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Add RMPOPT support.

PATCH Superseded Ashish Kalra 2 participants 10 messages Sep 16

Subsystems (6)
x86 KVM Crypto API KVM x86 +2 more subsystems

v15 of 16 Superseded Latest is v16 →

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Ashish Kalra

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v15 cover Add RMPOPT support.

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

In the SEV-SNP architecture, hypervisor and non-SNP guests are subject to RMP checks on writes to provide integrity of SEV-SNP guest memory.

The RMPOPT architecture enables optimizations whereby the RMP checks can be skipped if 1GB regions of memory are known to not contain any SNP guest memory.

RMPOPT is a new instruction designed to minimize the performance overhead of RMP checks for the hypervisor and non-SNP guests.

RMPOPT instruction currently supports two functions. In case of the verify and report status function the CPU will read the RMP contents, verify the entire 1GB region starting at the provided SPA is HV-owned. For the entire 1GB region it checks that all RMP entries in this region are HV-owned (i.e, not in assigned state) and then accordingly updates the RMPOPT table to indicate if optimization has been enabled and provide indication to software if the optimization was successful.

In case of report status function, the CPU returns the optimization status for the 1GB region.

The RMPOPT table is managed by a combination of software and hardware. Software uses the RMPOPT instruction to set bits in the table, indicating that regions of memory are entirely HV-owned. Hardware automatically clears bits in the RMPOPT table when RMP contents are changed during RMPUPDATE instruction.

For more information on the RMPOPT instruction, see the AMD64 RMPOPT technical documentation.

As SNP is enabled by default the hypervisor and non-SNP guests are subject to RMP write checks to provide integrity of SNP guest memory.

This patch-series adds support to enable RMP optimizations for up to 2TB of system RAM across the system and allow RMPUPDATE to disable those optimizations as SNP guests are launched.

Support for RAM larger than 2 TB will be added in follow-on series.

This series also adds support to disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active, as the SEV firmware enumerates CPUs at SNP initialization and is not aware of the OS bringing CPUs online or offline afterwards. This also keeps the set of CPUs stable for the asynchronous RMPOPT scan, so the per-core RMPOPT_BASE MSRs programmed during setup remain valid.

This series also introduces support to re-enable RMP optimizations during SNP guest termination, after guest pages have been converted back to shared.

RMP optimizations are performed asynchronously by queuing work on a dedicated workqueue after a 10 second delay.

Delaying work allows batching of multiple SNP guest terminations.

Once 1GB hugetlb guest_memfd support is merged, support for re-enabling RMPOPT optimizations during 1GB page cleanup will be added in follow-on series.

v15:
- 3/5 (Initialize RMPOPT MSRs): rename snp_setup_rmpopt() to snp_enable_rmpopt(); program each core's RMPOPT_BASE only when it is not already set.
- 4/5 (async RMPOPT): split setup from enable -- an initcall allocates the workqueue and computes the (fixed) optimization range once, and snp_enable_rmpopt() programs the RMPOPT_BASE MSRs and queues the optimization pass. Gate rmpopt_capable() on a static rmpopt_enabled bool instead of an if (rmpopt_wq) check and drop rmpopt_wq_mutex. Queue both the initial and the teardown pass with mod_delayed_work().
- 5/5 (Re-enable on guest shutdown): call snp_enable_rmpopt() on guest teardown instead of a separate snp_rmpopt_all_physmem().

This is a full resend rather than a 4/5-5/5 reply because patch 3 changed as part of the setup/enable split.

Review feedback from Borislav Petkov.

v14:
- 3/5 (Initialize RMPOPT MSRs): remove rmpopt_disable() and the RMPOPT_BASE teardown from this patch. RMPOPT is now set up once and not torn down, so the RMPOPT_BASE MSRs are left in place on shutdown; the (now minimal) disable path moves to 4/5.
- 4/5 (async RMPOPT): rework the setup/teardown -- initialize once and do not tear it down. rmpopt_disable() now only cancels the pending re-optimization pass. Use a dedicated per-CPU workqueue (WQ_PERCPU) and drop the migrate_disable()/migrate_enable() around the local warm-up scan. Add a binutils-version comment above the RMPOPT .byte encoding and trim redundant comments and the 2 TB pr_info(). Reword the subject to "Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously".
- 5/5 (Re-enable on guest shutdown): move the call-site comment onto the snp_rmpopt_all_physmem() definition and simplify the RMPOPT_WORK_TIMEOUT comment.
- Correct the Suggested-by/Reviewed-by tags across the series.

Review feedback from Borislav Petkov.

v13:
- 3/5 (Initialize RMPOPT MSRs): use cpu_primary_thread_mask directly instead of building a local rmpopt_cpumask -- all primary threads are online while SNP is active, so the two are equivalent. Rename snp_cleanup_rmpopt() to rmpopt_disable().
- 4/5 (async RMPOPT): drop the leader/follower bookkeeping. Warm the RMP scan cache once, then fan the RMPOPT out to cpu_primary_thread_mask; re-running RMPOPT on the warm-up CPU is a cache hit, so the separate follower cpumask and the cpumask_andnot() are no longer needed. Rename rmpopt_work_handler() to do_rmpopt_work() and drop the now-unused this_cpu.
- Add Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <[email protected]> to the series.

Review feedback from Borislav Petkov.

v12:
- Merged the former "Add interface to re-enable RMP optimizations" and "KVM: SEV: Perform RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown" patches into a single patch (now 5/5), since the interface has no user without the KVM caller. The series is now 5 patches.
- 2/5 (Disable CPU hotplug): drop a stray reference to later patches from the commit message and trim the snp_prepare() comment. Move cpu_hotplug_enable() to the end of snp_shutdown(), after clear_rmp() and the mfd_reconfigure() IPI, so no all-CPU operation runs after hotplug is re-enabled.
- 3/5 (Initialize RMPOPT MSRs): restructure snp_probe_rmptable_info() so the contiguous probe (which clears X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) is the common fall-through, also covering X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP advertised but disabled by firmware. Move snp_setup_rmpopt() to the end of __sev_snp_init_locked(). Give snp_cleanup_rmpopt() its own short comment in snp_shutdown().
- 4/5 (async RMPOPT): document the optimization trigger points in the commit message. Rename enum rmpopt_function to rmpopt_op_type. Merge __rmpopt() into rmpopt() and replace rmpopt_smp() with a new rmpopt_scan_range() that loops as the on_each_cpu() callback, so the follower scan issues one IPI per core rather than one per 1GB. Use u64 for physical addresses. Allocate the follower cpumask once at setup. Document rmpopt_wq as the setup sentinel. Move the RMPOPT_WORK_TIMEOUT define to the guest-shutdown patch (its only user) as (10 * MSEC_PER_SEC). Remove a spammy pr_info() and reword comments.
- 5/5 (Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown): document why re-optimization is driven by guest teardown (the only event that returns guest memory to hypervisor ownership); reword the commit message (s/clear/disable/ for optimizations, drop "Conversely").

Review feedback from Borislav Petkov.

v11:
- Reordered so "Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active" (2/6) precedes "Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs" (3/6): the RMPOPT setup/cleanup code is then introduced with CPU hotplug already disabled and never takes cpus_read_lock().
- 1/6 (cpufeatures): drop the tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h change and adopt the commit message as applied by Boris.
- 2/6 (Disable CPU hotplug): reword the commit message. Drop the redundant cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() in snp_prepare() in this same patch -- with hotplug disabled the online CPU mask is stable, so the read lock is not needed and hotplug handling has no hole when bisecting.
- 3/6 (Initialize RMPOPT MSRs): replace the rmpopt_capable bool with a small helper local to arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c -- cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) && cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) -- clearing X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT for a contiguous (non-segmented) RMP in snp_probe_rmptable_info() (runs at BSP init, before alternatives). Rename rmpopt_cleanup() to snp_cleanup_rmpopt() to match snp_setup_rmpopt(). Both are introduced without cpus_read_lock() (hotplug is already disabled by 2/6). Simplify the RMPOPT_BASE comments. Drop the now-unused <asm/sev.h> include from core.c.
- 4/6 (async RMPOPT): the follower scan is likewise introduced without cpus_read_lock(). Drop the cond_resched() calls (nops on x86). On re-initialization after a legacy SNP shutdown, re-queue the optimization pass instead of skipping it. pr_warn() on cpumask allocation failure.

Review feedback from Borislav Petkov and K Prateek Nayak.

v10:
- Rework the CPU-hotplug patch (3/6): disable CPU hotplug in snp_prepare(), before SnpEn is set, instead of late in __sev_snp_init_locked(), so no CPU can come online without SnpEn during SNP initialization (per upstream review). Tie hotplug to SnpEn: it stays disabled while SnpEn is set -- including across a failed SNP_INIT and across the legacy SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX path -- and is re-enabled only once the firmware clears SnpEn on the x86_snp_shutdown path. Drop the separate idempotent flag: snp_prepare() re-enables hotplug on its own early failure, and a kexec target that boots with SnpEn already set disables hotplug once in snp_rmptable_init(). Reword the commit log and comments accordingly.
- Emit a pr_warn() in rmpopt_work_handler() (4/6) when the follower cpumask allocation fails, instead of silently skipping the optimization pass.

Sashiko AI upstream review identified several of the above issues.

v9:
- Rename rmpopt_configured to rmpopt_capable.
- Make rmpopt_cpumask a cpumask_var_t (allocated/freed at setup/cleanup) instead of a static cpumask_t.
- Drop the v8 WARN_ON_ONCE() on the RMPOPT_BASE writes; use a plain wrmsrq_on_cpu(), matching the SNP MSR-write convention in this file.
- Disable CPU hotplug with cpu_hotplug_disable()/cpu_hotplug_enable() (per tglx); re-enable only on the full x86_snp_shutdown path.
- Simplify rmpopt_work_handler() to a single leader-then-followers path:
with CPU hotplug disabled while SNP is active and snp_prepare() requiring all CPUs online when RMPOPT_BASE is programmed, every core is always programmed, so the explicit-leader fallback is now unreachable. Drop it along with the v8 work_on_cpu()/rmpopt_leader_fn() helper.
- Drop the debugfs interface (was patch 7/7) and its report-only plumbing; observability will be revisited after this series is merged.
- Restrict snp_rmpopt_all_physmem()'s export to the kvm-amd module.
- Use scoped_guard(cpus_read_lock) for the per-CPU MSR and follower loops.

Sashiko AI upstream review identified several of the above issues.

v8:
- Add a new patch to disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active, keeping the CPU set stable for the RMPOPT work handler.
- Drop the setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) calls; the rmpopt_configured bool is the runtime guard.
- WARN_ON_ONCE() on the RMPOPT_BASE MSR writes that previously ignored their return value.
- Simplify rmpopt_work_handler() by removing the explicit-leader
fallback: with CPU hotplug disabled while SNP is active and snp_prepare() requiring all CPUs online when RMPOPT_BASE is programmed, every core is always programmed, so the running CPU can always be the leader. This drops the smp_call_function_single() fallback (and with it the AB-BA deadlock and IRQ-latency concerns) and collapses the leader selection into a single leader-then-followers path.
- Use mod_delayed_work() in snp_rmpopt_all_physmem() so the batching delay tracks the last SNP guest termination.

Sashiko AI code review identified several of the above issues.

v7:
- Sync tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h to mirror the kernel header for X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT.
- Fix commit title to use X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT to match the code (was X86_FEATURE_AMD_RMPOPT).
- Add static bool rmpopt_configured, set only when segmented RMP setup succeeds in setup_rmptable(). Check rmpopt_configured alongside cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) in snp_setup_rmpopt() and snp_rmpopt_all_physmem(), because setup_clear_cpu_cap() is unreliable after alternatives are patched. Add snp_clear_rmpopt_configured() called from amd_cc_platform_clear() when CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP is cleared. Do not use __ro_after_init on rmpopt_configured since the writer snp_clear_rmpopt_configured() is not __init.
- Add cond_resched() to all three leader loops in rmpopt_work_handler() to prevent soft lockups on systems with up to 2TB of RAM.
- Add comment above __rmpopt() documenting the RMPOPT instruction encoding (F2 0F 01 FC) and register interface (RAX = system physical address input, RCX = operation type input, RFLAGS.CF = output).
Note: RMPOPT does not modify RAX unlike PVALIDATE/RMPUPDATE, so the existing "a" (input-only) constraint is correct.

Sashiko AI code review identified several of the above issues.

v6:
- Drop wrmsrq_on_cpus() helper; use for_each_cpu() with wrmsrq_on_cpu() instead, as RMPOPT_BASE MSR programming is not performance-critical.
- Rewrite rmpopt_work_handler() leader selection to use a local follower_mask copy instead of modifying the global rmpopt_cpumask. This eliminates the current_cpu_cleared tracking and the restore at the end, and removes the need for synchronization comments about transient cpumask inconsistency.
- Add three-way leader selection in rmpopt_work_handler():
1. Current CPU is a primary thread in cpumask: run leader locally.
2. Current CPU is a sibling thread whose primary is in cpumask:
run leader locally (RMPOPT_BASE MSR is per-core), remove the primary from followers via cpumask_andnot(topology_sibling_cpumask).
3. Current CPU's core has no RMPOPT_BASE MSR programmed: pick an explicit leader via cpumask_first() + smp_call_function_single() to avoid #UD, with cpus_read_lock() around the IPI loop.
- Add WARN_ON_ONCE guard for empty cpumask in the explicit leader fallback path, with migrate_enable() before goto out.
- Add .llseek = seq_lseek to rmpopt_table_fops for consistency with other seq_file-based debugfs files and to support tools like "less".
- Change debugfs file permissions from 0444 to 0400 to restrict access to root only.
- Add comment in rmpopt_table_seq_show() explaining why cpu_online_mask is safe: RMPOPT_BASE MSR is per-core and snp_prepare() ensures all CPUs are online when the MSR is programmed.

Sashiko AI code review identified several of the above issues.

v5:
- Introduce rmpopt_cleanup() to tear down workqueue, debugfs, cpumask, and MSR state, called from snp_shutdown().
- Introduce rmpopt_wq_mutex to serialize snp_setup_rmpopt(), snp_rmpopt_all_physmem(), and rmpopt_cleanup().
- Introduce rmpopt_show_mutex to serialize debugfs reporting of rmpopt_report_cpumask.
- Move snp_rmpopt_all_physmem() call after SNP DECOMMISSION during guest shutdown.
- Use migrate_disable()/migrate_enable() for CPU pinning in the rmpopt_work_handler() leader loop to maintain CPU affinity without disabling preemption for the entire RMPOPT scan.
- Add cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() around the follower on_each_cpu_mask() loop in rmpopt_work_handler().
- Guard snp_setup_rmpopt() against re-initialization when SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX with x86_snp_shutdown=0 skips rmpopt_cleanup() but clears snp_initialized, preventing workqueue and resource leaks on repeated init/shutdown cycles.
- Replace setup_clear_cpu_cap() with pr_err() on alloc_workqueue() failure in snp_setup_rmpopt(), as setup_clear_cpu_cap() cannot be used after alternatives are patched; callers check rmpopt_wq != NULL as the runtime guard instead.
- Add pr_info() when RMPOPT coverage is capped at 2TB.
- Add comments noting CPU hotplug is not supported with SNP enabled and only online primary threads are covered by rmpopt_cpumask.
- Add comment in setup_rmptable() noting Segmented RMP must be enabled to enable RMPOPT.
- Simplify cpumask setup loop to set if primary thread rather than skip if not primary.
- Improve grammar and clarity in snp_setup_rmpopt() comments.
- Added Reviewed-by's.

Sashiko AI code review identified several of the above issues.

v4:
- Add new wrmsrq_on_cpus() helper to write same u64 value to a per-CPU MSR across a cpumask without per-cpu struct allocation overhead.
- Rename configure_and_enable_rmpopt() to snp_setup_rmpopt().
- Use wrmsrq_on_cpus() instead of wrmsrq_on_cpu() loop for programming RMPOPT_BASE MSRs.
- Add setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) if segmented RMP setup fails or workqueue allocation fails.
- Add X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT feature clear logic in amd_cc_platform_clear() for CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP.
- All of the above allow checking for only X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT for both RMPOPT setup/enable and RMP re-optimizations.
- Rename snp_perform_rmp_optimization() to snp_rmpopt_all_physmem().
- Split rmpopt() into rmpopt() and rmpopt_smp() for SMP callback use.
- Introduce separate rmpopt_report_cpumask for debugfs reporting, distinct from rmpopt_cpumask used for primary thread tracking.
- Remove snp_perform_rmp_optimization() call from __sev_snp_init_locked() and instead setup and enable RMPOPT after SNP is enabled and initialized.

v3:
- Drop all RMPOPT kthread support and introduce adding custom and dedicated workqueue to schedule delayed and asynchronous RMPOPT work.
- Drop the guest_memfd inode cleanup interface and add support to re-enable RMP optimizations during guest shutdown using the asynchronous and delayed workqueue interface.
- Introduce new __rmpopt() helper and rmpopt() and rmpopt_report_status() wrappers on top which use rax and rcx parameters to closely match RMPOPT specs.
- Use new optimized RMPOPT loop to issue RMPOPT instructions on all system RAM upto 2TB and all CPUs, by optimizing each range on one CPU first, then let other CPUs execute RMPOPT in parallel so they can skip most work as the range has already been optimized.
- Also add support for running the optimized RMPOPT loop only on one thread per core.
- Replace all PUD_SIZE references with SZ_1G to conform to 1GB regions as specified by RMPOPT specifications and not be dependent on PUD_SIZE which makes the RMPOPT patch-set independent of x86 page table sizes.
- Use wrmsrq_on_cpu() to program the RMPOPT_BASE MSR registers on all CPUs that removes all ugly casting to use on_each_cpu_mask().
- Fix inline commits and patch commit messages

v2:
- Drop all NUMA and Socket configuration and enablement support and enable RMPOPT support for up to 2TB of system RAM.
- Drop get_cpumask_of_primary_threads() and enable per-core RMPOPT base MSRs and issue RMPOPT instruction on all CPUs.
- Drop the configfs interface to manually re-enable RMP optimizations.
- Add new guest_memfd cleanup interface to automatically re-enable RMP optimizations during guest shutdown.
- Include references to the public RMPOPT documentation.
- Move debugfs directory for RMPOPT under architecuture specific parent directory.

Ashish Kalra (5):
x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT feature flag x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown

 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h |   2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h   |   3 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h         |   2 +
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    |   1 +
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c             |   2 +
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c            | 181 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c       |   2 +
 7 files changed, 177 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#1 lore raw

PATCH v15 1/5 x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT feature flag

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

Add a flag indicating whether RMPOPT instruction is supported.

RMPOPT is a new instruction that reduces the performance overhead of RMP checks for the hypervisor and non-SNP guests by allowing those checks to be skipped when 1-GB memory regions are known to contain no SEV-SNP guest memory.

For more information on the RMPOPT instruction, see the AMD64 RMPOPT technical documentation.

[ bp: Zap respective tools/ change. ]

---
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c    | 1 +
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +1 -1
index f70ee74b5f92..3b5b32d3391b 100644
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_K8			( 3*32+ 4) /* Opteron, Athlon64 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN5		( 3*32+ 5) /* CPU based on Zen5 microarchitecture */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ZEN6		( 3*32+ 6) /* CPU based on Zen6 microarchitecture */
-/* Free                                 ( 3*32+ 7) */
+#define X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT		( 3*32+ 7) /* Support for AMD RMPOPT instruction */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC	( 3*32+ 8) /* "constant_tsc" TSC ticks at a constant rate */
 /* free: was #define X86_FEATURE_UP	( 3*32+ 9) * "up" SMP kernel running on UP */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ART			( 3*32+10) /* "art" Always running timer (ART) */
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/scattered.c +1 -0
index 8665a6474806..d1795ce219da 100644
@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@ static const struct cpuid_bit cpuid_bits[] = {
 	{ X86_FEATURE_PERFMON_V2,		CPUID_EAX,  0, 0x80000022, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_V2,		CPUID_EAX,  1, 0x80000022, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_LBR_PMC_FREEZE,	CPUID_EAX,  2, 0x80000022, 0 },
+	{ X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT,			CPUID_EDX,  0, 0x80000025, 0 },
 	{ X86_FEATURE_AMD_HTR_CORES,		CPUID_EAX, 30, 0x80000026, 0 },
 	{ 0, 0, 0, 0, 0 }
 };
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
author maintainer
#2 lore raw

PATCH v15 2/5 x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active

In reply to Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

While SNP is active, every memory write is checked against the RMP to protect SNP guest memory. A core performs these RMP checks only once SNP has been initialized via SNP_INIT and the SNP-enable bit in SYSCFG is set on that core; the firmware requires the SNP-enable bit to be set on every present CPU before SNP initialization.

A core that is not SNP-enabled and not SNP-initialized performs no RMP checks at all, so there is no valid configuration with SNP active and any CPU exempt from RMP checks.

The firmware determines which CPUs are present from the processor and the BIOS/UEFI configuration (e.g. SMT disabled in the BIOS) and enumerates them at SNP init; it is not aware of the OS bringing CPUs online or offline afterwards.

SNP_INIT fails unless SnpEn is set on all CPUs, so a CPU that is offline when SNP_INIT is issued, does not have SnpEn set, SNP_INIT fails, and there can be no SNP guest memory. OS CPU hotplug can thus diverge from the firmware's expectations and break SNP.

Tie CPU hotplug to the SNP-enable bit: disable it in snp_prepare() before SNP is enabled, and re-enable it in snp_shutdown() once the firmware has disabled SNP.

If snp_prepare() fails before enabling SNP it re-enables hotplug itself; once SNP is enabled hotplug stays disabled, including across a failed SNP_INIT and across the legacy SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX path, both of which leave SNP enabled.

A kexec target that boots with SNP already enabled, disables hotplug once in snp_rmptable_init(), since snp_prepare() bails when SNP is already enabled.

With CPU hotplug now disabled while SNP is active, the online CPU mask is stable, so the cpus_read_lock() previously taken in snp_prepare() to iterate it is redundant. Drop cpus_read_lock()/cpus_read_unlock() here.

---
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 26 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +26 -10
index cff285d8ad8e..558f7924a3f8 100644
@@ -513,7 +513,6 @@ static void clear_hsave_pa(void *arg)
 
 int snp_prepare(void)
 {
-	int ret;
 	u64 val;
 
 	/*
@@ -526,14 +525,18 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
 
 	clear_rmp();
 
-	cpus_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * No CPU may come online without SnpEn while SNP is active; disable
+	 * hotplug here and re-enable it in snp_shutdown().
+	 */
+	cpu_hotplug_disable();
 
 	if (!cpumask_equal(cpu_online_mask, cpu_present_mask)) {
-		ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		cpu_hotplug_enable();
 		pr_warn("SNP init failed: not all CPUs online. (%*pbl online <-> %*pbl present masks).\n",
 			cpumask_pr_args(cpu_online_mask),
 			cpumask_pr_args(cpu_present_mask));
-		goto unlock;
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
 
 	wbinvd_on_all_cpus();
@@ -548,12 +551,7 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
 	/* SNP_INIT requires MSR_VM_HSAVE_PA to be cleared on all CPUs. */
 	on_each_cpu(clear_hsave_pa, NULL, 1);
 
-	ret = 0;
-
-unlock:
-	cpus_read_unlock();
-
-	return ret;
+	return 0;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
 
@@ -567,6 +565,13 @@ void snp_shutdown(void)
 
 	clear_rmp();
 	on_each_cpu(mfd_reconfigure, NULL, 1);
+
+	/*
+	 * The firmware has disabled SNP (SnpEn is clear), so re-enable CPU
+	 * hotplug.  A legacy SNP shutdown returns above with SnpEn still set and
+	 * leaves hotplug disabled.
+	 */
+	cpu_hotplug_enable();
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
 
@@ -577,6 +582,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
  */
 int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 {
+	u64 val;
+
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
@@ -586,6 +593,15 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 	if (!setup_rmptable())
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
+	/*
+	 * On a kexec boot SNP may already be enabled (legacy firmware leaves
+	 * SnpEn set across shutdown), in which case snp_prepare() bails without
+	 * disabling CPU hotplug, so disable it here.
+	 */
+	rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+		cpu_hotplug_disable();
+
 	/*
 	 * Setting crash_kexec_post_notifiers to 'true' to ensure that SNP panic
 	 * notifier is invoked to do SNP IOMMU shutdown before kdump.
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 2/5] x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] x86/sev: PM suspend bypasses cpu_hotplug_disable() leading to missing SnpEn - [Medium] x86/sev…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] x86/sev: PM suspend bypasses cpu_hotplug_disable() leading to missing SnpEn
- [Medium] x86/sev: early return skips cpu_hotplug_disable() when SnpEn is already set --

commit b1980431b3abd35a5fe5e83fed1107ef1f0ec745
Author: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

x86/sev: Disable CPU hotplug while SNP is active

This patch ties CPU hotplug to the SNP-enable bit to prevent CPUs from coming online without SNP enabled and initialized. It replaces the cpus_read_lock() previously taken in snp_prepare() with cpu_hotplug_disable() and reenables it in snp_shutdown(). Additionally, it disables CPU hotplug in snp_rmptable_init() for kexec boots where SNP is already active.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +0 -0
index cff285d8ad8e3..558f7924a3f85 100644

[ ... ]

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c int snp_prepare(void) · line 534

Quoted 12 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +5 -1
@@ -526,14 +525,18 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
 
 	clear_rmp();
 
-	cpus_read_lock();
+	/*
+	 * No CPU may come online without SnpEn while SNP is active; disable
+	 * hotplug here and re-enable it in snp_shutdown().
+	 */
+	cpu_hotplug_disable();
 
 	if (!cpumask_equal(cpu_online_mask, cpu_present_mask)) {

[Severity: High]
Does this fully prevent secondary CPUs from coming online without SnpEn set during power management suspend and resume?

Looking at the PM suspend path, freeze_secondary_cpus() calls _cpu_down(), and thaw_secondary_cpus() calls _cpu_up().

Both of these internal functions bypass the cpu_hotplug_disabled counter that is incremented by cpu_hotplug_disable().

Could a PM suspend/resume cycle successfully offline and online secondary CPUs, causing them to resume without SnpEn set and bypassing hardware RMP checks?

[ ... ]

Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +2 -0
@@ -577,6 +582,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
  */
 int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 {
+	u64 val;
+
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP)))
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
@@ -586,6 +593,15 @@ int __init snp_rmptable_init(void)
 	if (!setup_rmptable())

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c int __init snp_rmptable_init(void) · line 603

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +8 -0
 		return -ENOSYS;
 
+	/*
+	 * On a kexec boot SNP may already be enabled (legacy firmware leaves
+	 * SnpEn set across shutdown), in which case snp_prepare() bails without
+	 * disabling CPU hotplug, so disable it here.
+	 */
+	rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG, val);
+	if (val & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
+		cpu_hotplug_disable();

[Severity: Medium]
Could this leave CPU hotplug enabled if an early initialization step fails during a kexec boot where legacy firmware leaves SnpEn set?

If setup_rmptable() fails and returns false, the function returns -ENOSYS early.

Because the check for MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN and the call to cpu_hotplug_disable() happen after these early returns, CPU hotplug would remain enabled.

Newly onlined CPUs might lack SnpEn as a result, creating a mixed hardware state. Should the hotplug disablement happen before these early returns?

[ ... ]

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=2
author maintainer
#4 lore raw

PATCH v15 3/5 x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs

In reply to Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

The new RMPOPT instruction helps manage per-CPU RMP optimization structures inside the CPU. It takes a 1GB-aligned physical address and either returns the status of the optimizations or tries to enable the optimizations.

Per-CPU RMPOPT tables support at most 2 TB of addressable memory for RMP optimizations.

Initialize the per-CPU RMPOPT table base to the starting physical address. This enables RMP optimization for up to 2 TB of system RAM on all CPUs.

Add snp_enable_rmpopt() to program RMPOPT once SNP is enabled and initialized.

---
Changes in v15:
- Rename snp_setup_rmpopt() to snp_enable_rmpopt().
- Program each core's RMPOPT_BASE only when it is not already set.

 arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h |  3 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h       |  2 ++
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c          | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
 drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c     |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h +3 -0
index 3a8e51a0c9e8..1635e2e1c576 100644
@@ -761,6 +761,9 @@
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT	0
 #define MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED	BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED_BIT)
 #define MSR_AMD64_RMP_SEGMENT_SHIFT(x)	(((x) & GENMASK_ULL(13, 8)) >> 8)
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE		0xc0010139
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE_BIT	0
+#define MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE		BIT_ULL(MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_ENABLE_BIT)
 
 #define MSR_SVSM_CAA			0xc001f000
 
arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h +2 -0
index 9e7a077c445d..fa81aa004e8b 100644
@@ -662,6 +662,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int pages)
 	__snp_leak_pages(pfn, pages, true);
 }
 int snp_prepare(void);
+void snp_enable_rmpopt(void);
 void snp_shutdown(void);
 #else
 static inline bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void) { return false; }
@@ -680,6 +681,7 @@ static inline void snp_leak_pages(u64 pfn, unsigned int npages) {}
 static inline void kdump_sev_callback(void) { }
 static inline void snp_fixup_e820_tables(void) {}
 static inline int snp_prepare(void) { return -ENODEV; }
+static inline void snp_enable_rmpopt(void) {}
 static inline void snp_shutdown(void) {}
 #endif
 
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +49 -5

74 lines not on this page · raw message

drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c +2 -0
index f833cb7e4da3..5c996ab63895 100644
@@ -1663,6 +1663,8 @@ static int __sev_snp_init_locked(int *error, unsigned int max_snp_asid)
 
 	sev_es_tmr_size = SNP_TMR_SIZE;
 
+	snp_enable_rmpopt();
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 3/5] x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Low] x86/sev: missing X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT cleanup on probe failure --

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Low] x86/sev: missing X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT cleanup on probe failure
--

commit 1564212e828a7dee0758e1b6a358828053507df5
Author: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>
x86/sev: Initialize RMPOPT configuration MSRs

This commit initializes the per-CPU RMPOPT table base to enable RMP optimizations for up to 2 TB of addressable memory. It introduces snp_enable_rmpopt() to program the RMPOPT MSR once SNP is enabled and modifies snp_probe_rmptable_info() to clear the RMPOPT capability if segmented RMP is unavailable.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +0 -0
index 558f7924a3f85..f458128b9864f 100644

[ ... ]

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +0 -0
@@ -699,13 +735,21 @@ static bool probe_segmented_rmptable_info(void)
 
 bool snp_probe_rmptable_info(void)
 {

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c static bool probe_segmented_rmptable_info(void) · line 742

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +3 -5
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP))
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SEGMENTED_RMP)) {
 		rdmsrq(MSR_AMD64_RMP_CFG, rmp_cfg);
 
-	if (rmp_cfg & MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED)
-		return probe_segmented_rmptable_info();
-	else
-		return probe_contiguous_rmptable_info();
+		if (rmp_cfg & MSR_AMD64_SEG_RMP_ENABLED)
+			return probe_segmented_rmptable_info();

[Severity: Low]
If probe_segmented_rmptable_info() fails and returns false, does this early return bypass the setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) cleanup below?

If the BIOS or firmware enables Segmented RMP but provides an invalid configuration (e.g., missing RMP_BASE or out-of-bounds segment size), this could leave the X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT CPU capability flag erroneously set. Consequently, later initcalls might unnecessarily allocate resources for RMPOPT, even though SEV-SNP initialization will subsequently fail.

Quoted 11 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +10 -0
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Segmented RMP is either not supported on the platform or is
+	 * disabled by the firmware.  RMPOPT is not supported without
+	 * segmented RMP.
+	 */
+	setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT);
+
+	return probe_contiguous_rmptable_info();
 }
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=3
author maintainer
#6 lore raw

PATCH v15 4/5 x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously

In reply to Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

When SNP is enabled, all writes to memory are checked to ensure memory integrity. This imposes performance overhead on the whole system.

RMPOPT is a new instruction that minimizes the performance overhead of RMP checks on the hypervisor and on non-SNP guests by allowing RMP checks to be skipped for 1GB regions of memory that are known not to contain any SNP guest memory.

Add support for performing RMP optimizations asynchronously using a dedicated per-CPU workqueue. The workqueue is allocated from an initcall, and snp_enable_rmpopt() queues the optimization pass.

Shortly after SNP initialization, run an optimization pass over all physical memory (up to 2TB of system RAM, starting from the lowest physical memory address aligned down to a 1GB boundary), skipping RMP checks for 1GB regions that do not contain SNP guest memory (excluding preassigned pages such as the RMP table and firmware pages).

As SNP guests are launched, RMPUPDATE assigns their private pages to guest-owned state; when such a page falls within an optimized 1GB region, the hardware clears that region's RMPOPT optimization and RMP checks resume there to protect the guest memory.

Since launching SNP guests clears these optimizations, perform them again asynchronously using the dedicated workqueue.

---
Changes in v15:
- Move the workqueue allocation and the (fixed) optimization range computation to an initcall; snp_enable_rmpopt() now only programs the RMPOPT_BASE MSRs and queues the optimization pass.
- Gate rmpopt_capable() on a static rmpopt_enabled bool set when the workqueue is allocated, instead of an if (rmpopt_wq) check, and drop rmpopt_wq_mutex.
- Queue both the initial and the teardown pass with mod_delayed_work().

 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 99 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 95 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +95 -4
index f458128b9864..54520d4cf280 100644
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
 #include <linux/iommu.h>
 #include <linux/amd-iommu.h>
 #include <linux/nospec.h>
+#include <linux/workqueue.h>
 
 #include <asm/sev.h>
 #include <asm/processor.h>
@@ -124,7 +125,25 @@ static void *rmp_bookkeeping __ro_after_init;
 
 static u64 probed_rmp_base, probed_rmp_size;
 
-static phys_addr_t rmpopt_pa_start;
+static u64 rmpopt_pa_start, rmpopt_pa_end;
+
+enum rmpopt_op_type {
+	RMPOPT_OP_VERIFY_AND_REPORT_STATUS,
+	RMPOPT_OP_REPORT_STATUS
+};
+
+static struct workqueue_struct *rmpopt_wq;
+static struct delayed_work rmpopt_delayed_work;
+static bool rmpopt_enabled;
+
+/*
+ * Delay, in milliseconds, before the RMP re-optimization pass runs after an SNP
+ * guest is torn down, passed as the delay to mod_delayed_work().  This coalesces
+ * a burst of teardowns into a single scan and gives each guest's pages time to
+ * be converted back to the shared, hypervisor-owned state.  The 10 second value
+ * is a heuristic trading re-optimization latency against scanning too eagerly.
+ */
+#define RMPOPT_WORK_TIMEOUT	(10 * MSEC_PER_SEC)
 
 static LIST_HEAD(snp_leaked_pages_list);
 static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(snp_leaked_pages_list_lock);
@@ -557,6 +576,12 @@ int snp_prepare(void)
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_prepare, "ccp");
 
+static void rmpopt_disable(void)
+{
+	if (rmpopt_wq)
+		cancel_delayed_work_sync(&rmpopt_delayed_work);
+}
+
 void snp_shutdown(void)
 {
 	u64 syscfg;
@@ -565,6 +590,8 @@ void snp_shutdown(void)
 	if (syscfg & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
 		return;
 
+	rmpopt_disable();
+
 	clear_rmp();
 	on_each_cpu(mfd_reconfigure, NULL, 1);
 
@@ -580,8 +607,69 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
 static bool rmpopt_capable(void)
 {
 	return cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) &&
-	       cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+	       cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) && rmpopt_enabled;
+}
+
+/*
+ * RMPOPT optimizations skip RMP checks at 1GB granularity if this range of
+ * memory does not contain any SNP guest memory.
+ *
+ * @pa is a system physical address; RMPOPT operates on the containing 1GB.
+ */
+static void rmpopt(u64 pa)
+{
+	enum rmpopt_op_type op = RMPOPT_OP_VERIFY_AND_REPORT_STATUS;
+	u64 pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, SZ_1G);
+
+	/* Supported by binutils 2.48+ */
+	asm volatile(".byte 0xf2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfc"
+		     :: "a" (pa_start), "c" (op)
+		     : "memory", "cc");
+}
+
+static void rmpopt_scan_range(void *arg)
+{
+	u64 pa;
+
+	for (pa = rmpopt_pa_start; pa < rmpopt_pa_end; pa += SZ_1G)
+		rmpopt(pa);
+}
+
+static void do_rmpopt_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Warm up the RMPOPT cache on this pinned per-CPU worker with interrupts
+	 * enabled, so the IRQ-disabled fan-out below only issues cache-hit RMPOPTs.
+	 */
+	rmpopt_scan_range(NULL);
+
+	on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_scan_range, NULL, true);
+}
+
+static int __init rmpopt_init(void)
+{
+	if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT))
+		return 0;
+
+	rmpopt_wq = alloc_workqueue("rmpopt_wq", WQ_PERCPU, 1);
+	if (!rmpopt_wq) {
+		pr_err("Failed to allocate RMPOPT workqueue\n");
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&rmpopt_delayed_work, do_rmpopt_work);
+
+	/* The optimization range is fixed at boot; compute it once. */
+	rmpopt_pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(PFN_PHYS(min_low_pfn), SZ_1G);
+	rmpopt_pa_end = ALIGN(PFN_PHYS(max_pfn), SZ_1G);
+	if ((rmpopt_pa_end - rmpopt_pa_start) > SZ_2T)
+		rmpopt_pa_end = rmpopt_pa_start + SZ_2T;
+
+	rmpopt_enabled = true;
+
+	return 0;
 }
+device_initcall(rmpopt_init);
 
 static void rmpopt_program_base(void *arg)
 {
@@ -599,8 +687,6 @@ void snp_enable_rmpopt(void)
 	if (!rmpopt_capable())
 		return;
 
-	rmpopt_pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(PFN_PHYS(min_low_pfn), SZ_1G);
-
 	/*
 	 * Per-CPU RMPOPT tables cover at most 2 TB.  Program each core's
 	 * RMPOPT_BASE with the start of RAM to optimize up to 2 TB.  The MSR
@@ -608,6 +694,11 @@ void snp_enable_rmpopt(void)
 	 * SNP init path (and again on guest teardown) rather than an initcall.
 	 */
 	on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_program_base, NULL, 1);
+
+	mod_delayed_work(rmpopt_wq, &rmpopt_delayed_work,
+			 msecs_to_jiffies(RMPOPT_WORK_TIMEOUT));
+
+	pr_info_once("RMPOPT optimizations enabled\n");
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_enable_rmpopt, "ccp");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 4/5] x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider: - [Critical] x86/sev: missing output constraint in RMPOPT asm causes infinite loop - [High] ccp: race…

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 3 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] x86/sev: missing output constraint in RMPOPT asm causes infinite loop
- [High] ccp: race condition in SEV-SNP shutdown causes RMPOPT #UD panic
- [High] x86/sev: per-CPU RMPOPT cache warmup logic causes massive NMI lockups --

commit c0d06ab160baf82951effc37ee61ce7592ca6b50
Author: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

x86/sev: Perform RMP optimizations asynchronously

Add support for performing RMP optimizations asynchronously using a dedicated per-CPU workqueue. The workqueue is allocated from an initcall, and snp_enable_rmpopt() queues the optimization pass.

Quoted 4 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +0 -0
index f458128b9864f..54520d4cf2803 100644

[ ... ]

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c void snp_shutdown(void) · line 593

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +1 -0
@@ -565,6 +590,8 @@ void snp_shutdown(void)
 	if (syscfg & MSR_AMD64_SYSCFG_SNP_EN)
 		return;
 
+	rmpopt_disable();

[Severity: High]
Does canceling the delayed work here leave a race window that could cause an invalid opcode panic?

The SEV-SNP shutdown sequence sends the SEV_CMD_SNP_SHUTDOWN_EX command to the firmware (e.g. from __sev_snp_shutdown_locked() in drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c), which clears the SYSCFG.SNPEn MSR and disables SNP enforcement in hardware.

By the time snp_shutdown() is called here and confirms the MSR is cleared, the hardware feature is already disabled. If the delayed workqueue is executing concurrently on another CPU during this window, could it attempt to execute the RMPOPT instruction while SNP is disabled, triggering an Invalid Opcode (#UD)?

[ ... ]

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp"); · line 611

Quoted 7 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +1 -1
@@ -580,8 +607,69 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp");
 static bool rmpopt_capable(void)
 {
 	return cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_RMPOPT) &&
-	       cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP);
+	       cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) && rmpopt_enabled;
 }

[Severity: High]
Does checking static boot attributes rather than dynamic state here allow subsequent caller sequences to bypass the capability check after a shutdown?

Because cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_SEV_SNP) reflects boot state, if SNP is dynamically disabled during a shutdown or kexec, rmpopt_capable() could still return true, allowing the workqueue to be improperly re-armed or the MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE to be rewritten after a shutdown.

Quoted 5 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +5 -0
+/*
+ * RMPOPT optimizations skip RMP checks at 1GB granularity if this range of
+ * memory does not contain any SNP guest memory.
+ *
+ * @pa is a system physical address; RMPOPT operates on the containing 1GB.

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp"); · line 627

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +10 -0
+ */
+static void rmpopt(u64 pa)
+{
+	enum rmpopt_op_type op = RMPOPT_OP_VERIFY_AND_REPORT_STATUS;
+	u64 pa_start = ALIGN_DOWN(pa, SZ_1G);
+
+	/* Supported by binutils 2.48+ */
+	asm volatile(".byte 0xf2, 0x0f, 0x01, 0xfc"
+		     :: "a" (pa_start), "c" (op)
+		     : "memory", "cc");

[Severity: Critical]
Is an output constraint missing for %rax here?

The RMPOPT instruction evaluates a physical memory region and returns a status code in %rax. The inline assembly passes pa_start via the "a" constraint (placing it in %rax) but doesn't declare %rax as an output or clobber.

When rmpopt() is inlined into rmpopt_scan_range(), the compiler might place the loop variable pa in %rax, assuming it is preserved. After the assembly executes, the hardware overwrites %rax with the status code (e.g., 0 for success).

Could this cause the loop to increment the status code by SZ_1G instead of the original physical address, resulting in an infinite loop?

Quoted 9 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +9 -0
+}
+
+static void rmpopt_scan_range(void *arg)
+{
+	u64 pa;
+
+	for (pa = rmpopt_pa_start; pa < rmpopt_pa_end; pa += SZ_1G)
+		rmpopt(pa);
+}

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_shutdown, "ccp"); · line 646

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +10 -0
+
+static void do_rmpopt_work(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Warm up the RMPOPT cache on this pinned per-CPU worker with interrupts
+	 * enabled, so the IRQ-disabled fan-out below only issues cache-hit RMPOPTs.
+	 */
+	rmpopt_scan_range(NULL);
+
+	on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_scan_range, NULL, true);

[Severity: High]
Is this per-CPU warmup logic sufficient to prevent cache-miss latencies on all other CPUs?

Because RMPOPT tables and their caches are strictly per-CPU (as configured via MSR_AMD64_RMPOPT_BASE), warming up the cache on a single worker CPU does not populate the caches on the other CPUs.

When on_each_cpu_mask() broadcasts the scan with interrupts disabled (true), won't every other primary thread execute up to 2048 cold-cache RMPOPT instructions in hardirq context, potentially triggering NMI watchdog lockups?

Quoted 1 line
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +1 -0
+}
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=4
author maintainer
#8 lore raw

PATCH v15 5/5 x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown

In reply to Ashish Kalra

From: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

The RMPOPT table is a per-CPU table which indicates whether 1GB regions of physical memory are entirely hypervisor-owned.

When performing host memory accesses in hypervisor mode as well as non-SNP guest mode, the processor may consult the RMPOPT table to potentially skip an RMP access and improve performance.

Normal guest events disable RMP optimizations: pages are converted from shared to private as SNP guests are launched, and large pages are split and collapsed during guest operation -- both disable the RMPOPT optimizations for the affected 1GB regions.

When guests are torn down, their pages are converted back to shared, so those regions may become eligible for RMPOPT optimization again. Without some intervention, all RMP optimizations would eventually be lost, so re-optimize all of physical memory on SNP guest teardown by calling snp_enable_rmpopt().

snp_enable_rmpopt() performs the re-optimization after a delay, using mod_delayed_work() so that the delay timer is reset on each call. This batches multiple guest terminations into a single pass: the re-optimization runs 10 seconds after the *last* termination rather than after the first. mod_delayed_work() also re-queues work that is already in-flight, so a re-scan request during an active scan is not silently dropped.

Guest teardown is currently the only event that returns guest memory to hypervisor ownership: SNP guests do not support ballooning or memory hotplug, so pages freed during a guest's lifetime remain guest-owned. It is therefore the only point at which memory becomes eligible for RMP re-optimization, which is why re-optimization is driven by guest teardown rather than by a periodic scan.

---
Changes in v15:
- Call snp_enable_rmpopt() on guest teardown instead of a separate snp_rmpopt_all_physmem(); the delayed re-optimization now lives in snp_enable_rmpopt().

 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c  | 2 ++
 arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -0
index 5705723f1f41..4d5e30af1ade 100644
@@ -3032,6 +3032,8 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 		 */
 		if (snp_decommission_context(kvm))
 			return;
+
+		snp_enable_rmpopt();
 	} else {
 		sev_unbind_asid(kvm, sev->handle);
 	}
arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c +1 -1
index 54520d4cf280..0f000cc89573 100644
@@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ void snp_enable_rmpopt(void)
 
 	pr_info_once("RMPOPT optimizations enabled\n");
 }
-EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_enable_rmpopt, "ccp");
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(snp_enable_rmpopt, "ccp,kvm-amd");
 
 /*
  * Do the necessary preparations which are verified by the firmware as
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v15 5/5] x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] kvm: system-wide synchronous IPI broadcast on every SNP guest teardown defeats batching --

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] kvm: system-wide synchronous IPI broadcast on every SNP guest teardown defeats batching --

commit 23bdc9ba80b8a413abe236834cbaf2ae517ee599
Author: Ashish Kalra <[email protected]>

x86/sev: Re-enable RMP optimizations on SNP guest shutdown

The RMPOPT table indicates whether 1GB regions of physical memory are entirely hypervisor-owned. When SNP guests are torn down, this patch re-optimizes all of physical memory by calling snp_enable_rmpopt(). This process is intended to be batched using a delayed work queue to avoid overhead during multiple guest terminations.

arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm) · line 3036

Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c +2 -0
index 0a887f8e05d3a..e05adec44d0aa 100644
@@ -3032,6 +3032,8 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
 		 */
 		if (snp_decommission_context(kvm))
 			return;
+
+		snp_enable_rmpopt();

[Severity: High]
The commit message mentions that using mod_delayed_work() batches multiple guest terminations into a single pass.

However, doesn't calling snp_enable_rmpopt() here on every guest teardown trigger a synchronous system-wide IPI broadcast each time?

arch/x86/virt/svm/sev.c:snp_enable_rmpopt() {
    ...
    on_each_cpu_mask(cpu_primary_thread_mask, rmpopt_program_base, NULL, 1);

    mod_delayed_work(rmpopt_wq, &rmpopt_delayed_work, ...);
    ...
}

Could this unbatched IPI broadcast cause severe performance degradation and latency spikes across the system when multiple guests are torn down rapidly, defeating the batching intent?

Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=5