s390/pai: Prevent ioctl(PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH)
PATCH 1/1 s390/pai: Prevent ioctl(PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH)
Prevent this ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, XXX) to take effect. PAI PMU events CRYPTO_ALL and NNPA_ALL are designed to read out the changed counter values at schedule out time, when these events have been installed system wide. Then they use CPU-context.
If an application issues ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, XXX) it expects to read out samples after XXX hits. The PAI PMUs do that read operation and then reset the values because it expects a context switch out. This contradicts the readout at next schedule out time. The reported result is too low.
Therefore prevent this call ioctl(PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH) right now.
--- arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c +2 -0
@@ -666,6 +666,8 @@ static void pai_have_sample(struct perf_event *event, struct pai_map *cpump)if (!event)/* No event active */ return ; + event->pending_kill =0 ;/* prevent ioctl(IOC_REFRESH) */ +atomic_set (&event->event_limit,0 ); pp = &pai_pmu[PAI_PMU_IDX (event)]; rawsize = pai_copy(cpump->save, cpump->area, pp, (unsigned long *)PAI_SAVE_AREA(event),
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0
[email protected]
AI reviewThank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider: - [High] Unprotected modification of core perf_event state (pending_kill, event_limit) causes data races…
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Unprotected modification of core perf_event state (pending_kill, event_limit) causes data races, dropped signals, and silently breaks the PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH API. --
commit ae843d6ca679921720078776be6911f36a1931c1
Author: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>
s390/pai: Prevent ioctl(PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH)
This commit prevents ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, XXX) from taking effect on PAI PMU events by clearing event->pending_kill and event->event_limit. The intention is to prevent counter resets that conflict with the schedule-out readouts these PMUs are designed for.
arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c static void pai_have_sample(struct perf_event *event, struct pai_map *cpump) · line 662
Quoted 10 lines
arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c +2
-0@@ -658,6 +658,8 @@ static void pai_have_sample(struct perf_event *event, struct pai_map *cpump)if (!event)/* No event active */ return ; + event->pending_kill =0 ;/* prevent ioctl(IOC_REFRESH) */ +atomic_set (&event->event_limit,0 );
[Severity: High]
Does this unprotected modification of core perf_event state (pending_kill, event_limit) cause data races, dropped signals, and silently break the PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH API?
Bypassing core perf locking rules to directly mutate event_limit and pending_kill causes data races, silently drops pending SIGIO signals, and breaks the API contract. The ioctl will return success, but userspace will never receive the requested signal, leading to application hangs.
If a userspace application calls ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, N) on a PAI event, and concurrently, a context switch calls pai_have_sample(), writing to event_limit will race with atomic_add() in the core subsystem, and clearing pending_kill will race with perf_event_wakeup().
PMU drivers should not directly mutate these core fields to implicitly break an ioctl. This approach creates cross-CPU data races because it lacks the synchronization (ctx->mutex for limits, irq_work execution order for signals) used by the core subsystem. Any user with access to the PAI PMU can trigger this state corruption.
Quoted 3 lines
arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c +0
-0pp = &pai_pmu[PAI_PMU_IDX (event)]; rawsize = pai_copy(cpump->save, cpump->area, pp, (unsigned long *)PAI_SAVE_AREA(event),
Signature · 1 line
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/[email protected]?part=1
Quoted 30 lines · On 8/27/26 08:57, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Unprotected modification of coreperf_eventstate (pending_kill,event_limit) causes data races, dropped signals, and silently breaks thePERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESHAPI. --commit
ae843d6ca679921720078776be6911f36a1931c1
Author: Thomas Richter <[email protected]>s390/pai: Prevent
ioctl(PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH)This commit prevents
ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, XXX)from taking effect on PAI PMU events by clearingevent->pending_killandevent->event_limit. The intention is to prevent counter resets that conflict with the schedule-out readouts these PMUs are designed for.arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c static void pai_have_sample(struct perf_event *event, struct pai_map *cpump) · line 662
Quoted 10 lines
arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c +2
-0@@ -658,6 +658,8 @@ static void pai_have_sample(struct perf_event *event, struct pai_map *cpump)if (!event)/* No event active */ return ; + event->pending_kill =0 ;/* prevent ioctl(IOC_REFRESH) */ +atomic_set (&event->event_limit,0 );[Severity: High]
Does this unprotected modification of coreperf_eventstate (pending_kill,event_limit) cause data races, dropped signals, and silently break thePERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESHAPI?
Quoted 4 lines
Bypassing core perf locking rules to directly mutate
event_limitandpending_killcauses data races, silently drops pending SIGIO signals, and breaks the API contract. The ioctl will return success, but userspace will never receive the requested signal, leading to application hangs.
A: The PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH API is disabled on purpose. The PAI PMU
relies on data collection on schedule out of a task. This is done by design. Invoking ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH API, X) breaks this behavior and should be blocked.
The modifications of members perf_event::event_limit and perf_event::pending_kill are protected. The invocation is triggered by the schedule out path and protected via perf_pmu_sched_task()
+--> __perf_pmu_sched_task()
+--> perf_ctx_lock()This locks the event and protects the states of the event.
Quoted 5 lines
If a userspace application calls
ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, N)on a PAI event, and concurrently, a context switch callspai_have_sample(), writing toevent_limitwill race withatomic_add()in the core subsystem, and clearingpending_killwill race withperf_event_wakeup().
This requires a common code change to block an ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, N) similar to the PMU check_period call back function.
Quoted 11 lines
PMU drivers should not directly mutate these core fields to implicitly break an ioctl. This approach creates cross-CPU data races because it lacks the synchronization (
ctx->mutexfor limits,irq_workexecution order for signals) used by the core subsystem. Any user with access to the PAI PMU can trigger this state corruption.Quoted 3 lines
arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c +0
-0pp = &pai_pmu[PAI_PMU_IDX (event)]; rawsize = pai_copy(cpump->save, cpump->area, pp, (unsigned long *)PAI_SAVE_AREA(event),
Signature · 9 lines
Thomas Richter, Dept 3303, IBM s390 Linux Development, Boeblingen, Germany -- IBM Deutschland Research & Development GmbH Vorsitzender des Aufsichtsrats: Wolfgang Wendt Geschäftsführung: David Faller Sitz der Gesellschaft: Böblingen / Registergericht: Amtsgericht Stuttgart, HRB 243294
Heiko Carstens
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Thomas Richter
Quoted 2 lines · On 8/27/26 08:57, [email protected] wrote:
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [High] Unprotected modification of coreperf_eventstate (pending_kill,event_limit) causes data races, dropped signals, and silently breaks thePERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESHAPI.
...
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arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c static void pai_have_sample(struct perf_event *event, struct pai_map *cpump) · line 662
Quoted 10 lines
arch/s390/kernel/perf_pai.c +2
-0@@ -658,6 +658,8 @@ static void pai_have_sample(struct perf_event *event, struct pai_map *cpump)if (!event)/* No event active */ return ; + event->pending_kill =0 ;/* prevent ioctl(IOC_REFRESH) */ +atomic_set (&event->event_limit,0 );[Severity: High]
Does this unprotected modification of coreperf_eventstate (pending_kill,event_limit) cause data races, dropped signals, and silently break thePERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESHAPI?Quoted 4 lines
Bypassing core perf locking rules to directly mutate
event_limitandpending_killcauses data races, silently drops pending SIGIO signals, and breaks the API contract. The ioctl will return success, but userspace will never receive the requested signal, leading to application hangs.A: The
PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESHAPI is disabled on purpose. The PAI PMU
relies on data collection on schedule out of a task. This is done by design. Invokingioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH API, X)breaks this behavior and should be blocked.The modifications of members
perf_event::event_limitandperf_event::pending_killare protected. The invocation is triggered by the schedule out path and protected viaperf_pmu_sched_task()+--> __perf_pmu_sched_task() +--> perf_ctx_lock()This locks the event and protects the states of the event.
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If a userspace application calls
ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, N)on a PAI event, and concurrently, a context switch callspai_have_sample(), writing toevent_limitwill race withatomic_add()in the core subsystem, and clearingpending_killwill race withperf_event_wakeup().This requires a common code change to block an
ioctl(fd, PERF_EVENT_IOC_REFRESH, N)similar to the PMUcheck_periodcall back function.
The above looks like a layering violation to me. Please resend with common code maintainers on cc, so they can yell if this is not acceptable.