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PATCH New Yoann Congal 1 participant 9 messages May 8

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#0 lore raw

cover Patch review

Please review this set of changes for scarthgap and have comments back by end of day Monday, May 11.

Passed a-full on autobuilder:
https://autobuilder.yoctoproject.org/valkyrie/#/builders/29/builds/3794

The following changes since commit 3c2f2b6f7af2bb743655859b64faae4786080cb9:

libsoup: fix CVE-2025-32049 (2026-05-05 13:01:04 +0200)

are available in the Git repository at:

https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib stable/scarthgap-nut
https://git.openembedded.org/openembedded-core-contrib/log/?h=stable/scarthgap-nut

for you to fetch changes up to 7952d214393b6c5230ba115f63b6f6d245a728bc:

glibc: Fix recipe bug that disabled stack protector (2026-05-08 01:06:24 +0200)

----------------------------------------------------------------

Hitendra Prajapati (4):
libarchive: fix for CVE-2026-4426
vim: fix for CVE-2026-39881
sudo: fix for CVE-2026-35535
inetutils: fix for CVE-2026-32772

Ivan Nestlerode (1):
glibc: Fix recipe bug that disabled stack protector

Moritz Haase (1):
devtool: Disable gpg signing when setting up source tree repos

Peter Marko (1):
coreutils: set CVE_PRODUCT

Xiangyu Chen (1):
grub: update search parameter

 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/cfg               |   2 +-
 .../inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch  | 172 ++++++++++++
 .../inetutils/inetutils_2.5.bb                |   1 +
 meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.4.bb  |   2 +
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc.inc             |   3 -
 .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch |  58 ++++
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb            |   1 +
 .../sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch           | 150 +++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.17p2.bb   |   1 +
 .../vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch            | 248 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |   1 +
 scripts/lib/devtool/__init__.py               |   2 +-
 12 files changed, 636 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/8 grub: update search parameter

From: Xiangyu Chen <[email protected]>

[ Upstream commit 42b530581f7246b3143ee50e3c6f981dcbb1dc74 ]

Grub would report an error message in boot stage as below:

"error: no such device: ((hd0,gpt1)/EFI/BOOT)/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg"

Consequently, the root variable is not set, and the intended protection against cross-device configuration loading (the purpose of the original 2014 commit) is lost.

The most robust fix is to use the --hint parameter. This separates the search target from the device hint, avoiding fragile string concatenation and supporting both prefixed and non-prefixed $cmdpath formats.

Fixes 5ce73b6055ac ("grub: add cmdpath to grub configuration file")
---
 meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/cfg | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
meta/recipes-bsp/grub/files/cfg +1 -1
index 8ca53d24d7b..8fe1a8d0c74 100644
@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-search.file ($cmdpath)/EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg root
+search --file --set=root --hint-efi=$cmdpath /EFI/BOOT/grub.cfg
 set prefix=($root)/EFI/BOOT
#2 lore raw

PATCH 2/8 libarchive: fix for CVE-2026-4426

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]

[1] https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/c3cb1c568ebf9e8f7f478cfc0356ae54e99712b0
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-4426

More details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-4426

---
 .../libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch | 58 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb            |  1 +
 2 files changed, 59 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive/CVE-2026-4426.patch new file +58 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..c303c2372a5
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+From c3cb1c568ebf9e8f7f478cfc0356ae54e99712b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: elhananhaenel <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 7 Mar 2026 22:14:23 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] iso9660: validate pz_log2_bs in parse_rockridge_ZF1()
+
+The zisofs block size exponent (pz_log2_bs) read from the Rock Ridge ZF
+extension entry is used directly in shift expressions without validation.
+The zisofs specification only permits values 15, 16, or 17 (corresponding
+to 32K, 64K, and 128K block sizes).
+
+When pz_log2_bs >= 64 on 64-bit systems (or >= 32 on 32-bit), the
+expression (size_t)1UL << pz_log2_bs is undefined behavior per C11
+6.5.7. On 32-bit systems, a large exponent also causes the block pointer
+allocation size computation (ceil + 1) * 4 to overflow to zero, leading
+to a heap buffer overflow write after malloc(0).
+
+Fix: reject any pz_log2_bs outside the range [15, 17] by disabling
+zisofs for the entry (file->pz = 0), which prevents the zisofs
+decompression path from executing.
+
+Found by fuzzing with ASAN/UBSAN.
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-4426
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libarchive/libarchive/commit/c3cb1c568ebf9e8f7f478cfc0356ae54e99712b0]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
+index 7d3655a..477aae9 100644
+--- a/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
++++ b/libarchive/archive_read_support_format_iso9660.c
+@@ -2756,11 +2756,16 @@ parse_rockridge_ZF1(struct file_info *file, const unsigned char *data,
+ {
+ 
+ 	if (data[0] == 0x70 && data[1] == 0x7a && data_length == 12) {
+-		/* paged zlib */
+-		file->pz = 1;
+-		file->pz_log2_bs = data[3];
+-		file->pz_uncompressed_size = archive_le32dec(&data[4]);
+-	}
++        /* paged zlib */
++        file->pz = 1;
++        file->pz_log2_bs = data[3];
++        if (file->pz_log2_bs < 15 || file->pz_log2_bs > 17) {
++            /* Invalid block size exponent; disable zisofs. */
++            file->pz = 0;
++            return;
++        }
++        file->pz_uncompressed_size = archive_le32dec(&data[4]);
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-extended/libarchive/libarchive_3.7.9.bb +1 -0
index bc0d3ba0743..de9682400a8 100644
@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ SRC_URI = "http://libarchive.org/downloads/libarchive-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://CVE-2025-60753-02.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-4111-1.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-4111-2.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-4426.patch \
            "
 UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "http://libarchive.org/"
 
#3 lore raw

PATCH 3/8 vim: fix for CVE-2026-39881

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]

[1] https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/7ab76a86048ed492374ac6b19c6cb52f89a365b4
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-39881

More details: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39881

---
 .../vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch            | 248 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc              |   1 +
 2 files changed, 249 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch
meta/recipes-support/vim/files/CVE-2026-39881.patch new file +248 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..e0d21c5f239
@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+From 7ab76a86048ed492374ac6b19c6cb52f89a365b4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]>
+Date: Tue, 7 Apr 2026 17:32:02 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] patch 9.2.0316: [security]: command injection in netbeans
+ interface via defineAnnoType
+
+Problem:  [security]: The netbeans defineAnnoType command passes typeName, fg and bg
+          unsanitized to coloncmd(), allowing a malicious server to inject
+          arbitrary Ex commands via '|'. Similarly, specialKeys does not
+          validate key tokens before building a map command.
+Solution: Validate typeName, fg and bg against an allowlist of safe
+          characters before passing them to coloncmd()
+
+Github Advisory:
+https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-mr87-rhgv-7pw6
+
+Supported by AI
+
+Signed-off-by: Christian Brabandt <[email protected]>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-39881
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/7ab76a86048ed492374ac6b19c6cb52f89a365b4]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ runtime/doc/netbeans.txt      |  4 +--
+ runtime/doc/tags              |  1 +
+ src/errors.h                  |  3 ++-
+ src/netbeans.c                | 46 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ src/po/vim.pot                |  5 +++-
+ src/testdir/test_netbeans.py  |  4 ++-
+ src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim | 38 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt b/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt
+index ca32f06f66..fa53eae784 100644
+--- a/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt
++++ b/runtime/doc/netbeans.txt
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-*netbeans.txt*  For Vim version 9.1.  Last change: 2025 Aug 10
++*netbeans.txt*  For Vim version 9.1.  Last change: 2026 Apr 30
+ 
+ 
+ 		  VIM REFERENCE MANUAL    by Gordon Prieur et al.
+@@ -847,7 +847,7 @@ REJECT		Not used.
+ These errors occur when a message violates the protocol:
+ *E627* *E628* *E629* *E632* *E633* *E634* *E635* *E636*
+ *E637* *E638* *E639* *E640* *E641* *E642* *E643* *E644* *E645* *E646*
+-*E647* *E648* *E650* *E651* *E652*
++*E647* *E648* *E649* *E650* *E651* *E652*
+ 
+ 
+ ==============================================================================
+diff --git a/runtime/doc/tags b/runtime/doc/tags
+index 8af54eae0a..300dfd18a6 100644
+--- a/runtime/doc/tags
++++ b/runtime/doc/tags
+@@ -5236,6 +5236,7 @@ E645	netbeans.txt	/*E645*
+ E646	netbeans.txt	/*E646*
+ E647	netbeans.txt	/*E647*
+ E648	netbeans.txt	/*E648*
++E649	netbeans.txt	/*E649*
+ E65	pattern.txt	/*E65*
+ E650	netbeans.txt	/*E650*
+ E651	netbeans.txt	/*E651*
+diff --git a/src/errors.h b/src/errors.h
+index 5d6867464b..01ed16a035 100644
+--- a/src/errors.h
++++ b/src/errors.h
+@@ -1664,7 +1664,8 @@ EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_setdot[]
+ 	INIT(= N_("E647: Invalid buffer identifier in setDot"));
+ EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_close[]
+ 	INIT(= N_("E648: Invalid buffer identifier in close"));
+-// E649 unused
++EXTERN char e_invalid_identifier_in_defineannotype[]
++	INIT(= N_("E649: Invalid identifier name in defineAnnoType"));
+ EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_defineannotype[]
+ 	INIT(= N_("E650: Invalid buffer identifier in defineAnnoType"));
+ EXTERN char e_invalid_buffer_identifier_in_addanno[]
+diff --git a/src/netbeans.c b/src/netbeans.c
+index 8a341a20be..599cdc1994 100644
+--- a/src/netbeans.c
++++ b/src/netbeans.c
+@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
+ #define GUARDEDOFFSET 1000000 // base for "guarded" sign id's
+ #define MAX_COLOR_LENGTH 32 // max length of color name in defineAnnoType
+ 
++// Characters valid in a sign/highlight group name
++#define VALID_CHARS         (char_u *)"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789"
++#define VALID_SIGNNAME_CHARS    VALID_CHARS "_"
++#define VALID_COLOR_CHARS       VALID_CHARS "#"
++
+ // The first implementation (working only with Netbeans) returned "1.1".  The
+ // protocol implemented here also supports A-A-P.
+ static char *ExtEdProtocolVersion = "2.5";
+@@ -77,6 +82,22 @@ static int dosetvisible = FALSE;
+ static int needupdate = 0;
+ static int inAtomic = 0;
+ 
++/*
++ * Return TRUE if "str" contains only characters from "allowed".
++ * Used to validate NetBeans-supplied strings before interpolating them
++ * into Ex commands via coloncmd().
++ */
++    static int
++nb_is_safe_string(char_u *str, char_u *allowed)
++{
++    if (str == NULL)
++	return FALSE;
++    for (char_u *p = str; *p != NUL; p++)
++	if (vim_strchr(allowed, *p) == NULL)
++	    return FALSE;
++    return TRUE;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Callback invoked when the channel is closed.
+  */
+@@ -1949,6 +1970,15 @@ nb_do_cmd(
+ 		VIM_CLEAR(typeName);
+ 		parse_error = TRUE;
+ 	    }
++	    else if (!nb_is_safe_string(typeName, VALID_SIGNNAME_CHARS) ||
++		    (*fg != NUL && !nb_is_safe_string(fg, VALID_COLOR_CHARS)) ||
++		    (*bg != NUL && !nb_is_safe_string(bg, VALID_COLOR_CHARS)))
++	    {
++		nbdebug(("    invalid chars in typeName/fg/bg in defineAnnoType\n"));
++		emsg(_(e_invalid_identifier_in_defineannotype));
++		VIM_CLEAR(typeName);
++		parse_error = TRUE;
++	    }
+ 	    else if (typeName != NULL && tooltip != NULL && glyphFile != NULL)
+ 		addsigntype(buf, typeNum, typeName, tooltip, glyphFile, fg, bg);
+ 
+@@ -2321,11 +2351,25 @@ special_keys(char_u *args)
+ 
+ 	if (strlen(tok) + i < KEYBUFLEN)
+ 	{
+-	    strcpy(&keybuf[i], tok);
++	    // Only allow alphanumeric and function-key name characters.
++	    // Reject anything else to prevent map command injection.
++	    int safe = TRUE;
++	    for (char_u *tp = (char_u *)tok; *tp != NUL; tp++)
++	    {
++		if (!ASCII_ISALNUM(*tp) && *tp != '-')
++		{
++		    safe = FALSE;
++		    break;
++		}
++	    }
++	    if (safe)
++	    {
++	    vim_strncpy((char_u *)&keybuf[i], (char_u *)tok, KEYBUFLEN - i - 1);
+ 	    vim_snprintf(cmdbuf, sizeof(cmdbuf),
+ 				 "<silent><%s> :nbkey %s<CR>", keybuf, keybuf);
+ 	    do_map(MAPTYPE_MAP, (char_u *)cmdbuf, MODE_NORMAL, FALSE);
+ 	}
++    }
+ 	tok = strtok(NULL, " ");
+     }
+     vim_free(save_str);
+diff --git a/src/po/vim.pot b/src/po/vim.pot
+index bf44567726..9608271418 100644
+--- a/src/po/vim.pot
++++ b/src/po/vim.pot
+@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ msgid ""
+ msgstr ""
+ "Project-Id-Version: Vim\n"
+ "Report-Msgid-Bugs-To: [email protected]\n"
+-"POT-Creation-Date: 2025-08-23 16:16+0200\n"
++"POT-Creation-Date: 2026-04-30 12:40+0200\n"
+ "PO-Revision-Date: YEAR-MO-DA HO:MI+ZONE\n"
+ "Last-Translator: FULL NAME <EMAIL@ADDRESS>\n"
+ "Language-Team: LANGUAGE <[email protected]>\n"
+@@ -5866,6 +5866,9 @@ msgstr ""
+ msgid "E648: Invalid buffer identifier in close"
+ msgstr ""
+ 
++msgid "E649: Invalid identifier name in defineAnnoType"
++msgstr ""
++
+ msgid "E650: Invalid buffer identifier in defineAnnoType"
+ msgstr ""
+ 
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py
+index 585886fb40..ba5fd638ec 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py
++++ b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.py
+@@ -113,7 +113,9 @@ class ThreadedTCPRequestHandler(socketserver.BaseRequestHandler):
+                   'endAtomic_Test' : '0:endAtomic!95\n',
+                   'AnnoScale_Test' : "".join(['2:defineAnnoType!60 ' + str(i) + ' "s' + str(i) + '" "x" "=>" blue none\n' for i in range(2, 26)]),
+                   'detach_Test' : '2:close!96\n1:close!97\nDETACH\n',
+-                  'specialKeys_overflow_Test' : '0:specialKeys!200 "' + 'A'*80 + '-X"\n'
++                  'specialKeys_overflow_Test' : '0:specialKeys!200 "' + 'A'*80 + '-X"\n',
++                  'defineAnnoType_injection_Test': '1:defineAnnoType!1 "MySign guifg=red|call writefile([\'inject\'],\'Xinject\')|" "tooltip" "glyphFile" 1 2\n'
++
+ 
+                 }
+                 # execute the specified test
+diff --git a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim
+index d1be5066ef..a464c63acc 100644
+--- a/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim
++++ b/src/testdir/test_netbeans.vim
+@@ -1024,4 +1024,42 @@ func Test_nb_specialKeys_overflow()
+   call s:run_server('Nb_specialKeys_overflow')
+ endfunc
+ 
++func Nb_defineAnnoType_injection(port)
++  call writefile([], "Xnetbeans", 'D')
++  let g:last = 0
++
++  exe 'nbstart :localhost:' .. a:port .. ':bunny'
++  call assert_true(has("netbeans_enabled"))
++  call WaitFor('len(ReadXnetbeans()) > (g:last + 2)')
++  let g:last += 3
++
++  split Xcmdbuf
++  let cmdbufnr = bufnr()
++  call WaitFor('len(ReadXnetbeans()) > (g:last + 2)')
++  let g:last += 3
++  hide
++
++  sleep 1m
++
++  call delete('Xinject')
++  call appendbufline(cmdbufnr, '$', 'defineAnnoType_injection_Test')
++  " E475 from :sign is expected — catch it before RunServer sees it.
++  " give it a bit of time to process it
++  try
++    sleep 500m
++  catch /E475/
++  catch /E649/
++  endtry
++
++  " Injected call must not have created this file
++  call assert_false(filereadable('Xinject'))
++  call delete('Xinject')
++  bwipe! Xcmdbuf
++  nbclose
++endfunc
++
++func Test_nb_defineAnnoType_injection()
++  call ch_log('Test_nb_defineAnnoType_injection')
++  call s:run_server('Nb_defineAnnoType_injection')
++endfunc
+ " vim: shiftwidth=2 sts=2 expandtab
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-support/vim/vim.inc +1 -0
index 9456cf3e13c..1396ac4fbc7 100644
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ SRC_URI = "git://github.com/vim/vim.git;branch=master;protocol=https \
            file://CVE-2026-33412.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-28418.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-28419.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-39881.patch \
            "
 
 PV .= ".1683"
#4 lore raw

PATCH 4/8 sudo: fix for CVE-2026-35535

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at Debian report in [2]

[1] https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/3e474c2f201484be83d994ae10a4e20e8c81bb69
[2] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-35535
[3] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35535

---
 .../sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch           | 150 ++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.17p2.bb   |   1 +
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/files/CVE-2026-35535.patch new file +150 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..8c27d2772bb
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+From 3e474c2f201484be83d994ae10a4e20e8c81bb69 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Todd C. Miller" <[email protected]>
+Date: Sat, 8 Nov 2025 15:34:02 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] exec_mailer: Set group as well as uid when running the mailer
+
+Also make a setuid(), setgid() or setgroups() failure fatal.
+
+Found by the ZeroPath AI Security Engineer <https://zeropath.com>
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-35535
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/sudo-project/sudo/commit/3e474c2f201484be83d994ae10a4e20e8c81bb69]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ include/sudo_eventlog.h      |  3 ++-
+ lib/eventlog/eventlog.c      | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
+ lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c |  4 +++-
+ plugins/sudoers/logging.c    |  2 +-
+ plugins/sudoers/policy.c     |  2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/sudo_eventlog.h b/include/sudo_eventlog.h
+index eb9f4f4..485d259 100644
+--- a/include/sudo_eventlog.h
++++ b/include/sudo_eventlog.h
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ struct eventlog_config {
+     int syslog_rejectpri;
+     int syslog_alertpri;
+     uid_t mailuid;
++    gid_t mailgid;
+     bool omit_hostname;
+     const char *logpath;
+     const char *time_fmt;
+@@ -151,7 +152,7 @@ void eventlog_set_syslog_rejectpri(int pri);
+ void eventlog_set_syslog_alertpri(int pri);
+ void eventlog_set_syslog_maxlen(size_t len);
+ void eventlog_set_file_maxlen(size_t len);
+-void eventlog_set_mailuid(uid_t uid);
++void eventlog_set_mailuser(uid_t uid, gid_t gid);
+ void eventlog_set_omit_hostname(bool omit_hostname);
+ void eventlog_set_logpath(const char *path);
+ void eventlog_set_time_fmt(const char *fmt);
+diff --git a/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c b/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c
+index 5a32824..d56c4e4 100644
+--- a/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c
++++ b/lib/eventlog/eventlog.c
+@@ -304,15 +304,13 @@ exec_mailer(int pipein)
+ 	syslog(LOG_ERR, _("unable to dup stdin: %m")); // -V618
+ 	sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR,
+ 	    "unable to dup stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
+-	sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys);
+-	_exit(127);
++	goto bad;
+     }
+ 
+     /* Build up an argv based on the mailer path and flags */
+     if ((mflags = strdup(evl_conf->mailerflags)) == NULL) {
+ 	syslog(LOG_ERR, _("unable to allocate memory")); // -V618
+-	sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys);
+-	_exit(127);
++	goto bad;
+     }
+     argv[0] = sudo_basename(mpath);
+ 
+@@ -331,11 +329,23 @@ exec_mailer(int pipein)
+     if (setuid(ROOT_UID) != 0) {
+ 	sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to change uid to %u",
+ 	    ROOT_UID);
++	goto bad;
++    }
++    if (setgid(evl_conf->mailgid) != 0) {
++	sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to change gid to %u",
++	    (unsigned int)evl_conf->mailgid);
++	goto bad;
++    }
++    if (setgroups(1, &evl_conf->mailgid) != 0) {
++	sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to set groups to %u",
++	    (unsigned int)evl_conf->mailgid);
++	goto bad;
+     }
+     if (evl_conf->mailuid != ROOT_UID) {
+ 	if (setuid(evl_conf->mailuid) != 0) {
+ 	    sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to change uid to %u",
+ 		(unsigned int)evl_conf->mailuid);
++	    goto bad;
+ 	}
+     }
+     sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys);
+@@ -347,6 +357,9 @@ exec_mailer(int pipein)
+     sudo_debug_printf(SUDO_DEBUG_ERROR, "unable to execute %s: %s",
+ 	mpath, strerror(errno));
+     _exit(127);
++bad:
++    sudo_debug_exit(__func__, __FILE__, __LINE__, sudo_debug_subsys);
++    _exit(127);
+ }
+ 
+ /* Send a message to the mailto user */
+diff --git a/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c b/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c
+index 0663a38..ec3b569 100644
+--- a/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c
++++ b/lib/eventlog/eventlog_conf.c
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ static struct eventlog_config evl_conf = {
+     MAXSYSLOGLEN,		/* syslog_maxlen */
+     0,				/* file_maxlen */
+     ROOT_UID,			/* mailuid */
++    ROOT_GID,			/* mailgid */
+     false,			/* omit_hostname */
+     _PATH_SUDO_LOGFILE,		/* logpath */
+     "%h %e %T",			/* time_fmt */
+@@ -151,9 +152,10 @@ eventlog_set_file_maxlen(size_t len)
+ }
+ 
+ void
+-eventlog_set_mailuid(uid_t uid)
++eventlog_set_mailuser(uid_t uid, gid_t gid)
+ {
+     evl_conf.mailuid = uid;
++    evl_conf.mailgid = gid;
+ }
+ 
+ void
+diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/logging.c b/plugins/sudoers/logging.c
+index bd4de92..9535289 100644
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/logging.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/logging.c
+@@ -1157,7 +1157,7 @@ init_eventlog_config(void)
+     eventlog_set_syslog_alertpri(def_syslog_badpri);
+     eventlog_set_syslog_maxlen(def_syslog_maxlen);
+     eventlog_set_file_maxlen(def_loglinelen);
+-    eventlog_set_mailuid(ROOT_UID);
++    eventlog_set_mailuser(ROOT_UID, ROOT_GID);
+     eventlog_set_omit_hostname(!def_log_host);
+     eventlog_set_logpath(def_logfile);
+     eventlog_set_time_fmt(def_log_year ? "%h %e %T %Y" : "%h %e %T");
+diff --git a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
+index f3adfb0..27f6e58 100644
+--- a/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
++++ b/plugins/sudoers/policy.c
+@@ -639,7 +639,7 @@ sudoers_policy_deserialize_info(struct sudoers_context *ctx, void *v,
+     }
+ 
+ #ifdef NO_ROOT_MAILER
+-    eventlog_set_mailuid(ctx->user.uid);
++    eventlog_set_mailuser(ctx->user.uid, ctx->user.gid);
+ #endif
+ 
+     /* Dump settings and user info (XXX - plugin args) */
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-extended/sudo/sudo_1.9.17p2.bb +1 -0
index d715bc2075f..c934dfdce27 100644
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ require sudo.inc
 SRC_URI = "https://www.sudo.ws/dist/sudo-${PV}.tar.gz \
            ${@bb.utils.contains('DISTRO_FEATURES', 'pam', '${PAM_SRC_URI}', '', d)} \
            file://0001-sudo.conf.in-fix-conflict-with-multilib.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-35535.patch \
            "
 
 PAM_SRC_URI = "file://sudo.pam"
#5 lore raw

PATCH 5/8 coreutils: set CVE_PRODUCT

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Peter Marko <[email protected]>

This removes rust uutils coreutils CVEs from reports. Comparing sbom-cve-check shows that only CVE-2026-35338..CVE-2026-35381 are removed and all of them contained reference to uutils.

(From OE-Core rev: 5c39687f62e5864ea783cbed497c2eb5387dcf96)

---
 meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.4.bb | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
meta/recipes-core/coreutils/coreutils_9.4.bb +2 -0
index caed1f8c499..a9618c8ab84 100644
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/coreutils/${BP}.tar.xz \
            "
 SRC_URI[sha256sum] = "ea613a4cf44612326e917201bbbcdfbd301de21ffc3b59b6e5c07e040b275e52"
 
+CVE_PRODUCT = "gnu:coreutils"
+
 # http://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/coreutils.git/commit/?id=v8.27-101-gf5d7c0842
 #
 CVE_STATUS[CVE-2016-2781] = "disputed: runcon is not really a sandbox command, use `runcon ... setsid ...` to avoid this particular issue."
#6 lore raw

PATCH 6/8 inetutils: fix for CVE-2026-32772

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>

Pick patch from [1] also mentioned at NVD report in [2]

[1] https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/13/1
[2] https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32772
[3] https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/patch/?id=d6b8b83aa51616946fd314bc48087312d13c99f8
[4] https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2026-32772

[YC: NEWS diff in [3] links to [1]]
---
 .../inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch  | 172 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../inetutils/inetutils_2.5.bb                |   1 +
 2 files changed, 173 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch
meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils/CVE-2026-32772.patch new file +172 -0
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..cc44f9531a4
@@ -0,0 +1,172 @@
+From d6b8b83aa51616946fd314bc48087312d13c99f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Collin Funk <[email protected]>
+Date: Thu, 26 Mar 2026 22:52:54 -0700
+Subject: telnet: don't leak the value of unexported environment variables
+
+Patch based on the following OpenBSD commit:
+<https://github.com/openbsd/src/commit/1a11dc7253488a97d6df686dae9230f78682e8df>
+
+* telnet/commands.c (env_getvalue): Add a boolean argument to prevent
+prevent unexported variables from being returned.
+* telnet/externs.h (env_getvalue): Adjust the function declaration.
+* telnet/authenc.c (telnet_getenv): Add the new argument.
+* telnet/telnet.c (dooption, gettermname, suboption, env_opt_add)
+(telnet): Likewise.
+
+A telnet server can read a client's environment variables with the
+NEW-ENVIRON option and the SEND ENV_USERVAR command.
+
+This had previously been reported as CVE-2005-0488, but inetutils never
+got a fix for it.
+
+Reported-by: Justin Swartz <[email protected]>
+Based-on-patch: https://gitlab.com/redhat/centos-stream/rpms/telnet/-/blob/c9s/telnet-0.17-env.patch
+Link: https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/03/13/1
+
+CVE: CVE-2026-32772
+Upstream-Status: Backport [https://cgit.git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/inetutils.git/patch/?id=d6b8b83aa51616946fd314bc48087312d13c99f8]
+Signed-off-by: Hitendra Prajapati <[email protected]>
+---
+ libtelnet/misc-proto.h |  4 +++-
+ telnet/authenc.c       |  4 ++--
+ telnet/commands.c      |  5 +++--
+ telnet/externs.h       |  4 +++-
+ telnet/telnet.c        | 10 +++++-----
+ 5 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libtelnet/misc-proto.h b/libtelnet/misc-proto.h
+index abf8316..a836a69 100644
+--- a/libtelnet/misc-proto.h
++++ b/libtelnet/misc-proto.h
+@@ -68,6 +68,8 @@
+ #ifndef __MISC_PROTO__
+ # define __MISC_PROTO__
+ 
++#include <stdbool.h>
++
+ void auth_encrypt_init (char *, char *, char *, char *, int);
+ void auth_encrypt_user (char *);
+ void auth_encrypt_connect (int);
+@@ -79,6 +81,6 @@ void printd (unsigned char *, int);
+ int net_write (unsigned char *, int);
+ void net_encrypt (void);
+ int telnet_spin (void);
+-char *telnet_getenv (char *);
++char *telnet_getenv (char *, bool);
+ char *telnet_gets (char *, char *, int, int);
+ #endif
+diff --git a/telnet/authenc.c b/telnet/authenc.c
+index b019251..dcd19e8 100644
+--- a/telnet/authenc.c
++++ b/telnet/authenc.c
+@@ -91,9 +91,9 @@ telnet_spin ()
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-telnet_getenv (char *val)
++telnet_getenv (char *val, bool exported_only)
+ {
+-  return ((char *) env_getvalue (val));
++  return ((char *) env_getvalue (val, exported_only));
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+diff --git a/telnet/commands.c b/telnet/commands.c
+index 2a133c9..d8d0864 100644
+--- a/telnet/commands.c
++++ b/telnet/commands.c
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
+ 
++#include <stdbool.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <limits.h>		/* LLONG_MAX for Solaris. */
+ 
+@@ -2059,10 +2060,10 @@ env_default (int init, int welldefined)
+ }
+ 
+ unsigned char *
+-env_getvalue (const char *var)
++env_getvalue (const char *var, bool exported_only)
+ {
+   register struct env_lst *ep = env_find (var);
+-  if (ep)
++  if (ep && (!exported_only || ep->export))
+     return (ep->value);
+   return (NULL);
+ }
+diff --git a/telnet/externs.h b/telnet/externs.h
+index f79c6ae..e0d9fbc 100644
+--- a/telnet/externs.h
++++ b/telnet/externs.h
+@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <stdbool.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <setjmp.h>
+ #if defined CRAY && !defined NO_BSD_SETJMP
+@@ -331,7 +332,8 @@ env_opt (unsigned char *, int),
+ env_opt_start (void),
+ env_opt_start_info (void), env_opt_add (unsigned char *), env_opt_end (int);
+ 
+-extern unsigned char *env_default (int, int), *env_getvalue (const char *);
++extern unsigned char *env_default (int, int);
++extern unsigned char *env_getvalue (const char *, bool);
+ 
+ int dosynch (const char *);
+ int get_status (const char *);
+diff --git a/telnet/telnet.c b/telnet/telnet.c
+index 8884b6e..6a5cf8b 100644
+--- a/telnet/telnet.c
++++ b/telnet/telnet.c
+@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@ dooption (int option)
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	    case TELOPT_XDISPLOC:	/* X Display location */
+-	      if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY"))
++	      if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY", false))
+ 		new_state_ok = 1;
+ 	      break;
+ 
+@@ -793,7 +793,7 @@ gettermname (void)
+       resettermname = 0;
+       if (tnamep && tnamep != unknown)
+ 	free (tnamep);
+-      if ((tname = (char *) env_getvalue ("TERM")) &&
++      if ((tname = (char *) env_getvalue ("TERM", false)) &&
+ 	  (init_term (tname, &err) == 0))
+ 	{
+ 	  tnamep = mklist (termbuf, tname);
+@@ -992,7 +992,7 @@ suboption (void)
+ 	  unsigned char temp[50], *dp;
+ 	  int len;
+ 
+-	  if ((dp = env_getvalue ("DISPLAY")) == NULL)
++	  if ((dp = env_getvalue ("DISPLAY", false)) == NULL)
+ 	    {
+ 	      /*
+ 	       * Something happened, we no longer have a DISPLAY
+@@ -1727,7 +1727,7 @@ env_opt_add (register unsigned char *ep)
+ 	env_opt_add (ep);
+       return;
+     }
+-  vp = env_getvalue ((char *) ep);
++  vp = env_getvalue ((char *) ep, true);
+   if (opt_replyp + (vp ? strlen ((char *) vp) : 0) +
+       strlen ((char *) ep) + 6 > opt_replyend)
+     {
+@@ -2484,7 +2484,7 @@ telnet (char *user)
+       send_will (TELOPT_LINEMODE, 1);
+       send_will (TELOPT_NEW_ENVIRON, 1);
+       send_do (TELOPT_STATUS, 1);
+-      if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY"))
++      if (env_getvalue ("DISPLAY", false))
+ 	send_will (TELOPT_XDISPLOC, 1);
+       if (eight)
+ 	tel_enter_binary (eight);
+-- 
+2.50.1
+
meta/recipes-connectivity/inetutils/inetutils_2.5.bb +1 -0
index 29ff62379d3..2e1d2a30d7a 100644
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ SRC_URI = "${GNU_MIRROR}/inetutils/inetutils-${PV}.tar.xz \
            file://CVE-2026-24061-2.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-28372.patch \
            file://CVE-2026-32746.patch \
+           file://CVE-2026-32772.patch \
            "
 
 inherit autotools gettext update-alternatives texinfo
#7 lore raw

PATCH 7/8 devtool: Disable gpg signing when setting up source tree repos

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Moritz Haase <[email protected]>

This stops 'devtool modify foo' from failing with an error message like

ERROR: Execution of 'git -c user.name=\"OpenEmbedded\" -c user.email=\"oe.patch@oe\" commit -q -m "Initial commit from upstream at version 1.90.0"' failed with exit code 128:
error: cannot run ssh-keygen: No such file or directory error:
fatal: failed to write commit object

when GPG signing is enabled in the git configuration.

(cherry picked from commit b5c84b07b87eafb4f68f7662b6cf26d8b73e3247)

---
 scripts/lib/devtool/__init__.py | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
scripts/lib/devtool/__init__.py +1 -1
index 6133c1c5b4d..c18887c6ced 100644
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ def setup_git_repo(repodir, version, devbranch, basetag='devtool-base', d=None):
         bb.process.run('git add -f -A .', cwd=repodir)
         commit_cmd = ['git']
         oe.patch.GitApplyTree.gitCommandUserOptions(commit_cmd, d=d)
-        commit_cmd += ['commit', '-q']
+        commit_cmd += ['commit', '-q', '--no-gpg-sign']
         stdout, _ = bb.process.run('git status --porcelain', cwd=repodir)
         if not stdout:
             commit_cmd.append('--allow-empty')
#8 lore raw

PATCH 8/8 glibc: Fix recipe bug that disabled stack protector

In reply to Yoann Congal

From: Ivan Nestlerode <[email protected]>

Fixes [YOCTO #16265]

The glibc recipe is supposed to be building with --enable-stack-protector=strong, but some CACHED_CONFIGVARS values are actually breaking this, causing glibc to be built with no stack protector at all.

Remove these CACHED_CONFIGVARS values so that stack protector support is detected properly in do_configure and then enabled properly during do_compile.

Full details are here:
https://bugzilla.yoctoproject.org/show_bug.cgi?id=16265

(cherry picked from commit 43f0602ede37428f3c35cf665bba934b84355240)
---
 meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc.inc | 3 ---
 1 file changed, 3 deletions(-)
meta/recipes-core/glibc/glibc.inc +0 -3
index b08a70aa46a..225d0539a01 100644
@@ -17,9 +17,6 @@ CACHED_CONFIGUREVARS += " \
   libc_cv_slibdir=${base_libdir} \
   libc_cv_rootsbindir=${base_sbindir} \
   libc_cv_localedir=${localedir} \
-  libc_cv_ssp_strong=no \
-  libc_cv_ssp_all=no \
-  libc_cv_ssp=no \
   libc_cv_include_x86_isa_level=no \
 "