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Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices

PATCH Superseded Zhuoying Cai 4 participants 72 messages Feb 12 – Mar 5

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v8 of 17 Superseded Latest is v17 →

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v8 cover Secure IPL Support for SCSI Scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi Devices

Changelog v7->v8

- Edited documentation

[PATCH v7 01/29] Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Updated version number from 10.2 to 11.0

[PATCH v7 02/29] crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 03/29] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 04/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Merged init_cert_x509() with init_cert()
- Simplified certificate path handling; removed redundant NULL checks in get_cert_paths()
- Added warnings for empty certificate directories and non-.pem files
- Renamed variables: VC_* → CERT_* and max_cert_size → largest_cert_size
- Made certificate store initialization independent of kernel/IPLB state
- Fixed memory leak
- Added comments explaining why DER data is not stored in S390IPLCertificate

[PATCH v7 05/29] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility
- Simplified control flow in handle_diag_320()
- Removed the word "Provide" from description text

[PATCH v7 06/29] s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check()
- Added Reviewed-by: Collin Walling <[email protected]>
- Added Reviewed-by: Hendrik Brueckner <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 07/29] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Added upper-bound validation for vcssb->length
- Added Reviewed-by: Collin Walling <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 08/29] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Simplified ECC curve validation logic
- Moved public-key algorithm detection to internal helpers
- Removed unused QCRYPTO_PK_ALGO enum
- Fixed commit message

[PATCH v7 09/29] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Added sanity checks for key ID retrieval; mark certificates invalid if extraction fails
- Reworked VCE construction logic
- Pass S390IPLCertificate as const pointers instead of copying structs

[PATCH v7 10/29] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 11/29] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
- Fixed typos
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 12/29] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Added comments on maximum component and signature lengths
- Added warning indicating failures due to oversize signature or component
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 13/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
- Updated documentation describing guest kernel usage of certificate data in the IIRB
- Simplified and renamed flags and type definitions
- Merged unused and reserved fields
- Moved IIRB definitions from pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h to include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h

[PATCH v7 14/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
- Moved IplBlocks struct from pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h to include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h
- Moved attribute annotations to the ipl_data declaration in main.c

* Note: checkpatch.pl flags the following:

          ERROR: externs should be avoided in .c files
          #88: FILE: pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c:26:
          +IplBlocks ipl_data __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));

This appears to be a false positive, as IplBlocks is not declared as an extern in a .c file, and checkpatch.pl reports the same warning for the existing IplParameterBlock declaration in main.c even before this patch.

[PATCH v7 15/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 16/29] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility
- Fixed reserved-field off-by-one error

[PATCH v7 17/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 19/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Updated warning message
- Simplified control flow and error handling in zipl_run()
- Removed UNSPECIFIED boot mode and defaulted to NORMAL
- Refactored zipl_run_secure()
- Renamed variables and functions
- Adjusted index handling in verify_signature(), accounting for DIAG 320 when retrieving certificates

[PATCH v7 21/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Renamed constants:

    S390_IPL_INFO_IIEI_* → S390_IIEI_*
    S390_IPL_COMPONENT_CEI_* → S390_CEI_*

- Improved readability by reducing function parameter counts
- Fixed check_sc() to allow only a single signed binary component
- Moved address-range/overlap checks to a separate patch (I’ve decided to keep the SecureIplSclabInfo struct and the zipl_secure_handle() function design in this version, as I believe they fit better after the refactoring in this patch. Please let me know if you have any feedback. Thank you.)

[PATCH v7 22/29] Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 23/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL
- Fixed commit message

[PATCH v7 24/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
- Updated documentation
- Fixed typo

[PATCH v7 25/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
- Handled support for multiple secure boot devices on the QEMU side

[PATCH v7 26/29] hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without a specified boot device
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v7 27/29] tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL
- Cleaned up test code
- Switched from time.sleep() to wait_for_console_pattern()

------------------------------------------------------------------------

# Description

This patch series is an external requirement by Linux distribution partners to verify secure IPL process. Additional secure IPL checks are also included in this series to address security holes in the original secure IPL design to prevent malicious actors to boot modified or unsigned code despite secure IPL being enforced.

Secure IPL is enabled when the QEMU options for secure IPL are specified in the command line.

During this process, additional security checks are performed to ensure system integrity.

As components are loaded from disk, DIAG 508 subcode 2 performs signature verification if a signature entry is identified. Upon successful verification, DIAG 320 subcode 2 will request the corresponding certificate from QEMU key store to the BIOS.

Secure IPL will continue until all the components are loaded if no error occurs during True secure IPL mode or in Audit mode (see explanation below).

After that, an IPL Information report block (IIRB) is initialized immediately following an IPL Parameter Information Block. The IIRB is populated with information about the components, verification results and certificate data.

Finally, the guest system proceeds to boot.

Only List-Directed-IPL contains the relevant zIPL data structures to perform secure IPL. This patch series only adds support for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices. Secure IPL for other device types will be considered as follow-up work at a later date.

** Note: "secure IPL" and "secure boot" are used interchangeably throughout the design. **

# True Secure IPL Mode and Audit Mode

## True Secure IPL Mode

When secure IPL is enabled and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will performed. The boot process will abort if any error occurs during the secure IPL checks.

## Audit Mode

When the secure IPL option is not selected and certificates are provided, all the secure IPL checks will still be performed. However, the boot process will continue if any errors occur, with messages logged to the console during the secure IPL checks.

The audit mode is also considered as simulated secure IPL because it is less pervasive, and allows the guest to boot regardless of the secure checking results.

# How to Enable Secure IPL

## QEMU Build Notes

When building QEMU, enable the cryptographic libraries.

Run configure script in QEMU repository with either parameter:

	./configure … --enable-gnutls

## Create Certificates via certtool

Generate and use an RSA private key for signing.

	certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem

A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the cert.info template to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool.

	cat > cert.info <<EOF
	cn = "My Name"
	expiration_days = 36500
	cert_signing_key
	EOF

	certtool --generate-self-signed \
		 --load-privkey key.pem \
		 --template cert.info \
		 --hash=SHA256 \
		 --outfile cert.pem

It is recommended to store the certificate(s) in the /…/qemu/certs directory for easy identification.

## Sign Kernel and Prepare zipl

All actions must be performed on a guest.

Copy the sign-file script (located in Linux source repository), generated private key(s), and certificate(s) to guest's file system.

Sign guest image(s) and stage3 binary:

	./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-…

	./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin

Run zipl with secure boot enabled.

	zipl --secure 1 -V

Guest image(s) are now signed, stored on disk, and can be verified.

## New QEMU Command Options for Secure IPL

New parameters have been added to the s390-ccw-virtio machine type to enable Secure IPL and provide certificates for signature verification.

This parameter enables or disables Secure IPL/boot. If not specified, it defaults to off.

	qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on|off

This parameter specifies one or more paths to boot certificates, used for signature verification. You can provide a single certificate file or a directory.

	qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio, \
                                   boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs, \
                                   boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem

Example:

	qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,
	                           secure-boot=on, \
	                           boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs, \
                                   boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem

Secure IPL command options overview:

If neither the -secure-boot nor the -boot-certs options are specified, the guest will boot in normal mode, and no security checks will be conducted.

If the -secure-boot option is not specified or is set to off, and the -boot-certs option is provided, the guest will boot in audit mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed; however, any errors encountered will not interrupt the boot process.

If the -secure-boot option is set to on and the -boot-certs option is provided, the guest will boot in true secure IPL mode. In this mode, all security checks are performed, and any errors encountered will terminate the boot process.
- If the -boot-certs option is not provided in true secure IPL mode, the boot process will fail for the corresponding device.

## Constraints

- z16 or "qemu" CPU model

- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format

- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices
- The boot process will terminate if secure boot is enabled without
specifying a boot device.
- If enabling secure boot with multiple boot devices, any
unsupported devices or non-eligible devices will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error logged to the console.

- attempting to perform secure IPL outside of these constraints will result in a failure.

# DIAGNOSE 508 - IPL Extensions

Signature verification is performed during IPL via DIAG 508. Component address, component length, signature address and signature length are obtained in the BIOS and pass to DIAG 508 subcode 2 to perform signature verification in QEMU. If verification succeeds, DIAG 508 subcode 2 (signature verification) will return the length and index of the certificate in the QemuCertificateStore that was used for verification.

## Data Structures

Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock (SVB) — stores addresses and lengths of the component and signature to be used for signature verification. Upon verification, an index and the length of the certificate used is stored.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Changelog v6->v7

Add functional test for secure IPL

Secure IPL documentation
- Merged command line into one line
- Limited line length to 80 columns

[PATCH v6 01/28] Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Renamed BootCertificate to BootCertificates
- Added Acked-by: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 02/28] crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback
- Edited commit message
- Added Acked-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 03/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store
- Added Acked-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 04/28] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Removed QEMU_PAKCED
- Inlined cert2buf wrapper function to reduce lines of code
- Reported error and handled exit in s390_ipl_create_cert_store()

[PATCH v6 05/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility
- Fixed typos
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 06/28] s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check
- Moved diag_parm_addr_valid() to target/s390x/diag.c
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 07/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 08/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Edited commit message
- Handled negative return value from gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm() in qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm
- Checked boundary before using hash_alg in qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id()
- Rename qcrypto_x509_is_ecc_curve_p521() to qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521()

[PATCH v6 09/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Removed redundant set vce->len
- Added check to make sure data doesn't exceed buffer bounds

[PATCH v6 10/28] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations
- Reworded document to avoid the term “KVM”
- Added Reviewed-by: Farhan Ali <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 11/28] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1
- Fixed indentation
- Replaced g_new0() and memcpy() with g_memdup2()

[PATCH v6 12/28] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Edit commit message and documentation in handle_diag508_sig_verif()
- Changed diag_508_verify_sig function return type from int to bool
- Set upper limit for comp_len and sig_len to avoid malicious memory allocation
- Fixed coding style - eliminate unnecessary variables

[PATCH v6 13/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)
- Removed bios structs packing

[PATCH v6 14/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers
- specify ipl_data attribute in the pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c

[PATCH v6 15/28] hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Moved the setting of iplb->len to when the DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR is set

[PATCH v6 17/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
- Preserved return error value from zipl_run_normal()

[PATCH v6 18/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Rework zipl_load_segment function
- Fixed typoes
- Added Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <[email protected]>

[PATCH v6 19/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Edited documentation
- Removed bios structs packing
- Be more specific in the error message and mention Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot
- Allocated memory for vcb using max_single_vcb_len instead of MAX_SECTOR_SIZE in request_certificate()
- Rename variables in zipl_run_secure()
cert_index → cert_entry_idx
comp_index → comp_entry_idx
cert_idx → cert_table_idx
- Refactored handle_certificate(): only handles certificate related operations and moved the increment of cert_entry_idx and cert to zipl_run_secure()

[PATCH v6 21/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Fixed coding style
- Added out of range warning in comp_addr_range_add()
- Fixed end address issue in is_psw_valid() and is_comp_overlap()
- Inlined comparison functions

[PATCH v6 22/28] Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Moved bool secure_boot next to other bool variables to avoid additional padding

[PATCH v6 24/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode
- Edited documentation
- Used panic instead of IPL_assert() in zipl_secure_handle()

[PATCH v6 25/28] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices
- Used a stack variable for QemuIplParameters instead of a malloc in check_secure_boot_support()

Changelog v5->v6

Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Renamed struct BootCertPath to BootCertificate
- Defined DummyBootCertificates struct for QMP to use BootCertificateList internally

crypto/x509-utils
- Used gnutls_x509_crt_export2() in qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der()
- Allocated buffers with g_new for results in qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der() and qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem()
- Added check for qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map bounds in qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id()
- Added qcrypto_x509_is_ecc_curve_p521() function to determine if an ECC public key algorithm uses P521 curve
- Fixed typo

hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Made any configuration errors fatal when loading certificates into the cert store
- Removed key_id_size and hash_size from S390IPLCertificate and defined them as constants
- Do not reinitialize the cert store if it already exists
- Handled memory cleanup

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Added QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Refactored build_vce_header() and created a new function for getting key type
- Added QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Updated Diag508SigVerifBlock

hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Override IPLB length only when DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR flag is set
- Dropped hw/s390x/ipl: Set iplb->len to maximum length of IPL Parameter Block patch

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Added validation for VCB and VCE before retrieving information in request_certificate()
- Replaced uint64_t *cert with uint8_t *cert in zipl_run_secure()

Changelog v4->v5

- Segmented documentation by introducing them alongside the patches that add the relevant functionality
- Removed hash-type restriction from S390IPLCertificateStore

Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option
- Added boot-certs property to the s390-ccw-virtio machine type

    - Changed to use an array property for passing certificate instead
      of colo-delimited strings.
    e.g. boot-certs.0.path=/path/to/dir,
         boot-certs.1.path=/to/other/dir,
         boot-certs.2.path=/some/...

crypto/x509-utils
- Refactored fallback handling into a separated commit
- Removed QCryptoKeyidFlags and qcrypto_x509_get_keyid_len() function
- Removed qcrypto_x509_get_cert_version() and qcrypto_x509_get_signature_algorithm()
- Passed QCryptoHashAlgo to qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() instead of QCryptoKeyidFlags
- Improved memory cleanup

hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Fixed error handling and memory management
- Added condition to only accept files with ".pem" extension

s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Renamed "S390_FEAT_DIAG_320" to "S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE"
- Merged this patch with s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility patch

s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for certificate store facility
- Added bit zero to indicate subcode 0 is supported
- Set response code to 0x0102 when the subcode is not supported
- Added check to ensure subcode fits within one byte

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Refactored and moved implementation to a helper function
- Added check to ensure VCSSB length is set to a minimum of 128 bytes from the userspace
- Removed max_vce_len field from the VCSSB data structure

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Refactored and split functions for extracting certificate information
- Set VCE length to 72 if certificate is invalid
- Returned VCE even if the certificate is invalid

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
- Refactor zipl_run_normal() to reduce duplicate code

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Moved secure-boot related functions into secure-ipl.c/h files
- Rename zipl_handle_sig_entry() to zipl_load_signature()
- Refactored zipl_run_secure() to use switch cases for different entry types instead of a while loop
- Renamed ZiplBootMode enumerations with "ZIPL_BOOT_MODE" prefix
- Added meaningful file header to secure-ipl.c
- Renamed zipl_secure_print() to zipl_secure_handle()

Changelog v3->v4:

cyrpto/x590-utils
- Updated patch descriptions to summarize what each patch introduces.
- Restricted accepted certificate format on the QEMU command line to PEM only.
- Added internal conversion routines to handle PEM-to-DER and
DER-to-PEM as needed.
- Renamed crypto functions using the qcrypto_x509_ prefix.
- Replaced QAPI enums with plain C enums.
- Improved GNUTLS error propagation throughout the crypto API.
- Standardized error returns to -1 (instead of using errno values) for consistency.
- Removed unused helpers: qcrypto_check_x509_cert_fmt() and qcrypto_get_x509_hash_len().
- Added bounds checking before converting GNUTLS enums to internal crypto enums.
- Modified qcrypto_get_x509_cert_key_id() to dynamically allocate the result.
- Fixed a typo in the crypto API documentation.

hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Removed max_size check when loading certificate.
- Removed check_path_type() and use the stat() & S_ISXXX checks inline where needed.
- Initialized all g_autofree variables.
- Refactored get_cert_paths()
- Used g_auto(GStrv) and g_autoptr(GPtrArray) for automatic cleanup.
- Renamed misleading variables and dropped unnecessary intermediates.
- Replaced check_path_type() with stat(), and treated failures as fatal.
- Treated empty path components as fatal configuration errors.
- Used GError with g_dir_open() and handled errors properly.
- Removed redundant casts and manual cleanup.
- Treated providing 65 or more certificates as a fatal error.
- Modified S390IPLCertificate
- Changed raw from char * to uint8_t * for API consistency.
- Added cert_der field to calculate certificate data buffer size for
DIAG 320 and format conversion.

s390x/diag
- Handled error propagation from crypto API correctly.
- Added g_autofree to variables to ensure proper memory cleanup.
- Initialized all g_autofree variables.

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Allocated certificate buffer based on calculated size instead of static MAX_CERT_SIZE.

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot
- Refactored to improve readability.
- Handled SCLAB Single Component/No Unsigned Component flags.

docs: Add secure IPL documentation
- Updated documentation.
- Illustrated with gnutls ‘certtool’ instead of ‘openssl’ for consistency with other certificate creation docs.

- Updated cover letter with corresponding changes.

Changelog v2->v3:

- Fixed typos in patches
- Edited and corrected patch description
- Enabled secure IPL feature in TCG
- Split crypto subsystem changes from s390x subsystem changes
- Added API documentation for each helper function
- Removed qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fmt()
- Reworked qcrypto_check_x509_cert_fmt() to return 0 on success and
negative error code on errors
- Rephrased error messages when GNUTLS is not enabled
- Changed dev cycle reference from 9.2 to 10.1

hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
- Passed *cert_buf to g_file_get_contents() directly in cert2buf()
- Returned NULL for early returns
- Added check to only allow maximum of 64 certificates in the certificate store

s390x: Guest support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Renamed “diag320” to “cstore”

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from VCStorageSizeBlock
- Removed unnecessary error check from subcode 1 implementation

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from VCBlock and VCEngtry
- Reworked diag_320_is_cert_valid() to return 0 on success and negative error code on errors
- Set *key_id_data and *hash_data to NULL after g_free()
- Moved DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC case block implementation to a separate function

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification
- Added a reserved field to Diag508CertificateStoreInfo
- Removed QEMU_PACKED from Diag508CertificateStoreInfo and Diag508SignatureVerificationBlock
- Applied g_autofree to svb, svb_comp and svb_sig varaibles
- Moved DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF case block implementation to a separate function

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_load_segment function
- Removed casting when calculating comp_len

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode
- Used malloc() to allocate certificate buffer instead of statically allocating
- Reworked zipl_secure_print()

s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)
- Added check to make sure SIPL is enabled when SCLAF is enabled

docs: Add secure IPL documentation
- Split document into two parts:
- docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst (developer reference)
- docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst (user guide)

Changelog v1->v2:

- Fixed typos in patches
- Edited cover letter
- Added secure IPL documentation

QEMU Command-Line Interface:
- Moved boot-certificates under the machine-type option for s390x-virtio-ccw
- Moved secure-boot under the machine-type option for s390x-virtio-ccw

hw/s390x/ipl: Create Certificate Store
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Added check to only accept certificates using SHA-256 hashing
- Recalculated data_buf_size to ensure word alignment
- Cleaned up memory allocation
- Refactored functions for clarity

s390x: Guest Support for Certificate Store Facility (CS)
- Updated patch description to clarify:
- Why Secure IPL is not available with Secure Execution
- Why this feature requires S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB
-Restricted features to z16 due to additional layers requiring z16

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 Subcode 1
- Renamed VerificationCertificate prefix to VC
- Byte-swap written values for endianness correctness

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 Subcode 2
- Edited commit message for clarity
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Renamed data structure variables
- Ensured length fields in VCE are word-aligned
- Handled the VC index 0 case
- General refactoring

s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 Subcode 2 for Signature Verification
- Defined subcode from 2 to 1
- Removed unused error codes
- Defined internal GNUTLS-related APIs
- Byte-swap read values

hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB Flags to IPL Parameter Block
- Moved DIAG308 flags to a new header file

s390x: Guest Support for Secure-IPL Facility
- Renamed SCLP variable from cbl to fac_ipl

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add Signature Verification for Secure Boot (Audit Mode)
- Moved Secure IPL-related functions to pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ip.c|h
- Refactored code for clarity

Collin L. Walling (2):
s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification

Zhuoying Cai (28):
Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store
s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1 s390x/ipl: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Rework zipl_load_segment function pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit
mode
pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks
s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility

    (SCLAF)

pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL functional test docs/specs: Add secure IPL documentation docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation

 crypto/meson.build                        |   2 +-
 crypto/x509-utils.c                       | 409 ++++++++++++
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst           | 185 ++++++
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst          | 176 ++++++
 hw/s390x/cert-store.c                     | 221 +++++++
 hw/s390x/cert-store.h                     |  40 ++
 hw/s390x/ipl.c                            |  87 +++
 hw/s390x/ipl.h                            |  21 +-
 hw/s390x/meson.build                      |   1 +
 hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c                |  52 ++
 hw/s390x/sclp.c                           |   2 +
 include/crypto/x509-utils.h               | 113 ++++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h            |  34 +
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h            |  92 +++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h            |  45 ++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h               |  97 ++-
 include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h        |   3 +
 include/hw/s390x/sclp.h                   |   4 +-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile                 |   3 +-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c                | 103 ++-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h                |  11 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h                   |   5 +-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c               |   6 +-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c                   |  40 +-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c                |   8 +-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h               |  17 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c                   |  51 ++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h                   |   7 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c             | 728 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h             | 153 +++++
 qapi/machine-s390x.json                   |  23 +
 qapi/pragma.json                          |   1 +
 qemu-options.hx                           |  10 +-
 target/s390x/cpu_features.c               |   7 +
 target/s390x/cpu_features.h               |   1 +
 target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc       |   5 +
 target/s390x/cpu_models.c                 |   7 +
 target/s390x/diag.c                       | 575 ++++++++++++++++-
 target/s390x/gen-features.c               |   7 +
 target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c                    |  34 +
 target/s390x/s390x-internal.h             |   4 +
 target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c            |  14 +
 tests/functional/s390x/meson.build        |   2 +
 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py | 142 +++++
 44 files changed, 3479 insertions(+), 69 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
 create mode 100644 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst
 create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c
 create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h
 create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h
 create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h
 create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h
 create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c
 create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h
 create mode 100644 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#1 lore raw

PATCH v8 1/30 Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option

Introduce a new boot-certs machine type option for the s390-ccw-virtio machine. This allows users to specify one or more certificate file paths or directories to be used during secure boot.

Each entry is specified using the syntax:
boot-certs.<index>.path=/path/to/cert.pem

Multiple paths can be specify using array properties:

	boot-certs.0.path=/path/to/cert.pem,
	boot-certs.1.path=/path/to/cert-dir,
	boot-certs.2.path=/path/to/another-dir...
---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst   | 20 ++++++++++++++++++++
 hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c         | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h |  2 ++
 qapi/machine-s390x.json            | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 qapi/pragma.json                   |  1 +
 qemu-options.hx                    |  6 +++++-
 6 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..0a02f171b4
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+Secure IPL Command Line Options
+===============================
+
+The s390-ccw-virtio machine type supports secure IPL. These parameters allow
+users to provide certificates and enable secure IPL directly via the command
+line.
+
+Providing Certificates
+----------------------
+
+The certificate store can be populated by supplying a list of X.509 certificate
+file paths or directories containing certificate files on the command-line:
+
+Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension.
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c +30 -0
index eb135a515d..9267563cbe 100644
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
 #include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h"
 #include "migration/blocker.h"
 #include "qapi/visitor.h"
+#include "qapi/qapi-visit-machine-s390x.h"
 #include "hw/s390x/cpu-topology.h"
 #include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h"
 #include "hw/virtio/virtio-md-pci.h"
@@ -795,6 +796,30 @@ static void machine_set_loadparm(Object *obj, Visitor *v,
     g_free(val);
 }
 
+static void machine_get_boot_certs(Object *obj, Visitor *v,
+                                   const char *name, void *opaque,
+                                   Error **errp)
+{
+    S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(obj);
+    BootCertificatesList **certs = &ms->boot_certs;
+
+    visit_type_BootCertificatesList(v, name, certs, errp);
+}
+
+static void machine_set_boot_certs(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
+                                   void *opaque, Error **errp)
+{
+    S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(obj);
+    BootCertificatesList *cert_list = NULL;
+
+    visit_type_BootCertificatesList(v, name, &cert_list, errp);
+    if (!cert_list) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    ms->boot_certs = cert_list;
+}
+
 static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
 {
     MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
@@ -848,6 +873,11 @@ static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
             "Up to 8 chars in set of [A-Za-z0-9. ] (lower case chars converted"
             " to upper case) to pass to machine loader, boot manager,"
             " and guest kernel");
+
+    object_class_property_add(oc, "boot-certs", "BootCertificatesList",
+                              machine_get_boot_certs, machine_set_boot_certs, NULL, NULL);
+    object_class_property_set_description(oc, "boot-certs",
+            "provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file for secure boot");
 }
 
 static inline void s390_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h +2 -0
index f1f06119d6..5ad1ea2f24 100644
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include "hw/core/boards.h"
 #include "qom/object.h"
 #include "hw/s390x/sclp.h"
+#include "qapi/qapi-types-machine-s390x.h"
 
 #define TYPE_S390_CCW_MACHINE               "s390-ccw-machine"
 
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ struct S390CcwMachineState {
     uint8_t loadparm[8];
     uint64_t memory_limit;
     uint64_t max_pagesize;
+    BootCertificatesList *boot_certs;
 
     SCLPDevice *sclp;
 };
qapi/machine-s390x.json +23 -0
index ea430e1b88..0e0f4fdfb0 100644
@@ -140,3 +140,26 @@
 { 'event': 'SCLP_CPI_INFO_AVAILABLE',
   'features': [ 'unstable' ]
 }
+
+##
+# @BootCertificates:
+#
+# Boot certificate for secure IPL.
+#
+# @path: path to an X.509 certificate file or a directory containing
+# certificate files.
+#
+# Since: 11.0
+##
+{ 'struct': 'BootCertificates',
+  'data': {'path': 'str'} }
+
+##
+# @DummyBootCertificates:
+#
+# Not used by QMP; hack to let us use BootCertificatesList internally.
+#
+# Since: 11.0
+##
+{ 'struct': 'DummyBootCertificates',
+  'data': {'unused-boot-certs': ['BootCertificates'] } }
qapi/pragma.json +1 -0
index 193bc39059..aad270402f 100644
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
         'DisplayProtocol',
         'DriveBackupWrapper',
         'DummyBlockCoreForceArrays',
+        'DummyBootCertificates',
         'DummyForceArrays',
         'DummyVirtioForceArrays',
         'HotKeyMod',
qemu-options.hx +5 -1
index ec92723f10..7c02220a5c 100644
@@ -45,7 +45,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \
     "                memory-backend='backend-id' specifies explicitly provided backend for main RAM (default=none)\n"
     "                cxl-fmw.0.targets.0=firsttarget,cxl-fmw.0.targets.1=secondtarget,cxl-fmw.0.size=size[,cxl-fmw.0.interleave-granularity=granularity]\n"
     "                sgx-epc.0.memdev=memid,sgx-epc.0.node=numaid\n"
-    "                smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n",
+    "                smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n"
+    "                boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file provides paths to a directory and/or a certificate file\n",
     QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
 SRST
 ``-machine [type=]name[,prop=value[,...]]``
@@ -209,6 +210,9 @@ SRST
         ::
 
             -machine smp-cache.0.cache=l1d,smp-cache.0.topology=core,smp-cache.1.cache=l1i,smp-cache.1.topology=core
+
+    ``boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file``
+        Provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file on the host [s390x only].
 ERST
 
 DEF("M", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_M,
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 01/30] Add boot-certs to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option

Quoted 14 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Introduce a new boot-certs machine type option for the s390-ccw-virtio machine. This allows users to specify one or more certificate file paths or directories to be used during secure boot.

Each entry is specified using the syntax:
boot-certs.<index>.path=/path/to/cert.pem

Multiple paths can be specify using array properties:

	boot-certs.0.path=/path/to/cert.pem,
	boot-certs.1.path=/path/to/cert-dir,
	boot-certs.2.path=/path/to/another-dir...

[...]

qapi/machine-s390x.json line 147

Quoted 13 lines
qapi/machine-s390x.json +5 -0
index ea430e1b88..0e0f4fdfb0 100644
@@ -140,3 +140,26 @@
 { 'event': 'SCLP_CPI_INFO_AVAILABLE',
   'features': [ 'unstable' ]
 }
+
+##
+# @BootCertificates:
+#
+# Boot certificate for secure IPL.

certificates

qapi/machine-s390x.json line 150

Quoted 3 lines
qapi/machine-s390x.json +3 -0
+#
+# @path: path to an X.509 certificate file or a directory containing
+# certificate files.

You have to indent like this

# @path: path to an X.509 certificate file or a directory containing
# certificate files.

As is, it gets rendered like

Object BootCertificates (Since: 11.0)

Boot certificate for secure IPL.

Members:
* path ("string") -- path to an X.509 certificate file or a directory containing

certificate files.

Please proofread the generated documentation to avoid such issues.

Quoted 15 lines
qapi/machine-s390x.json +15 -0
+#
+# Since: 11.0
+##
+{ 'struct': 'BootCertificates',
+  'data': {'path': 'str'} }
+
+##
+# @DummyBootCertificates:
+#
+# Not used by QMP; hack to let us use BootCertificatesList internally.
+#
+# Since: 11.0
+##
+{ 'struct': 'DummyBootCertificates',
+  'data': {'unused-boot-certs': ['BootCertificates'] } }

[...]

#3 lore raw

PATCH v8 2/30 crypto/x509-utils: Refactor with GNUTLS fallback

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Always compile x509-utils.c and add a fallback when GNUTLS is unavailable.

These functions will be needed in the s390x code regardless of whether GNUTLS is available.

---
 crypto/meson.build  |  2 +-
 crypto/x509-utils.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
crypto/meson.build +1 -1
index b51597a879..fda85543de 100644
@@ -22,12 +22,12 @@ crypto_ss.add(files(
   'tlscredsx509.c',
   'tlssession.c',
   'rsakey.c',
+  'x509-utils.c',
 ))
 
 if gnutls.found()
   crypto_ss.add(files(
     'tlscredsbox.c',
-    'x509-utils.c',
   ))
 endif
 
crypto/x509-utils.c +16 -0
index 39bb6d4d8c..6176a88653 100644
@@ -11,6 +11,8 @@
 #include "qemu/osdep.h"
 #include "qapi/error.h"
 #include "crypto/x509-utils.h"
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_GNUTLS
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 #include <gnutls/crypto.h>
 #include <gnutls/x509.h>
@@ -78,3 +80,17 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
     gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
     return ret;
 }
+
+#else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
+
+int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                      QCryptoHashAlgo hash,
+                                      uint8_t *result,
+                                      size_t *resultlen,
+                                      Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "GNUTLS is required to get fingerprint");
+    return -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#4 lore raw

PATCH v8 3/30 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for certificate store

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Introduce new helper functions for x509 certificate, which will be used by the certificate store:

qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der() - converts a certificate from PEM to DER format

These functions provide support for certificate format conversion.

---
 crypto/x509-utils.c         | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/x509-utils.h | 21 ++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 70 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +49 -0
index 6176a88653..2696d48155 100644
@@ -81,6 +81,46 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
     return ret;
 }
 
+int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                  uint8_t **result, size_t *resultlen,
+                                  Error **errp)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    int rc;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+    gnutls_datum_t datum_der = {.data = NULL, .size = 0};
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_export2(crt, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER, &datum_der);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to convert certificate to DER format: %s",
+                   gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *resultlen = datum_der.size;
+    *result = g_memdup2(datum_der.data, datum_der.size);
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    gnutls_free(datum_der.data);
+    return ret;
+}
+
 #else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
 
 int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -93,4 +133,13 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
     return -1;
 }
 
+int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                  uint8_t **result,
+                                  size_t *resultlen,
+                                  Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "GNUTLS is required to export X.509 certificate");
+    return -1;
+}
+
 #endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +21 -0
index 1e99661a71..91ae79fb03 100644
@@ -19,4 +19,25 @@ int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
                                       size_t *resultlen,
                                       Error **errp);
 
+/**
+ * qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der
+ * @cert: pointer to the raw certificate data in PEM format
+ * @size: size of the certificate
+ * @result: output location for the allocated buffer for the certificate
+ *          in DER format
+ *          (the function allocates memory which must be freed by the caller)
+ * @resultlen: pointer to the size of the buffer (will be updated with the
+ *             actual size of the DER-encoded certificate)
+ * @errp: error pointer
+ *
+ * Convert the given @cert from PEM to DER format.
+ *
+ * Returns: 0 on success,
+ *         -1 on error.
+ */
+int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                  uint8_t **result,
+                                  size_t *resultlen,
+                                  Error **errp);
+
 #endif
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#5 lore raw

PATCH v8 4/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Create a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.

Load certificates from the boot-certs parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option into the cert store.

Currently, only X.509 certificates in PEM format are supported, as the QEMU command line accepts certificates in PEM format only.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst |  16 +++
 hw/s390x/cert-store.c           | 221 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 hw/s390x/cert-store.h           |  41 ++++++
 hw/s390x/ipl.c                  |  10 ++
 hw/s390x/ipl.h                  |   3 +
 hw/s390x/meson.build            |   1 +
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h     |   2 +
 7 files changed, 294 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
 create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.c
 create mode 100644 hw/s390x/cert-store.h
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst new file +16 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7ddac98a37
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+s390 Certificate Store and Functions
+====================================
+
+s390 Certificate Store
+----------------------
+
+A certificate store is implemented for s390-ccw guests to retain within
+memory all certificates provided by the user via the command-line, which
+are expected to be stored somewhere on the host's file system. The store
+will keep track of the number of certificates, their respective size,
+and a summation of the sizes.
+
+Note: A maximum of 64 certificates are allowed to be stored in the certificate
+store.
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +221 -0

221 lines not on this page · raw message

hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +41 -0

41 lines not on this page · raw message

hw/s390x/ipl.c +10 -0
index d34adb5522..ea108fe370 100644
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include "qemu/option.h"
 #include "qemu/ctype.h"
 #include "standard-headers/linux/virtio_ids.h"
+#include "cert-store.h"
 
 #define KERN_IMAGE_START                0x010000UL
 #define LINUX_MAGIC_ADDR                0x010008UL
@@ -425,6 +426,13 @@ void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm(char *ascii_lp, uint8_t *ebcdic_lp)
     }
 }
 
+S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store(void)
+{
+    S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
+
+    return &ipl->cert_store;
+}
+
 static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
 {
     CcwDevice *ccw_dev = NULL;
@@ -718,6 +726,8 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)
     cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->start_addr;
     cpu->env.psw.mask = IPL_PSW_MASK;
 
+    s390_ipl_create_cert_store(&ipl->cert_store);
+
     if (!ipl->kernel || ipl->iplb_valid) {
         cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->bios_start_addr;
         if (!ipl->iplb_valid) {
hw/s390x/ipl.h +3 -0
index 85be03de1b..0c773ac8ce 100644
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
 #ifndef HW_S390_IPL_H
 #define HW_S390_IPL_H
 
+#include "cert-store.h"
 #include "cpu.h"
 #include "exec/target_page.h"
 #include "system/address-spaces.h"
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ int s390_ipl_pv_unpack(struct S390PVResponse *pv_resp);
 void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu);
 IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb(void);
 IplParameterBlock *s390_ipl_get_iplb_pv(void);
+S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store(void);
 
 enum s390_reset {
     /* default is a reset not triggered by a CPU e.g. issued by QMP */
@@ -64,6 +66,7 @@ struct S390IPLState {
     IplParameterBlock iplb;
     IplParameterBlock iplb_pv;
     QemuIplParameters qipl;
+    S390IPLCertificateStore cert_store;
     uint64_t start_addr;
     uint64_t compat_start_addr;
     uint64_t bios_start_addr;
hw/s390x/meson.build +1 -0
index 8866012ddc..80d3d4a74d 100644
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ s390x_ss.add(files(
   'sclpcpu.c',
   'sclpquiesce.c',
   'tod.c',
+  'cert-store.c',
 ))
 s390x_ss.add(when: 'CONFIG_KVM', if_true: files(
   'tod-kvm.c',
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +2 -0
index 6824391111..e505f44020 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
 #define LOADPARM_LEN    8
 #define NO_LOADPARM "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"
 
+#define MAX_CERTIFICATES  64
+
 /*
  * The QEMU IPL Parameters will be stored at absolute address
  * 204 (0xcc) which means it is 32-bit word aligned but not
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#6 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 04/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store

Quoted 10 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Create a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.

Load certificates from the boot-certs parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option into the cert store.

Currently, only X.509 certificates in PEM format are supported, as the QEMU command line accepts certificates in PEM format only.

---

...

Quoted 3 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +0 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@

...

Quoted 24 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +24 -0
+void s390_ipl_create_cert_store(S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store)
+{
+    GPtrArray *cert_path_builder;
+    Error *err = NULL;
+
+    /* If cert store is already populated, then no work to do */
+    if (cert_store->count) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    cert_path_builder = get_cert_paths(&err);
+    if (cert_path_builder == NULL) {
+        error_report_err(err);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    if (cert_path_builder->len == 0) {
+        g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (cert_path_builder->len > MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1) {
+        error_report("Cert store exceeds maximum of %d certificates", MAX_CERTIFICATES);
+        g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);

hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 210

Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10 -0
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    cert_store->largest_cert_size = 0;
+    cert_store->total_bytes = 0;
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < cert_path_builder->len; i++) {
+        g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *cert = init_cert(
+                                              (char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i],
+                                              &err);

I'd maybe write it like this to decrease indentation:

        g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *cert =
                   init_cert((char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i],
                             &err);

... but up to you, it's just cosmetics.

...

Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50e36e2389
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@

...

hw/s390x/cert-store.h line 37

Quoted 9 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +9 -0
+struct S390IPLCertificateStore {
+    uint16_t count;
+    size_t   largest_cert_size;
+    size_t   total_bytes;
+    S390IPLCertificate certs[MAX_CERTIFICATES];
+};
+typedef struct S390IPLCertificateStore S390IPLCertificateStore;
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(S390IPLCertificateStore) != 5656,
+                   "size of S390IPLCertificateStore is wrong");

Why is there a QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG here? As far as I can see, this is not a structure that we share in the API with the guest, is it? So if this is just internal to QEMU, the size of the structure should not matter here, I think?

Thomas

#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 04/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store

Quoted 81 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 10 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Create a certificate store for boot certificates used for secure IPL.

Load certificates from the boot-certs parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option into the cert store.

Currently, only X.509 certificates in PEM format are supported, as the QEMU command line accepts certificates in PEM format only.

---

...

Quoted 3 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +0 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@

...

Quoted 24 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +24 -0
+void s390_ipl_create_cert_store(S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store)
+{
+    GPtrArray *cert_path_builder;
+    Error *err = NULL;
+
+    /* If cert store is already populated, then no work to do */
+    if (cert_store->count) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    cert_path_builder = get_cert_paths(&err);
+    if (cert_path_builder == NULL) {
+        error_report_err(err);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    if (cert_path_builder->len == 0) {
+        g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (cert_path_builder->len > MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1) {
+        error_report("Cert store exceeds maximum of %d certificates", MAX_CERTIFICATES);
+        g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);

hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 210

Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10 -0
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    cert_store->largest_cert_size = 0;
+    cert_store->total_bytes = 0;
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < cert_path_builder->len; i++) {
+        g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *cert = init_cert(
+                                              (char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i],
+                                              &err);

I'd maybe write it like this to decrease indentation:

         g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *cert =
                    init_cert((char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i],
                              &err);

... but up to you, it's just cosmetics.

...

Quoted 6 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..50e36e2389
@@ -0,0 +1,41 @@

...

hw/s390x/cert-store.h line 37

Quoted 9 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.h new file +9 -0
+struct S390IPLCertificateStore {
+    uint16_t count;
+    size_t   largest_cert_size;
+    size_t   total_bytes;
+    S390IPLCertificate certs[MAX_CERTIFICATES];
+};
+typedef struct S390IPLCertificateStore S390IPLCertificateStore;
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(S390IPLCertificateStore) != 5656,
+                   "size of S390IPLCertificateStore is wrong");

Why is there a QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG here? As far as I can see, this is not a structure that we share in the API with the guest, is it? So if this is just internal to QEMU, the size of the structure should not matter here, I think?

Quoted 1 line

Thomas

I initially assumed that all non-packed structs should be guarded with QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG to prevent padding changes.

You are correct that this structure is only used within QEMU. If the size is not relevant in this case, then it should be safe to remove the check here.

Quoted 1 line
Reviewed-by on v8 4/30
#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 04/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Create certificate store

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

<..snip..>

Quoted 12 lines · Zhuoying Cai

void s390_ipl_create_cert_store(S390IPLCertificateStore *cert_store)

hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +11 -0
+{
+    GPtrArray *cert_path_builder;
+    Error *err = NULL;
+
+    /* If cert store is already populated, then no work to do */
+    if (cert_store->count) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    cert_path_builder = get_cert_paths(&err);
+    if (cert_path_builder == NULL) {

hw/s390x/cert-store.c line 198

Quoted 10 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +10 -0
+        error_report_err(err);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    if (cert_path_builder->len == 0) {
+        g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (cert_path_builder->len > MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1) {

I think we are off by 1 here and it should be cert_path_builder->len > MAX_CERTIFICATES. With this fixed

Quoted 23 lines
hw/s390x/cert-store.c new file +23 -0
+        error_report("Cert store exceeds maximum of %d certificates", MAX_CERTIFICATES);
+        g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    cert_store->largest_cert_size = 0;
+    cert_store->total_bytes = 0;
+
+    for (int i = 0; i < cert_path_builder->len; i++) {
+        g_autofree S390IPLCertificate *cert = init_cert(
+                                              (char *) cert_path_builder->pdata[i],
+                                              &err);
+        if (!cert) {
+            error_report_err(err);
+            g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);
+            exit(1);
+        }
+
+        update_cert_store(cert_store, cert);
+    }
+
+    g_ptr_array_free(cert_path_builder, TRUE);
+}
#9 lore raw

PATCH v8 5/30 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

DIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support Certificate Store (CS) Facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.

Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query the Installed Subcodes Mask (ISM).

This subcode is only supported when the CS facility is enabled.

Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 134's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.

Note: secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst     | 12 +++++++++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h      | 20 ++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/cpu_features.c         |  1 +
 target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc |  1 +
 target/s390x/cpu_models.c           |  2 ++
 target/s390x/diag.c                 | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/gen-features.c         |  3 +++
 target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c              | 16 +++++++++++
 target/s390x/s390x-internal.h       |  2 ++
 target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c      |  7 +++++
 10 files changed, 106 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +12 -0
index 7ddac98a37..c2e8f7aba5 100644
@@ -14,3 +14,15 @@ and a summation of the sizes.
 
 Note: A maximum of 64 certificates are allowed to be stored in the certificate
 store.
+
+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'320' - Certificate Store Facility
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is used to provide support for userspace to directly
+query the s390 certificate store. Userspace may be the s390-ccw BIOS or
+the guest kernel.
+
+Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes
+    Returns a 256-bit installed subcodes mask (ISM) stored in the installed
+    subcodes block (ISB). This mask indicates which subcodes are currently
+    installed and available for use.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h new file +20 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..aa04b699c6
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/*
+ * S/390 DIAGNOSE 320 definitions and structures
+ *
+ * Copyright 2025 IBM Corp.
+ * Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef S390X_DIAG320_H
+#define S390X_DIAG320_H
+
+#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM     0
+
+#define DIAG_320_RC_OK              0x0001
+#define DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED   0x0102
+
+#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES 0x80000000
+
+#endif
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +1 -0
index 4b5be6798e..436471f4b4 100644
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,
         break;
     case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134:
         clear_be_bit(s390_feat_def(S390_FEAT_DIAG_318)->bit, data);
+        clear_be_bit(s390_feat_def(S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE)->bit, data);
         break;
     default:
         return;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
index c017bffcdc..2976ecd0ee 100644
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s
 
 /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 134 (bit numbers relative to byte-134) */
 DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes")
+DEF_FEAT(CERT_STORE, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Certificate Store functions")
 
 /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */
 DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
index 954a7a99a9..6b8471700e 100644
@@ -248,6 +248,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)
     if (s390_is_pv()) {
         switch (feat) {
         case S390_FEAT_DIAG_318:
+        case S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE:
         case S390_FEAT_HPMA2:
         case S390_FEAT_SIE_F2:
         case S390_FEAT_SIE_SKEY:
@@ -505,6 +506,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model)
         { S390_FEAT_PTFF_STOUE, S390_FEAT_MULTIPLE_EPOCH },
         { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP },
         { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
+        { S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
         { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR },
         { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING },
         { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/diag.c +42 -0

51 lines not on this page · raw message

target/s390x/gen-features.c +3 -0
index 8218e6470e..6c20c3a862 100644
@@ -720,6 +720,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {
     S390_FEAT_PAIE,
     S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP,
     S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR,
+    S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE,
 };
 
 static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -919,6 +920,8 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {
     S390_FEAT_KIMD_SHA_512,
     S390_FEAT_KLMD_SHA_512,
     S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG,
+    S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB,
+    S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE,
 };
 
 /****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +16 -0
index 06296381a2..636d2d8f01 100644
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@
 #define DIAG_TIMEREVENT                 0x288
 #define DIAG_IPL                        0x308
 #define DIAG_SET_CONTROL_PROGRAM_CODES  0x318
+#define DIAG_CERT_STORE                 0x320
 #define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL              0x500
 #define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT             0x501
 
@@ -1560,6 +1561,16 @@ static void handle_diag_318(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run)
     }
 }
 
+static void kvm_handle_diag_320(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run)
+{
+    uint64_t r1, r3;
+
+    r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa & 0x00f0) >> 4;
+    r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa & 0x000f;
+
+    handle_diag_320(&cpu->env, r1, r3, RA_IGNORED);
+}
+
 #define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffff
 
 static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1590,6 +1601,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)
     case DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT:
         r = handle_sw_breakpoint(cpu, run);
         break;
+    case DIAG_CERT_STORE:
+        kvm_handle_diag_320(cpu, run);
+        break;
     default:
         trace_kvm_insn_diag(func_code);
         kvm_s390_program_interrupt(cpu, PGM_SPECIFICATION);
@@ -2490,6 +2504,8 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)
         set_bit(S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, model->features);
     }
 
+    set_bit(S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, model->features);
+
     /* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */
     query_uv_feat_guest(model->features);
 
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
index 9691366ec9..771b62fbe2 100644
@@ -388,6 +388,8 @@ int mmu_translate_real(CPUS390XState *env, target_ulong raddr, int rw,
 int handle_diag_288(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3);
 void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3,
                      uintptr_t ra);
+void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3,
+                     uintptr_t ra);
 
 
 /* translate.c */
target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7 -0
index 1fd900fbbf..4d73475d95 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)
         /* time bomb (watchdog) */
         r = handle_diag_288(env, r1, r3);
         break;
+    case 0x320:
+        /* cert store */
+        bql_lock();
+        handle_diag_320(env, r1, r3, GETPC());
+        bql_unlock();
+        r = 0;
+        break;
     default:
         r = -1;
         break;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 5/30
#10 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 05/30] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility

Quoted 43 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support Certificate Store (CS) Facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.

Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query the Installed Subcodes Mask (ISM).

This subcode is only supported when the CS facility is enabled.

Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 134's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.

Note: secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---
  docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst     | 12 +++++++++
  include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h      | 20 ++++++++++++++
  target/s390x/cpu_features.c         |  1 +
  target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc |  1 +
  target/s390x/cpu_models.c           |  2 ++
  target/s390x/diag.c                 | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  target/s390x/gen-features.c         |  3 +++
  target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c              | 16 +++++++++++
  target/s390x/s390x-internal.h       |  2 ++
  target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c      |  7 +++++
  10 files changed, 106 insertions(+)

create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index 7ddac98a37..c2e8f7aba5 100644

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst and a summation of the sizes. · line 23

Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +7 -0
@@ -14,3 +14,15 @@ and a summation of the sizes.
 
  Note: A maximum of 64 certificates are allowed to be stored in the certificate
  store.
+
+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'320' - Certificate Store Facility
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is used to provide support for userspace to directly
+query the s390 certificate store. Userspace may be the s390-ccw BIOS or
+the guest kernel.

I think I'd rather say "guest code" instead of "userspace" in the above two sentences, to avoid confusion. "userspace" is normally everything that does not belong to the kernel, so the term sounds rather misleading here.

Anyway, with that confusion fixed:

#11 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 05/30] s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 320 for Certificate Store Facility

Quoted 58 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 43 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAGNOSE 320 is introduced to support Certificate Store (CS) Facility, which includes operations such as query certificate storage information and provide certificates in the certificate store.

Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query the Installed Subcodes Mask (ISM).

This subcode is only supported when the CS facility is enabled.

Availability of CS facility is determined by byte 134 bit 5 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 134's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.

Note: secure IPL is not available for Secure Execution (SE) guests, as their images are already integrity protected, and an additional protection of the kernel by secure IPL is not necessary.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---
  docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst     | 12 +++++++++
  include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h      | 20 ++++++++++++++
  target/s390x/cpu_features.c         |  1 +
  target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc |  1 +
  target/s390x/cpu_models.c           |  2 ++
  target/s390x/diag.c                 | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  target/s390x/gen-features.c         |  3 +++
  target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c              | 16 +++++++++++
  target/s390x/s390x-internal.h       |  2 ++
  target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c      |  7 +++++
  10 files changed, 106 insertions(+)

create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index 7ddac98a37..c2e8f7aba5 100644

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst and a summation of the sizes. · line 23

Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +7 -0
@@ -14,3 +14,15 @@ and a summation of the sizes.
 
  Note: A maximum of 64 certificates are allowed to be stored in the certificate
  store.
+
+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'320' - Certificate Store Facility
+-----------------------------------------------------------
+
+DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is used to provide support for userspace to directly
+query the s390 certificate store. Userspace may be the s390-ccw BIOS or
+the guest kernel.

I think I'd rather say "guest code" instead of "userspace" in the above two sentences, to avoid confusion. "userspace" is normally everything that does not belong to the kernel, so the term sounds rather misleading here.

Quoted 3 lines

Anyway, with that confusion fixed:

Will do. Thanks for the review!

#12 lore raw

PATCH v8 6/30 s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Create a function to validate the address parameter of DIAGNOSE.

Refactor the function for reuse in the next patch, which allows address validation in read or write operation of DIAGNOSE.

---
 target/s390x/diag.c | 10 +++++++---
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
target/s390x/diag.c +7 -3
index d82eedfeca..e867fc2156 100644
@@ -26,6 +26,12 @@
 #include "qemu/error-report.h"
 
 
+static inline bool diag_parm_addr_valid(uint64_t addr, size_t size, bool write)
+{
+    return address_space_access_valid(&address_space_memory, addr,
+                                      size, write, MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED);
+}
+
 int handle_diag_288(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3)
 {
     uint64_t func = env->regs[r1];
@@ -65,9 +71,7 @@ static int diag308_parm_check(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t addr,
         s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_SPECIFICATION, ra);
         return -1;
     }
-    if (!address_space_access_valid(&address_space_memory, addr,
-                                    sizeof(IplParameterBlock), write,
-                                    MEMTXATTRS_UNSPECIFIED)) {
+    if (!diag_parm_addr_valid(addr, sizeof(IplParameterBlock), write)) {
         s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_ADDRESSING, ra);
         return -1;
     }
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 6/30
#13 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 06/30] s390x/diag: Refactor address validation check from diag308_parm_check

Quoted 5 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Create a function to validate the address parameter of DIAGNOSE.

Refactor the function for reuse in the next patch, which allows address validation in read or write operation of DIAGNOSE.

Quoted 7 lines
---
  target/s390x/diag.c | 10 +++++++---
  1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
#14 lore raw

PATCH v8 7/30 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates from the certificate store.

Upon successful completion, this subcode returns information of the current cert store, such as the number of certificates stored and allowed in the cert store, amount of space may need to be allocate to store a certificate, etc for verification-certificate blocks (VCBs).

The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificate are available in the cert store.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 12 +++++++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h  | 22 ++++++++++++
 target/s390x/diag.c             | 63 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +12 -0
index c2e8f7aba5..d3ece8a82d 100644
@@ -26,3 +26,15 @@ Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes
     Returns a 256-bit installed subcodes mask (ISM) stored in the installed
     subcodes block (ISB). This mask indicates which subcodes are currently
     installed and available for use.
+
+Subcode 1 - query verification certificate storage information
+    Provides the information required to determine the amount of memory needed
+    to store one or more verification-certificates (VCs) from the certificate
+    store (CS).
+
+    Upon successful completion, this subcode returns various storage size values
+    for verification-certificate blocks (VCBs).
+
+    The output is returned in the verification-certificate-storage-size block
+    (VCSSB). A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificates are available
+    in the CS.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +22 -0
index aa04b699c6..6e4779c699 100644
@@ -11,10 +11,32 @@
 #define S390X_DIAG320_H
 
 #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM     0
+#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI    1
 
 #define DIAG_320_RC_OK              0x0001
 #define DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED   0x0102
+#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN 0x0202
 
 #define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES 0x80000000
+#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI     0x40000000
+
+#define VCSSB_NO_VC     4
+#define VCSSB_MIN_LEN   128
+#define VCE_HEADER_LEN  128
+#define VCB_HEADER_LEN  64
+
+struct VCStorageSizeBlock {
+    uint32_t length;
+    uint8_t reserved0[3];
+    uint8_t version;
+    uint32_t reserved1[6];
+    uint16_t total_vc_ct;
+    uint16_t max_vc_ct;
+    uint32_t reserved3[11];
+    uint32_t max_single_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t total_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t reserved4[10];
+};
+typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock;
 
 #endif
target/s390x/diag.c +62 -1

86 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#15 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 07/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1

Quoted 21 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates from the certificate store.

Upon successful completion, this subcode returns information of the current cert store, such as the number of certificates stored and allowed in the cert store, amount of space may need to be allocate to store a certificate, etc for verification-certificate blocks (VCBs).

The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificate are available in the cert store.

---

...

Quoted 25 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +12 -0
index aa04b699c6..6e4779c699 100644
@@ -11,10 +11,32 @@
  #define S390X_DIAG320_H
 
  #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM     0
+#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI    1
 
  #define DIAG_320_RC_OK              0x0001
  #define DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED   0x0102
+#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN 0x0202
 
  #define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES 0x80000000
+#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI     0x40000000
+
+#define VCSSB_NO_VC     4
+#define VCSSB_MIN_LEN   128
+#define VCE_HEADER_LEN  128
+#define VCB_HEADER_LEN  64
+
+struct VCStorageSizeBlock {
+    uint32_t length;
+    uint8_t reserved0[3];

include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 40

Quoted 10 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +10 -0
+    uint8_t version;
+    uint32_t reserved1[6];
+    uint16_t total_vc_ct;
+    uint16_t max_vc_ct;
+    uint32_t reserved3[11];
+    uint32_t max_single_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t total_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t reserved4[10];
+};
+typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock;

Since this API between QEMU and the guest, maybe add a

QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(VCStorageSizeBlock) != ...);

here to make sure that there is no accidential padding.
(should not happen since field are naturally aligned, but better be safe than sorry?)

Quoted 13 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +0 -0
  #endif
target/s390x/diag.c +4 -0
index e867fc2156..3c7e64eb05 100644
@@ -197,11 +197,54 @@ out:
      }
  }
 
+static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1,
+                                     uintptr_t ra, S390IPLCertificateStore *cs)
+{
+    g_autofree VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb = NULL;

target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 213

Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10 -0
+
+    vcssb = g_new0(VCStorageSizeBlock, 1);
+    if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, r1, vcssb, sizeof(*vcssb))) {
+        s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (be32_to_cpu(vcssb->length) > sizeof(*vcssb)) {
+        return -1;
+    }

Thanks for adding the check, but I think this should rather be :

        return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN;

since we did not inject an exception in this case?

Quoted 3 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +3 -0
+    if (be32_to_cpu(vcssb->length) < VCSSB_MIN_LEN) {
+        return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN;
+    }

...

Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +4 -0
+    case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI:
+        if (!diag_parm_addr_valid(addr, sizeof(VCStorageSizeBlock), true)) {
+            s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_ADDRESSING, ra);
+            return;

target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 292

Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10 -0
+        }
+
+        if (addr & 0x7) {
+            s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_ADDRESSING, ra);
+            return;
+        }
+
+        rc = handle_diag320_query_vcsi(cpu, addr, r1, ra, cs);
+        if (rc == -1) {
+            return;

... otherwise the error will be ignored silently here and the guest will think that the call succeeded.

Maybe you could also create some kvm-unit-tests for this new diag call that exercises these error scenarios, then you'll easily see whether the diag behaves as expected.

Thanks,
Thomas

Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +3 -0
+        }
+        env->regs[r1 + 1] = rc;
+        break;
      default:
          env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED;
          break;
#16 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 07/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1

Quoted 61 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 21 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates from the certificate store.

Upon successful completion, this subcode returns information of the current cert store, such as the number of certificates stored and allowed in the cert store, amount of space may need to be allocate to store a certificate, etc for verification-certificate blocks (VCBs).

The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificate are available in the cert store.

---

...

Quoted 25 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +12 -0
index aa04b699c6..6e4779c699 100644
@@ -11,10 +11,32 @@
  #define S390X_DIAG320_H
 
  #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM     0
+#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI    1
 
  #define DIAG_320_RC_OK              0x0001
  #define DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED   0x0102
+#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN 0x0202
 
  #define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES 0x80000000
+#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI     0x40000000
+
+#define VCSSB_NO_VC     4
+#define VCSSB_MIN_LEN   128
+#define VCE_HEADER_LEN  128
+#define VCB_HEADER_LEN  64
+
+struct VCStorageSizeBlock {
+    uint32_t length;
+    uint8_t reserved0[3];

include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 40

Quoted 10 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +10 -0
+    uint8_t version;
+    uint32_t reserved1[6];
+    uint16_t total_vc_ct;
+    uint16_t max_vc_ct;
+    uint32_t reserved3[11];
+    uint32_t max_single_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t total_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t reserved4[10];
+};
+typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock;

Since this API between QEMU and the guest, maybe add a

Quoted 6 lines

QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(VCStorageSizeBlock) != ...);

here to make sure that there is no accidential padding. (should not happen since field are naturally aligned, but better be safe than sorry?)

Please correct me if I’m wrong. QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON() is a QEMU-specific macro and is not accessible from the guest, so using it here would cause a compile error. I’m not aware of similar checks being used on the guest side. Would QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON() still be appropriate in this case, or is there a better way to ensure that no unintended padding is introduced?

Quoted 54 lines
Quoted 13 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +0 -0
  #endif
target/s390x/diag.c +4 -0
index e867fc2156..3c7e64eb05 100644
@@ -197,11 +197,54 @@ out:
      }
  }
 
+static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1,
+                                     uintptr_t ra, S390IPLCertificateStore *cs)
+{
+    g_autofree VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb = NULL;

target/s390x/diag.c out: · line 213

Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10 -0
+
+    vcssb = g_new0(VCStorageSizeBlock, 1);
+    if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, r1, vcssb, sizeof(*vcssb))) {
+        s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (be32_to_cpu(vcssb->length) > sizeof(*vcssb)) {
+        return -1;
+    }

Thanks for adding the check, but I think this should rather be :

         return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN;

since we did not inject an exception in this case?

Quoted 3 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +3 -0
+    if (be32_to_cpu(vcssb->length) < VCSSB_MIN_LEN) {
+        return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN;
+    }

...

Quoted 4 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +4 -0
+    case DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI:
+        if (!diag_parm_addr_valid(addr, sizeof(VCStorageSizeBlock), true)) {
+            s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_ADDRESSING, ra);
+            return;

target/s390x/diag.c void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 292

Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10 -0
+        }
+
+        if (addr & 0x7) {
+            s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_ADDRESSING, ra);
+            return;
+        }
+
+        rc = handle_diag320_query_vcsi(cpu, addr, r1, ra, cs);
+        if (rc == -1) {
+            return;

... otherwise the error will be ignored silently here and the guest will think that the call succeeded.

Quoted 8 lines

Maybe you could also create some kvm-unit-tests for this new diag call that exercises these error scenarios, then you'll easily see whether the diag behaves as expected.

Thanks,
Thomas

Thanks for the suggestion. I’ll fix the return code and look into adding kvm‑unit‑tests for this new diag call.

Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 6 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +3 -0
+        }
+        env->regs[r1 + 1] = rc;
+        break;
      default:
          env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED;
          break;
#17 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 07/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 1

Quoted 69 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 61 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 21 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 1 provides information needed to determine the amount of storage to store one or more certificates from the certificate store.

Upon successful completion, this subcode returns information of the current cert store, such as the number of certificates stored and allowed in the cert store, amount of space may need to be allocate to store a certificate, etc for verification-certificate blocks (VCBs).

The subcode value is denoted by setting the left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The verification-certificate-storage-size block (VCSSB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificate are available in the cert store.

---

...

Quoted 25 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +12 -0
index aa04b699c6..6e4779c699 100644
@@ -11,10 +11,32 @@
   #define S390X_DIAG320_H
 
   #define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM     0
+#define DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI    1
 
   #define DIAG_320_RC_OK              0x0001
   #define DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED   0x0102
+#define DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCSSB_LEN 0x0202
 
   #define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES 0x80000000
+#define DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI     0x40000000
+
+#define VCSSB_NO_VC     4
+#define VCSSB_MIN_LEN   128
+#define VCE_HEADER_LEN  128
+#define VCB_HEADER_LEN  64
+
+struct VCStorageSizeBlock {
+    uint32_t length;
+    uint8_t reserved0[3];

include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h line 40

Quoted 10 lines
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +10 -0
+    uint8_t version;
+    uint32_t reserved1[6];
+    uint16_t total_vc_ct;
+    uint16_t max_vc_ct;
+    uint32_t reserved3[11];
+    uint32_t max_single_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t total_vcb_len;
+    uint32_t reserved4[10];
+};
+typedef struct VCStorageSizeBlock VCStorageSizeBlock;

Since this API between QEMU and the guest, maybe add a

Quoted 6 lines

QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(VCStorageSizeBlock) != ...);

here to make sure that there is no accidential padding. (should not happen since field are naturally aligned, but better be safe than sorry?)

Quoted 5 lines

Please correct me if I’m wrong. QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON() is a QEMU-specific macro and is not accessible from the guest, so using it here would cause a compile error. I’m not aware of similar checks being used on the guest side. Would QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON() still be appropriate in this case, or is there a better way to ensure that no unintended padding is introduced?

Ah, you're right, my bad, sorry, we don't define QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON for the s390-ccw bios, indeed. We could likely define it there, too, like we do for QEMU_PACKED already, but for the time being, it's ok to not add a QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON here.

Thomas

#18 lore raw

PATCH v8 8/30 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Introduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata:

qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times() - validates the certificate's validity period against the current time qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm() - returns the public key algorithm used in the certificate qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() - extracts the key ID from the certificate qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521() - determines the ECC public key algorithm uses P-521 curve

These functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.

---
 crypto/x509-utils.c         | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/x509-utils.h |  51 ++++++++
 2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +236 -0
index 2696d48155..906d5e5e87 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160,
 };
 
+static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[] = {
+    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5] = -1,
+    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA1] = GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA1,
+    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA224] = -1,
+    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256] = GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA256,
+    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA384] = -1,
+    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA512] = GNUTLS_KEYID_USE_SHA512,
+    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = -1,
+};
+
 int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
                                       QCryptoHashAlgo alg,
                                       uint8_t *result,
@@ -121,6 +131,210 @@ cleanup:
     return ret;
 }
 
+int qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+    time_t now = time(NULL);
+    time_t exp_time;
+    time_t act_time;
+
+    if (now == ((time_t)-1)) {
+        error_setg_errno(errp, errno, "Cannot get current time");
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    exp_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_expiration_time(crt);
+    if (exp_time == ((time_t)-1)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get certificate expiration time");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    if (exp_time < now) {
+        error_setg(errp, "The certificate has expired");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    act_time = gnutls_x509_crt_get_activation_time(crt);
+    if (act_time == ((time_t)-1)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get certificate activation time");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+    if (act_time > now) {
+        error_setg(errp, "The certificate is not yet active");
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    unsigned int bits;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_algorithm(crt, &bits);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unknown public key algorithm %d", rc);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = rc;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                 QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg,
+                                 uint8_t **result,
+                                 size_t *resultlen,
+                                 Error **errp)
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unknown hash algorithm %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map) ||
+        qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg] == -1) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unsupported key id flag %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *resultlen = gnutls_hash_get_len(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg]);
+    if (*resultlen == 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get hash algorithn length: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *result = g_malloc0(*resultlen);
+    if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id(crt,
+                                   qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg],
+                                   *result, resultlen) != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get key ID from certificate");
+        g_clear_pointer(result, g_free);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+static int qcrypto_x509_get_ecc_curve(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+    gnutls_ecc_curve_t curve_id;
+    gnutls_datum_t x = {.data = NULL, .size = 0};
+    gnutls_datum_t y = {.data = NULL, .size = 0};
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_get_pk_ecc_raw(crt, &curve_id, &x, &y);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get ECC public key curve: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = curve_id;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    gnutls_free(x.data);
+    gnutls_free(y.data);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
+{
+    int algo;
+    int curve_id;
+
+    algo = qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm(cert, size, errp);
+    if (algo != GNUTLS_PK_ECDSA) {
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    curve_id = qcrypto_x509_get_ecc_curve(cert, size, errp);
+    if (curve_id == -1) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get ECC curve");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    if (curve_id == GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_INVALID) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Invalid ECC curve");
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return curve_id == GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1;
+}
+
 #else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
 
 int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -142,4 +356,26 @@ int qcrypto_x509_convert_cert_der(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
     return -1;
 }
 
+int qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "GNUTLS is required to get certificate times");
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                 QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg,
+                                 uint8_t **result,
+                                 size_t *resultlen,
+                                 Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "GNUTLS is required to get key ID");
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "GNUTLS is required to determine ecc curve");
+    return -1;
+}
+
 #endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +51 -0

55 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#19 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 08/30] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2

Quoted 22 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Introduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata:

qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times() - validates the certificate's validity period against the current time qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm() - returns the public key algorithm used in the certificate qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() - extracts the key ID from the certificate qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521() - determines the ECC public key algorithm uses P-521 curve

These functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.

---
  crypto/x509-utils.c         | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  include/crypto/x509-utils.h |  51 ++++++++
  2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
index 2696d48155..906d5e5e87 100644

crypto/x509-utils.c static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = { · line 27

Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
      [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160,

So there is a mapping for RIPEMD160 - everything else will be mapped to 0, which is GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN if I got the gnutls.h header right ...

Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
  };

...

crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 225

Quoted 5 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +5 -0
+int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                 QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg,
+                                 uint8_t **result,
+                                 size_t *resultlen,
+                                 Error **errp)

... and in patch 09/30, you call this function with:

+ rc = qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(cert->raw, cert->size,
+ QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256,
+ &key_id_data, &key_id_len, &err);

i.e. hash_alg is QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256...

Quoted 20 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +20 -0
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unknown hash algorithm %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map) ||
+        qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg] == -1) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unsupported key id flag %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));

crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 255

Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10 -0
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *resultlen = gnutls_hash_get_len(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg]);

... so qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg] should result in GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN as far as I can see. How is this supposed to work? Is this code used at all? Or is the error simply ignored somewhere up in the call chain? Or did I miss something?

Thomas

Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10 -0
+    if (*resultlen == 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get hash algorithn length: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *result = g_malloc0(*resultlen);
+    if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id(crt,
+                                   qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg],
+                                   *result, resultlen) != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get key ID from certificate");

crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 275

Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10 -0
+        g_clear_pointer(result, g_free);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    return ret;
+}

Thomas

#20 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 08/30] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2

Quoted 80 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 22 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Introduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata:

qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times() - validates the certificate's validity period against the current time qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm() - returns the public key algorithm used in the certificate qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() - extracts the key ID from the certificate qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521() - determines the ECC public key algorithm uses P-521 curve

These functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.

---
  crypto/x509-utils.c         | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  include/crypto/x509-utils.h |  51 ++++++++
  2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
index 2696d48155..906d5e5e87 100644

crypto/x509-utils.c static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = { · line 27

Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
      [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160,

So there is a mapping for RIPEMD160 - everything else will be mapped to 0, which is GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN if I got the gnutls.h header right ...

Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
  };

...

crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 225

Quoted 5 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +5 -0
+int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                 QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg,
+                                 uint8_t **result,
+                                 size_t *resultlen,
+                                 Error **errp)

... and in patch 09/30, you call this function with:

(quoted diff) +3 -0
+    rc = qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(cert->raw, cert->size,
+                                      QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256,
+                                      &key_id_data, &key_id_len, &err);

i.e. hash_alg is QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256...

Quoted 20 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +20 -0
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unknown hash algorithm %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map) ||
+        qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg] == -1) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unsupported key id flag %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));

crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 255

Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10 -0
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *resultlen = gnutls_hash_get_len(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg]);

... so qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg] should result in GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN as far as I can see. How is this supposed to work? Is this code used at all? Or is the error simply ignored somewhere up in the call chain? Or did I miss something?

Quoted 3 lines

Thomas

Thanks for the review!

To clarify: the diff context only showed the RIPEMD160 line, but the existing qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[] also includes SHA256 in x509-utils.c.

static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5] = GNUTLS_DIG_MD5,
    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA1] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1,
    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA224] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA224,
    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256,
    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA384] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384,
    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA512] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512,
    [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160,
};

For the call in patch 09/30, hash_alg is QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256, so qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg] resolves to GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256 (value 6), and gnutls_hash_get_len(...) returns 32 as expected.

Quoted 23 lines
Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10 -0
+    if (*resultlen == 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get hash algorithn length: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *result = g_malloc0(*resultlen);
+    if (gnutls_x509_crt_get_key_id(crt,
+                                   qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg],
+                                   *result, resultlen) != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to get key ID from certificate");

crypto/x509-utils.c cleanup: · line 275

Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10 -0
+        g_clear_pointer(result, g_free);
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    return ret;
+}

Thomas

#21 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 08/30] crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 320 subcode 2

Quoted 99 lines · Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 80 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 22 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Introduce new helper functions to extract certificate metadata:

qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times() - validates the certificate's validity period against the current time qcrypto_x509_get_pk_algorithm() - returns the public key algorithm used in the certificate qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id() - extracts the key ID from the certificate qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521() - determines the ECC public key algorithm uses P-521 curve

These functions provide support for metadata extraction and validity checking for X.509 certificates.

---
   crypto/x509-utils.c         | 236 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
   include/crypto/x509-utils.h |  51 ++++++++
   2 files changed, 287 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
index 2696d48155..906d5e5e87 100644

crypto/x509-utils.c static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = { · line 27

Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
       [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160,

So there is a mapping for RIPEMD160 - everything else will be mapped to 0, which is GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN if I got the gnutls.h header right ...

Quoted 1 line
crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
   };

...

crypto/x509-utils.c

Quoted 5 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +5 -0
+int qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
+                                 QCryptoHashAlgo hash_alg,
+                                 uint8_t **result,
+                                 size_t *resultlen,
+                                 Error **errp)

... and in patch 09/30, you call this function with:

(quoted diff) +3 -0
+    rc = qcrypto_x509_get_cert_key_id(cert->raw, cert->size,
+                                      QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256,
+                                      &key_id_data, &key_id_len, &err);

i.e. hash_alg is QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256...

Quoted 20 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +20 -0
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt;
+    gnutls_datum_t datum = {.data = cert, .size = size};
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map)) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unknown hash algorithm %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    if (hash_alg >= G_N_ELEMENTS(qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map) ||
+        qcrypto_to_gnutls_keyid_flags_map[hash_alg] == -1) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Unsupported key id flag %d", hash_alg);
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));

crypto/x509-utils.c

Quoted 10 lines
crypto/x509-utils.c +10 -0
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *resultlen = gnutls_hash_get_len(qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg]);

... so qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg] should result in GNUTLS_DIG_UNKNOWN as far as I can see. How is this supposed to work? Is this code used at all? Or is the error simply ignored somewhere up in the call chain? Or did I miss something?

Quoted 1 line

Thomas

Thanks for the review!

To clarify: the diff context only showed the RIPEMD160 line, but the existing qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[] also includes SHA256 in x509-utils.c.

static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5] = GNUTLS_DIG_MD5,
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA1] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA1,
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA224] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA224,
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256,
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA384] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA384,
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA512] = GNUTLS_DIG_SHA512,
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160,
};
Quoted 3 lines

For the call in patch 09/30, hash_alg is QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_SHA256, so qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[hash_alg] resolves to GNUTLS_DIG_SHA256 (value 6), and gnutls_hash_get_len(...) returns 32 as expected.

Ooops, sorry, I've been fooled by the line wrapping of my e-mail client.

It broke the lines like this:

crypto/x509-utils.c +0 -0
index 2696d48155..906d5e5e87 100644
@@ -27,6 +27,16 @@ static const int
qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_RIPEMD160] = GNUTLS_DIG_RMD160,

};

So without having a real close look, it indeed looked like there is only one entry in the array here :-/

Sorry for the noise!

Thomas

#22 lore raw

PATCH v8 9/30 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.

The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.

Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.

Note: SHA2-256 VC hash type is required for retrieving the hash (fingerprint) of the certificate.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst |  22 +++
 hw/s390x/cert-store.h           |   3 +-
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h  |  50 +++++
 target/s390x/diag.c             | 328 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 400 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +22 -0
index d3ece8a82d..22da589162 100644
@@ -38,3 +38,25 @@ Subcode 1 - query verification certificate storage information
     The output is returned in the verification-certificate-storage-size block
     (VCSSB). A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificates are available
     in the CS.
+
+Subcode 2 - store verification certificates
+    Provides VCs that are in the certificate store.
+
+    The output is provided in a VCB, which includes a common header followed by
+    zero or more verification-certificate entries (VCEs).
+
+    The instruction expects the cert store to
+    maintain an origin of 1 for the index (i.e. a retrieval of the first
+    certificate in the store should be denoted by setting first-VC to 1).
+
+    The first-VC index and last-VC index fields of VCB specify the range of VCs
+    to be stored by subcode 2. Stored count and remained count fields specify
+    the number of VCs stored and could not be stored in the VCB due to
+    insufficient storage specified in the VCB input length field.
+
+    Each VCE contains a header followed by information extracted from a
+    certificate within the certificate store. The information includes:
+    key-id, hash, and certificate data. This information is stored
+    contiguously in a VCE (with zero-padding). Following the header, the
+    key-id is immediately stored. The hash and certificate data follow and
+    may be accessed via the respective offset fields stored in the VCE.
hw/s390x/cert-store.h +1 -2
index 50e36e2389..bacd353ead 100644
@@ -11,10 +11,9 @@
 #define HW_S390_CERT_STORE_H
 
 #include "hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h"
+#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h"
 #include "crypto/x509-utils.h"
 
-#define CERT_NAME_MAX_LEN  64
-
 #define CERT_KEY_ID_LEN    QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256
 #define CERT_HASH_LEN      QCRYPTO_HASH_DIGEST_LEN_SHA256
 
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h +50 -0

73 lines not on this page · raw message

target/s390x/diag.c +327 -1

360 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#23 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 09/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2

Quoted 22 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.

The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.

Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.

Note: SHA2-256 VC hash type is required for retrieving the hash (fingerprint) of the certificate.

[...]

target/s390x/diag.c static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1, · line 247

Quoted 12 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8 -0
@@ -235,8 +237,324 @@ static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1,
     return DIAG_320_RC_OK;
 }
 
+static bool is_cert_valid(const S390IPLCertificate *cert)
+{
+    int rc;
+    Error *err = NULL;
+
+    rc = qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times(cert->raw, cert->size, &err);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_report_err(err);

Does not build for me:

    ../target/s390x/diag.c: In function ‘is_cert_valid’:
    ../target/s390x/diag.c:249:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘error_report_err’; did you mean ‘error_report’? [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
      249 |         error_report_err(err);
          |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
          |         error_report
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5 -0
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}

[...]

#24 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 09/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2

Quoted 42 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 22 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.

The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.

Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.

Note: SHA2-256 VC hash type is required for retrieving the hash (fingerprint) of the certificate.

[...]

target/s390x/diag.c static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1, · line 247

Quoted 12 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +8 -0
@@ -235,8 +237,324 @@ static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1,
     return DIAG_320_RC_OK;
 }
 
+static bool is_cert_valid(const S390IPLCertificate *cert)
+{
+    int rc;
+    Error *err = NULL;
+
+    rc = qcrypto_x509_check_cert_times(cert->raw, cert->size, &err);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_report_err(err);

Does not build for me:

Quoted 6 lines
    ../target/s390x/diag.c: In function ‘is_cert_valid’:
    ../target/s390x/diag.c:249:9: error: implicit declaration of function ‘error_report_err’; did you mean ‘error_report’? [-Wimplicit-function-declaration]
      249 |         error_report_err(err);
          |         ^~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
          |         error_report

Thanks for pointing this out. The build error is resolved by adding #include "qapi/error.h" to the file. I’ll update this in the next version.

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +5 -0
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return true;
+}

[...]

#25 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 09/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2

In reply to Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 59 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.

The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.

Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.

Note: SHA2-256 VC hash type is required for retrieving the hash (fingerprint) of the certificate.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst |  22 +++
 hw/s390x/cert-store.h           |   3 +-
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h  |  50 +++++
 target/s390x/diag.c             | 328 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 4 files changed, 400 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +22 -0
index d3ece8a82d..22da589162 100644
@@ -38,3 +38,25 @@ Subcode 1 - query verification certificate storage information
     The output is returned in the verification-certificate-storage-size block
     (VCSSB). A VCSSB length of 4 indicates that no certificates are available
     in the CS.
+
+Subcode 2 - store verification certificates
+    Provides VCs that are in the certificate store.
+
+    The output is provided in a VCB, which includes a common header followed by
+    zero or more verification-certificate entries (VCEs).
+
+    The instruction expects the cert store to
+    maintain an origin of 1 for the index (i.e. a retrieval of the first
+    certificate in the store should be denoted by setting first-VC to 1).
+
+    The first-VC index and last-VC index fields of VCB specify the range of VCs
+    to be stored by subcode 2. Stored count and remained count fields specify
+    the number of VCs stored and could not be stored in the VCB due to
+    insufficient storage specified in the VCB input length field.
+
+    Each VCE contains a header followed by information extracted from a
+    certificate within the certificate store. The information includes:
+    key-id, hash, and certificate data. This information is stored
+    contiguously in a VCE (with zero-padding). Following the header, the
+    key-id is immediately stored. The hash and certificate data follow and
+    may be accessed via the respective offset fields stored in the VCE.

[...]

Quoted 18 lines

QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(VCStorageSizeBlock) != VCSSB_MIN_LEN,

                    "size of VCStorageSizeBlock is wrong");
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +4 -1
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(VCBlock) != VCB_HEADER_LEN, "size of VCBlock is wrong");
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(VCEntry) != VCE_HEADER_LEN, "size of VCEntry is wrong");
 
 void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
 {
@@ -267,7 +585,8 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
          * for now.
          */
         uint32_t ism_word0 = cpu_to_be32(DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES |
-                                         DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI);
+                                         DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI |
+                                         DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC);
 
         if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, r1, &ism_word0, sizeof(ism_word0))) {
             s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra) · line 614

Quoted 3 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
@@ -293,6 +612,13 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
         }
         env->regs[r1 + 1] = rc;
         break;

Subcode 2 should raise a specification exception if the address in register r1 is not on a 4K‑byte boundary. I will handle this with the appropriate changes in the next version.

Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +7 -0
+    case DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC:
+        rc = handle_diag320_store_vc(cpu, addr, r1, ra, cs);
+        if (rc == -1) {
+            return;
+        }
+        env->regs[r1 + 1] = rc;
+        break;
     default:
         env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED;
         break;
#26 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 09/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 320 subcode 2

In reply to Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 23 lines · Zhuoying Cai

DIAG 320 subcode 2 provides verification-certificates (VCs) that are in the certificate store. Only X509 certificates in DER format and SHA-256 hash type are recognized.

The subcode value is denoted by setting the second-left-most bit of an 8-byte field.

The Verification Certificate Block (VCB) contains the output data when the operation completes successfully. It includes a common header followed by zero or more Verification Certificate Entries (VCEs), depending on the VCB input length and the VC range (from the first VC index to the last VC index) in the certificate store.

Each VCE contains information about a certificate retrieved from the S390IPLCertificateStore, such as the certificate name, key type, key ID length, hash length, and the raw certificate data.
The key ID and hash are extracted from the raw certificate by the crypto API.

Note: SHA2-256 VC hash type is required for retrieving the hash (fingerprint) of the certificate.

---

...

Quoted 4 lines
  #define VCSSB_NO_VC     4
  #define VCSSB_MIN_LEN   128
  #define VCE_HEADER_LEN  128

+#define VCE_INVALID_LEN 72

Why is 72 an invalid len? Because it's less than VCE_HEADER_LEN ? ... a comment might be helpful here.

...

Quoted 18 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +18 -0
+static VCEntry *diag_320_build_vce(const S390IPLCertificate *cert, int idx)
+{
+    g_autofree VCEntry *vce = NULL;
+    uint32_t vce_max_size;
+    int rc;
+
+    /*
+     * Each field of the VCE is word-aligned.
+     * Allocate enough space for the largest possible size for this VCE.
+     * As the certificate fields (key-id, hash, data) are parsed, the
+     * VCE's length field will be updated accordingly.
+     */
+    vce_max_size = VCE_HEADER_LEN +
+                   ROUND_UP(CERT_KEY_ID_LEN, 4) +
+                   ROUND_UP(CERT_HASH_LEN, 4) +
+                   ROUND_UP(cert->der_size, 4);
+
+    vce = g_malloc0(vce_max_size);

target/s390x/diag.c static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1, · line 444

Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10 -0
+    rc = build_vce_header(vce, cert, idx);
+    if (rc) {
+        vce->len = cpu_to_be32(VCE_INVALID_LEN);
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    vce->len = cpu_to_be32(vce_max_size);
+    rc = build_vce_data(vce, cert);
+    if (rc) {
+        vce->len = cpu_to_be32(VCE_INVALID_LEN);

So errors are apparently encoded via VCE_INVALID_LEN here...

Quoted 60 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +60 -0
+    }
+
+out:
+    return g_steal_pointer(&vce);
+}
+
+static int handle_diag320_store_vc(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1, uintptr_t ra,
+                                   S390IPLCertificateStore *cs)
+{
+    g_autofree VCBlock *vcb = NULL;
+    size_t entry_offset;
+    size_t remaining_space;
+    uint32_t vce_len;
+    uint16_t first_vc_index;
+    uint16_t last_vc_index;
+    int cs_start_index;
+    int cs_end_index;
+    uint32_t in_len;
+
+    vcb = g_new0(VCBlock, 1);
+    if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_read(cpu, addr, r1, vcb, sizeof(*vcb))) {
+        s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    in_len = be32_to_cpu(vcb->in_len);
+    first_vc_index = be16_to_cpu(vcb->first_vc_index);
+    last_vc_index = be16_to_cpu(vcb->last_vc_index);
+
+    if (in_len % TARGET_PAGE_SIZE != 0) {
+        return DIAG_320_RC_INVAL_VCB_LEN;
+    }
+
+    if (first_vc_index > last_vc_index) {
+        return DIAG_320_RC_BAD_RANGE;
+    }
+
+    vcb->out_len = VCB_HEADER_LEN;
+
+    /*
+     * DIAG 320 subcode 2 expects to query a certificate store that
+     * maintains an index origin of 1. However, the S390IPLCertificateStore
+     * maintains an index origin of 0. Thus, the indices must be adjusted
+     * for correct access into the cert store. A couple of special cases
+     * must also be accounted for.
+     */
+
+    /* Both indices are 0; return header with no certs */
+    if (first_vc_index == 0 && last_vc_index == 0) {
+        goto out;
+    }
+
+    /* Normalize indices */
+    cs_start_index = (first_vc_index == 0) ? 0 : first_vc_index - 1;
+    cs_end_index = last_vc_index - 1;
+
+    /* Requested range is outside the cert store; return header with no certs */
+    if (cs_start_index >= cs->count || cs_end_index >= cs->count) {
+        goto out;
+    }

target/s390x/diag.c static int handle_diag320_query_vcsi(S390CPU *cpu, uint64_t addr, uint64_t r1, · line 514

Quoted 10 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +10 -0
+
+    entry_offset = VCB_HEADER_LEN;
+    remaining_space = in_len - VCB_HEADER_LEN;
+
+    for (int i = cs_start_index; i <= cs_end_index; i++) {
+        VCEntry *vce;
+        const S390IPLCertificate *cert = &cs->certs[i];
+
+        vce = diag_320_build_vce(cert, i);
+        vce_len = be32_to_cpu(vce->len);

... but the caller here does not seem to check for VCE_INVALID_LEN ... is it OK to simply ignore this? Again, a comment might be helpful.

Thomas

Quoted 69 lines
target/s390x/diag.c +49 -1
+        /*
+         * If there is no more space to store the cert,
+         * set the remaining verification cert count and
+         * break early.
+         */
+        if (remaining_space < vce_len) {
+            vcb->remain_ct = cpu_to_be16(last_vc_index - i);
+            g_free(vce);
+            break;
+        }
+
+        /* Write VCE */
+        if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr + entry_offset, r1, vce, vce_len)) {
+            s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+            g_free(vce);
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        entry_offset += vce_len;
+        vcb->out_len += vce_len;
+        remaining_space -= vce_len;
+        vcb->stored_ct++;
+
+        g_free(vce);
+    }
+    vcb->stored_ct = cpu_to_be16(vcb->stored_ct);
+
+out:
+    vcb->out_len = cpu_to_be32(vcb->out_len);
+
+    if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, r1, vcb, VCB_HEADER_LEN)) {
+        s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
+        return -1;
+    }
+
+    return DIAG_320_RC_OK;
+}
+
  QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(VCStorageSizeBlock) != VCSSB_MIN_LEN,
                     "size of VCStorageSizeBlock is wrong");
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(VCBlock) != VCB_HEADER_LEN, "size of VCBlock is wrong");
+QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(sizeof(VCEntry) != VCE_HEADER_LEN, "size of VCEntry is wrong");
 
  void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
  {
@@ -267,7 +585,8 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
           * for now.
           */
          uint32_t ism_word0 = cpu_to_be32(DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES |
-                                         DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI);
+                                         DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI |
+                                         DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC);
 
          if (s390_cpu_virt_mem_write(cpu, addr, r1, &ism_word0, sizeof(ism_word0))) {
              s390_cpu_virt_mem_handle_exc(cpu, ra);
@@ -293,6 +612,13 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
          }
          env->regs[r1 + 1] = rc;
          break;
+    case DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC:
+        rc = handle_diag320_store_vc(cpu, addr, r1, ra, cs);
+        if (rc == -1) {
+            return;
+        }
+        env->regs[r1 + 1] = rc;
+        break;
      default:
          env->regs[r1 + 1] = DIAG_320_RC_NOT_SUPPORTED;
          break;
#27 lore raw

PATCH v8 10/30 s390x/diag: Introduce DIAG 508 for secure IPL operations

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

From: Collin Walling <[email protected]>

In order to support secure IPL (aka secure boot) for the s390-ccw BIOS, a new s390 DIAGNOSE instruction is introduced to leverage QEMU for handling operations such as signature verification and certificate retrieval.

Currently, only subcode 0 is supported with this patch, which is used to query a bitmap of which subcodes are supported.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h  | 15 +++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/diag.c             | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c          | 14 ++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/s390x-internal.h   |  2 ++
 target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c  |  7 +++++++
 6 files changed, 83 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +18 -0
index 22da589162..867d92fa68 100644
@@ -60,3 +60,21 @@ Subcode 2 - store verification certificates
     contiguously in a VCE (with zero-padding). Following the header, the
     key-id is immediately stored. The hash and certificate data follow and
     may be accessed via the respective offset fields stored in the VCE.
+
+
+Secure IPL Data Structures, Facilities, and Functions
+=====================================================
+
+DIAGNOSE function code 'X'508' - IPL extensions
+---------------------------------------------------
+
+DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is reserved for guest use in order to facilitate communication
+of additional IPL operations that cannot be handled by userspace, such as
+signature verification for secure IPL.
+
+If the function code specifies 0x508, IPL extension functions are performed.
+These functions are meant to provide extended functionality for s390 guest boot
+that requires assistance from QEMU.
+
+Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes
+    Returns a 64-bit mask indicating which subcodes are supported.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h new file +15 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6281ad8299
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+/*
+ * S/390 DIAGNOSE 508 definitions and structures
+ *
+ * Copyright 2025 IBM Corp.
+ * Author(s): Collin Walling <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef S390X_DIAG508_H
+#define S390X_DIAG508_H
+
+#define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC    0x0000
+
+#endif
target/s390x/diag.c +27 -0
index e70375d2a9..0b56023bb8 100644
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #include "hw/s390x/cert-store.h"
 #include "hw/s390x/ipl.h"
 #include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag320.h"
+#include "hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h"
 #include "hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h"
 #include "system/kvm.h"
 #include "kvm/kvm_s390x.h"
@@ -624,3 +625,29 @@ void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
         break;
     }
 }
+
+void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3, uintptr_t ra)
+{
+    uint64_t subcode = env->regs[r3];
+    int rc;
+
+    if (env->psw.mask & PSW_MASK_PSTATE) {
+        s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_PRIVILEGED, ra);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if ((subcode & ~0x0ffffULL) || (r1 & 1)) {
+        s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_SPECIFICATION, ra);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    switch (subcode) {
+    case DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC:
+        rc = 0;
+        break;
+    default:
+        s390_program_interrupt(env, PGM_SPECIFICATION, ra);
+        return;
+    }
+    env->regs[r1 + 1] = rc;
+}
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +14 -0
index 636d2d8f01..e06b760e03 100644
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@
 #define DIAG_CERT_STORE                 0x320
 #define DIAG_KVM_HYPERCALL              0x500
 #define DIAG_KVM_BREAKPOINT             0x501
+#define DIAG_SECURE_IPL                 0x508
 
 #define ICPT_INSTRUCTION                0x04
 #define ICPT_PROGRAM                    0x08
@@ -1571,6 +1572,16 @@ static void kvm_handle_diag_320(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run)
     handle_diag_320(&cpu->env, r1, r3, RA_IGNORED);
 }
 
+static void kvm_handle_diag_508(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run)
+{
+    uint64_t r1, r3;
+
+    r1 = (run->s390_sieic.ipa & 0x00f0) >> 4;
+    r3 = run->s390_sieic.ipa & 0x000f;
+
+    handle_diag_508(&cpu->env, r1, r3, RA_IGNORED);
+}
+
 #define DIAG_KVM_CODE_MASK 0x000000000000ffff
 
 static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)
@@ -1604,6 +1615,9 @@ static int handle_diag(S390CPU *cpu, struct kvm_run *run, uint32_t ipb)
     case DIAG_CERT_STORE:
         kvm_handle_diag_320(cpu, run);
         break;
+    case DIAG_SECURE_IPL:
+        kvm_handle_diag_508(cpu, run);
+        break;
     default:
         trace_kvm_insn_diag(func_code);
         kvm_s390_program_interrupt(cpu, PGM_SPECIFICATION);
target/s390x/s390x-internal.h +2 -0
index 771b62fbe2..949a6a4552 100644
@@ -390,6 +390,8 @@ void handle_diag_308(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3,
                      uintptr_t ra);
 void handle_diag_320(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3,
                      uintptr_t ra);
+void handle_diag_508(CPUS390XState *env, uint64_t r1, uint64_t r3,
+                     uintptr_t ra);
 
 
 /* translate.c */
target/s390x/tcg/misc_helper.c +7 -0
index 4d73475d95..562dde9cb3 100644
@@ -149,6 +149,13 @@ void HELPER(diag)(CPUS390XState *env, uint32_t r1, uint32_t r3, uint32_t num)
         bql_unlock();
         r = 0;
         break;
+    case 0x508:
+        /* secure ipl operations */
+        bql_lock();
+        handle_diag_508(env, r1, r3, GETPC());
+        bql_unlock();
+        r = 0;
+        break;
     default:
         r = -1;
         break;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#28 lore raw

PATCH v8 11/30 crypto/x509-utils: Add helper functions for DIAG 508 subcode 1

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Introduce helper functions to support signature verification required by DIAG 508 subcode 1:

qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem() – converts a signature from DER to PEM format qcrypto_x509_verify_sig() – verifies the provided data against the given signature

These functions enable basic signature verification support.

---
 crypto/x509-utils.c         | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/crypto/x509-utils.h |  41 ++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 149 insertions(+)
crypto/x509-utils.c +108 -0
index 906d5e5e87..2b991ff9ac 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
 #include <gnutls/gnutls.h>
 #include <gnutls/crypto.h>
 #include <gnutls/x509.h>
+#include <gnutls/pkcs7.h>
 
 static const int qcrypto_to_gnutls_hash_alg_map[QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO__MAX] = {
     [QCRYPTO_HASH_ALGO_MD5] = GNUTLS_DIG_MD5,
@@ -335,6 +336,96 @@ int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
     return curve_id == GNUTLS_ECC_CURVE_SECP521R1;
 }
 
+int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem(uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_size,
+                                  uint8_t **result, size_t *resultlen,
+                                  Error **errp)
+{
+    int ret = -1;
+    int rc;
+    gnutls_pkcs7_t signature;
+    gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_der = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size};
+    gnutls_datum_t sig_datum_pem = {.data = NULL, .size = 0};
+
+    rc = gnutls_pkcs7_init(&signature);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize pkcs7 data: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        return ret;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_pkcs7_import(signature, &sig_datum_der, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_DER);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import signature: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_pkcs7_export2(signature, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM, &sig_datum_pem);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to convert signature to PEM format: %s",
+                   gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    *resultlen = sig_datum_pem.size;
+    *result = g_memdup2(sig_datum_pem.data, sig_datum_pem.size);
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(signature);
+    gnutls_free(sig_datum_pem.data);
+    return ret;
+}
+
+int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig(uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
+                            uint8_t *comp, size_t comp_size,
+                            uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_size, Error **errp)
+{
+    int rc;
+    int ret = -1;
+    gnutls_x509_crt_t crt = NULL;
+    gnutls_pkcs7_t signature = NULL;
+    gnutls_datum_t cert_datum = {.data = cert, .size = cert_size};
+    gnutls_datum_t data_datum = {.data = comp, .size = comp_size};
+    gnutls_datum_t sig_datum = {.data = sig, .size = sig_size};
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_init(&crt);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_x509_crt_import(crt, &cert_datum, GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import certificate: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_pkcs7_init(&signature);
+    if (rc < 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to initialize pkcs7 data: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+     }
+
+    rc = gnutls_pkcs7_import(signature, &sig_datum , GNUTLS_X509_FMT_PEM);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to import signature: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    rc = gnutls_pkcs7_verify_direct(signature, crt, 0, &data_datum, 0);
+    if (rc != 0) {
+        error_setg(errp, "Failed to verify signature: %s", gnutls_strerror(rc));
+        goto cleanup;
+    }
+
+    ret = 0;
+
+cleanup:
+    gnutls_x509_crt_deinit(crt);
+    gnutls_pkcs7_deinit(signature);
+    return ret;
+}
+
 #else /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
 
 int qcrypto_get_x509_cert_fingerprint(uint8_t *cert, size_t size,
@@ -378,4 +469,21 @@ int qcrypto_x509_check_ecc_curve_p521(uint8_t *cert, size_t size, Error **errp)
     return -1;
 }
 
+int qcrypto_pkcs7_convert_sig_pem(uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_size,
+                                  uint8_t **result,
+                                  size_t *resultlen,
+                                  Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "GNUTLS is required to export pkcs7 signature");
+    return -1;
+}
+
+int qcrypto_x509_verify_sig(uint8_t *cert, size_t cert_size,
+                            uint8_t *comp, size_t comp_size,
+                            uint8_t *sig, size_t sig_size, Error **errp)
+{
+    error_setg(errp, "GNUTLS is required for signature-verification support");
+    return -1;
+}
+
 #endif /* ! CONFIG_GNUTLS */
include/crypto/x509-utils.h +41 -0

45 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#29 lore raw

PATCH v8 12/30 s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

From: Collin Walling <[email protected]>

DIAG 508 subcode 1 performs signature-verification on signed components. A signed component may be a Linux kernel image, or any other signed binary. **Verification of initrd is not supported.**

The instruction call expects two item-pairs: an address of a device component, an address of the analogous signature file (in PKCS#7 DER format), and their respective lengths. All of this data should be encapsulated within a Diag508SigVerifBlock.

The DIAG handler will read from the provided addresses to retrieve the necessary data, parse the signature file, then perform the signature-verification. Because there is no way to correlate a specific certificate to a component, each certificate in the store is tried until either verification succeeds, or all certs have been exhausted.

A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the corresponding certificate will be set in the Diag508SigVerifBlock. The following values indicate failure:

	0x0102: no certificates are available in the store
	0x0202: component data is invalid
	0x0302: PKCS#7 format signature is invalid
	0x0402: signature-verification failed
	0x0502: length of Diag508SigVerifBlock is invalid
---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst |  17 +++++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h  |  30 +++++++++
 target/s390x/diag.c             | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +17 -0
index 867d92fa68..6e5a86fcf4 100644
@@ -78,3 +78,20 @@ that requires assistance from QEMU.
 
 Subcode 0 - query installed subcodes
     Returns a 64-bit mask indicating which subcodes are supported.
+
+Subcode 1 - perform signature verification
+    Perform signature-verification on a signed component, using certificates
+    from the certificate store and leveraging qcrypto libraries to perform
+    this operation.
+
+    Note: verification of initrd is not supported.
+
+    A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the
+    corresponding certificate will be set in the Diag508SigVerifBlock.
+    The following values indicate failure:
+
+    * ``0x0102``: no certificates are available in the store
+    * ``0x0202``: component data is invalid
+    * ``0x0302``: PKCS#7 format signature is invalid
+    * ``0x0402``: signature-verification failed
+    * ``0x0502``: length of Diag508SigVerifBlock is invalid
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h +30 -0
index 6281ad8299..8a147f32a0 100644
@@ -11,5 +11,35 @@
 #define S390X_DIAG508_H
 
 #define DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC    0x0000
+#define DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF     0x8000
+
+#define DIAG_508_RC_OK              0x0001
+#define DIAG_508_RC_NO_CERTS        0x0102
+#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_COMP_DATA 0x0202
+#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_PKCS7_SIG 0x0302
+#define DIAG_508_RC_FAIL_VERIF      0x0402
+#define DIAG_508_RC_INVAL_LEN       0x0502
+
+/*
+ * Maximum componenet and signature sizes for current secure boot implementation
+ * Not architecturally defined and may need to revisit if increased
+ */
+#define DIAG_508_MAX_COMP_LEN      0x10000000
+#define DIAG_508_MAX_SIG_LEN       4096
+
+struct Diag508SigVerifBlock {
+    uint32_t length;
+    uint8_t reserved0[3];
+    uint8_t version;
+    uint32_t reserved[2];
+    uint8_t cert_store_index;
+    uint8_t reserved1[7];
+    uint64_t cert_len;
+    uint64_t comp_len;
+    uint64_t comp_addr;
+    uint64_t sig_len;
+    uint64_t sig_addr;
+};
+typedef struct Diag508SigVerifBlock Diag508SigVerifBlock;
 
 #endif
target/s390x/diag.c +110 -1

126 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 12/30
#30 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 12/30] s390x/diag: Implement DIAG 508 subcode 1 for signature verification

Quoted 28 lines · Zhuoying Cai

From: Collin Walling<[email protected]>

DIAG 508 subcode 1 performs signature-verification on signed components. A signed component may be a Linux kernel image, or any other signed binary. **Verification of initrd is not supported.**

The instruction call expects two item-pairs: an address of a device component, an address of the analogous signature file (in PKCS#7 DER format), and their respective lengths. All of this data should be encapsulated within a Diag508SigVerifBlock.

The DIAG handler will read from the provided addresses to retrieve the necessary data, parse the signature file, then perform the signature-verification. Because there is no way to correlate a specific certificate to a component, each certificate in the store is tried until either verification succeeds, or all certs have been exhausted.

A return code of 1 indicates success, and the index and length of the corresponding certificate will be set in the Diag508SigVerifBlock. The following values indicate failure:

	0x0102: no certificates are available in the store
	0x0202: component data is invalid
	0x0302: PKCS#7 format signature is invalid
	0x0402: signature-verification failed
	0x0502: length of Diag508SigVerifBlock is invalid
Quoted 8 lines
---
  docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst |  17 +++++
  include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag508.h  |  30 +++++++++
  target/s390x/diag.c             | 111 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
  3 files changed, 157 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
#31 lore raw

PATCH v8 13/30 s390x/ipl: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

The IPL information report block (IIRB) contains information used to locate IPL records and to report the results of signature verification of one or more secure components of the load device.

IIRB is stored immediately following the IPL Parameter Block. Results on component verification in any case (failure or success) are stored.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 14 ++++++++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h     | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +14 -0
index 6e5a86fcf4..82dd8b847a 100644
@@ -95,3 +95,17 @@ Subcode 1 - perform signature verification
     * ``0x0302``: PKCS#7 format signature is invalid
     * ``0x0402``: signature-verification failed
     * ``0x0502``: length of Diag508SigVerifBlock is invalid
+
+IPL Information Report Block
+----------------------------
+
+The IPL Parameter Block (IPLPB), utilized for IPL operation, is extended with an
+IPL Information Report Block (IIRB), which contains the results from secure IPL
+operations such as:
+
+* component data
+* verification results
+* certificate data
+
+The guest's kernel inspects the IIRB and uses the certificate data it contains
+to build the keyring.
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +59 -0

63 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 13/30
#32 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 13/30] s390x/ipl: Introduce IPL Information Report Block (IIRB)

Quoted 4 lines · Zhuoying Cai

The IPL information report block (IIRB) contains information used to locate IPL records and to report the results of signature verification of one or more secure components of the load device.

Quoted 8 lines

IIRB is stored immediately following the IPL Parameter Block. Results on component verification in any case (failure or success) are stored.

---
  docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 14 ++++++++
  include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h     | 59 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 73 insertions(+)
#33 lore raw

PATCH v8 14/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Define a memory space for both IPL Parameter Block (IPLB) and IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) since IIRB is stored immediately following IPLB.

Convert IPLB to pointer and it points to the start of the defined memory space. IIRB points to the end of IPLB.

---
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h |  6 ++++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h     |  5 +++--
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c |  6 +++---
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c     | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c  |  8 ++++----
 5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +6 -0
index 0f1f55c428..f5e63a2fdb 100644
@@ -185,4 +185,10 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlock {
 };
 typedef struct IplInfoReportBlock IplInfoReportBlock;
 
+struct IplBlocks {
+    IplParameterBlock   iplb;
+    IplInfoReportBlock  iirb;
+};
+typedef struct IplBlocks IplBlocks;
+
 #endif
pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h +3 -2
index 08f259ff31..fefca65ac6 100644
@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@
 #include <string.h>
 
 extern QemuIplParameters qipl;
-extern IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));
+extern IplParameterBlock *iplb;
 extern bool have_iplb;
+extern IplBlocks ipl_data;
 
 #define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00
 #define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ static inline bool load_next_iplb(void)
 
     qipl.index++;
     next_iplb = (IplParameterBlock *) qipl.next_iplb;
-    memcpy(&iplb, next_iplb, sizeof(IplParameterBlock));
+    memcpy(iplb, next_iplb, sizeof(IplParameterBlock));
 
     qipl.chain_len--;
     qipl.next_iplb = qipl.next_iplb + sizeof(IplParameterBlock);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c +3 -3
index 86321d0f46..fa2ca5cbe1 100644
@@ -43,11 +43,11 @@ int jump_to_IPL_code(uint64_t address)
      * The IPLB for QEMU SCSI type devices must be rebuilt during re-ipl. The
      * iplb.devno is set to the boot position of the target SCSI device.
      */
-    if (iplb.pbt == S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI) {
-        iplb.devno = qipl.index;
+    if (iplb->pbt == S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI) {
+        iplb->devno = qipl.index;
     }
 
-    if (have_iplb && !set_iplb(&iplb)) {
+    if (have_iplb && !set_iplb(iplb)) {
         panic("Failed to set IPLB");
     }
 
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +19 -15
index 76bf743900..819f053009 100644
@@ -22,7 +22,9 @@
 static SubChannelId blk_schid = { .one = 1 };
 static char loadparm_str[LOADPARM_LEN + 1];
 QemuIplParameters qipl;
-IplParameterBlock iplb __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));
+/* Ensure that IPLB and IIRB are page aligned and sequential in memory */
+IplBlocks ipl_data __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));
+IplParameterBlock *iplb;
 bool have_iplb;
 static uint16_t cutype;
 LowCore *lowcore; /* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */
@@ -51,7 +53,7 @@ void write_subsystem_identification(void)
 void write_iplb_location(void)
 {
     if (cutype == CU_TYPE_VIRTIO && virtio_get_device_type() != VIRTIO_ID_NET) {
-        lowcore->ptr_iplb = ptr2u32(&iplb);
+        lowcore->ptr_iplb = ptr2u32(iplb);
     }
 }
 
@@ -162,7 +164,7 @@ static void menu_setup(void)
         return;
     }
 
-    switch (iplb.pbt) {
+    switch (iplb->pbt) {
     case S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW:
     case S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI:
         menu_set_parms(qipl.qipl_flags & BOOT_MENU_FLAG_MASK,
@@ -191,8 +193,8 @@ static void boot_setup(void)
 {
     char lpmsg[] = "LOADPARM=[________]\n";
 
-    if (have_iplb && memcmp(iplb.loadparm, NO_LOADPARM, LOADPARM_LEN) != 0) {
-        ebcdic_to_ascii((char *) iplb.loadparm, loadparm_str, LOADPARM_LEN);
+    if (have_iplb && memcmp(iplb->loadparm, NO_LOADPARM, LOADPARM_LEN) != 0) {
+        ebcdic_to_ascii((char *) iplb->loadparm, loadparm_str, LOADPARM_LEN);
     } else {
         sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(loadparm_str);
     }
@@ -216,21 +218,21 @@ static bool find_boot_device(void)
     VDev *vdev = virtio_get_device();
     bool found = false;
 
-    switch (iplb.pbt) {
+    switch (iplb->pbt) {
     case S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW:
         vdev->scsi_device_selected = false;
-        debug_print_int("device no. ", iplb.ccw.devno);
-        blk_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid & 0x3;
+        debug_print_int("device no. ", iplb->ccw.devno);
+        blk_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid & 0x3;
         debug_print_int("ssid ", blk_schid.ssid);
-        found = find_subch(iplb.ccw.devno);
+        found = find_subch(iplb->ccw.devno);
         break;
     case S390_IPL_TYPE_QEMU_SCSI:
         vdev->scsi_device_selected = true;
-        vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb.scsi.channel;
-        vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb.scsi.target;
-        vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb.scsi.lun;
-        blk_schid.ssid = iplb.scsi.ssid & 0x3;
-        found = find_subch(iplb.scsi.devno);
+        vdev->selected_scsi_device.channel = iplb->scsi.channel;
+        vdev->selected_scsi_device.target = iplb->scsi.target;
+        vdev->selected_scsi_device.lun = iplb->scsi.lun;
+        blk_schid.ssid = iplb->scsi.ssid & 0x3;
+        found = find_subch(iplb->scsi.devno);
         break;
     default:
         puts("Unsupported IPLB");
@@ -311,10 +313,12 @@ static void probe_boot_device(void)
 
 void main(void)
 {
+    iplb = &ipl_data.iplb;
+
     copy_qipl();
     sclp_setup();
     css_setup();
-    have_iplb = store_iplb(&iplb);
+    have_iplb = store_iplb(iplb);
     if (!have_iplb) {
         boot_setup();
         probe_boot_device();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c +4 -4
index a9521dff41..457fbc3095 100644
@@ -528,11 +528,11 @@ static bool virtio_setup(void)
      */
     enable_mss_facility();
 
-    if (have_iplb || store_iplb(&iplb)) {
-        IPL_assert(iplb.pbt == S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW, "IPL_TYPE_CCW expected");
-        dev_no = iplb.ccw.devno;
+    if (have_iplb || store_iplb(iplb)) {
+        IPL_assert(iplb->pbt == S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW, "IPL_TYPE_CCW expected");
+        dev_no = iplb->ccw.devno;
         debug_print_int("device no. ", dev_no);
-        net_schid.ssid = iplb.ccw.ssid & 0x3;
+        net_schid.ssid = iplb->ccw.ssid & 0x3;
         debug_print_int("ssid ", net_schid.ssid);
         found = find_net_dev(&schib, dev_no);
     } else {
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 14/30
#34 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 14/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Define memory for IPLB and convert IPLB to pointers

Quoted 7 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Define a memory space for both IPL Parameter Block (IPLB) and IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) since IIRB is stored immediately following IPLB.

Convert IPLB to pointer and it points to the start of the defined memory space. IIRB points to the end of IPLB.

Quoted 8 lines
---
  include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h |  6 ++++++
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/iplb.h     |  5 +++--
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/jump2ipl.c |  6 +++---
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c     | 34 +++++++++++++++++++---------------
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/netmain.c  |  8 ++++----
  5 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
#35 lore raw

PATCH v8 15/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Add IPIB flags to IPL Parameter Block to determine if IPL needs to perform securely and if IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) exists.

Move DIAG308 flags to a separated header file and add flags for secure IPL.

Secure boot in audit mode will perform if certificate(s) exist in the key store. IIRB will exist and results of verification will be stored in IIRB.

To ensure proper alignment of the IIRB and prevent overlap, set iplb->len to the maximum length of the IPLB, allowing alignment constraints to be determined based on its size.

---
 hw/s390x/ipl.c                 | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 hw/s390x/ipl.h                 | 18 +-----------------
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h    |  5 ++++-
 4 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h
hw/s390x/ipl.c +21 -0
index ea108fe370..b66dfd06bd 100644
@@ -433,6 +433,13 @@ S390IPLCertificateStore *s390_ipl_get_certificate_store(void)
     return &ipl->cert_store;
 }
 
+static bool s390_has_certificate(void)
+{
+    S390IPLState *ipl = get_ipl_device();
+
+    return ipl->cert_store.count > 0;
+}
+
 static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
 {
     CcwDevice *ccw_dev = NULL;
@@ -490,6 +497,20 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
         s390_ipl_convert_loadparm((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm);
         iplb->flags |= DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID;
 
+        /*
+         * Secure boot in audit mode will perform
+         * if certificate(s) exist in the key store.
+         *
+         * IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) will exist
+         * for secure boot in audit mode.
+         *
+         * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB.
+         */
+        if (s390_has_certificate()) {
+            iplb->hdr_flags |= DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR;
+            iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);
+        }
+
         return true;
     }
 
hw/s390x/ipl.h +1 -17
index 0c773ac8ce..1f9d200f1b 100644
@@ -23,7 +23,6 @@
 #include "qom/object.h"
 #include "target/s390x/kvm/pv.h"
 
-#define DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID 0x80
 #define MAX_BOOT_DEVS 8 /* Max number of devices that may have a bootindex */
 
 void s390_ipl_convert_loadparm(char *ascii_lp, uint8_t *ebcdic_lp);
@@ -91,22 +90,6 @@ struct S390IPLState {
 };
 QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");
 
-#define DIAG_308_RC_OK              0x0001
-#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF         0x0102
-#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID         0x0402
-#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF      0x0902
-#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV    0x0a02
-
-#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR       0
-#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM     1
-#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR          3
-#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP    4
-#define DIAG308_SET                 5
-#define DIAG308_STORE               6
-#define DIAG308_PV_SET              8
-#define DIAG308_PV_STORE            9
-#define DIAG308_PV_START            10
-
 #define S390_IPL_TYPE_FCP 0x00
 #define S390_IPL_TYPE_CCW 0x02
 #define S390_IPL_TYPE_PV 0x05
@@ -117,6 +100,7 @@ QEMU_BUILD_BUG_MSG(offsetof(S390IPLState, iplb) & 3, "alignment of iplb wrong");
 #define S390_IPLB_MIN_CCW_LEN 200
 #define S390_IPLB_MIN_FCP_LEN 384
 #define S390_IPLB_MIN_QEMU_SCSI_LEN 200
+#define S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN 4096
 
 static inline bool iplb_valid_len(IplParameterBlock *iplb)
 {
include/hw/s390x/ipl/diag308.h new file +34 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..6e62f29215
@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+/*
+ * S/390 DIAGNOSE 308 definitions and structures
+ *
+ * Copyright 2025 IBM Corp.
+ * Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+ */
+
+#ifndef S390X_DIAG308_H
+#define S390X_DIAG308_H
+
+#define DIAG_308_RC_OK              0x0001
+#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_CONF         0x0102
+#define DIAG_308_RC_INVALID         0x0402
+#define DIAG_308_RC_NO_PV_CONF      0x0902
+#define DIAG_308_RC_INVAL_FOR_PV    0x0a02
+
+#define DIAG308_RESET_MOD_CLR       0
+#define DIAG308_RESET_LOAD_NORM     1
+#define DIAG308_LOAD_CLEAR          3
+#define DIAG308_LOAD_NORMAL_DUMP    4
+#define DIAG308_SET                 5
+#define DIAG308_STORE               6
+#define DIAG308_PV_SET              8
+#define DIAG308_PV_STORE            9
+#define DIAG308_PV_START            10
+
+#define DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID 0x80
+
+#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL 0x40
+#define DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR 0x20
+
+#endif
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +4 -1
index f5e63a2fdb..1b6cb3231d 100644
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
 #ifndef S390X_QIPL_H
 #define S390X_QIPL_H
 
+#include "diag308.h"
+
 /* Boot Menu flags */
 #define QIPL_FLAG_BM_OPTS_CMD   0x80
 #define QIPL_FLAG_BM_OPTS_ZIPL  0x40
@@ -103,7 +105,8 @@ typedef struct IplBlockQemuScsi IplBlockQemuScsi;
 union IplParameterBlock {
     struct {
         uint32_t len;
-        uint8_t  reserved0[3];
+        uint8_t  hdr_flags;
+        uint8_t  reserved0[2];
         uint8_t  version;
         uint32_t blk0_len;
         uint8_t  pbt;
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#36 lore raw

PATCH v8 16/30 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Introduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.

Use fac_ipl to represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.

Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 136's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.

Secure IPL is not available for guests under protected virtualization.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---
 hw/s390x/sclp.c                     | 2 ++
 include/hw/s390x/sclp.h             | 4 +++-
 target/s390x/cpu_features.c         | 4 ++++
 target/s390x/cpu_features.h         | 1 +
 target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc | 3 +++
 target/s390x/cpu_models.c           | 2 ++
 target/s390x/gen-features.c         | 2 ++
 target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c              | 3 +++
 8 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/sclp.c +2 -0
index b9c3983df1..666bae33f0 100644
@@ -146,6 +146,8 @@ static void read_SCP_info(SCLPDevice *sclp, SCCB *sccb)
     if (s390_has_feat(S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB)) {
         s390_get_feat_block(S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134,
                             &read_info->fac134);
+        s390_get_feat_block(S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL,
+                            read_info->fac_ipl);
     }
 
     read_info->facilities = cpu_to_be64(SCLP_HAS_CPU_INFO |
include/hw/s390x/sclp.h +3 -1
index ddc61f1c21..a9595d8007 100644
@@ -136,7 +136,9 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {
     uint32_t hmfai;
     uint8_t  _reserved7[134 - 128];     /* 128-133 */
     uint8_t  fac134;
-    uint8_t  _reserved8[144 - 135];     /* 135-143 */
+    uint8_t  _reserved8;
+    uint8_t  fac_ipl[2];                /* 136-137 */
+    uint8_t  _reserved9[144 - 138];     /* 138-143 */
     struct CPUEntry entries[];
     /*
      * When the Extended-Length SCCB (ELS) feature is enabled the
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +4 -0
index 436471f4b4..200bd8c15b 100644
@@ -119,6 +119,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,
      * Some facilities are not available for CPUs in protected mode:
      * - All SIE facilities because SIE is not available
      * - DIAG318
+     * - Secure IPL Facility
      *
      * As VMs can move in and out of protected mode the CPU model
      * doesn't protect us from that problem because it is only
@@ -149,6 +150,9 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,
         clear_be_bit(s390_feat_def(S390_FEAT_DIAG_318)->bit, data);
         clear_be_bit(s390_feat_def(S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE)->bit, data);
         break;
+    case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL:
+        clear_be_bit(s390_feat_def(S390_FEAT_SIPL)->bit, data);
+        break;
     default:
         return;
     }
target/s390x/cpu_features.h +1 -0
index 5635839d03..b038198555 100644
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ typedef enum {
     S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR,
     S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT,
     S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC134,
+    S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL,
     S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_CPU,
     S390_FEAT_TYPE_MISC,
     S390_FEAT_TYPE_PLO,
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +3 -0
index 2976ecd0ee..bcf8a666e4 100644
@@ -140,6 +140,9 @@ DEF_FEAT(SIE_IBS, "ibs", SCLP_CONF_CHAR_EXT, 10, "SIE: Interlock-and-broadcast-s
 DEF_FEAT(DIAG_318, "diag318", SCLP_FAC134, 0, "Control program name and version codes")
 DEF_FEAT(CERT_STORE, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Certificate Store functions")
 
+/* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */
+DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility")
+
 /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */
 DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
 DEF_FEAT(SIE_SKEY, "skey", SCLP_CPU, 5, "SIE: Storage-key facility")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +2 -0
index 6b8471700e..f99536ef9a 100644
@@ -263,6 +263,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)
         case S390_FEAT_SIE_CMMA:
         case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI:
         case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS:
+        case S390_FEAT_SIPL:
         case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY:
             return false;
             break;
@@ -507,6 +508,7 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model)
         { S390_FEAT_AP_QUEUE_INTERRUPT_CONTROL, S390_FEAT_AP },
         { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
         { S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
+        { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
         { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR },
         { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING },
         { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +2 -0
index 6c20c3a862..bd2060ab93 100644
@@ -721,6 +721,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {
     S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP,
     S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR,
     S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE,
+    S390_FEAT_SIPL,
 };
 
 static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -922,6 +923,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {
     S390_FEAT_PRNO_TRNG,
     S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB,
     S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE,
+    S390_FEAT_SIPL,
 };
 
 /****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +3 -0
index e06b760e03..11b0740c1b 100644
@@ -2520,6 +2520,9 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)
 
     set_bit(S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, model->features);
 
+    /* Some Secure IPL facilities are emulated by QEMU */
+    set_bit(S390_FEAT_SIPL, model->features);
+
     /* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */
     query_uv_feat_guest(model->features);
 
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 16/30
#37 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 16/30] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Facility

Quoted 10 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Introduce Secure-IPL (SIPL) facility.

Use fac_ipl to represent bytes 136 and 137 for IPL device facilities of the SCLP Read Info block.

Availability of SIPL facility is determined by byte 136 bit 1 of the SCLP Read Info block. Byte 136's facilities cannot be represented without the availability of the extended-length-SCCB, so add it as a check for consistency.

Quoted 7 lines

Secure IPL is not available for guests under protected virtualization.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---

#38 lore raw

PATCH v8 17/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Refactor zipl_run()

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Refactor to enhance readability before enabling secure IPL in later patches.

---
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 51 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +33 -18
index 0f8baa0198..22801ca746 100644
@@ -674,12 +674,42 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)
     return 0;
 }
 
+static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)
+{
+    ComponentEntry *entry = *entry_ptr;
+
+    while (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ||
+           entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE) {
+
+        /* Secure boot is off, so we skip signature entries */
+        if (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE) {
+            entry++;
+            continue;
+        }
+
+        if (zipl_load_segment(entry)) {
+            return -1;
+        }
+
+        entry++;
+
+        if ((uint8_t *)&entry[1] > tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) {
+            puts("Wrong entry value");
+            return -EINVAL;
+        }
+    }
+
+    *entry_ptr = entry;
+    return 0;
+}
+
 /* Run a zipl program */
 static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)
 {
     ComponentHeader *header;
     ComponentEntry *entry;
     uint8_t tmp_sec[MAX_SECTOR_SIZE];
+    int rc;
 
     if (virtio_read(pte->blockno, tmp_sec)) {
         puts("Cannot read header");
@@ -700,25 +730,10 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)
 
     /* Load image(s) into RAM */
     entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1]);
-    while (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD ||
-           entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE) {
-
-        /* We don't support secure boot yet, so we skip signature entries */
-        if (entry->component_type == ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE) {
-            entry++;
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if (zipl_load_segment(entry)) {
-            return -1;
-        }
 
-        entry++;
-
-        if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1]) > (tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE)) {
-            puts("Wrong entry value");
-            return -EINVAL;
-        }
+    rc = zipl_run_normal(&entry, tmp_sec);
+    if (rc) {
+        return rc;
     }
 
     if (entry->component_type != ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC) {
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#39 lore raw

PATCH v8 18/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Rework zipl_load_segment function

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Make the address variable a parameter of zipl_load_segment and return segment length.

Modify this function to allow the caller to specify a memory address where segment data should be loaded into.

seg_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.

---
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +10 -5
index 22801ca746..9a03eab6ed 100644
@@ -613,19 +613,22 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)
  * IPL a SCSI disk
  */
 
-static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)
+/*
+ * Returns: length of the segment on success,
+ *          negative value on error.
+ */
+static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)
 {
     const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE / sizeof(ScsiBlockPtr));
     ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;
     const int bprs_size = sizeof(sec);
     block_number_t blockno;
-    uint64_t address;
     int i;
     char err_msg[] = "zIPL failed to read BPRS at 0xZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZZ";
     char *blk_no = &err_msg[30]; /* where to print blockno in (those ZZs) */
+    int seg_len = 0;
 
     blockno = entry->data.blockno;
-    address = entry->compdat.load_addr;
 
     debug_print_int("loading segment at block", blockno);
     debug_print_int("addr", address);
@@ -668,10 +671,12 @@ static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry)
                 puts("zIPL load segment failed");
                 return -EIO;
             }
+
+            seg_len += bprs->size * (bprs[i].blockct + 1);
         }
     } while (blockno);
 
-    return 0;
+    return seg_len;
 }
 
 static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)
@@ -687,7 +692,7 @@ static int zipl_run_normal(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)
             continue;
         }
 
-        if (zipl_load_segment(entry)) {
+        if (zipl_load_segment(entry, entry->compdat.load_addr) < 0) {
             return -1;
         }
 
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#40 lore raw

PATCH v8 19/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.

Add a comp_len variable to store the length of a segment in zipl_load_segment. comp_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.

Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).

Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.

---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst |  35 +++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile        |   3 +-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c       |  36 +++-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h       |  11 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c          |   6 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h      |  14 ++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c          |  43 ++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h          |   6 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c    | 356 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h    | 102 +++++++++
 10 files changed, 609 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c
 create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +35 -0
index 0a02f171b4..3a19b72085 100644
@@ -18,3 +18,38 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension.
 .. code-block:: shell
 
     qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
+
+
+IPL Modes
+=========
+Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL
+configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the
+``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line.
+
+Normal Mode
+-----------
+
+The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL
+operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported.
+This is the default mode.
+
+Configuration:
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ...
+
+Audit Mode
+----------
+
+When the certificate store is populated with at least one certificate
+and no additional secure IPL parameters are provided on the command
+line, then secure IPL will proceed in "audit mode". All secure IPL
+operations will be performed with signature verification errors reported
+as non-disruptive warnings.
+
+Configuration:
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile +2 -1
index a0f24c94a8..603761a857 100644
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d
 .PHONY : all clean build-all distclean
 
 OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \
-	  virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o
+	  virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \
+	  secure-ipl.o
 
 SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOF
 
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +34 -2
index 9a03eab6ed..43a661325f 100644
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
 #include "bootmap.h"
 #include "virtio.h"
 #include "bswap.h"
+#include "secure-ipl.h"
 
 #ifdef DEBUG
 /* #define DEBUG_FALLBACK */
@@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void)
  * Returns: length of the segment on success,
  *          negative value on error.
  */
-static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)
+int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address)
 {
     const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE / sizeof(ScsiBlockPtr));
     ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec;
@@ -736,7 +737,19 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)
     /* Load image(s) into RAM */
     entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1]);
 
-    rc = zipl_run_normal(&entry, tmp_sec);
+    switch (boot_mode) {
+    case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT:
+        rc = zipl_run_secure(&entry, tmp_sec);
+        break;
+    case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL:
+        rc = zipl_run_normal(&entry, tmp_sec);
+        break;
+    default:
+        puts("Unknown boot mode");
+        rc = -1;
+        break;
+    }
+
     if (rc) {
         return rc;
     }
@@ -1103,17 +1116,33 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void)
  * IPL starts here
  */
 
+ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags)
+{
+    bool sipl_set = hdr_flags & DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL;
+    bool iplir_set = hdr_flags & DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR;
+
+    if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) {
+        return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT;
+    }
+
+    return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL;
+}
+
 void zipl_load(void)
 {
     VDev *vdev = virtio_get_device();
 
     if (vdev->is_cdrom) {
+        IPL_assert((boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL),
+                   "Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!");
         ipl_iso_el_torito();
         puts("Failed to IPL this ISO image!");
         return;
     }
 
     if (virtio_get_device_type() == VIRTIO_ID_NET) {
+        IPL_assert((boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL),
+                    "Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!");
         netmain();
         puts("Failed to IPL from this network!");
         return;
@@ -1124,6 +1153,9 @@ void zipl_load(void)
         return;
     }
 
+    IPL_assert((boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL),
+                "Secure boot with the ECKD scheme is not supported!");
+
     switch (virtio_get_device_type()) {
     case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK:
         zipl_load_vblk();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h +11 -0
index 95943441d3..dc2783faa2 100644
@@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable {
     BootMapPointer entry[];
 } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable;
 
+#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1
+
+typedef struct SignatureInformation {
+    uint8_t format;
+    uint8_t reserved[3];
+    uint32_t sig_len;
+} SignatureInformation;
+
 typedef union ComponentEntryData {
     uint64_t load_psw;
     uint64_t load_addr;
+    SignatureInformation sig_info;
 } ComponentEntryData;
 
 typedef struct ComponentEntry {
@@ -113,6 +122,8 @@ typedef struct ScsiMbr {
     ScsiBlockPtr pt;   /* block pointer to program table */
 } __attribute__ ((packed)) ScsiMbr;
 
+int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address);
+
 #define ZIPL_MAGIC              "zIPL"
 #define ZIPL_MAGIC_EBCDIC       "\xa9\xc9\xd7\xd3"
 #define IPL1_MAGIC "\xc9\xd7\xd3\xf1" /* == "IPL1" in EBCDIC */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +6 -0
index 819f053009..106cdf9dec 100644
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb;
 bool have_iplb;
 static uint16_t cutype;
 LowCore *lowcore; /* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */
+ZiplBootMode boot_mode;
 
 #define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT  "
 #define LOADPARM_EMPTY  "        "
@@ -275,6 +276,9 @@ static void ipl_boot_device(void)
     switch (cutype) {
     case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990:
     case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107:
+        IPL_assert((boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL),
+                    "Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!");
+
         dasd_ipl(blk_schid, cutype);
         break;
     case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO:
@@ -324,6 +328,8 @@ void main(void)
         probe_boot_device();
     }
 
+    boot_mode = get_boot_mode(iplb->hdr_flags);
+
     while (have_iplb) {
         boot_setup();
         if (have_iplb && find_boot_device()) {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +14 -0
index b1dc35cded..1b43817af9 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;
 #define MIN_NON_ZERO(a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \
                             ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))
 #endif
+#ifndef ROUND_UP
+#define ROUND_UP(n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d)))
+#endif
 
 #define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))
 
@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);
 void sclp_set_write_mask(uint32_t receive_mask, uint32_t send_mask);
 void sclp_setup(void);
 void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm);
+bool sclp_is_diag320_on(void);
+bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void);
 int sclp_read(char *str, size_t count);
 
 /* virtio.c */
@@ -76,6 +81,15 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);
 /* bootmap.c */
 void zipl_load(void);
 
+typedef enum ZiplBootMode {
+    ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL = 0,
+    ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT = 1,
+} ZiplBootMode;
+
+extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode;
+
+ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags);
+
 /* jump2ipl.c */
 void write_reset_psw(uint64_t psw);
 int jump_to_IPL_code(uint64_t address);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +43 -0

49 lines not on this page · raw message

pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +6 -0
index 64b53cad29..cf147f4634 100644
@@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {
 } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader;
 
 #define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))
+#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4
+#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000
 
 typedef struct ReadInfo {
     SCCBHeader h;
@@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo {
     uint8_t rnsize;
     uint8_t reserved[13];
     uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN];
+    uint8_t reserved1[102];
+    uint8_t fac134;
+    uint8_t reserved2;
+    uint16_t fac_ipl;
 } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo;
 
 typedef struct SCCB {
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +356 -0

356 lines not on this page · raw message

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h new file +102 -0

102 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#41 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode

Quoted 18 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be logged to the console instead.

Add a comp_len variable to store the length of a segment in zipl_load_segment. comp_len variable is necessary to store the calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure.

Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support).

Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.

---

...

pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h typedef unsigned long long u64; · line 44

Quoted 11 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +3 -0
index b1dc35cded..1b43817af9 100644
@@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64;
  #define MIN_NON_ZERO(a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \
                              ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b))))
  #endif
+#ifndef ROUND_UP
+#define ROUND_UP(n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d)))
+#endif

That reason for the "0 ?" is quite hard to understand without any comments ... it would be nice if you could add a similar remark here as we have it already in osdep.h for the corresponding macro.

Quoted 43 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +11 -0
  #define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0]))
 
@@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string);
  void sclp_set_write_mask(uint32_t receive_mask, uint32_t send_mask);
  void sclp_setup(void);
  void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm);
+bool sclp_is_diag320_on(void);
+bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void);
  int sclp_read(char *str, size_t count);
 
  /* virtio.c */
@@ -76,6 +81,15 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);
  /* bootmap.c */
  void zipl_load(void);
 
+typedef enum ZiplBootMode {
+    ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL = 0,
+    ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT = 1,
+} ZiplBootMode;
+
+extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode;
+
+ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags);
+
  /* jump2ipl.c */
  void write_reset_psw(uint64_t psw);
  int jump_to_IPL_code(uint64_t address);
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +8 -0
index 4a07de018d..f7514b0245 100644
@@ -113,6 +113,49 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm)
      }
  }
 
+static void sclp_get_fac134(uint8_t *fac134)
+{
+    ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb;
+
+    memset((char *)_sccb, 0, sizeof(ReadInfo));
+    sccb->h.length = SCCB_SIZE;
+    if (!sclp_service_call(SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO, sccb)) {
+        *fac134 = sccb->fac134;

pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) · line 133

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +10 -0
+    }
+}
+
+bool sclp_is_diag320_on(void)
+{
+    uint8_t fac134 = 0;
+
+    sclp_get_fac134(&fac134);
+    return fac134 & SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT;
+}

Unless you want to use sclp_get_fac134() later in other spots, too, I'd maybe merge its code directly into the sclp_is_diag320_on() function instead.

...

Quoted 19 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +13 -0
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..1d5c2d40ce
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+/*
+ * S/390 Secure IPL
+ *
+ * Functions to support IPL in secure boot mode (DIAG 320, DIAG 508,
+ * signature verification, and certificate handling).
+ *
+ * For secure IPL overview: docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst
+ * For secure IPL technical: docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst
+ *
+ * Copyright 2025 IBM Corp.
+ * Author(s): Zhuoying Cai <[email protected]>
+ *
+ * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 23

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +10 -0
+ */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include "bootmap.h"
+#include "s390-ccw.h"
+#include "secure-ipl.h"
+
+uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MIN_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));

Please mark the array as "static" unless you want to use it from another file later.

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 31

Quoted 7 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +7 -0
+VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb(void)
+{
+    VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb;
+
+    vcssb = (VCStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data;
+    /* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */
+    if (vcssb->length >= VCSSB_MIN_LEN) {

So in case we find VCSSB_MIN_LEN, we assume that it is ok ...

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 40

Quoted 9 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +9 -0
+        return vcssb;
+    }
+
+    if (!is_cert_store_facility_supported()) {
+        puts("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    vcssb->length = VCSSB_MIN_LEN;

... and here we set VCSSB_MIN_LEN ...

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 41

Quoted 1 line
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +1 -0
+    if (diag320(vcssb, DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI) != DIAG_320_RC_OK) {

... but in case of errors, we leave the VCSSB_MIN_LEN in the buffer, so the next time this function gets called we will assume the buffer is fine, though the initialization failed for the first time. ==> I think you need to reset vcssb->length here or add some different logic to avoid this situation.

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c line 46

Quoted 5 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +5 -0
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return vcssb;
+}

Thomas

#42 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

<...snip...>

Quoted 1 line · Zhuoying Cai

uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MIN_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));

I don't see us setting vcssb_data set to 0 before we even start secure ipl verification. I think we should be safe and set it to 0 before the first time we touch this? otherwise if its pointing to garbage data it can break the length checks.

Thanks

Farhan

Quoted 23 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +23 -0
+
+VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb(void)
+{
+    VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb;
+
+    vcssb = (VCStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data;
+    /* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */
+    if (vcssb->length >= VCSSB_MIN_LEN) {
+        return vcssb;
+    }
+
+    if (!is_cert_store_facility_supported()) {
+        puts("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    vcssb->length = VCSSB_MIN_LEN;
+    if (diag320(vcssb, DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI) != DIAG_320_RC_OK) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return vcssb;
+}

<...snip...>

#43 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 19/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode

Quoted 5 lines · Farhan Ali

<...snip...>

Quoted 1 line · Zhuoying Cai

uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MIN_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE)));

Quoted 9 lines

I don't see us setting vcssb_data set to 0 before we even start secure ipl verification. I think we should be safe and set it to 0 before the first time we touch this? otherwise if its pointing to garbage data it can break the length checks.

Thanks

Farhan

I'll declare the array as static, as Thomas suggested. My understanding is that an explicit zero initialization isn’t required, since static variables are initialized to zero by default. Please let me know if I’m missing anything.

Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 23 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c new file +23 -0
+
+VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb(void)
+{
+    VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb;
+
+    vcssb = (VCStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data;
+    /* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */
+    if (vcssb->length >= VCSSB_MIN_LEN) {
+        return vcssb;
+    }
+
+    if (!is_cert_store_facility_supported()) {
+        puts("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!");
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    vcssb->length = VCSSB_MIN_LEN;
+    if (diag320(vcssb, DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI) != DIAG_320_RC_OK) {
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    return vcssb;
+}

<...snip...>

#44 lore raw

PATCH v8 20/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Add address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.

---
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h |  6 ++++
 2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +54 -0
index 1d5c2d40ce..27d2833642 100644
@@ -210,6 +210,55 @@ static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list,
     cert_list->ipl_info_header.len = sizeof(cert_list->ipl_info_header);
 }
 
+static bool is_comp_overlap(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
+                            int addr_range_index,
+                            uint64_t start_addr, uint64_t end_addr)
+{
+    /* neither a signed nor an unsigned component can overlap with a signed component */
+    for (int i = 0; i < addr_range_index; i++) {
+        if ((comp_addr_range[i].start_addr < end_addr &&
+            start_addr < comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) &&
+            comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) {
+            return true;
+       }
+    }
+
+    return false;
+}
+
+static void comp_addr_range_add(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
+                                int addr_range_index, bool is_signed,
+                                uint64_t start_addr, uint64_t end_addr)
+{
+    if (addr_range_index >= MAX_CERTIFICATES) {
+        printf("Warning: Ignoring component address range index [%d]"
+               " because the maximum supported index is %d\n",
+               addr_range_index, MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1);
+        return;
+    }
+
+    comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].is_signed = is_signed;
+    comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].start_addr = start_addr;
+    comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].end_addr = end_addr;
+}
+
+static void addr_overlap_check(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
+                               int *addr_range_index,
+                               uint64_t start_addr, uint64_t end_addr, bool is_signed)
+{
+    bool overlap;
+
+    overlap = is_comp_overlap(comp_addr_range, *addr_range_index,
+                              start_addr, end_addr);
+    if (overlap) {
+        zipl_secure_handle("Component addresses overlap");
+    }
+
+    comp_addr_range_add(comp_addr_range, *addr_range_index, is_signed,
+                        start_addr, end_addr);
+    *addr_range_index += 1;
+}
+
 static int zipl_load_signature(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t sig_sec)
 {
     if (zipl_load_segment(entry, sig_sec) < 0) {
@@ -253,6 +302,8 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)
      * exists for the certificate).
      */
     int cert_list_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES] = { [0 ... MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1] = -1 };
+    SecureIplCompAddrRange comp_addr_range[MAX_CERTIFICATES];
+    int addr_range_index = 0;
     int signed_count = 0;
 
     if (!secure_ipl_supported()) {
@@ -282,6 +333,9 @@ int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec)
                 goto out;
             }
 
+            addr_overlap_check(comp_addr_range, &addr_range_index,
+                               comp_addr, comp_addr + comp_len, sig_len > 0);
+
             if (!sig_len) {
                 break;
             }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +6 -0
index eb5ba0ed47..69edfce241 100644
@@ -16,6 +16,12 @@
 VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb(void);
 int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec);
 
+typedef struct SecureIplCompAddrRange {
+    bool is_signed;
+    uint64_t start_addr;
+    uint64_t end_addr;
+} SecureIplCompAddrRange;
+
 static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message)
 {
     switch (boot_mode) {
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#45 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks

Quoted 32 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add address range tracking and overlap checks to ensure that no component overlaps with a signed component during secure IPL.

---
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h |  6 ++++
  2 files changed, 60 insertions(+)
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +15 -0
index 1d5c2d40ce..27d2833642 100644
@@ -210,6 +210,55 @@ static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list,
      cert_list->ipl_info_header.len = sizeof(cert_list->ipl_info_header);
  }
 
+static bool is_comp_overlap(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
+                            int addr_range_index,
+                            uint64_t start_addr, uint64_t end_addr)
+{
+    /* neither a signed nor an unsigned component can overlap with a signed component */
+    for (int i = 0; i < addr_range_index; i++) {
+        if ((comp_addr_range[i].start_addr < end_addr &&
+            start_addr < comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) &&
+            comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) {
+            return true;
+       }
+    }
+
+    return false;
+}

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, · line 237

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10 -0
+
+static void comp_addr_range_add(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
+                                int addr_range_index, bool is_signed,
+                                uint64_t start_addr, uint64_t end_addr)
+{
+    if (addr_range_index >= MAX_CERTIFICATES) {
+        printf("Warning: Ignoring component address range index [%d]"
+               " because the maximum supported index is %d\n",
+               addr_range_index, MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1);
+        return;

Shouldn't this rather panic() instead - otherwise we might continue boot in secure mode though there is a problem with overlapping components?

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, · line 243

Quoted 6 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +6 -0
+    }
+
+    comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].is_signed = is_signed;
+    comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].start_addr = start_addr;
+    comp_addr_range[addr_range_index].end_addr = end_addr;
+}

Thomas

#46 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks

In reply to Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 6 lines · Zhuoying Cai
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +6 -0
+static bool is_comp_overlap(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
+                            int addr_range_index,
+                            uint64_t start_addr, uint64_t end_addr)
+{
+    /* neither a signed nor an unsigned component can overlap with a signed component */
+    for (int i = 0; i < addr_range_index; i++) {

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, · line 228

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10 -0
+        if ((comp_addr_range[i].start_addr < end_addr &&
+            start_addr < comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) &&
+            comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) {
+            return true;
+       }
+    }
+
+    return false;
+}
+

Shouldn't we use <= and >= checks? For example if comp_addr_range[i].start_addr == end_addr, wouldn't that be an overlap? and similar for start_addr?

Thanks

Farhan

#47 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 20/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signed component address overlap checks

Quoted 23 lines · Farhan Ali
Quoted 6 lines · Zhuoying Cai
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +6 -0
+static bool is_comp_overlap(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
+                            int addr_range_index,
+                            uint64_t start_addr, uint64_t end_addr)
+{
+    /* neither a signed nor an unsigned component can overlap with a signed component */
+    for (int i = 0; i < addr_range_index; i++) {

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comp_list, · line 228

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10 -0
+        if ((comp_addr_range[i].start_addr < end_addr &&
+            start_addr < comp_addr_range[i].end_addr) &&
+            comp_addr_range[i].is_signed) {
+            return true;
+       }
+    }
+
+    return false;
+}
+

Shouldn't we use <= and >= checks? For example if comp_addr_range[i].start_addr == end_addr, wouldn't that be an overlap? and similar for start_addr?

Quoted 5 lines

Thanks

Farhan

Please correct me if I’m wrong. My understanding is that the component address ranges are defined as half-open intervals [start_addr, end_addr), where end_addr is exclusive. If that is the case, then the < comparisons are correct — for example, [1, 3) and [3, 5) are adjacent but not overlapping.

#48 lore raw

PATCH v8 21/30 s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

The secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during secure IPL.

Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst     | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/cpu_features.c         |  2 ++
 target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc |  1 +
 target/s390x/cpu_models.c           |  3 +++
 target/s390x/gen-features.c         |  2 ++
 target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c              |  1 +
 6 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +19 -0
index 82dd8b847a..e7a93806f6 100644
@@ -109,3 +109,22 @@ operations such as:
 
 The guest's kernel inspects the IIRB and uses the certificate data it contains
 to build the keyring.
+
+
+Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility
+---------------------------------
+
+The Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) enhances system security
+during the IPL by enforcing additional verification rules.
+
+When SCLAF is available, its behavior depends on the IPL mode. It introduces
+verification of both signed and unsigned components to help ensure that only
+authorized code is loaded during the IPL process. Any errors detected by SCLAF
+are reported in the IIRB.
+
+Unsigned components are restricted to load addresses at or above absolute
+storage address ``0x2000``.
+
+Signed components must include a Secure Code Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB),
+which is appended at the very end of the component. The SCLAB defines security
+attributes for handling the signed code.
target/s390x/cpu_features.c +2 -0
index 200bd8c15b..29ea3bfec2 100644
@@ -120,6 +120,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,
      * - All SIE facilities because SIE is not available
      * - DIAG318
      * - Secure IPL Facility
+     * - Secure IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility
      *
      * As VMs can move in and out of protected mode the CPU model
      * doesn't protect us from that problem because it is only
@@ -152,6 +153,7 @@ void s390_fill_feat_block(const S390FeatBitmap features, S390FeatType type,
         break;
     case S390_FEAT_TYPE_SCLP_FAC_IPL:
         clear_be_bit(s390_feat_def(S390_FEAT_SIPL)->bit, data);
+        clear_be_bit(s390_feat_def(S390_FEAT_SCLAF)->bit, data);
         break;
     default:
         return;
target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc +1 -0
index bcf8a666e4..f6ba9e87e1 100644
@@ -142,6 +142,7 @@ DEF_FEAT(CERT_STORE, "cstore", SCLP_FAC134, 5, "Certificate Store functions")
 
 /* Features exposed via SCLP SCCB Facilities byte 136 - 137 (bit numbers relative to byte-136) */
 DEF_FEAT(SIPL, "sipl", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 1, "Secure-IPL facility")
+DEF_FEAT(SCLAF, "sclaf", SCLP_FAC_IPL, 3, "Secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility")
 
 /* Features exposed via SCLP CPU info. */
 DEF_FEAT(SIE_F2, "sief2", SCLP_CPU, 4, "SIE: interception format 2 (Virtual SIE)")
target/s390x/cpu_models.c +3 -0
index f99536ef9a..7d214b5f72 100644
@@ -264,6 +264,7 @@ bool s390_has_feat(S390Feat feat)
         case S390_FEAT_SIE_PFMFI:
         case S390_FEAT_SIE_IBS:
         case S390_FEAT_SIPL:
+        case S390_FEAT_SCLAF:
         case S390_FEAT_CONFIGURATION_TOPOLOGY:
             return false;
             break;
@@ -509,6 +510,8 @@ static void check_consistency(const S390CPUModel *model)
         { S390_FEAT_DIAG_318, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
         { S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
         { S390_FEAT_SIPL, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
+        { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB },
+        { S390_FEAT_SCLAF, S390_FEAT_SIPL },
         { S390_FEAT_NNPA, S390_FEAT_VECTOR },
         { S390_FEAT_RDP, S390_FEAT_LOCAL_TLB_CLEARING },
         { S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP, S390_FEAT_AP },
target/s390x/gen-features.c +2 -0
index bd2060ab93..c3e0c6ceff 100644
@@ -722,6 +722,7 @@ static uint16_t full_GEN16_GA1[] = {
     S390_FEAT_UV_FEAT_AP_INTR,
     S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE,
     S390_FEAT_SIPL,
+    S390_FEAT_SCLAF,
 };
 
 static uint16_t full_GEN17_GA1[] = {
@@ -924,6 +925,7 @@ static uint16_t qemu_MAX[] = {
     S390_FEAT_EXTENDED_LENGTH_SCCB,
     S390_FEAT_CERT_STORE,
     S390_FEAT_SIPL,
+    S390_FEAT_SCLAF,
 };
 
 /****** END FEATURE DEFS ******/
target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c +1 -0
index 11b0740c1b..85db8b4172 100644
@@ -2522,6 +2522,7 @@ bool kvm_s390_get_host_cpu_model(S390CPUModel *model, Error **errp)
 
     /* Some Secure IPL facilities are emulated by QEMU */
     set_bit(S390_FEAT_SIPL, model->features);
+    set_bit(S390_FEAT_SCLAF, model->features);
 
     /* Test for Ultravisor features that influence secure guest behavior */
     query_uv_feat_guest(model->features);
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#49 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 21/30] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)

Quoted 24 lines · Zhuoying Cai

The secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during secure IPL.

Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst     | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/cpu_features.c         |  2 ++
 target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc |  1 +
 target/s390x/cpu_models.c           |  3 +++
 target/s390x/gen-features.c         |  2 ++
 target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c              |  1 +
 6 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index 82dd8b847a..e7a93806f6 100644

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst operations such as: · line 115

Quoted 7 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +4 -0
@@ -109,3 +109,22 @@ operations such as:
 
 The guest's kernel inspects the IIRB and uses the certificate data it contains
 to build the keyring.
+
+
+Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility
+---------------------------------

Does not build:

    docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst:170: WARNING: Title underline too short.

    Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility
    --------------------------------- [docutils]

Please test with configure --enable-docs.

Quoted 15 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +15 -0
+
+The Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) enhances system security
+during the IPL by enforcing additional verification rules.
+
+When SCLAF is available, its behavior depends on the IPL mode. It introduces
+verification of both signed and unsigned components to help ensure that only
+authorized code is loaded during the IPL process. Any errors detected by SCLAF
+are reported in the IIRB.
+
+Unsigned components are restricted to load addresses at or above absolute
+storage address ``0x2000``.
+
+Signed components must include a Secure Code Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB),
+which is appended at the very end of the component. The SCLAB defines security
+attributes for handling the signed code.

[...]

#50 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 21/30] s390x: Guest support for Secure-IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF)

Quoted 36 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 24 lines · Zhuoying Cai

The secure-IPL-code-loading-attributes facility (SCLAF) provides additional security during secure IPL.

Availability of SCLAF is determined by byte 136 bit 3 of the SCLP Read Info block.

This feature is available starting with the gen16 CPU model.

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst     | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
 target/s390x/cpu_features.c         |  2 ++
 target/s390x/cpu_features_def.h.inc |  1 +
 target/s390x/cpu_models.c           |  3 +++
 target/s390x/gen-features.c         |  2 ++
 target/s390x/kvm/kvm.c              |  1 +
 6 files changed, 28 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index 82dd8b847a..e7a93806f6 100644

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst operations such as: · line 115

Quoted 7 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +4 -0
@@ -109,3 +109,22 @@ operations such as:
 
 The guest's kernel inspects the IIRB and uses the certificate data it contains
 to build the keyring.
+
+
+Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility
+---------------------------------

Does not build:

Quoted 6 lines
    docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst:170: WARNING: Title underline too short.

    Secure Code Loading Attributes Facility
    --------------------------------- [docutils]

Please test with configure --enable-docs.

With that fixed, I get

    docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst: WARNING: document isn't included in any toctree [toc.not_included]

[...]

#51 lore raw

PATCH v8 22/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Add additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.

Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to 0x2000.

When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).

The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.

When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.

Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).

When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.

---
 include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h   |  29 +++-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h   |   1 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c       |   8 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h       |   1 +
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 318 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h |  42 +++++
 6 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h +27 -2
index 1b6cb3231d..9518fcb1dc 100644
@@ -136,10 +136,20 @@ struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader {
 };
 typedef struct IplInfoReportBlockHeader IplInfoReportBlockHeader;
 
+/* IPL Info Error Indicators */
+#define S390_IIEI_NO_SIGNED_COMP      0x8000 /* bit 0 */
+#define S390_IIEI_NO_SCLAB            0x4000 /* bit 1 */
+#define S390_IIEI_NO_GLOBAL_SCLAB     0x2000 /* bit 2 */
+#define S390_IIEI_MORE_GLOBAL_SCLAB   0x1000 /* bit 3 */
+#define S390_IIEI_FOUND_UNSIGNED_COMP 0x800 /* bit 4 */
+#define S390_IIEI_MORE_SIGNED_COMP    0x400 /* bit 5 */
+
 struct IplInfoBlockHeader {
     uint32_t len;
     uint8_t  type;
-    uint8_t  reserved1[11];
+    uint8_t  reserved1[3];
+    uint16_t iiei;
+    uint8_t  reserved2[6];
 };
 typedef struct IplInfoBlockHeader IplInfoBlockHeader;
 
@@ -163,13 +173,28 @@ typedef struct IplSignatureCertificateList IplSignatureCertificateList;
 #define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_SC  0x80
 #define S390_IPL_DEV_COMP_FLAG_CSV 0x40
 
+/* IPL Device Component Error Indicators */
+#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB             0x80000000 /* bit 0 */
+#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN         0x40000000 /* bit 1 */
+#define S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT      0x20000000 /* bit 2 */
+#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR 0x10000000 /* bit 3 */
+#define S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW  0x8000000  /* bit 4 */
+#define S390_CEI_INVALID_LOAD_PSW          0x4000000  /* bit 5 */
+#define S390_CEI_NUC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLA    0x2000000  /* bit 6 */
+#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE         0x1000000  /* bit 7 */
+#define S390_CEI_SC_NOT_IN_GLOBAL_SCLAB    0x800000   /* bit 8 */
+#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO  0x400000   /* bit 9 */
+#define S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO   0x200000   /* bit 10 */
+#define S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR     0x100000   /* bit 11 */
+
 struct IplDeviceComponentEntry {
     uint64_t addr;
     uint64_t len;
     uint8_t  flags;
     uint8_t  reserved1[5];
     uint16_t cert_index;
-    uint8_t  reserved2[8];
+    uint32_t cei;
+    uint8_t  reserved2[4];
 };
 typedef struct IplDeviceComponentEntry IplDeviceComponentEntry;
 
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +1 -0
index 1b43817af9..8dbfb846d2 100644
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ void sclp_setup(void);
 void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm);
 bool sclp_is_diag320_on(void);
 bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void);
+bool sclp_is_sclaf_on(void);
 int sclp_read(char *str, size_t count);
 
 /* virtio.c */
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c +8 -0
index f7514b0245..e7aea51d5b 100644
@@ -156,6 +156,14 @@ bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void)
     return fac_ipl & SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT;
 }
 
+bool sclp_is_sclaf_on(void)
+{
+    uint16_t fac_ipl = 0;
+
+    sclp_get_fac_ipl(&fac_ipl);
+    return fac_ipl & SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT;
+}
+
 int sclp_read(char *str, size_t count)
 {
     ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1 -0
index cf147f4634..3441020d6b 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {
 #define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))
 #define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4
 #define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000
+#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000
 
 typedef struct ReadInfo {
     SCCBHeader h;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +316 -2

354 lines not on this page · raw message

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +42 -0

54 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#52 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 22/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot

Quoted 33 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.

Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to 0x2000.

When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).

The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.

When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.

Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).

When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.

---
  include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h   |  29 +++-
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h   |   1 +
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c       |   8 +
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h       |   1 +
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 318 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h |  42 +++++
  6 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

...

Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1 -0
index cf147f4634..3441020d6b 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {
  #define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))
  #define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4
  #define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000
+#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000
 
  typedef struct ReadInfo {
      SCCBHeader h;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0 -0
index 27d2833642..54e41ec11c 100644

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static bool secure_ipl_supported(void) · line 204

Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +5 -0
@@ -197,6 +197,12 @@ static bool secure_ipl_supported(void)
          return false;
      }
 
+    if (!sclp_is_sclaf_on()) {
+        puts("Secure IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility is not supported by"
+             " the hypervisor!");
+        return false;
+    }

Let me double-check: This emits a warning and then the bios might continue with the boot process with another device? (zipl_load() prints another warning and returns without panic'ing when ipl_scsi() failed)

... is this what we want? Or should the boot process be stopped in case we're running in (non-audit) secure mode?

Quoted 79 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +72 -0
      return true;
  }
 
@@ -259,6 +265,290 @@ static void addr_overlap_check(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
      *addr_range_index += 1;
  }
 
+static void check_unsigned_addr(uint64_t load_addr, IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    /* unsigned load address must be greater than or equal to 0x2000 */
+    if (load_addr >= 0x2000) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    set_comp_cei_with_log(comp_entry, S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR,
+                          "Load address is less than 0x2000");
+}
+
+static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic,
+                                 IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    /* identifies the presence of SCLAB */
+    if (magic_match(sclab_magic, ZIPL_MAGIC)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    if (comp_entry) {
+        comp_entry->cei |= S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB;
+    }
+
+    /* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */
+    return false;
+}
+
+static void check_sclab_length(uint16_t sclab_len, IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    if (sclab_len >= S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_MIN_LEN) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    set_comp_cei_with_log(comp_entry,
+                          S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_LEN | S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB,
+                          "Invalid SCLAB length");
+}
+
+static void check_sclab_format(uint8_t sclab_format, IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    /* SCLAB format must set to zero, indicating a format-0 SCLAB being used */
+    if (sclab_format == 0) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    set_comp_cei_with_log(comp_entry, S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB_FORMAT,
+                          "Format-0 SCLAB is not being used");
+}
+
+static void check_sclab_opsw(SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab,
+                             SecureIplSclabInfo *sclab_info,
+                             IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    const char *msg;
+    uint32_t cei_flag = 0;
+
+    if (!(sclab->flags & S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OPSW)) {
+        /* OPSW = 0 - Load PSW field in SCLAB must contain zeros */
+        if (sclab->load_psw != 0) {
+            cei_flag |= S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_PSW_NOT_ZERO;
+            msg = "Load PSW is not zero when Override PSW bit is zero";
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* OPSW = 1 indicating global SCLAB */
+        sclab_info->global_count += 1;
+        if (sclab_info->global_count == 1) {
+            sclab_info->load_psw = sclab->load_psw;
+            sclab_info->flags = sclab->flags;
+        }
+
+        /* OLA must set to one */
+        if (!(sclab->flags & S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA)) {

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void addr_overlap_check(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range, · line 349

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10 -0
+            cei_flag |= S390_CEI_SCLAB_OLA_NOT_ONE;
+            msg = "Override Load Address bit is not set to one in the global SCLAB";
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!cei_flag) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    set_comp_cei_with_log(comp_entry, cei_flag, msg);

Code gets slightly shorter if you inverse the logic here:

    if (cei_flag) {
        set_comp_cei_with_log(comp_entry, cei_flag, msg);
    }
Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +17 -0
+}
+
+static void check_sclab_ola(SecureCodeLoadingAttributesBlock *sclab, uint64_t load_addr,
+                            IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    const char *msg;
+    uint32_t cei_flag = 0;
+
+    if (!(sclab->flags & S390_SECURE_IPL_SCLAB_FLAG_OLA)) {
+        /* OLA = 0 - Load address field in SCLAB must contain zeros */
+        if (sclab->load_addr != 0) {
+            cei_flag |= S390_CEI_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR_NOT_ZERO;
+            msg = "Load Address is not zero when Override Load Address bit is zero";
+        }
+    } else {
+        /* OLA = 1 - Load address field must match storage address of the component */
+        if (sclab->load_addr != load_addr) {

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static void addr_overlap_check(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range, · line 376

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +10 -0
+            cei_flag |= S390_CEI_UNMATCHED_SCLAB_LOAD_ADDR;
+            msg = "Load Address does not match with component load address";
+        }
+    }
+
+    if (!cei_flag) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    set_comp_cei_with_log(comp_entry, cei_flag, msg);

dito

Thomas

#53 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 22/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add additional security checks for secure boot

Quoted 65 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 33 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add additional checks to ensure that components do not overlap with signed components when loaded into memory.

Add additional checks to ensure the load addresses of unsigned components are greater than or equal to 0x2000.

When the secure IPL code loading attributes facility (SCLAF) is installed, all signed components must contain a secure code loading attributes block (SCLAB).

The SCLAB provides further validation of information on where to load the signed binary code from the load device, and where to start the execution of the loaded OS code.

When SCLAF is installed, its content must be evaluated during secure IPL. However, a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode. The SCALB checking will be skipped in this case.

Add IPL Information Error Indicators (IIEI) and Component Error Indicators (CEI) for IPL Information Report Block (IIRB).

When SCLAF is installed, additional secure boot checks are performed during zipl and store results of verification into IIRB.

---
  include/hw/s390x/ipl/qipl.h   |  29 +++-
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h   |   1 +
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c       |   8 +
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h       |   1 +
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 318 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h |  42 +++++
  6 files changed, 395 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

...

Quoted 17 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h +1 -0
index cf147f4634..3441020d6b 100644
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader {
  #define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader))
  #define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4
  #define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000
+#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SCLAF_BIT 0x1000
 
  typedef struct ReadInfo {
      SCCBHeader h;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +0 -0
index 27d2833642..54e41ec11c 100644

pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c static bool secure_ipl_supported(void) · line 204

Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +5 -0
@@ -197,6 +197,12 @@ static bool secure_ipl_supported(void)
          return false;
      }
 
+    if (!sclp_is_sclaf_on()) {
+        puts("Secure IPL Code Loading Attributes Facility is not supported by"
+             " the hypervisor!");
+        return false;
+    }

Let me double-check: This emits a warning and then the bios might continue with the boot process with another device? (zipl_load() prints another warning and returns without panic'ing when ipl_scsi() failed)

Quoted 3 lines

... is this what we want? Or should the boot process be stopped in case we're running in (non-audit) secure mode?

Thanks for pointing this out.

I agree that the boot process shouldn’t continue in this situation. All secure‑boot facilities need to be present so the required checks can run; if anything is missing, falling back to another device wouldn’t make sense because no security checks could be performed.

So the boot process should stop rather than continue, whether we’re in audit or secure mode. I’ll update this in the next version.

Quoted 34 lines
Quoted 34 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +27 -0
      return true;
  }
 
@@ -259,6 +265,290 @@ static void addr_overlap_check(SecureIplCompAddrRange *comp_addr_range,
      *addr_range_index += 1;
  }
 
+static void check_unsigned_addr(uint64_t load_addr, IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    /* unsigned load address must be greater than or equal to 0x2000 */
+    if (load_addr >= 0x2000) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    set_comp_cei_with_log(comp_entry, S390_CEI_INVALID_UNSIGNED_ADDR,
+                          "Load address is less than 0x2000");
+}
+
+static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic,
+                                 IplDeviceComponentEntry *comp_entry)
+{
+    /* identifies the presence of SCLAB */
+    if (magic_match(sclab_magic, ZIPL_MAGIC)) {
+        return true;
+    }
+
+    if (comp_entry) {
+        comp_entry->cei |= S390_CEI_INVALID_SCLAB;
+    }
+
+    /* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */
+    return false;
+}
+

[...]

#54 lore raw

PATCH v8 23/30 Add secure-boot to s390-ccw-virtio machine type option

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Add secure-boot as a parameter of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option.

The secure-boot=on|off parameter is implemented to enable secure IPL.

By default, secure-boot is set to false if not specified in the command line.

---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst   | 22 +++++++++++++++++-----
 hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c         | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h |  1 +
 qemu-options.hx                    |  6 +++++-
 4 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +17 -5
index 3a19b72085..2465f8b26d 100644
@@ -19,19 +19,31 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension.
 
     qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
 
+Enabling Secure IPL
+-------------------
+
+Secure IPL is enabled by explicitly setting ``secure-boot=on``; if not
+specified, secure boot is considered off.
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on|off
+
 
 IPL Modes
 =========
 Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL
-configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the
-``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line.
+configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on specific
+combinations of the ``secure-boot`` and ``boot-certs`` options on the QEMU
+command line.
 
 Normal Mode
 -----------
 
-The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL
-operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported.
-This is the default mode.
+The absence of both certificates and the ``secure-boot`` option will attempt to
+IPL a guest without secure IPL operations. No checks are performed, and no
+warnings/errors are reported.  This is the default mode, and can be explicitly
+enabled with ``secure-boot=off``.
 
 Configuration:
 
hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.c +22 -0
index 9267563cbe..5e902e1989 100644
@@ -820,6 +820,21 @@ static void machine_set_boot_certs(Object *obj, Visitor *v, const char *name,
     ms->boot_certs = cert_list;
 }
 
+static inline bool machine_get_secure_boot(Object *obj, Error **errp)
+{
+    S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(obj);
+
+    return ms->secure_boot;
+}
+
+static inline void machine_set_secure_boot(Object *obj, bool value,
+                                            Error **errp)
+{
+    S390CcwMachineState *ms = S390_CCW_MACHINE(obj);
+
+    ms->secure_boot = value;
+}
+
 static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
 {
     MachineClass *mc = MACHINE_CLASS(oc);
@@ -878,6 +893,13 @@ static void ccw_machine_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
                               machine_get_boot_certs, machine_set_boot_certs, NULL, NULL);
     object_class_property_set_description(oc, "boot-certs",
             "provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file for secure boot");
+
+    object_class_property_add_bool(oc, "secure-boot",
+                                   machine_get_secure_boot,
+                                   machine_set_secure_boot);
+    object_class_property_set_description(oc, "secure-boot",
+            "enable/disable secure boot");
+
 }
 
 static inline void s390_machine_initfn(Object *obj)
include/hw/s390x/s390-virtio-ccw.h +1 -0
index 5ad1ea2f24..93a4c0ccad 100644
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ struct S390CcwMachineState {
     bool aes_key_wrap;
     bool dea_key_wrap;
     bool pv;
+    bool secure_boot;
     uint8_t loadparm[8];
     uint64_t memory_limit;
     uint64_t max_pagesize;
qemu-options.hx +5 -1
index 7c02220a5c..95570f902f 100644
@@ -46,7 +46,8 @@ DEF("machine", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_machine, \
     "                cxl-fmw.0.targets.0=firsttarget,cxl-fmw.0.targets.1=secondtarget,cxl-fmw.0.size=size[,cxl-fmw.0.interleave-granularity=granularity]\n"
     "                sgx-epc.0.memdev=memid,sgx-epc.0.node=numaid\n"
     "                smp-cache.0.cache=cachename,smp-cache.0.topology=topologylevel\n"
-    "                boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file provides paths to a directory and/or a certificate file\n",
+    "                boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file provides paths to a directory and/or a certificate file\n"
+    "                secure-boot=on|off enable/disable secure boot (default=off) \n",
     QEMU_ARCH_ALL)
 SRST
 ``-machine [type=]name[,prop=value[,...]]``
@@ -213,6 +214,9 @@ SRST
 
     ``boot-certs.0.path=/path/directory,boot-certs.1.path=/path/file``
         Provide paths to a directory and/or a certificate file on the host [s390x only].
+
+    ``secure-boot=on|off``
+        Enables or disables secure boot on s390-ccw guest. The default is off.
 ERST
 
 DEF("M", HAS_ARG, QEMU_OPTION_M,
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#55 lore raw

PATCH v8 24/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

If -M secure-boot=on is specified on the command line option, indicating true secure IPL enabled, set Secure-IPL bit and IPL-Information-Report bit on in IPIB Flags field, and trigger true secure IPL in the S390 BIOS.

Any error that occurs during true secure IPL will cause the IPL to terminate.

---
 hw/s390x/ipl.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +18 -1
index b66dfd06bd..f8dd50f69d 100644
@@ -440,6 +440,11 @@ static bool s390_has_certificate(void)
     return ipl->cert_store.count > 0;
 }
 
+static bool s390_secure_boot_enabled(void)
+{
+    return S390_CCW_MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->secure_boot;
+}
+
 static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
 {
     CcwDevice *ccw_dev = NULL;
@@ -497,6 +502,18 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
         s390_ipl_convert_loadparm((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm);
         iplb->flags |= DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID;
 
+        /*
+         * If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags to
+         * trigger secure boot in the s390 BIOS.
+         *
+         * Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot.
+         *
+         * If SIPL is on, IPLIR must also be on.
+         */
+        if (s390_secure_boot_enabled()) {
+            iplb->hdr_flags |= (DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL | DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR);
+            iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);
+        }
         /*
          * Secure boot in audit mode will perform
          * if certificate(s) exist in the key store.
@@ -506,7 +523,7 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
          *
          * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB.
          */
-        if (s390_has_certificate()) {
+        else if (s390_has_certificate()) {
             iplb->hdr_flags |= DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR;
             iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);
         }
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 24/30
#56 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 24/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Set IPIB flags for secure IPL

Quoted 11 lines · Zhuoying Cai

If -M secure-boot=on is specified on the command line option, indicating true secure IPL enabled, set Secure-IPL bit and IPL-Information-Report bit on in IPIB Flags field, and trigger true secure IPL in the S390 BIOS.

Any error that occurs during true secure IPL will cause the IPL to terminate.

---
  hw/s390x/ipl.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
  1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
#57 lore raw

PATCH v8 25/30 pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

When secure boot is enabled (-secure-boot on) and certificate(s) are provided, the boot operates in True Secure IPL mode.

Any verification error during True Secure IPL mode will cause the entire boot process to terminate.

Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities. If secure boot is enabled but no certificate is provided, the boot process will also terminate, as this is not a valid secure boot configuration.

Note: True Secure IPL mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.

---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 13 +++++++++++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c       | 11 +++++++++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c          |  3 +++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h      |  2 ++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c    |  4 ++++
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h    |  3 +++
 6 files changed, 36 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +13 -0
index 2465f8b26d..e0af086c38 100644
@@ -65,3 +65,16 @@ Configuration:
 .. code-block:: shell
 
     qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
+
+Secure Mode
+-----------
+
+When the ``secure-boot=on`` option is set and certificates are provided,
+a secure boot is performed with error reporting enabled. The boot process aborts
+if any error occurs.
+
+Configuration:
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +11 -0
index 43a661325f..699ef981e2 100644
@@ -738,12 +738,16 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)
     entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1]);
 
     switch (boot_mode) {
+    case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE:
     case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT:
         rc = zipl_run_secure(&entry, tmp_sec);
         break;
     case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL:
         rc = zipl_run_normal(&entry, tmp_sec);
         break;
+    case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID:
+        rc = -1;
+        break;
     default:
         puts("Unknown boot mode");
         rc = -1;
@@ -1120,9 +1124,16 @@ ZiplBootMode get_boot_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags)
 {
     bool sipl_set = hdr_flags & DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL;
     bool iplir_set = hdr_flags & DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR;
+    VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb;
 
     if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) {
         return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT;
+    } else if (sipl_set && iplir_set) {
+        vcssb = zipl_secure_get_vcssb();
+        if (vcssb == NULL || vcssb->length == VCSSB_NO_VC) {
+            return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID;
+        }
+        return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE;
     }
 
     return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +3 -0
index 106cdf9dec..1678ede8fb 100644
@@ -329,6 +329,9 @@ void main(void)
     }
 
     boot_mode = get_boot_mode(iplb->hdr_flags);
+    if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID) {
+        panic("Need at least one certificate for secure boot!");
+    }
 
     while (have_iplb) {
         boot_setup();
pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h +2 -0
index 8dbfb846d2..4038d5007b 100644
@@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr);
 void zipl_load(void);
 
 typedef enum ZiplBootMode {
+    ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID = -1,
     ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL = 0,
     ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT = 1,
+    ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE = 2,
 } ZiplBootMode;
 
 extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode;
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c +4 -0
index 54e41ec11c..3dfac62ccf 100644
@@ -289,6 +289,10 @@ static bool check_sclab_presence(uint8_t *sclab_magic,
     }
 
     /* a missing SCLAB will not be reported in audit mode */
+    if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE) {
+        zipl_secure_handle("Magic does not match. SCLAB does not exist");
+    }
+
     return false;
 }
 
pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h +3 -0
index 4e9f4f08b9..1e736d53fe 100644
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message)
     case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT:
         IPL_check(false, message);
         break;
+    case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE:
+        panic(message);
+        break;
     default:
         break;
     }
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#58 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 25/30] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Handle true secure IPL mode

Quoted 16 lines · Zhuoying Cai

When secure boot is enabled (-secure-boot on) and certificate(s) are provided, the boot operates in True Secure IPL mode.

Any verification error during True Secure IPL mode will cause the entire boot process to terminate.

Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in the key store along with necessary facilities. If secure boot is enabled but no certificate is provided, the boot process will also terminate, as this is not a valid secure boot configuration.

Note: True Secure IPL mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices.

---

...

Quoted 8 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +0 -0
index 43a661325f..699ef981e2 100644
@@ -738,12 +738,16 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte)
      entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1]);
 
      switch (boot_mode) {

pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) · line 750

Quoted 10 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +4 -0
+    case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE:
      case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT:
          rc = zipl_run_secure(&entry, tmp_sec);
          break;
      case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL:
          rc = zipl_run_normal(&entry, tmp_sec);
          break;
+    case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID:
+        rc = -1;
+        break;

boot_mode can never be set to ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID invalid (see below), so I suggest to drop this "case" again (and let the default case catch it in case this ever changes - at least that one prints a message).

Quoted 3 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c +0 -0
      default:
          puts("Unknown boot mode");
          rc = -1;

...

pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c void main(void) · line 334

Quoted 11 lines
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +3 -0
index 106cdf9dec..1678ede8fb 100644
@@ -329,6 +329,9 @@ void main(void)
      }
 
      boot_mode = get_boot_mode(iplb->hdr_flags);
+    if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_INVALID) {
+        panic("Need at least one certificate for secure boot!");
+    }

Here you make sure that boot_mode can never be set to INVALID afterwards.

Thomas

#59 lore raw

PATCH v8 26/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

The current approach to enable secure boot relies on providing secure-boot and boot-certs parameters of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option, which apply to all boot devices.

With the possibility of multiple boot devices, secure boot expects all provided devices to be supported and eligible (e.g., virtio-blk/virtio-scsi using the SCSI scheme).

If multiple boot devices are provided and include an unsupported (e.g., ECKD, VFIO) or a non-eligible (e.g., Net) device, the boot process will terminate with an error logged to the console.

---
 hw/s390x/ipl.c          | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
 pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c |  3 --
 2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +54 -25
index f8dd50f69d..e46e655ef1 100644
@@ -445,6 +445,58 @@ static bool s390_secure_boot_enabled(void)
     return S390_CCW_MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->secure_boot;
 }
 
+static bool s390_validate_secure_boot_device(int devtype, Error **errp)
+{
+    switch (devtype) {
+    case CCW_DEVTYPE_VFIO:
+       error_setg(errp, "Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!");
+       return false;
+    case CCW_DEVTYPE_VIRTIO_NET:
+       error_setg(errp, "Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!");
+       return false;
+    default:
+       return true;
+    }
+}
+
+static void s390_apply_secure_boot(IplParameterBlock *iplb, int devtype,
+                                   bool secure_boot, bool audit_mode)
+{
+    Error *local_error = NULL;
+
+    if (!secure_boot && !audit_mode) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (!s390_validate_secure_boot_device(devtype, &local_error)) {
+        error_report_err(local_error);
+        exit(1);
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags (SIPL) to
+     * trigger secure boot in the s390 BIOS.
+     *
+     * Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot.
+     */
+    if (secure_boot) {
+        iplb->hdr_flags |= DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * For both secure boot and audit mode, enable the IPL Information
+     * Report (IPLIR) flag so that the firmware generates an IPL
+     * Information Report Block (IIRB).
+     *
+     * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB.
+     *
+     * Extend the IPL parameter block to its maximum length to ensure
+     * sufficient space for the BIOS to populate the IIRB.
+     */
+    iplb->hdr_flags |= DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR;
+    iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);
+}
+
 static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
 {
     CcwDevice *ccw_dev = NULL;
@@ -502,31 +554,8 @@ static bool s390_build_iplb(DeviceState *dev_st, IplParameterBlock *iplb)
         s390_ipl_convert_loadparm((char *)lp, iplb->loadparm);
         iplb->flags |= DIAG308_FLAGS_LP_VALID;
 
-        /*
-         * If secure-boot is enabled, then toggle the secure IPL flags to
-         * trigger secure boot in the s390 BIOS.
-         *
-         * Boot process will terminate if any error occurs during secure boot.
-         *
-         * If SIPL is on, IPLIR must also be on.
-         */
-        if (s390_secure_boot_enabled()) {
-            iplb->hdr_flags |= (DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL | DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR);
-            iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);
-        }
-        /*
-         * Secure boot in audit mode will perform
-         * if certificate(s) exist in the key store.
-         *
-         * IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) will exist
-         * for secure boot in audit mode.
-         *
-         * Results of secure boot will be stored in IIRB.
-         */
-        else if (s390_has_certificate()) {
-            iplb->hdr_flags |= DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR;
-            iplb->len = cpu_to_be32(S390_IPLB_MAX_LEN);
-        }
+        s390_apply_secure_boot(iplb, devtype, s390_secure_boot_enabled(),
+                               s390_has_certificate());
 
         return true;
     }
pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c +0 -3
index 1678ede8fb..6633a2cbaf 100644
@@ -276,9 +276,6 @@ static void ipl_boot_device(void)
     switch (cutype) {
     case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990:
     case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107:
-        IPL_assert((boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL),
-                    "Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!");
-
         dasd_ipl(blk_schid, cutype);
         break;
     case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO:
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
Reviewed-by on v8 26/30
#60 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 26/30] hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot with multiple boot devices

Quoted 12 lines · Zhuoying Cai

The current approach to enable secure boot relies on providing secure-boot and boot-certs parameters of s390-ccw-virtio machine type option, which apply to all boot devices.

With the possibility of multiple boot devices, secure boot expects all provided devices to be supported and eligible (e.g., virtio-blk/virtio-scsi using the SCSI scheme).

If multiple boot devices are provided and include an unsupported (e.g., ECKD, VFIO) or a non-eligible (e.g., Net) device, the boot process will terminate with an error logged to the console.

Quoted 5 lines
---
  hw/s390x/ipl.c          | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
  pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c |  3 --
  2 files changed, 54 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
#61 lore raw

PATCH v8 27/30 hw/s390x/ipl: Handle secure boot without specifying a boot device

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

If secure boot in audit mode or True Secure IPL mode is enabled without specifying a boot device, the boot process will terminate with an error.

---
 hw/s390x/ipl.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
hw/s390x/ipl.c +10 -0
index e46e655ef1..00ddfcf858 100644
@@ -799,6 +799,16 @@ void s390_ipl_prepare_cpu(S390CPU *cpu)
         cpu->env.psw.addr = ipl->bios_start_addr;
         if (!ipl->iplb_valid) {
             ipl->iplb_valid = s390_init_all_iplbs(ipl);
+
+            /*
+             * Secure IPL without specifying a boot device.
+             * IPLB is not generated if no boot device is defined.
+             */
+            if ((s390_has_certificate() || s390_secure_boot_enabled()) &&
+                !ipl->iplb_valid) {
+                error_report("No boot device defined for Secure IPL");
+                exit(1);
+            }
         } else {
             ipl->qipl.chain_len = 0;
         }
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#62 lore raw

PATCH v8 28/30 tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL functional test

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Add functional test for secure IPL.

---
 tests/functional/s390x/meson.build        |   2 +
 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 144 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py
tests/functional/s390x/meson.build +2 -0
index 70cd36e291..cb050f3c01 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
 test_s390x_timeouts = {
   'ccw_virtio' : 420,
+  'secure_ipl' : 280,
 }
 
 tests_s390x_system_quick = [
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ tests_s390x_system_thorough = [
   'ccw_virtio',
   'pxelinux',
   'replay',
+  'secure_ipl',
   'topology',
   'tuxrun',
 ]
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +142 -0

142 lines not on this page · raw message

Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#63 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 28/30] tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL functional test

Quoted 1 line · Zhuoying Cai

Add functional test for secure IPL.

Thanks for adding it! Some comments below...

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py

Quoted 29 lines
---
  tests/functional/s390x/meson.build        |   2 +
  tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 144 insertions(+)

create mode 100644 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py

tests/functional/s390x/meson.build +2 -0
index 70cd36e291..cb050f3c01 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
  test_s390x_timeouts = {
    'ccw_virtio' : 420,
+  'secure_ipl' : 280,
  }
 
  tests_s390x_system_quick = [
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ tests_s390x_system_thorough = [
    'ccw_virtio',
    'pxelinux',
    'replay',
+  'secure_ipl',
    'topology',
    'tuxrun',
  ]
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644

chmod a+x please, so we can also run this test directly, without the meson test harness.

Quoted 35 lines

index 0000000000..c95553e4e9

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +31 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# s390x Secure IPL functional test: validates secure-boot verification results
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+from qemu_test import QemuSystemTest, Asset
+from qemu_test import exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern, exec_command
+from qemu_test import wait_for_console_pattern, skipBigDataTest
+
+class S390xSecureIpl(QemuSystemTest):
+    ASSET_F40_QCOW2 = Asset(
+        ('https://archives.fedoraproject.org/pub/archive/'
+         'fedora-secondary/releases/40/Server/s390x/images/'
+         'Fedora-Server-KVM-40-1.14.s390x.qcow2'),
+        '091c232a7301be14e19c76ce9a0c1cbd2be2c4157884a731e1fc4f89e7455a5f')
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self.root_password = None
+        self.qcow2_path = None
+        self.cert_path = None
+        self.prompt = None
+
+    # Boot a temporary VM to set up secure IPL image:
+    # - Create certificate
+    # - Sign stage3 binary and kernel
+    # - Run zipl
+    # - Extract certificate
+    def setup_s390x_secure_ipl(self):
+        temp_vm = self.get_vm(name='sipl_setup')

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py line 41

Quoted 10 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +10 -0
+        temp_vm.set_machine('s390-ccw-virtio')
+
+        self.qcow2_path = self.ASSET_F40_QCOW2.fetch()
+
+        temp_vm.set_console()
+        temp_vm.add_args('-nographic',
+                         '-accel', 'kvm',
+                         '-m', '1024',
+                         '-drive',
+                         f'id=drive0,if=none,format=qcow2,file={self.qcow2_path}',

Assets are stored as read-only in the cache, so this should fail? Did you maybe copy the asset manually into your cache?

Anyway, I think you certainly want to operate on a "copy" of your asset instead (done with "qemu-img -b ..." to use the original asset as backing file), so you don't alter the original asset while running the test.

Quoted 63 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +63 -0
+                         '-device', 'virtio-blk-ccw,drive=drive0,bootindex=1')
+        temp_vm.launch()
+
+        # Initial root account setup (Fedora first boot screen)
+        self.root_password = 'fedora40password'
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, 'Please make a selection from the above',
+                                 vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, '4', 'Password:', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password,
+                                          'Password (confirm):', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password,
+                                    'Please make a selection from the above',
+                                    vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Login as root
+        self.prompt = '[root@localhost ~]#'
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'c', 'localhost login:', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'root', 'Password:', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password, self.prompt,
+                                          vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Certificate generation
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                                          'openssl version', 'OpenSSL 3.2.1 30',
+                                          vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                            'openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 '
+                            '-keyout mykey.pem -outform PEM -out mycert.pem '
+                            '-days 36500 -subj "/CN=My Name/" -nodes -verbose',
+                            'Writing private key to \'mykey.pem\'', vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Install kernel-devel (needed for sign-file)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                                'sudo dnf install kernel-devel-$(uname -r) -y',
+                                'Complete!', vm=temp_vm)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, self.prompt, vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                                    'ls /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/',
+                                    'sign-file', vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Sign stage3 binary and kernel
+        exec_command(self, '/usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file '
+                    'sha256 mykey.pem mycert.pem /lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin',
+                    vm=temp_vm)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, self.prompt, vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command(self, '/usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file '
+                    'sha256 mykey.pem mycert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)',
+                    vm=temp_vm)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, self.prompt, vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Run zipl to prepare for secure boot
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'zipl --secure 1 -VV', 'Done.',
+                                          vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Extract certificate to host
+        out = exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'cat mycert.pem',
+                                                '-----END CERTIFICATE-----',
+                                                vm=temp_vm)
+        # strip first line to avoid console echo artifacts
+        cert = "\n".join(out.decode("utf-8").splitlines()[1:])
+        self.log.info("%s", cert)
+
+        self.cert_path = self.scratch_file("mycert.pem")

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py line 114

Quoted 10 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +10 -0
+
+        with open(self.cert_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as file_object:
+            file_object.write(cert)
+
+        # Shutdown temp vm
+        temp_vm.shutdown()
+
+    @skipBigDataTest()
+    def test_s390x_secure_ipl(self):
+        self.require_accelerator('kvm')

Could this test also be run with TCG?

Thomas

Quoted 28 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +28 -0
+        self.setup_s390x_secure_ipl()
+
+        self.set_machine('s390-ccw-virtio')
+
+        self.vm.set_console()
+        self.vm.add_args('-nographic',
+                         '-machine', 's390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,'
+                         f'boot-certs.0.path={self.cert_path}',
+                         '-accel', 'kvm',
+                         '-m', '1024',
+                         '-drive',
+                         f'id=drive1,if=none,format=qcow2,file={self.qcow2_path}',
+                         '-device', 'virtio-blk-ccw,drive=drive1,bootindex=1')
+        self.vm.launch()
+
+        # Expect two verified components
+        verified_output = "Verified component"
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, verified_output)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, verified_output)
+
+        # Login and verify the vm is booted using secure boot
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, 'localhost login:')
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'root', 'Password:')
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password, self.prompt)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'cat /sys/firmware/ipl/secure', '1')
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    QemuSystemTest.main()
#64 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 28/30] tests/functional/s390x: Add secure IPL functional test

Thanks for the feedback.

Quoted 87 lines · Thomas Huth
Quoted 1 line · Zhuoying Cai

Add functional test for secure IPL.

Thanks for adding it! Some comments below...

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py

Quoted 29 lines
---
  tests/functional/s390x/meson.build        |   2 +
  tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py | 142 ++++++++++++++++++++++
  2 files changed, 144 insertions(+)

create mode 100644 tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py

tests/functional/s390x/meson.build +2 -0
index 70cd36e291..cb050f3c01 100644
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
 
  test_s390x_timeouts = {
    'ccw_virtio' : 420,
+  'secure_ipl' : 280,
  }
 
  tests_s390x_system_quick = [
@@ -12,6 +13,7 @@ tests_s390x_system_thorough = [
    'ccw_virtio',
    'pxelinux',
    'replay',
+  'secure_ipl',
    'topology',
    'tuxrun',
  ]
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +0 -0
new file mode 100644

chmod a+x please, so we can also run this test directly, without the meson test harness.

Quoted 35 lines

index 0000000000..c95553e4e9

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +31 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python3
+#
+# s390x Secure IPL functional test: validates secure-boot verification results
+#
+# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+
+from qemu_test import QemuSystemTest, Asset
+from qemu_test import exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern, exec_command
+from qemu_test import wait_for_console_pattern, skipBigDataTest
+
+class S390xSecureIpl(QemuSystemTest):
+    ASSET_F40_QCOW2 = Asset(
+        ('https://archives.fedoraproject.org/pub/archive/'
+         'fedora-secondary/releases/40/Server/s390x/images/'
+         'Fedora-Server-KVM-40-1.14.s390x.qcow2'),
+        '091c232a7301be14e19c76ce9a0c1cbd2be2c4157884a731e1fc4f89e7455a5f')
+
+    def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs):
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self.root_password = None
+        self.qcow2_path = None
+        self.cert_path = None
+        self.prompt = None
+
+    # Boot a temporary VM to set up secure IPL image:
+    # - Create certificate
+    # - Sign stage3 binary and kernel
+    # - Run zipl
+    # - Extract certificate
+    def setup_s390x_secure_ipl(self):
+        temp_vm = self.get_vm(name='sipl_setup')

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py line 41

Quoted 10 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +10 -0
+        temp_vm.set_machine('s390-ccw-virtio')
+
+        self.qcow2_path = self.ASSET_F40_QCOW2.fetch()
+
+        temp_vm.set_console()
+        temp_vm.add_args('-nographic',
+                         '-accel', 'kvm',
+                         '-m', '1024',
+                         '-drive',
+                         f'id=drive0,if=none,format=qcow2,file={self.qcow2_path}',

Assets are stored as read-only in the cache, so this should fail? Did you maybe copy the asset manually into your cache?

Quoted 4 lines

Anyway, I think you certainly want to operate on a "copy" of your asset instead (done with "qemu-img -b ..." to use the original asset as backing file), so you don't alter the original asset while running the test.

I’ll create a copy and set it up instead of using the original asset.

Quoted 76 lines
Quoted 63 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +63 -0
+                         '-device', 'virtio-blk-ccw,drive=drive0,bootindex=1')
+        temp_vm.launch()
+
+        # Initial root account setup (Fedora first boot screen)
+        self.root_password = 'fedora40password'
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, 'Please make a selection from the above',
+                                 vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, '4', 'Password:', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password,
+                                          'Password (confirm):', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password,
+                                    'Please make a selection from the above',
+                                    vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Login as root
+        self.prompt = '[root@localhost ~]#'
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'c', 'localhost login:', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'root', 'Password:', vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password, self.prompt,
+                                          vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Certificate generation
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                                          'openssl version', 'OpenSSL 3.2.1 30',
+                                          vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                            'openssl req -new -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 '
+                            '-keyout mykey.pem -outform PEM -out mycert.pem '
+                            '-days 36500 -subj "/CN=My Name/" -nodes -verbose',
+                            'Writing private key to \'mykey.pem\'', vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Install kernel-devel (needed for sign-file)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                                'sudo dnf install kernel-devel-$(uname -r) -y',
+                                'Complete!', vm=temp_vm)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, self.prompt, vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self,
+                                    'ls /usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/',
+                                    'sign-file', vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Sign stage3 binary and kernel
+        exec_command(self, '/usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file '
+                    'sha256 mykey.pem mycert.pem /lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin',
+                    vm=temp_vm)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, self.prompt, vm=temp_vm)
+        exec_command(self, '/usr/src/kernels/$(uname -r)/scripts/sign-file '
+                    'sha256 mykey.pem mycert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)',
+                    vm=temp_vm)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, self.prompt, vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Run zipl to prepare for secure boot
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'zipl --secure 1 -VV', 'Done.',
+                                          vm=temp_vm)
+
+        # Extract certificate to host
+        out = exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'cat mycert.pem',
+                                                '-----END CERTIFICATE-----',
+                                                vm=temp_vm)
+        # strip first line to avoid console echo artifacts
+        cert = "\n".join(out.decode("utf-8").splitlines()[1:])
+        self.log.info("%s", cert)
+
+        self.cert_path = self.scratch_file("mycert.pem")

tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py line 114

Quoted 10 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +10 -0
+
+        with open(self.cert_path, 'w', encoding="utf-8") as file_object:
+            file_object.write(cert)
+
+        # Shutdown temp vm
+        temp_vm.shutdown()
+
+    @skipBigDataTest()
+    def test_s390x_secure_ipl(self):
+        self.require_accelerator('kvm')

Could this test also be run with TCG?

Quoted 3 lines

Thomas

No, this test will not work with TCG due to the test setup.

The Fedora Server qcow2 image has the root account locked by default. Under TCG, the system boots much more slowly and drops into emergency mode while the root account is still locked. As a result, the test cannot proceed because login is not possible.

QEMU (TCG) log shows:
Cannot open access to console, the root account is locked.

See sulogin(8) man page for more details. Press Enter to continue.
...

There are also repeated SELinux AVC denials (e.g., access to z90crypt), indicating the system reaches emergency state before completing normal initialization.

Therefore, this test cannot run under TCG with the current image and setup.

Quoted 29 lines
Quoted 28 lines
tests/functional/s390x/test_secure_ipl.py new file +28 -0
+        self.setup_s390x_secure_ipl()
+
+        self.set_machine('s390-ccw-virtio')
+
+        self.vm.set_console()
+        self.vm.add_args('-nographic',
+                         '-machine', 's390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,'
+                         f'boot-certs.0.path={self.cert_path}',
+                         '-accel', 'kvm',
+                         '-m', '1024',
+                         '-drive',
+                         f'id=drive1,if=none,format=qcow2,file={self.qcow2_path}',
+                         '-device', 'virtio-blk-ccw,drive=drive1,bootindex=1')
+        self.vm.launch()
+
+        # Expect two verified components
+        verified_output = "Verified component"
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, verified_output)
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, verified_output)
+
+        # Login and verify the vm is booted using secure boot
+        wait_for_console_pattern(self, 'localhost login:')
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'root', 'Password:')
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, self.root_password, self.prompt)
+        exec_command_and_wait_for_pattern(self, 'cat /sys/firmware/ipl/secure', '1')
+
+if __name__ == '__main__':
+    QemuSystemTest.main()
#65 lore raw

PATCH v8 29/30 docs/specs: Add secure IPL documentation

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Add documentation for secure IPL

---
 docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +55 -0
index e7a93806f6..b20500529a 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,60 @@
 .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 
+s390 Secure IPL
+===============
+
+Secure IPL (a.k.a. secure boot) enables s390-ccw virtual machines to
+leverage qcrypto libraries and z/Architecture emulations to verify the
+integrity of signed kernels. The qcrypto libraries are used to perform
+certificate validation and signature-verification, whereas the
+z/Architecture emulations are used to ensure secure IPL data has not
+been tampered with, convey data between QEMU and userspace, and set up
+the relevant secure IPL data structures with verification results.
+
+To find out more about using this feature, see
+``docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst``.
+
+Note that "userspace" will refer to the s390-ccw BIOS unless stated
+otherwise.
+
+Both QEMU and userspace work in cooperation to perform secure IPL. The Secure
+Loading Attributes Facility (SCLAF) is used to check the Secure Code
+Loading Attribute Block (SCLAB) and ensure that secure IPL data has not
+been tampered with. DIAGNOSE 'X'320' is invoked by userspace to query
+the certificate store info and retrieve specific certificates from QEMU.
+DIAGNOSE 'X'508' is used by userspace to leverage qcrypto libraries to
+perform signature-verification in QEMU. Lastly, userspace generates and
+appends an IPL Information Report Block (IIRB) at the end of the IPL
+Parameter Block, which is used by the kernel to store signed and
+verified entries.
+
+The logical steps are as follows:
+
+- Userspace reads data payload from disk (e.g. stage3 boot loader, kernel)
+- Userspace checks the validity of the SCLAB
+- Userspace invokes DIAG 508 subcode 1 and provides it the payload
+- QEMU handles DIAG 508 request by reading the payload and retrieving the
+  certificate store
+- QEMU DIAG 508 utilizes qcrypto libraries to perform signature-verification on
+  the payload, attempting with each cert in the store (until success or
+  exhausted)
+- QEMU DIAG 508 returns:
+
+  - success: index of cert used to verify payload
+  - failure: error code
+
+- Userspace responds to this operation:
+
+  - success: retrieves cert from store via DIAG 320 using returned index
+  - failure: reports with warning (audit mode), aborts with error (secure mode)
+
+- Userspace appends IIRB at the end of the IPLB
+- Userspace kicks off IPL
+
+More information regarding the respective DIAGNOSE commands and IPL data
+structures are outlined within this document.
+
+
 s390 Certificate Store and Functions
 ====================================
 
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#66 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 29/30] docs/specs: Add secure IPL documentation

Quoted 19 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add documentation for secure IPL

---
  docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 55 insertions(+)
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +5 -0
index e7a93806f6..b20500529a 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,60 @@
  .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 
+s390 Secure IPL
+===============
+
+Secure IPL (a.k.a. secure boot) enables s390-ccw virtual machines to
+leverage qcrypto libraries and z/Architecture emulations to verify the

docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst line 17

Quoted 10 lines
docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst +10 -0
+integrity of signed kernels. The qcrypto libraries are used to perform
+certificate validation and signature-verification, whereas the
+z/Architecture emulations are used to ensure secure IPL data has not
+been tampered with, convey data between QEMU and userspace, and set up
+the relevant secure IPL data structures with verification results.
+
+To find out more about using this feature, see
+``docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst``.
+
+Note that "userspace" will refer to the s390-ccw BIOS unless stated

As mentioned in an earlier patch already, I'd maybe rather replace the term "userspace" here (and in the text below) by "guest code", that's less confusing.

Thomas

#67 lore raw

PATCH v8 30/30 docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation

In reply to Zhuoying Cai

Add documentation for secure IPL

---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +96 -0
index e0af086c38..275aa422c7 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
 .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 
+s390 Secure IPL
+===============
+
+Secure IPL, also known as secure boot, enables s390-ccw virtual machines to
+verify the integrity of guest kernels.
+
+For technical details of this feature, see ``docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst``.
+
+This document explains how to use secure IPL with s390x in QEMU. It covers
+new command line options for providing certificates and enabling secure IPL,
+the different IPL modes (Normal, Audit, and Secure), and system requirements.
+
+A quickstart guide is provided to demonstrate how to generate certificates,
+sign images, and start a guest in Secure Mode.
+
+
 Secure IPL Command Line Options
 ===============================
 
@@ -78,3 +94,83 @@ Configuration:
 .. code-block:: shell
 
     qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
+
+
+Constraints
+===========
+
+The following constraints apply when attempting to secure IPL an s390 guest:
+
+- z16 or "qemu" CPU model
+- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format
+- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices
+- a boot device must be specified
+- any unsupported devices (e.g., ECKD and VFIO) or non-eligible devices (e.g.,
+  network) will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error
+  logged to the console.
+
+
+Secure IPL Quickstart
+=====================
+
+Build QEMU with gnutls enabled
+-------------------------------
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    ./configure … --enable-gnutls
+
+Generate certificate (e.g. via certtool)
+----------------------------------------
+
+A private key is required before generating a certificate. This key must be kept
+secure and confidential.
+
+Use an RSA private key for signing.
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem
+
+A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the ``cert.info``
+template to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool.
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    cat > cert.info <<EOF
+    cn = "My Name"
+    expiration_days = 36500
+    cert_signing_key
+    EOF
+
+    certtool --generate-self-signed \
+             --load-privkey key.pem \
+             --template cert.info \
+             --hash=SHA256 \
+             --outfile cert.pem
+
+Sign Images (e.g. via sign-file)
+--------------------------------
+
+- signing must be performed on a KVM guest filesystem
+- sign-file script used in the example below is located within the kernel source
+  repo
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /boot/vmlinuz-…
+    ./sign-file sha256 key.pem cert.pem /usr/lib/s390-tools/stage3.bin
+
+Run zipl with secure boot enabled
+---------------------------------
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    zipl --secure 1 -V
+
+Command line options for starting the guest
+----------------------------
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=cert.pem ...
Signature · 1 line
2.52.0
#68 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 30/30] docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation

Quoted 12 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add documentation for secure IPL

---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index e0af086c38..275aa422c7 100644

[...]

Quoted 2 lines

+Command line options for starting the guest
+----------------------------

Does not build:

    docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst:172: WARNING: Title underline too short.

    Command line options for starting the guest
    ---------------------------- [docutils]

Please test with configure --enable-docs.

Quoted 4 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +4 -0
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=cert.pem ...
#69 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 30/30] docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation

Quoted 20 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 12 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add documentation for secure IPL

---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index e0af086c38..275aa422c7 100644

[...]

Quoted 2 lines

+Command line options for starting the guest
+----------------------------

Quoted 8 lines

Does not build:

    docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst:172: WARNING: Title underline too short.

    Command line options for starting the guest
    ---------------------------- [docutils]

Please test with configure --enable-docs.

With that fixed, I get

    docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst: WARNING: document isn't included in any toctree [toc.not_included]
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +4 -0
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=cert.pem ...
#70 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 30/30] docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation

Quoted 26 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 24 lines · Markus Armbruster
Quoted 12 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add documentation for secure IPL

---
 docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index e0af086c38..275aa422c7 100644

[...]

Quoted 2 lines

+Command line options for starting the guest
+----------------------------

Does not build:

    docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst:172: WARNING: Title underline too short.
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 4 lines

Command line options for starting the guest
---------------------------- [docutils]

Please test with configure --enable-docs.

With that fixed, I get

    docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst: WARNING: document isn't included in any toctree [toc.not_included]

Thank you for the review. I’ll test the series with configure --enable-docs and will fix the documentation build issues in the next version.

Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 4 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +4 -0
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=cert.pem ...
#71 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v8 30/30] docs/system/s390x: Add secure IPL documentation

In reply to Zhuoying Cai
Quoted 15 lines · Zhuoying Cai

Add documentation for secure IPL

---
  docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 96 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
  1 file changed, 96 insertions(+)
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +0 -0
index e0af086c38..275aa422c7 100644
@@ -1,5 +1,21 @@
  .. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
 

docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst line 12

Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +10 -0
+s390 Secure IPL
+===============
+
+Secure IPL, also known as secure boot, enables s390-ccw virtual machines to
+verify the integrity of guest kernels.
+
+For technical details of this feature, see ``docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst``.
+
+This document explains how to use secure IPL with s390x in QEMU. It covers
+new command line options for providing certificates and enabling secure IPL,

s/new/the/

... the command line options are new right now, but in a couple of months, this won't be true anymore.

Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +6 -0
+the different IPL modes (Normal, Audit, and Secure), and system requirements.
+
+A quickstart guide is provided to demonstrate how to generate certificates,
+sign images, and start a guest in Secure Mode.
+
+
  Secure IPL Command Line Options
  ===============================
 

docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst Configuration: · line 102

Quoted 9 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +6 -0
@@ -78,3 +94,83 @@ Configuration:
  .. code-block:: shell
 
      qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,secure-boot=on,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ...
+
+
+Constraints
+===========
+
+The following constraints apply when attempting to secure IPL an s390 guest:

"when attempting to boot an s390x guest in secure mode".

Otherwise it sounds like "to secure" is the verb.

Quoted 42 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +42 -0
+- z16 or "qemu" CPU model
+- certificates must be in X.509 PEM format
+- only support for SCSI scheme of virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices
+- a boot device must be specified
+- any unsupported devices (e.g., ECKD and VFIO) or non-eligible devices (e.g.,
+  network) will cause the entire boot process terminating early with an error
+  logged to the console.
+
+
+Secure IPL Quickstart
+=====================
+
+Build QEMU with gnutls enabled
+-------------------------------
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    ./configure … --enable-gnutls
+
+Generate certificate (e.g. via certtool)
+----------------------------------------
+
+A private key is required before generating a certificate. This key must be kept
+secure and confidential.
+
+Use an RSA private key for signing.
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    certtool --generate-privkey > key.pem
+
+A self-signed certificate requires the organization name. Use the ``cert.info``
+template to pre-fill values and avoid interactive prompts from certtool.
+
+.. code-block:: shell
+
+    cat > cert.info <<EOF
+    cn = "My Name"
+    expiration_days = 36500
+    cert_signing_key
+    EOF
+

docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst Configuration: · line 155

Quoted 10 lines
docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst +10 -0
+    certtool --generate-self-signed \
+             --load-privkey key.pem \
+             --template cert.info \
+             --hash=SHA256 \
+             --outfile cert.pem
+
+Sign Images (e.g. via sign-file)
+--------------------------------
+
+- signing must be performed on a KVM guest filesystem

I'd remove the "KVM" in above sentence. It is also supposed to work with TCG, isn't it?

Thomas