Patch review
cover Patch review
Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Monday, May 11.
Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/3794
The following changes since commit 3c2f2b6f7af2bb743655859b64faae4786080cb9:
libsoup: fix CVE-2025-32049 (2026-05-05 13:01:04 +0200)
are available in the Git repository at:
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut
for you to fetch changes up to 7952d214393b6c5230ba115f63b6f6d245a728bc:
glibc: Fix recipe bug that disabled stack protector (2026-05-08 01:06:24 +0200)
----------------------------------------------------------------
Hitendra Prajapati (4):
libarchive: fix for CVE-2026-4426
vim: fix for CVE-2026-39881
sudo: fix for CVE-2026-35535
inetutils: fix for CVE-2026-32772
Ivan Nestlerode (1):
glibc: Fix recipe bug that disabled stack protector
Moritz Haase (1):
devtool: Disable gpg signing when setting up source tree repos
Peter Marko (1):
coreutils: set CVE_PRODUCT
Xiangyu Chen (1):
grub: update search parameter
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/cfg | 2 +- .../inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch | 172 ++++++++++++ .../inetutils/inetutils_2.5.bb | 1 + meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.4.bb | 2 + meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc.inc | 3 - .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch | 58 ++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 1 + .../sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch | 150 +++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.17p2.bb | 1 + .../vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch | 248 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + scripts/lib/devtool/__init__.py | 2 +- 12 files changed, 636 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch
PATCH 1/8 grub: update search parameter
From: Xiangyu Chen <[email protected]>
[ Upstream commit 42b530581f7246b3143ee50e3c6f981dcbb1dc74 ]
Grub would report an error message in boot stage as below:
"error: no such device: ((hd0,gpt1)/EFI/BOOT)/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg"
Consequently, the root variable is not set, and the intended protection against cross-device configuration loading (the purpose of the original 2014 commit) is lost.
The most robust fix is to use the --hint parameter. This separates the search target from the device hint, avoiding fragile string concatenation and supporting both prefixed and non-prefixed $cmdpath formats.
--- meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/cfg | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/cfg +1 -1
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@ -search.file ($cmdpath)/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg root +search --file --set=root --hint-efi=$cmdpath /EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg set prefix=($root)/EFI/BOOT
PATCH 2/8 libarchive: fix for CVE-2026-4426
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]
[1] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/c3cb1c568ebf9e8f7f478cfc0356ae54e99712b0
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4426
More details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4426
--- .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch | 58 +++++++++++++++++++ .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch new file +58 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@ +From c3cb1c568ebf9e8f7f478cfc0356ae54e99712b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: elhananhaenel <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2026 22:14:23 +0200 +Subject: [PATCH] iso9660: validate pz_log2_bs in parse_rockridge_ZF1() + +The zisofs block size exponent (pz_log2_bs) read from the Rock Ridge ZF +extension entry is used directly in shift expressions without validation. +The zisofs specification only permits values 15, 16, or 17 (corresponding +to 32K, 64K, and 128K block sizes). + +When pz_log2_bs >= 64 on 64-bit systems (or >= 32 on 32-bit), the +expression (size_t)1UL << pz_log2_bs is undefined behavior per C11 +6.5.7. On 32-bit systems, a large exponent also causes the block pointer +allocation size computation (ceil + 1) * 4 to overflow to zero, leading +to a heap buffer overflow write after malloc(0). + +Fix: reject any pz_log2_bs outside the range [15, 17] by disabling +zisofs for the entry (file->pz = 0), which prevents the zisofs +decompression path from executing. + +Found by fuzzing with ASAN/UBSAN. + +CVE: CVE-2026-4426 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/c3cb1c568ebf9e8f7f478cfc0356ae54e99712b0] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 15 ++++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c +index 7d3655a..477aae9 100644 +--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c ++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c +@@ -2756,11 +2756,16 @@ parse_rockridge_ZF1(struct file_info *file, const unsigned char *data, + { + + if (data[0] == 0x70 && data[1] == 0x7a && data_length == 12) { +- /* paged zlib */ +- file->pz = 1; +- file->pz_log2_bs = data[3]; +- file->pz_uncompressed_size = archive_le32dec(&data[4]); +- } ++ /* paged zlib */ ++ file->pz = 1; ++ file->pz_log2_bs = data[3]; ++ if (file->pz_log2_bs < 15 || file->pz_log2_bs > 17) { ++ /* Invalid block size exponent; disable zisofs. */ ++ file->pz = 0; ++ return; ++ } ++ file->pz_uncompressed_size = archive_le32dec(&data[4]); ++ } + } + + static void +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +1 -0
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \ file://CVE-2025-60753-02.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4111-1.patch \ file://CVE-2026-4111-2.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-4426.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
PATCH 3/8 vim: fix for CVE-2026-39881
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]
[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/7ab76a86048ed492374ac6b19c6cb52f89a365b4
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-39881
More details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39881
--- .../vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch | 248 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc | 1 + 2 files changed, 249 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch new file +248 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +From 7ab76a86048ed492374ac6b19c6cb52f89a365b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> +Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 17:32:02 +0000 +Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0316: [security]: command injection in netbeans + interface via defineAnnoType + +Problem: [security]: The netbeans defineAnnoType command passes typeName, fg and bg + unsanitized to coloncmd(), allowing a malicious server to inject + arbitrary Ex commands via '|'. Similarly, specialKeys does not + validate key tokens before building a map command. +Solution: Validate typeName, fg and bg against an allowlist of safe + characters before passing them to coloncmd() + +Github Advisory: +https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-mr87-rhgv-7pw6 + +Supported by AI + +Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]> + +CVE: CVE-2026-39881 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/7ab76a86048ed492374ac6b19c6cb52f89a365b4] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + runtime/doc/netbeans.txt | 4 +-- + runtime/doc/tags | 1 + + src/errors.h | 3 ++- + src/netbeans.c | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- + src/po/vim.pot | 5 +++- + src/testdir/test_netbeans.py | 4 ++- + src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 7 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt b/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt +index ca32f06f66..fa53eae784 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt ++++ b/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt +@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ +-*netbeans.txt* For Vim version 9.1. Last change: 2025 Aug 10 ++*netbeans.txt* For Vim version 9.1. Last change: 2026 Apr 30 + + + VIM REFERENCE MANUAL by Gordon Prieur et al. +@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ REJECT Not used. + These errors occur when a message violates the protocol: + *E627* *E628* *E629* *E632* *E633* *E634* *E635* *E636* + *E637* *E638* *E639* *E640* *E641* *E642* *E643* *E644* *E645* *E646* +-*E647* *E648* *E650* *E651* *E652* ++*E647* *E648* *E649* *E650* *E651* *E652* + + + ============================================================================== +diff --git a/runtime/doc/tags b/runtime/doc/tags +index 8af54eae0a..300dfd18a6 100644 +--- a/runtime/doc/tags ++++ b/runtime/doc/tags +@@ -5236,6 +5236,7 @@ E645 netbeans.txt /*E645* + E646 netbeans.txt /*E646* + E647 netbeans.txt /*E647* + E648 netbeans.txt /*E648* ++E649 netbeans.txt /*E649* + E65 pattern.txt /*E65* + E650 netbeans.txt /*E650* + E651 netbeans.txt /*E651* +diff --git a/src/errors.h b/src/errors.h +index 5d6867464b..01ed16a035 100644 +--- a/src/errors.h ++++ b/src/errors.h +@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_setdot[] + INIT(= N_("E647: Invalid buffer identifier in setDot")); + EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_close[] + INIT(= N_("E648: Invalid buffer identifier in close")); +-// E649 unused ++EXTERN char e_invalid_identifier_in_defineannotype[] ++ INIT(= N_("E649: Invalid identifier name in defineAnnoType")); + EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_defineannotype[] + INIT(= N_("E650: Invalid buffer identifier in defineAnnoType")); + EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_addanno[] +diff --git a/src/netbeans.c b/src/netbeans.c +index 8a341a20be..599cdc1994 100644 +--- a/src/netbeans.c ++++ b/src/netbeans.c +@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@ + #define GUARDEDOFFSET 1000000 // base for "guarded" sign id's + #define MAX_COLOR_LENGTH 32 // max length of color name in defineAnnoType + ++// Characters valid in a sign/highlight group name ++#define VALID_CHARS (char_u *)"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789" ++#define VALID_SIGNNAME_CHARS VALID_CHARS "_" ++#define VALID_COLOR_CHARS VALID_CHARS "#" ++ + // The first implementation (working only with Netbeans) returned "1.1". The + // protocol implemented here also supports A-A-P. + static char *ExtEdProtocolVersion = "2.5"; +@@ -77,6 +82,22 @@ static int dosetvisible = FALSE; + static int needupdate = 0; + static int inAtomic = 0; + ++/* ++ * Return TRUE if "str" contains only characters from "allowed". ++ * Used to validate NetBeans-supplied strings before interpolating them ++ * into Ex commands via coloncmd(). ++ */ ++ static int ++nb_is_safe_string(char_u *str, char_u *allowed) ++{ ++ if (str == NULL) ++ return FALSE; ++ for (char_u *p = str; *p != NUL; p++) ++ if (vim_strchr(allowed, *p) == NULL) ++ return FALSE; ++ return TRUE; ++} ++ + /* + * Callback invoked when the channel is closed. + */ +@@ -1949,6 +1970,15 @@ nb_do_cmd( + VIM_CLEAR(typeName); + parse_error = TRUE; + } ++ else if (!nb_is_safe_string(typeName, VALID_SIGNNAME_CHARS) || ++ (*fg != NUL && !nb_is_safe_string(fg, VALID_COLOR_CHARS)) || ++ (*bg != NUL && !nb_is_safe_string(bg, VALID_COLOR_CHARS))) ++ { ++ nbdebug((" invalid chars in typeName/fg/bg in defineAnnoType\n")); ++ emsg(_(e_invalid_identifier_in_defineannotype)); ++ VIM_CLEAR(typeName); ++ parse_error = TRUE; ++ } + else if (typeName != NULL && tooltip != NULL && glyphFile != NULL) + addsigntype(buf, typeNum, typeName, tooltip, glyphFile, fg, bg); + +@@ -2321,11 +2351,25 @@ special_keys(char_u *args) + + if (strlen(tok) + i < KEYBUFLEN) + { +- strcpy(&keybuf[i], tok); ++ // Only allow alphanumeric and function-key name characters. ++ // Reject anything else to prevent map command injection. ++ int safe = TRUE; ++ for (char_u *tp = (char_u *)tok; *tp != NUL; tp++) ++ { ++ if (!ASCII_ISALNUM(*tp) && *tp != '-') ++ { ++ safe = FALSE; ++ break; ++ } ++ } ++ if (safe) ++ { ++ vim_strncpy((char_u *)&keybuf[i], (char_u *)tok, KEYBUFLEN - i - 1); + vim_snprintf(cmdbuf, sizeof(cmdbuf), + "<silent><%s> :nbkey %s<CR>", keybuf, keybuf); + do_map(MAPTYPE_MAP, (char_u *)cmdbuf, MODE_NORMAL, FALSE); + } ++ } + tok = strtok(NULL, " "); + } + vim_free(save_str); +diff --git a/src/po/vim.pot b/src/po/vim.pot +index bf44567726..9608271418 100644 +--- a/src/po/vim.pot ++++ b/src/po/vim.pot +@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid "" + msgstr "" + "Project-Id-Version: Vim\n" + "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: [email protected]\n" +-"POT-Creation-Date: 2025-08-23 16:16+0200\n" ++"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-04-30 12:40+0200\n" + "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n" + "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n" + "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <[email protected]>\n" +@@ -5866,6 +5866,9 @@ msgstr "" + msgid "E648: Invalid buffer identifier in close" + msgstr "" + ++msgid "E649: Invalid identifier name in defineAnnoType" ++msgstr "" ++ + msgid "E650: Invalid buffer identifier in defineAnnoType" + msgstr "" + +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py +index 585886fb40..ba5fd638ec 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py ++++ b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py +@@ -113,7 +113,9 @@ class ThreadedTCPRequestHandler(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler): + 'endAtomic_Test' : '0:endAtomic!95\n', + 'AnnoScale_Test' : "".join(['2:defineAnnoType!60 ' + str(i) + ' "s' + str(i) + '" "x" "=>" blue none\n' for i in range(2, 26)]), + 'detach_Test' : '2:close!96\n1:close!97\nDETACH\n', +- 'specialKeys_overflow_Test' : '0:specialKeys!200 "' + 'A'*80 + '-X"\n' ++ 'specialKeys_overflow_Test' : '0:specialKeys!200 "' + 'A'*80 + '-X"\n', ++ 'defineAnnoType_injection_Test': '1:defineAnnoType!1 "MySign guifg=red|call writefile([\'inject\'],\'Xinject\')|" "tooltip" "glyphFile" 1 2\n' ++ + + } + # execute the specified test +diff --git a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim +index d1be5066ef..a464c63acc 100644 +--- a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim ++++ b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim +@@ -1024,4 +1024,42 @@ func Test_nb_specialKeys_overflow() + call s:run_server('Nb_specialKeys_overflow') + endfunc + ++func Nb_defineAnnoType_injection(port) ++ call writefile([], "Xnetbeans", 'D') ++ let g:last = 0 ++ ++ exe 'nbstart :localhost:' .. a:port .. ':bunny' ++ call assert_true(has("netbeans_enabled")) ++ call WaitFor('len(ReadXnetbeans()) > (g:last + 2)') ++ let g:last += 3 ++ ++ split Xcmdbuf ++ let cmdbufnr = bufnr() ++ call WaitFor('len(ReadXnetbeans()) > (g:last + 2)') ++ let g:last += 3 ++ hide ++ ++ sleep 1m ++ ++ call delete('Xinject') ++ call appendbufline(cmdbufnr, '$', 'defineAnnoType_injection_Test') ++ " E475 from :sign is expected — catch it before RunServer sees it. ++ " give it a bit of time to process it ++ try ++ sleep 500m ++ catch /E475/ ++ catch /E649/ ++ endtry ++ ++ " Injected call must not have created this file ++ call assert_false(filereadable('Xinject')) ++ call delete('Xinject') ++ bwipe! Xcmdbuf ++ nbclose ++endfunc ++ ++func Test_nb_defineAnnoType_injection() ++ call ch_log('Test_nb_defineAnnoType_injection') ++ call s:run_server('Nb_defineAnnoType_injection') ++endfunc + " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \ file://CVE-2026-33412.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28418.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28419.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-39881.patch \ " PV .= ".1683"
PATCH 4/8 sudo: fix for CVE-2026-35535
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]
[1] https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/3e474c2f201484be83d994ae10a4e20e8c81bb69
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-35535
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35535
--- .../sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch | 150 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.17p2.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch new file +150 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +From 3e474c2f201484be83d994ae10a4e20e8c81bb69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: "Todd C. Miller" <[email protected]> +Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 15:34:02 -0700 +Subject: [PATCH] exec_mailer: Set group as well as uid when running the mailer + +Also make a setuid(), setgid() or setgroups() failure fatal. + +Found by the ZeroPath AI Security Engineer <https://zeropath.com> + +CVE: CVE-2026-35535 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/3e474c2f201484be83d994ae10a4e20e8c81bb69] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + include/sudo_eventlog.h | 3 ++- + lib/eventlog/eventlog.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++---- + lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c | 4 +++- + plugins/sudoers/logging.c | 2 +- + plugins/sudoers/policy.c | 2 +- + 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/include/sudo_eventlog.h b/include/sudo_eventlog.h +index eb9f4f4..485d259 100644 +--- a/include/sudo_eventlog.h ++++ b/include/sudo_eventlog.h +@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct eventlog_config { + int syslog_rejectpri; + int syslog_alertpri; + uid_t mailuid; ++ gid_t mailgid; + bool omit_hostname; + const char *logpath; + const char *time_fmt; +@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ void eventlog_set_syslog_rejectpri(int pri); + void eventlog_set_syslog_alertpri(int pri); + void eventlog_set_syslog_maxlen(size_t len); + void eventlog_set_file_maxlen(size_t len); +-void eventlog_set_mailuid(uid_t uid); ++void eventlog_set_mailuser(uid_t uid, gid_t gid); + void eventlog_set_omit_hostname(bool omit_hostname); + void eventlog_set_logpath(const char *path); + void eventlog_set_time_fmt(const char *fmt); +diff --git a/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c b/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c +index 5a32824..d56c4e4 100644 +--- a/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c ++++ b/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c +@@ -304,15 +304,13 @@ exec_mailer(int pipein) + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("unable to dup stdin: %m")); // -V618 + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, + "unable to dup stdin: %s", strerror(errno)); +- sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys); +- _exit(127); ++ goto bad; + } + + /* Build up an argv based on the mailer path and flags */ + if ((mflags = strdup(evl_conf->mailerflags)) == NULL) { + syslog(LOG_ERR, _("unable to allocate memory")); // -V618 +- sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys); +- _exit(127); ++ goto bad; + } + argv[0] = sudo_basename(mpath); + +@@ -331,11 +329,23 @@ exec_mailer(int pipein) + if (setuid(ROOT_UID) != 0) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to change uid to %u", + ROOT_UID); ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ if (setgid(evl_conf->mailgid) != 0) { ++ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to change gid to %u", ++ (unsigned int)evl_conf->mailgid); ++ goto bad; ++ } ++ if (setgroups(1, &evl_conf->mailgid) != 0) { ++ sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to set groups to %u", ++ (unsigned int)evl_conf->mailgid); ++ goto bad; + } + if (evl_conf->mailuid != ROOT_UID) { + if (setuid(evl_conf->mailuid) != 0) { + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to change uid to %u", + (unsigned int)evl_conf->mailuid); ++ goto bad; + } + } + sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys); +@@ -347,6 +357,9 @@ exec_mailer(int pipein) + sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to execute %s: %s", + mpath, strerror(errno)); + _exit(127); ++bad: ++ sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys); ++ _exit(127); + } + + /* Send a message to the mailto user */ +diff --git a/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c b/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c +index 0663a38..ec3b569 100644 +--- a/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c ++++ b/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c +@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static struct eventlog_config evl_conf = { + MAXSYSLOGLEN, /* syslog_maxlen */ + 0, /* file_maxlen */ + ROOT_UID, /* mailuid */ ++ ROOT_GID, /* mailgid */ + false, /* omit_hostname */ + _PATH_SUDO_LOGFILE, /* logpath */ + "%h %e %T", /* time_fmt */ +@@ -151,9 +152,10 @@ eventlog_set_file_maxlen(size_t len) + } + + void +-eventlog_set_mailuid(uid_t uid) ++eventlog_set_mailuser(uid_t uid, gid_t gid) + { + evl_conf.mailuid = uid; ++ evl_conf.mailgid = gid; + } + + void +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/logging.c b/plugins/sudoers/logging.c +index bd4de92..9535289 100644 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/logging.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/logging.c +@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ init_eventlog_config(void) + eventlog_set_syslog_alertpri(def_syslog_badpri); + eventlog_set_syslog_maxlen(def_syslog_maxlen); + eventlog_set_file_maxlen(def_loglinelen); +- eventlog_set_mailuid(ROOT_UID); ++ eventlog_set_mailuser(ROOT_UID, ROOT_GID); + eventlog_set_omit_hostname(!def_log_host); + eventlog_set_logpath(def_logfile); + eventlog_set_time_fmt(def_log_year ? "%h %e %T %Y" : "%h %e %T"); +diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c +index f3adfb0..27f6e58 100644 +--- a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c ++++ b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c +@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(struct sudoers_context *ctx, void *v, + } + + #ifdef NO_ROOT_MAILER +- eventlog_set_mailuid(ctx->user.uid); ++ eventlog_set_mailuser(ctx->user.uid, ctx->user.gid); + #endif + + /* Dump settings and user info (XXX - plugin args) */ +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.17p2.bb +1 -0
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ require sudo.inc SRC_URI = "https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${PV}.tar.gz \ ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \ file://0001-sudo.conf.in-fix-conflict-with-multilib.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-35535.patch \ " PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sudo.pam"
PATCH 5/8 coreutils: set CVE_PRODUCT
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Peter Marko <[email protected]>
This removes rust uutils coreutils CVEs from reports. Comparing sbom-cve-check shows that only CVE-2026-35338..CVE-2026-35381 are removed and all of them contained reference to uutils.
(From OE-Core rev: 5c39687f62e5864ea783cbed497c2eb5387dcf96)
--- meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.4.bb | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.4.bb +2 -0
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/coreutils/${BP}.tar.xz \ " SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ea613a4cf44612326e917201bbbcdfbd301de21ffc3b59b6e5c07e040b275e52" +CVE_PRODUCT = "gnu:coreutils" + # http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/coreutils.git/commit/?id=v8.27-101-gf5d7c0842 # CVE_STATUS[CVE-2016-2781] = "disputed: runcon is not really a sandbox command, use `runcon ... setsid ...` to avoid this particular issue."
PATCH 6/8 inetutils: fix for CVE-2026-32772
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at NVD report in [2]
[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/13/1
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32772
[3] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/patch/?id=d6b8b83aa51616946fd314bc48087312d13c99f8
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-32772
--- .../inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch | 172 ++++++++++++++++++ .../inetutils/inetutils_2.5.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 173 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch new file +172 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +From d6b8b83aa51616946fd314bc48087312d13c99f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Collin Funk <[email protected]> +Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2026 22:52:54 -0700 +Subject: telnet: don't leak the value of unexported environment variables + +Patch based on the following OpenBSD commit: +<https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/1a11dc7253488a97d6df686dae9230f78682e8df> + +* telnet/commands.c (env_getvalue): Add a boolean argument to prevent +prevent unexported variables from being returned. +* telnet/externs.h (env_getvalue): Adjust the function declaration. +* telnet/authenc.c (telnet_getenv): Add the new argument. +* telnet/telnet.c (dooption, gettermname, suboption, env_opt_add) +(telnet): Likewise. + +A telnet server can read a client's environment variables with the +NEW-ENVIRON option and the SEND ENV_USERVAR command. + +This had previously been reported as CVE-2005-0488, but inetutils never +got a fix for it. + +Reported-by: Justin Swartz <[email protected]> +Based-on-patch: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/telnet/-/blob/c9s/telnet-0.17-env.patch +Link: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/13/1 + +CVE: CVE-2026-32772 +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/patch/?id=d6b8b83aa51616946fd314bc48087312d13c99f8] +Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]> +--- + libtelnet/misc-proto.h | 4 +++- + telnet/authenc.c | 4 ++-- + telnet/commands.c | 5 +++-- + telnet/externs.h | 4 +++- + telnet/telnet.c | 10 +++++----- + 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/libtelnet/misc-proto.h b/libtelnet/misc-proto.h +index abf8316..a836a69 100644 +--- a/libtelnet/misc-proto.h ++++ b/libtelnet/misc-proto.h +@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@ + #ifndef __MISC_PROTO__ + # define __MISC_PROTO__ + ++#include <stdbool.h> ++ + void auth_encrypt_init (char *, char *, char *, char *, int); + void auth_encrypt_user (char *); + void auth_encrypt_connect (int); +@@ -79,6 +81,6 @@ void printd (unsigned char *, int); + int net_write (unsigned char *, int); + void net_encrypt (void); + int telnet_spin (void); +-char *telnet_getenv (char *); ++char *telnet_getenv (char *, bool); + char *telnet_gets (char *, char *, int, int); + #endif +diff --git a/telnet/authenc.c b/telnet/authenc.c +index b019251..dcd19e8 100644 +--- a/telnet/authenc.c ++++ b/telnet/authenc.c +@@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ telnet_spin () + } + + char * +-telnet_getenv (char *val) ++telnet_getenv (char *val, bool exported_only) + { +- return ((char *) env_getvalue (val)); ++ return ((char *) env_getvalue (val, exported_only)); + } + + char * +diff --git a/telnet/commands.c b/telnet/commands.c +index 2a133c9..d8d0864 100644 +--- a/telnet/commands.c ++++ b/telnet/commands.c +@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ + #include <stdarg.h> + #include <errno.h> + ++#include <stdbool.h> + #include <stdlib.h> + #include <limits.h> /* LLONG_MAX for Solaris. */ + +@@ -2059,10 +2060,10 @@ env_default (int init, int welldefined) + } + + unsigned char * +-env_getvalue (const char *var) ++env_getvalue (const char *var, bool exported_only) + { + register struct env_lst *ep = env_find (var); +- if (ep) ++ if (ep && (!exported_only || ep->export)) + return (ep->value); + return (NULL); + } +diff --git a/telnet/externs.h b/telnet/externs.h +index f79c6ae..e0d9fbc 100644 +--- a/telnet/externs.h ++++ b/telnet/externs.h +@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ + # endif + #endif + ++#include <stdbool.h> + #include <stdio.h> + #include <setjmp.h> + #if defined CRAY && !defined NO_BSD_SETJMP +@@ -331,7 +332,8 @@ env_opt (unsigned char *, int), + env_opt_start (void), + env_opt_start_info (void), env_opt_add (unsigned char *), env_opt_end (int); + +-extern unsigned char *env_default (int, int), *env_getvalue (const char *); ++extern unsigned char *env_default (int, int); ++extern unsigned char *env_getvalue (const char *, bool); + + int dosynch (const char *); + int get_status (const char *); +diff --git a/telnet/telnet.c b/telnet/telnet.c +index 8884b6e..6a5cf8b 100644 +--- a/telnet/telnet.c ++++ b/telnet/telnet.c +@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ dooption (int option) + #endif + + case TELOPT_XDISPLOC: /* X Display location */ +- if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY")) ++ if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY", false)) + new_state_ok = 1; + break; + +@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ gettermname (void) + resettermname = 0; + if (tnamep && tnamep != unknown) + free (tnamep); +- if ((tname = (char *) env_getvalue ("TERM")) && ++ if ((tname = (char *) env_getvalue ("TERM", false)) && + (init_term (tname, &err) == 0)) + { + tnamep = mklist (termbuf, tname); +@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ suboption (void) + unsigned char temp[50], *dp; + int len; + +- if ((dp = env_getvalue ("DISPLAY")) == NULL) ++ if ((dp = env_getvalue ("DISPLAY", false)) == NULL) + { + /* + * Something happened, we no longer have a DISPLAY +@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ env_opt_add (register unsigned char *ep) + env_opt_add (ep); + return; + } +- vp = env_getvalue ((char *) ep); ++ vp = env_getvalue ((char *) ep, true); + if (opt_replyp + (vp ? strlen ((char *) vp) : 0) + + strlen ((char *) ep) + 6 > opt_replyend) + { +@@ -2484,7 +2484,7 @@ telnet (char *user) + send_will (TELOPT_LINEMODE, 1); + send_will (TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, 1); + send_do (TELOPT_STATUS, 1); +- if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY")) ++ if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY", false)) + send_will (TELOPT_XDISPLOC, 1); + if (eight) + tel_enter_binary (eight); +-- +2.50.1 +
meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils_2.5.bb +1 -0
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/inetutils/inetutils-${PV}.tar.xz \ file://CVE-2026-24061-2.patch \ file://CVE-2026-28372.patch \ file://CVE-2026-32746.patch \ + file://CVE-2026-32772.patch \ " inherit autotools gettext update-alternatives texinfo
PATCH 7/8 devtool: Disable gpg signing when setting up source tree repos
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Moritz Haase <[email protected]>
This stops 'devtool modify foo' from failing with an error message like
ERROR: Execution of 'git -c user.name=\"OpenEmbedded\" -c user.email=\"oe.patch@oe\" commit -q -m "Initial commit from upstream at version 1.90.0"' failed with exit code 128:
error: cannot run ssh-keygen: No such file or directory error:
fatal: failed to write commit object
when GPG signing is enabled in the git configuration.
(cherry picked from commit b5c84b07b87eafb4f68f7662b6cf26d8b73e3247)
--- scripts/lib/devtool/__init__.py | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/lib/devtool/__init__.py +1 -1
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ def setup_git_repo(repodir, version, devbranch, basetag='devtool-base', d=None): bb.process.run('git add -f -A .', cwd=repodir) commit_cmd = ['git'] oe.patch.GitApplyTree.gitCommandUserOptions(commit_cmd, d=d) - commit_cmd += ['commit', '-q'] + commit_cmd += ['commit', '-q', '--no-gpg-sign'] stdout, _ = bb.process.run('git status --porcelain', cwd=repodir) if not stdout: commit_cmd.append('--allow-empty')
PATCH 8/8 glibc: Fix recipe bug that disabled stack protector
In reply to Yoann CongalFrom: Ivan Nestlerode <[email protected]>
Fixes [YOCTO #16265]
The glibc recipe is supposed to be building with --enable-stack-protector=strong, but some CACHED_CONFIGVARS values are actually breaking this, causing glibc to be built with no stack protector at all.
Remove these CACHED_CONFIGVARS values so that stack protector support is detected properly in do_configure and then enabled properly during do_compile.
Full details are here:
https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16265
--- meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc.inc | 3 --- 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc.inc +0 -3
@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@ CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += " \ libc_cv_slibdir=${base_libdir} \ libc_cv_rootsbindir=${base_sbindir} \ libc_cv_localedir=${localedir} \ - libc_cv_ssp_strong=no \ - libc_cv_ssp_all=no \ - libc_cv_ssp=no \ libc_cv_include_x86_isa_level=no \ "