free(s->sums);
++	if (s->sums) {
++		free(s->sums);
++		free(s->sum2_array);
++	}
+	free(s);
+ }
+
+diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h
+index d3709fe0..8ddbe702 100644
+--- a/rsync.h
++++ b/rsync.h
+@@ -958,12 +958,12 @@ struct sum_buf {
+	uint32 sum1;	        /**< simple checksum */
+	int32 chain;		/**< next hash-table collision */
+	short flags;		/**< flag bits */
+-	char sum2[SUM_LENGTH];	/**< checksum  */
+ };
+
+ struct sum_struct {
+	OFF_T flength;		/**< total file length */
+	struct sum_buf *sums;	/**< points to info for each chunk */
++	char *sum2_array;	/**< checksums of length xfer_sum_len */
+	int32 count;		/**< how many chunks */
+	int32 blength;		/**< block_length */
+	int32 remainder;	/**< flength % block_length */
+@@ -982,6 +982,8 @@ struct map_struct {
+	int status;		/* first errno from read errors		*/
+ };
+
++#define sum2_at(s, i)	((s)->sum2_array + ((OFF_T)(i) * xfer_sum_len))
++
+ #define NAME_IS_FILE		(0)    /* filter name as a file */
+ #define NAME_IS_DIR		(1<<0) /* filter name as a dir */
+ #define NAME_IS_XATTR		(1<<2) /* filter name as an xattr */
+diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
+index 3d4f052e..ab205341 100644
+--- a/sender.c
++++ b/sender.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ extern int log_before_transfer;
+ extern int stdout_format_has_i;
+ extern int logfile_format_has_i;
+ extern int want_xattr_optim;
++extern int xfer_sum_len;
+ extern int csum_length;
+ extern int append_mode;
+ extern int copy_links;
+@@ -94,10 +95,11 @@ static struct sum_struct *receive_sums(int f)
+		return(s);
+
+	s->sums = new_array(struct sum_buf, s->count);
++	s->sum2_array = new_array(char, s->count * xfer_sum_len);
+
+	for (i = 0; i < s->count; i++) {
+		s->sums[i].sum1 = read_int(f);
+-		read_buf(f, s->sums[i].sum2, s->s2length);
++		read_buf(f, sum2_at(s, i), s->s2length);
+
+		s->sums[i].offset = offset;
+		s->sums[i].flags = 0;
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch new file +43 -0

43 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +2 -0
index 130581a785..2f3ea61978 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://makefile-no-rebuild.patch \
            file://determism.patch \
            file://0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12085

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>

A flaw was found in the rsync daemon which could be triggered when rsync compares file checksums. This flaw allows an attacker to manipulate the checksum length (s2length) to cause a comparison between a checksum and uninitialized memory and leak one byte of uninitialized stack data at a time.

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch          | 32 +++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |  1 +
 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12085.patch new file +32 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..165d5a62f9
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 589b0691e59f761ccb05ddb8e1124991440db2c7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 09:57:08 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] prevent information leak off the stack
+
+prevent leak of uninitialised stack data in hash_search
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-12085
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=589b0691e59f761ccb05ddb8e1124991440db2c7]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ match.c | 3 +++
+ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/match.c b/match.c
+index 36e78ed2..dfd6af2c 100644
+--- a/match.c
++++ b/match.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,9 @@ static void hash_search(int f,struct sum_struct *s,
+	int more;
+	schar *map;
+
++	// prevent possible memory leaks
++	memset(sum2, 0, sizeof sum2);
++
+	/* want_i is used to encourage adjacent matches, allowing the RLL
+	 * coding of the output to work more efficiently. */
+	want_i = 0;
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +1 -0
index 2f3ea61978..0d9c68a915 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://0001-Add-missing-prototypes-to-function-declarations.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12085.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/8 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12086

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>

A flaw was found in rsync. It could allow a server to enumerate the contents of an arbitrary file from the client's machine. This issue occurs when files are being copied from a client to a server. During this process, the rsync server will send checksums of local data to the client to compare with in order to determine what data needs to be sent to the server. By sending specially constructed checksum values for arbitrary files, an attacker may be able to reconstruct the data of those files byte-by-byte based on the responses from the client.

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch     |  42 +++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch     | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch     | 108 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch     |  41 +++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |   4 +
 5 files changed, 303 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch new file +42 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..958a25a37b
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+From 8ad4b5d912fad1df29717dddaa775724da77d299 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 11:08:03 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] refuse fuzzy options when fuzzy not selected
+
+this prevents a malicious server providing a file to compare to when
+the user has not given the fuzzy option
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-12086
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=8ad4b5d912fad1df29717dddaa775724da77d299]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ receiver.c | 5 +++++
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index 6b4b369e..2d7f6033 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ extern char sender_file_sum[MAX_DIGEST_LEN];
+ extern struct file_list *cur_flist, *first_flist, *dir_flist;
+ extern filter_rule_list daemon_filter_list;
+ extern OFF_T preallocated_len;
++extern int fuzzy_basis;
+
+ extern struct name_num_item *xfer_sum_nni;
+ extern int xfer_sum_len;
+@@ -716,6 +717,10 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+				fnamecmp = get_backup_name(fname);
+				break;
+			case FNAMECMP_FUZZY:
++				if (fuzzy_basis == 0) {
++					rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious fuzzy operation for %s\n", xname);
++					exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++				}
+				if (file->dirname) {
+					pathjoin(fnamecmpbuf, sizeof fnamecmpbuf, file->dirname, xname);
+					fnamecmp = fnamecmpbuf;
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch new file +108 -0

108 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch new file +108 -0

108 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +4 -0
index 0d9c68a915..0bde73aad2 100644
@@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2024-12084-0001.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12084-0002.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12085.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12086-0001.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/8 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12087

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>

A path traversal vulnerability exists in rsync. It stems from behavior enabled by the --inc-recursive option, a default-enabled option for many client options and can be enabled by the server even if not explicitly enabled by the client. When using the --inc-recursive option, a lack of proper symlink verification coupled with deduplication checks occurring on a per-file-list basis could allow a server to write files outside of the client's intended destination directory. A malicious server could write malicious files to arbitrary locations named after valid directories/paths on the client.

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch     | 49 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch     | 31 ++++++++++++
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch     | 40 +++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |  3 ++
 4 files changed, 123 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch new file +49 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..67abc64a62
@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+From 688f5c379a433038bde36897a156d589be373a98 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Wayne Davison <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 14 Nov 2024 15:46:50 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] Refuse a duplicate dirlist.
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-12087
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=688f5c379a433038bde36897a156d589be373a98]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ flist.c | 9 +++++++++
+ rsync.h | 1 +
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
+index 464d556e..847b1054 100644
+--- a/flist.c
++++ b/flist.c
+@@ -2584,6 +2584,15 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx)
+		init_hard_links();
+ #endif
+
++	if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) {
++		struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx];
++		if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) {
++			rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx);
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++		}
++		file->flags |= FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST;
++	}
++
+	flist = flist_new(0, "recv_file_list");
+	flist_expand(flist, FLIST_START_LARGE);
+
+diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h
+index 0f9e277f..b9a7101a 100644
+--- a/rsync.h
++++ b/rsync.h
+@@ -84,6 +84,7 @@
+ #define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4)	/* sender */
+ #define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4)	/* generator */
+ #define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5)	/* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */
++#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
+ #define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6)	/* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */
+ #define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6)	/* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */
+ #define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7)	/* receiver/generator */
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch new file +31 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8a22e0c371
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 344327385fa47fa5bb67a32c237735e6240cfb93 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 26 Nov 2024 16:12:45 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] range check dir_ndx before use
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-12087
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=344327385fa47fa5bb67a32c237735e6240cfb93]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ flist.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
+index 847b1054..087f9da6 100644
+--- a/flist.c
++++ b/flist.c
+@@ -2585,6 +2585,10 @@ struct file_list *recv_file_list(int f, int dir_ndx)
+ #endif
+
+	if (inc_recurse && dir_ndx >= 0) {
++		if (dir_ndx >= dir_flist->used) {
++			rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing invalid dir_ndx %u >= %u\n", dir_ndx, dir_flist->used);
++			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
++		}
+		struct file_struct *file = dir_flist->files[dir_ndx];
+		if (file->flags & FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST) {
+			rprintf(FERROR_XFER, "rsync: refusing malicious duplicate flist for dir %d\n", dir_ndx);
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch new file +40 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0ece69c4e7
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+From 996af4a79f9afe4d7158ecdd87c78cee382c6b39 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Natanael Copa <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 15 Jan 2025 15:10:24 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST collission with FLAG_HLINKED
+
+fixes commit 688f5c379a43 (Refuse a duplicate dirlist.)
+
+Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/702
+Fixes: https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/issues/697
+CVE: CVE-2024-12087
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/RsyncProject/rsync/commit/996af4a79f9afe4d7158ecdd87c78cee382c6b39]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ rsync.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/rsync.h b/rsync.h
+index 9be1297b..479ac484 100644
+--- a/rsync.h
++++ b/rsync.h
+@@ -84,7 +84,6 @@
+ #define FLAG_DUPLICATE (1<<4)	/* sender */
+ #define FLAG_MISSING_DIR (1<<4)	/* generator */
+ #define FLAG_HLINKED (1<<5)	/* receiver/generator (checked on all types) */
+-#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<5)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
+ #define FLAG_HLINK_FIRST (1<<6)	/* receiver/generator (w/FLAG_HLINKED) */
+ #define FLAG_IMPLIED_DIR (1<<6)	/* sender/receiver/generator (dirs only) */
+ #define FLAG_HLINK_LAST (1<<7)	/* receiver/generator */
+@@ -93,6 +92,7 @@
+ #define FLAG_SKIP_GROUP (1<<10)	/* receiver/generator */
+ #define FLAG_TIME_FAILED (1<<11)/* generator */
+ #define FLAG_MOD_NSEC (1<<12)	/* sender/receiver/generator */
++#define FLAG_GOT_DIR_FLIST (1<<13)/* sender/receiver/generator - dir_flist only */
+
+ /* These flags are passed to functions but not stored. */
+
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +3 -0
index 0bde73aad2..d6942dc595 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2024-12086-0002.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12086-0003.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12086-0004.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/8 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12088

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>

A flaw was found in rsync. When using the --safe-links option, rsync fails to properly verify if a symbolic link destination contains another symbolic link within it. This results in a path traversal vulnerability, which may lead to arbitrary file write outside the desired directory.

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch          | 141 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 142 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12088.patch new file +141 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b2a3a86e1a
@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
+From 407c71c7ce562137230e8ba19149c81ccc47c387 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 23 Nov 2024 15:15:53 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] make --safe-links stricter
+
+when --safe-links is used also reject links where a '../' component is
+included in the destination as other than the leading part of the
+filename
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-12088
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=407c71c7ce562137230e8ba19149c81ccc47c387]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ testsuite/safe-links.test    | 55 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ testsuite/unsafe-byname.test |  2 +-
+ util1.c                      | 26 ++++++++++++++++-
+ 3 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 testsuite/safe-links.test
+
+diff --git a/testsuite/safe-links.test b/testsuite/safe-links.test
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..6e95a4b9
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/testsuite/safe-links.test
+@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
++#!/bin/sh
++
++. "$suitedir/rsync.fns"
++
++test_symlink() {
++	is_a_link "$1" || test_fail "File $1 is not a symlink"
++}
++
++test_regular() {
++	if [ ! -f "$1" ]; then
++		test_fail "File $1 is not regular file or not exists"
++	fi
++}
++
++test_notexist() {
++        if [ -e "$1" ]; then
++                test_fail "File $1 exists"
++	fi
++        if [ -h "$1" ]; then
++                test_fail "File $1 exists as a symlink"
++	fi
++}
++
++cd "$tmpdir"
++
++mkdir from
++
++mkdir "from/safe"
++mkdir "from/unsafe"
++
++mkdir "from/safe/files"
++mkdir "from/safe/links"
++
++touch "from/safe/files/file1"
++touch "from/safe/files/file2"
++touch "from/unsafe/unsafefile"
++
++ln -s ../files/file1 "from/safe/links/"
++ln -s ../files/file2 "from/safe/links/"
++ln -s ../../unsafe/unsafefile "from/safe/links/"
++ln -s a/a/a/../../../unsafe2 "from/safe/links/"
++
++#echo "LISTING FROM"
++#ls -lR from
++
++echo "rsync with relative path and just -a"
++$RSYNC -avv --safe-links from/safe/ to
++
++#echo "LISTING TO"
++#ls -lR to
++
++test_symlink to/links/file1
++test_symlink to/links/file2
++test_notexist to/links/unsafefile
++test_notexist to/links/unsafe2
+diff --git a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
+index 75e72014..d2e318ef 100644
+--- a/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
++++ b/testsuite/unsafe-byname.test
+@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ test_unsafe ..//../dest 		from/dir			unsafe
+ test_unsafe ..				from/file			safe
+ test_unsafe ../..			from/file			unsafe
+ test_unsafe ..//..			from//file			unsafe
+-test_unsafe dir/..			from				safe
++test_unsafe dir/..			from				unsafe
+ test_unsafe dir/../..			from				unsafe
+ test_unsafe dir/..//..			from				unsafe
+
+diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c
+index da50ff1e..f260d398 100644
+--- a/util1.c
++++ b/util1.c
+@@ -1318,7 +1318,14 @@ int handle_partial_dir(const char *fname, int create)
+  *
+  * "src" is the top source directory currently applicable at the level
+  * of the referenced symlink.  This is usually the symlink's full path
+- * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer. */
++ * (including its name), as referenced from the root of the transfer.
++ *
++ * NOTE: this also rejects dest names with a .. component in other
++ * than the first component of the name ie. it rejects names such as
++ * a/b/../x/y. This needs to be done as the leading subpaths 'a' or
++ * 'b' could later be replaced with symlinks such as a link to '.'
++ * resulting in the link being transferred now becoming unsafe
++ */
+ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
+ {
+	const char *name, *slash;
+@@ -1328,6 +1335,23 @@ int unsafe_symlink(const char *dest, const char *src)
+	if (!dest || !*dest || *dest == '/')
+		return 1;
+
++	// reject destinations with /../ in the name other than at the start of the name
++	const char *dest2 = dest;
++	while (strncmp(dest2, "../", 3) == 0) {
++	    dest2 += 3;
++	    while (*dest2 == '/') {
++		// allow for ..//..///../foo
++		dest2++;
++	    }
++	}
++	if (strstr(dest2, "/../"))
++	    return 1;
++
++	// reject if the destination ends in /..
++	const size_t dlen = strlen(dest);
++	if (dlen > 3 && strcmp(&dest[dlen-3], "/..") == 0)
++	    return 1;
++
+	/* find out what our safety margin is */
+	for (name = src; (slash = strchr(name, '/')) != 0; name = slash+1) {
+		/* ".." segment starts the count over.  "." segment is ignored. */
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +1 -0
index d6942dc595..169650fe91 100644
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2024-12087-0001.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12088.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/8 rsync: fix CVE-2024-12747

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>

A flaw was found in rsync. This vulnerability arises from a race condition during rsync's handling of symbolic links. Rsync's default behavior when encountering symbolic links is to skip them. If an attacker replaced a regular file with a symbolic link at the right time, it was possible to bypass the default behavior and traverse symbolic links. Depending on the privileges of the rsync process, an attacker could leak sensitive information, potentially leading to privilege escalation.

---
 .../rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch          | 192 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb    |   1 +
 2 files changed, 193 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/files/CVE-2024-12747.patch new file +192 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..b1dd0a03b9
@@ -0,0 +1,192 @@
+From 0590b09d9a34ae72741b91ec0708a820650198b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Andrew Tridgell <[email protected]>
+Date: Wed, 18 Dec 2024 08:59:42 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH] fixed symlink race condition in sender
+
+when we open a file that we don't expect to be a symlink use
+O_NOFOLLOW to prevent a race condition where an attacker could change
+a file between being a normal file and a symlink
+
+CVE: CVE-2024-12747
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://git.samba.org/?p=rsync.git;a=commit;h=0590b09d9a34ae72741b91ec0708a820650198b0]
+
+Signed-off-by: Archana Polampalli <[email protected]>
+---
+ checksum.c  |  2 +-
+ flist.c     |  2 +-
+ generator.c |  4 ++--
+ receiver.c  |  2 +-
+ sender.c    |  2 +-
+ syscall.c   | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
+ t_unsafe.c  |  3 +++
+ tls.c       |  3 +++
+ trimslash.c |  2 ++
+ util1.c     |  2 +-
+ 10 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/checksum.c b/checksum.c
+index cb21882c..66e80896 100644
+--- a/checksum.c
++++ b/checksum.c
+@@ -406,7 +406,7 @@ void file_checksum(const char *fname, const STRUCT_STAT *st_p, char *sum)
+	int32 remainder;
+	int fd;
+
+-	fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++	fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		memset(sum, 0, file_sum_len);
+		return;
+diff --git a/flist.c b/flist.c
+index 087f9da6..17832533 100644
+--- a/flist.c
++++ b/flist.c
+@@ -1390,7 +1390,7 @@ struct file_struct *make_file(const char *fname, struct file_list *flist,
+
+	if (copy_devices && am_sender && IS_DEVICE(st.st_mode)) {
+		if (st.st_size == 0) {
+-			int fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++			int fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+			if (fd >= 0) {
+				st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fname);
+				close(fd);
+diff --git a/generator.c b/generator.c
+index 110db28f..3f13bb95 100644
+--- a/generator.c
++++ b/generator.c
+@@ -1798,7 +1798,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
+
+	if (write_devices && IS_DEVICE(sx.st.st_mode) && sx.st.st_size == 0) {
+		/* This early open into fd skips the regular open below. */
+-		if ((fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) >= 0)
++		if ((fd = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY)) >= 0)
+			real_sx.st.st_size = sx.st.st_size = get_device_size(fd, fnamecmp);
+	}
+
+@@ -1867,7 +1867,7 @@ static void recv_generator(char *fname, struct file_struct *file, int ndx,
+	}
+
+	/* open the file */
+-	if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
++	if (fd < 0 && (fd = do_open_checklinks(fnamecmp)) < 0) {
+		rsyserr(FERROR, errno, "failed to open %s, continuing",
+			full_fname(fnamecmp));
+	  pretend_missing:
+diff --git a/receiver.c b/receiver.c
+index 8031b8f4..edfbb210 100644
+--- a/receiver.c
++++ b/receiver.c
+@@ -775,7 +775,7 @@ int recv_files(int f_in, int f_out, char *local_name)
+			if (fnamecmp != fname) {
+				fnamecmp = fname;
+				fnamecmp_type = FNAMECMP_FNAME;
+-				fd1 = do_open(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY, 0);
++				fd1 = do_open_nofollow(fnamecmp, O_RDONLY);
+			}
+
+			if (fd1 == -1 && basis_dir[0]) {
+diff --git a/sender.c b/sender.c
+index 2bbff2fa..a4d46c39 100644
+--- a/sender.c
++++ b/sender.c
+@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ void send_files(int f_in, int f_out)
+			exit_cleanup(RERR_PROTOCOL);
+		}
+
+-		fd = do_open(fname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++		fd = do_open_checklinks(fname);
+		if (fd == -1) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT) {
+				enum logcode c = am_daemon && protocol_version < 28 ? FERROR : FWARNING;
+diff --git a/syscall.c b/syscall.c
+index 081357bb..8cea2900 100644
+--- a/syscall.c
++++ b/syscall.c
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ extern int preallocate_files;
+ extern int preserve_perms;
+ extern int preserve_executability;
+ extern int open_noatime;
++extern int copy_links;
++extern int copy_unsafe_links;
+
+ #ifndef S_BLKSIZE
+ # if defined hpux || defined __hpux__ || defined __hpux
+@@ -788,3 +790,21 @@ cleanup:
+	return retfd;
+ #endif // O_NOFOLLOW, O_DIRECTORY
+ }
++
++/*
++  varient of do_open/do_open_nofollow which does do_open() if the
++  copy_links or copy_unsafe_links options are set and does
++  do_open_nofollow() otherwise
++
++  This is used to prevent a race condition where an attacker could be
++  switching a file between being a symlink and being a normal file
++
++  The open is always done with O_RDONLY flags
++ */
++int do_open_checklinks(const char *pathname)
++{
++	if (copy_links || copy_unsafe_links) {
++		return do_open(pathname, O_RDONLY, 0);
++	}
++	return do_open_nofollow(pathname, O_RDONLY);
++}
+diff --git a/t_unsafe.c b/t_unsafe.c
+index 010cac50..e10619a2 100644
+--- a/t_unsafe.c
++++ b/t_unsafe.c
+@@ -28,6 +28,9 @@ int am_root = 0;
+ int am_sender = 1;
+ int read_only = 0;
+ int list_only = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
++
+ short info_levels[COUNT_INFO], debug_levels[COUNT_DEBUG];
+
+ int
+diff --git a/tls.c b/tls.c
+index e6b0708a..858f8f10 100644
+--- a/tls.c
++++ b/tls.c
+@@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ int list_only = 0;
+ int link_times = 0;
+ int link_owner = 0;
+ int nsec_times = 0;
++int safe_symlinks = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+
+ #ifdef SUPPORT_XATTRS
+
+diff --git a/trimslash.c b/trimslash.c
+index 1ec928ca..f2774cd7 100644
+--- a/trimslash.c
++++ b/trimslash.c
+@@ -26,6 +26,8 @@ int am_root = 0;
+ int am_sender = 1;
+ int read_only = 1;
+ int list_only = 0;
++int copy_links = 0;
++int copy_unsafe_links = 0;
+
+ int
+ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff --git a/util1.c b/util1.c
+index f260d398..d84bc414 100644
+--- a/util1.c
++++ b/util1.c
+@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ int copy_file(const char *source, const char *dest, int tmpfilefd, mode_t mode)
+	int len;   /* Number of bytes read into `buf'. */
+	OFF_T prealloc_len = 0, offset = 0;
+
+-	if ((ifd = do_open(source, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) {
++	if ((ifd = do_open_nofollow(source, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
+		int save_errno = errno;
+		rsyserr(FERROR_XFER, errno, "open %s", full_fname(source));
+		errno = save_errno;
+--
+2.40.0
meta/recipes-devtools/rsync/rsync_3.2.7.bb +1 -0
index 169650fe91..d0796d3c12 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://download.samba.org/pub/${BPN}/src/${BP}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2024-12087-0002.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12087-0003.patch \
            file://CVE-2024-12088.patch \
+           file://CVE-2024-12747.patch \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "4e7d9d3f6ed10878c58c5fb724a67dacf4b6aac7340b13e488fb2dc41346f2bb"
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/8 rust-target-config: Fix TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH with correct size

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Harish Sadineni <[email protected]>

[YOCTO #15600]

The TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH value was incorrectly set to 64 instead of 32. It is updated for PPC, Mips, and riscv64 architectures.

Discussion links for solution:
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/207486
https://lists.openembedded.org/g/openembedded-core/message/207496

(cherry picked from commit b9df8cd8b29064d115dab3bfd1ea14f94a5c0238)
---
 meta/classes-recipe/rust-target-config.bbclass | 10 +++++-----
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
meta/classes-recipe/rust-target-config.bbclass +5 -5
index 926b0630b1..1bd7626bd8 100644
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[mipsel] = "32"
 DATA_LAYOUT[mips64] = "E-m:e-i8:8:32-i16:16:32-i64:64-n32:64-S128"
 TARGET_ENDIAN[mips64] = "big"
 TARGET_POINTER_WIDTH[mips64] = "64"
-TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[mips64] = "64"
+TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[mips64] = "32"
 MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[mips64] = "64"
 
 ## mips64-n32-unknown-linux-{gnu, musl}
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[mips64-n32] = "64"
 DATA_LAYOUT[mips64el] = "e-m:e-i8:8:32-i16:16:32-i64:64-n32:64-S128"
 TARGET_ENDIAN[mips64el] = "little"
 TARGET_POINTER_WIDTH[mips64el] = "64"
-TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[mips64el] = "64"
+TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[mips64el] = "32"
 MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[mips64el] = "64"
 
 ## powerpc-unknown-linux-{gnu, musl}
@@ -223,14 +223,14 @@ MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[powerpc] = "32"
 DATA_LAYOUT[powerpc64] = "E-m:e-i64:64-n32:64-S128-v256:256:256-v512:512:512"
 TARGET_ENDIAN[powerpc64] = "big"
 TARGET_POINTER_WIDTH[powerpc64] = "64"
-TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[powerpc64] = "64"
+TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[powerpc64] = "32"
 MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[powerpc64] = "64"
 
 ## powerpc64le-unknown-linux-{gnu, musl}
 DATA_LAYOUT[powerpc64le] = "e-m:e-i64:64-n32:64-v256:256:256-v512:512:512"
 TARGET_ENDIAN[powerpc64le] = "little"
 TARGET_POINTER_WIDTH[powerpc64le] = "64"
-TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[powerpc64le] = "64"
+TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[powerpc64le] = "32"
 MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[powerpc64le] = "64"
 
 ## riscv32gc-unknown-linux-{gnu, musl}
@@ -244,7 +244,7 @@ MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[riscv32gc] = "32"
 DATA_LAYOUT[riscv64gc] = "e-m:e-p:64:64-i64:64-i128:128-n64-S128"
 TARGET_ENDIAN[riscv64gc] = "little"
 TARGET_POINTER_WIDTH[riscv64gc] = "64"
-TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[riscv64gc] = "64"
+TARGET_C_INT_WIDTH[riscv64gc] = "32"
 MAX_ATOMIC_WIDTH[riscv64gc] = "64"
 
 ## loongarch64-unknown-linux-{gnu, musl}
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/8 boost: fix do_fetch error

In reply to Steve Sakoman

From: Jiaying Song <[email protected]>

Change the SRC_URI to the correct value due to the following error:
WARNING: boost-native-1.84.0-r0 do_fetch: Checksum failure encountered with download of https://boostorg.jfrog.io/artifactory/main/release/1.84.0/source/boost_1_84_0.tar.bz2 - will attempt other sources if available

---
 meta/recipes-support/boost/boost-1.84.0.inc | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-support/boost/boost-1.84.0.inc +1 -1
index 5bbea2ba5b..be1ad20f47 100644
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ BOOST_VER = "${@"_".join(d.getVar("PV").split("."))}"
 BOOST_MAJ = "${@"_".join(d.getVar("PV").split(".")[0:2])}"
 BOOST_P = "boost_${BOOST_VER}"
 
-SRC_URI = "https://boostorg.jfrog.io/artifactory/main/release/${PV}/source/${BOOST_P}.tar.bz2"
+SRC_URI = "https://archives.boost.io/release/${PV}/source/${BOOST_P}.tar.bz2"
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "cc4b893acf645c9d4b698e9a0f08ca8846aa5d6c68275c14c3e7949c24109454"
 
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://www.boost.org/users/download/"
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2.43.0