Refactor key_state_export_keying_material functions
PATCH v2 1/3 Refactor key_state_export_keying_material functions
This refactors the common code between mbed SSL and OpenSSL into export_user_keying_material and also prepares the backend functions to export more than one key.
Also fix checking the return value of SSL_export_keying_material only 1 is a sucess, -1 is also an error.
Patch V2: Cache secrets for mbed TLS instead generating all ekms
in the call back function
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++- src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 16 +++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h | 12 +++++-- src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 43 +++++++++-------------- 5 files changed, 113 insertions(+), 67 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +35 -1
@@ -2412,6 +2412,40 @@ error:return false; } +static void +export_user_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ssl, +struct tls_session *session) +{ +if (session->opt->ekm_size >0 ) + { +unsigned int size = session->opt->ekm_size; +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +unsigned char *ekm; +if ((ekm =key_state_export_keying_material (session, + session->opt->ekm_label, + session->opt->ekm_label_size, + session->opt->ekm_size, + &gc))) + { +unsigned int len = (size *2 ) +2 ; + +const char *key =format_hex_ex (ekm, size, len,0 ,NULL , &gc); +setenv_str (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" , key); + +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED ,"%s: exported keying material: %s" , + __func__, key); +secure_memzero (ekm, size); + } +else + { +msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: Export keying material failed!" ); +setenv_del (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" ); + } +gc_free (&gc); + } +} +/** * Handle reading key data, peer-info, username/password, OCC * from the TLS control channel (cleartext).
@@ -2541,7 +2575,7 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessioif ((ks->authenticated >KS_AUTH_FALSE ) &&plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL )) { -key_state_export_keying_material (&ks->ks_ssl, session); +export_user_keying_material (&ks->ks_ssl, session);if (plugin_call (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL ,NULL ,NULL , session->opt->es) !=OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS ) {
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +13 -3
@@ -394,13 +394,23 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,* derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be * used for a variety of purposes. * +* * @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state info * @param session The session associated with the given key_state +* @param label The label to use when exporting the key +* @param label_size The size of the label to use when exporting the key +* +* @param gc gc_arena that might be used to allocate the string +* returned +* @returns The exported key material, the caller may zero the +* string but should not free it */ -void -key_state_export_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, -struct tls_session *session) __attribute__((nonnull)); +unsigned char * +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char * label,size_t label_size, +size_t ekm_size, +struct gc_arena *gc) __attribute__((nonnull));/**************************************************************************/ /** @addtogroup control_tls
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +38 -35
96 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h +10 -2
@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@ struct external_context {void *sign_ctx; }; +/** struct to cache TLS secrets for keying material exporter (RFC 5705). +* The constants (64 and 48) are inherent to TLS version and +* the whole keying material export will likely change when they change */ +struct tls_key_cache { +unsigned char client_server_random[64 ]; +mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type; +unsigned char master_secret[48 ]; +}; +/** * Structure that wraps the TLS context. Contents differ depending on the * SSL library used.
@@ -114,8 +123,7 @@ struct key_state_ssl {mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx;/**< mbedTLS connection context */ bio_ctx *bio_ctx; -/** Keying material exporter cache (RFC 5705). */ -uint8_t *exported_key_material; +struct tls_key_cache tls_key_cache; };
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +17 -26
52 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
PATCH v2 2/3 Move openvpn specific key expansion into its own function
This moves the OpenVPN specific PRF into its own function also simplifies the code a bit by passing tls_session directly instead of 5 of its fields.
Patch V2: Rebase
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +69 -40
@@ -1765,27 +1765,38 @@ openvpn_PRF(const uint8_t *secret,VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *)output, output_len); } -/* -* Using source entropy from local and remote hosts, mix into -* master key. -*/ -static bool -generate_key_expansion (struct key_ctx_bi *key, -const struct key_type *key_type, -const struct key_source2 *key_src, -const struct session_id *client_sid, -const struct session_id *server_sid, -bool server) +static void +init_key_contexts (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +const struct key_type *key_type, +bool server, +struct key2 *key2) +{ +/* Initialize OpenSSL key contexts */ +int key_direction = server ?KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE :KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL ; +init_key_ctx_bi (key, key2, key_direction, key_type,"Data Channel" ); + +/* Initialize implicit IVs */ +key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->encrypt, (*key2).keys[(int )server].hmac, +MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); +key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->decrypt, (*key2).keys[1 -(int )server].hmac, +MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); + +} + + +static struct key2 +generate_key_expansion_oepnvpn_prf (const struct tls_session *session) { +uint8_t master[48 ] = {0 }; -struct key2 key2 = {0 }; -bool ret = false; -if (key->initialized) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: key already initialized" ); - goto exit; - } +const struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; +const struct key_source2 *key_src = ks->key_src; + +const struct session_id *client_sid = session->opt->server ? + &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id; +const struct session_id *server_sid = !session->opt->server ? + &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id;/* debugging print of source key material */ key_source2_print (key_src);
@@ -1803,6 +1814,7 @@ generate_key_expansion(struct key_ctx_bi *key, master, sizeof(master)); +struct key2 key2;/* compute key expansion */ openvpn_PRF(master, sizeof(master),
@@ -1815,41 +1827,62 @@ generate_key_expansion(struct key_ctx_bi *key, server_sid, (uint8_t *)key2.keys, sizeof(key2.keys)); +secure_memzero (&master,sizeof (master)); +/* We use the DES fixup here so we can drop it once we +* drop DES support and non RFC5705 key derivation */ +for (int i =0 ; i <2 ; ++i) + { +fixup_key (&key2.keys[i], &session->opt->key_type); + } key2.n =2 ; -key2_print (&key2, key_type,"Master Encrypt" ,"Master Decrypt" ); +return key2; +} + +/* +* Using source entropy from local and remote hosts, mix into +* master key. +*/ +static bool +generate_key_expansion (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +const struct tls_session *session) +{ +bool ret = false; + +if (key->initialized) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: key already initialized" ); + goto exit; + } + + +bool server = session->opt->server; + +struct key2 key2 =generate_key_expansion_oepnvpn_prf (session); + +key2_print (&key2, &session->opt->key_type, +"Master Encrypt" ,"Master Decrypt" );/* check for weak keys */ for (int i =0 ; i <2 ; ++i) { -fixup_key (&key2.keys[i], key_type); -if (!check_key (&key2.keys[i], key_type)) +if (!check_key (&key2.keys[i], &session->opt->key_type)) {msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Bad dynamic key generated" ); goto exit; } } - -/* Initialize OpenSSL key contexts */ -int key_direction = server ?KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE :KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL ; -init_key_ctx_bi (key, &key2, key_direction, key_type,"Data Channel" ); - -/* Initialize implicit IVs */ -key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->encrypt, key2.keys[(int )server].hmac, -MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); -key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->decrypt, key2.keys[1 -(int )server].hmac, -MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); - +init_key_contexts (key, &session->opt->key_type, server, &key2); ret = true; exit: -secure_memzero (&master,sizeof (master));secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2));return ret; } +static void key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (struct key_ctx *ctx,uint8_t *key,size_t key_len) {
@@ -1879,10 +1912,7 @@ tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys(struct tls_session *session) {bool ret = false;struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ];/* primary key */ -const struct session_id *client_sid = session->opt->server ? - &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id; -const struct session_id *server_sid = !session->opt->server ? - &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id; +if (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_FALSE ) {
@@ -1891,9 +1921,8 @@ tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys(struct tls_session *session) } ks->crypto_options.flags = session->opt->crypto_flags; -if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi, - &session->opt->key_type, ks->key_src, client_sid, server_sid, - session->opt->server)) + +if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi, session)) {msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: generate_key_expansion failed" ); goto cleanup;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 2/3] Move openvpn specific key expansion into its own function
Hi,
Quoted 3 lines · Arne Schwabe
This moves the OpenVPN specific PRF into its own function also simplifies the code a bit by passing
tls_sessiondirectly instead of 5 of its fields.
Moves in the right direction. Some comments though:
Quoted 23 lines
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>Patch V2: Rebase
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------- 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)src/openvpn/ssl.c +0
-8@@ -1765,27 +1765,38 @@ openvpn_PRF(const uint8_t *secret,VALGRIND_MAKE_READABLE ((void *)output, output_len); } -/* -* Using source entropy from local and remote hosts, mix into -* master key. -*/ -static bool -generate_key_expansion(struct key_ctx_bi *key, - const struct key_type *key_type, - const struct key_source2 *key_src,
src/openvpn/ssl.c openvpn_PRF(const uint8_t *secret, · line 1774
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +7
-3-const struct session_id *client_sid, - const struct session_id *server_sid, - bool server) +static void +init_key_contexts (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +const struct key_type *key_type, +bool server, +struct key2 *key2) +{ +/* Initialize OpenSSL key contexts */
Since you're touching this, can you remove "OpenSSL" from this comment. It's a lie! Sometimes.
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +4
-0+int key_direction = server ?KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE :KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL ; +init_key_ctx_bi (key, key2, key_direction, key_type,"Data Channel" ); + +/* Initialize implicit IVs */
src/openvpn/ssl.c openvpn_PRF(const uint8_t *secret, · line 1788
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +10
-0+key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->encrypt, (*key2).keys[(int )server].hmac, +MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); +key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->decrypt, (*key2).keys[1 -(int )server].hmac, +MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); + +} + + +static struct key2 +generate_key_expansion_oepnvpn_prf (const struct tls_session *session)
What is this oepnvpn you're talking about?
src/openvpn/ssl.c openvpn_PRF(const uint8_t *secret, · line 1790
Quoted 2 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +1
-0{ +
Unneeded newline.
Quoted 29 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +8
-7uint8_t master[48 ] = {0 }; -struct key2 key2 = {0 }; -bool ret = false; -if (key->initialized) - { -msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: key already initialized" ); - goto exit; - } +const struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ]; +const struct key_source2 *key_src = ks->key_src; + +const struct session_id *client_sid = session->opt->server ? + &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id; +const struct session_id *server_sid = !session->opt->server ? + &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id;/* debugging print of source key material */ key_source2_print (key_src);@@ -1803,6 +1814,7 @@ generate_key_expansion(struct key_ctx_bi *key, master, sizeof(master)); +struct key2 key2;/* compute key expansion */ openvpn_PRF(master, sizeof(master),@@ -1815,41 +1827,62 @@ generate_key_expansion(struct key_ctx_bi *key, server_sid,
src/openvpn/ssl.c generate_key_expansion(struct key_ctx_bi *key, · line 1837
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +7
-0(uint8_t *)key2.keys, sizeof(key2.keys)); +secure_memzero (&master,sizeof (master)); +/* We use the DES fixup here so we can drop it once we +* drop DES support and non RFC5705 key derivation */ +for (int i =0 ; i <2 ; ++i) + { +fixup_key (&key2.keys[i], &session->opt->key_type); + }
Very nice that we can finally get rid of this. But I'm wondering now:
should we forbid DES (or maybe even any small block cipher) when using EKM?
Even if we remove small block cipher support completely from 2.6, I'd still really like to backport EKM to 2.5 ("long-term compat"). At that will still allow persistent users to force it to use DES.
Quoted 16 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +13
-1key2.n =2 ; -key2_print (&key2, key_type,"Master Encrypt" ,"Master Decrypt" ); +return key2; +} + +/* +* Using source entropy from local and remote hosts, mix into +* master key. +*/ +static bool +generate_key_expansion (struct key_ctx_bi *key, +const struct tls_session *session) +{ +bool ret = false; +
src/openvpn/ssl.c generate_key_expansion(struct key_ctx_bi *key, · line 1862
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +10
-0+if (key->initialized) + { +msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: key already initialized" ); + goto exit; + } + + +bool server = session->opt->server; + +struct key2 key2 =generate_key_expansion_oepnvpn_prf (session);
Possible use-before-initialization/declaration here (undefined behavior).
key2 is used in the exit: label, so it should not be declared after the "goto exit" above. This is type of mistake is the reason I don't like late-declaration of any variable in functions that use a goto-error flow. Next to not-too-smart static analyzers complaining about this construct even if not used behind the label.
Quoted 55 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +7
-18+ +key2_print (&key2, &session->opt->key_type, +"Master Encrypt" ,"Master Decrypt" );/* check for weak keys */ for (int i =0 ; i <2 ; ++i) { -fixup_key (&key2.keys[i], key_type); -if (!check_key (&key2.keys[i], key_type)) +if (!check_key (&key2.keys[i], &session->opt->key_type)) {msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: Bad dynamic key generated" ); goto exit; } } - -/* Initialize OpenSSL key contexts */ -int key_direction = server ?KEY_DIRECTION_INVERSE :KEY_DIRECTION_NORMAL ; -init_key_ctx_bi (key, &key2, key_direction, key_type,"Data Channel" ); - -/* Initialize implicit IVs */ -key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->encrypt, key2.keys[(int )server].hmac, -MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); -key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (&key->decrypt, key2.keys[1 -(int )server].hmac, -MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH ); - +init_key_contexts (key, &session->opt->key_type, server, &key2); ret = true; exit: -secure_memzero (&master,sizeof (master));secure_memzero (&key2,sizeof (key2));return ret; } +static void key_ctx_update_implicit_iv (struct key_ctx *ctx,uint8_t *key,size_t key_len) {@@ -1879,10 +1912,7 @@ tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys(struct tls_session *session) {bool ret = false;struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ];/* primary key */ -const struct session_id *client_sid = session->opt->server ? - &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id; -const struct session_id *server_sid = !session->opt->server ? - &ks->session_id_remote : &session->session_id; +if (ks->authenticated ==KS_AUTH_FALSE ) {@@ -1891,9 +1921,8 @@ tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys(struct tls_session *session) }
src/openvpn/ssl.c tls_session_generate_data_channel_keys(struct tls_session *session) · line 1928
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl.c +2
-3ks->crypto_options.flags = session->opt->crypto_flags; -if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi, - &session->opt->key_type, ks->key_src, client_sid, server_sid, - session->opt->server)) + +if (!generate_key_expansion (&ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi, session)) {msg (D_TLS_ERRORS ,"TLS Error: generate_key_expansion failed" ); goto cleanup;
-Steffan
PATCH v2 3/3 Implement generating data channel keys via EKM/RFC 5705
In reply to Arne SchwabeOpenVPN currently uses its own (based on TLS 1.0) key derivation mechansim to generate the 256 bytes key data in key2 struct that are then used used to generate encryption/hmac/iv vectors. While this mechanism is still secure, it is not state of the art.
Instead of modernisating our own approach, this commit implements key derivation using the Keying Material Exporters API introduced by RFC 5705.
We also use an opportunistic approach of negotiating the use of EKM (exported key material) through an IV_PROTO flag and prefer EKM to our own PRF if both client and server support it. The use of EKM is pushed to the client as part of NCP as key-derivation tls-ekm.
We still exchange the random data (112 bytes from client to server and 64 byte from server to client) that for the OpenVPN PRF but do not use it. Removing that exchange would break the handshake and make a key-method 3 or similar necessary.
Side note: this commit breaks the (not yet merged) WolfSSL support as it claims to support EKM in the OpenSSL compat API but always returns an error if you try to use it.
Patch V2: rebase/change to V2 of EKM refactoring
--- Changes.rst | 11 +++++++ doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 15 ++++++++-- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 4 +++ src/openvpn/init.c | 1 + src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 +++ src/openvpn/options.c | 14 +++++++++ src/openvpn/options.h | 3 ++ src/openvpn/push.c | 5 +++- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 2 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 2 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 7 ++--- 12 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +11 -0
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ +Overview of changes in 2.6 +========================== + + +New features +------------ +Keying Material Exporters (RFC 5705) based key generation + As part of the cipher negotiation OpenVPN will automatically prefer + the RFC5705 based key material generation to the current custom + OpenVPN PRF. This feature requires OpenSSL or mbed TLS 2.18+. + Overview of changes in 2.5 ==========================
doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +13 -2
@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@* * @subsection key_generation_method_2 Key method 2 * +* There are two methods for generating key data when using key method 2 +* the first is OpenVPN's traditional approach that exchanges random +* data and uses a PRF and the other is using the RFC5705 keying material +* exporter to generate the key material. For both methods the random +* data is exchange but only used in the traditional method. +* * -# The client generates random material in the following amounts: * - Pre-master secret: 48 bytes * - Client's PRF seed for master secret: 32 bytes
@@ -73,8 +79,13 @@* server's random material. * * %Key method 2 %key expansion is performed by the \c -* generate_key_expansion() function. Please refer to its source code for -* details of the %key expansion process. +* generate_key_expansion_oepnvpn_prf() function. Please refer to its source +* code for details of the %key expansion process. +* +* When the client sends the IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT and the server replies +* with `key-derivation tls-ekm` RFC5705 key material exporter with the label +* EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys is used for the key data. +* * * @subsection key_generation_random Source of random material *
src/openvpn/crypto.h +4 -0
@@ -254,6 +254,10 @@ struct crypto_options#define CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS (1<<2)/**< Bit-flag indicating not to display * replay warnings. */ +#define CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT (1<<3) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that key derivation +* is done using TLS keying material export [RFC5705] +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */ };
src/openvpn/init.c +1 -0
@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ restore_ncp_options(struct context *c) c->options.ciphername = c->c1.ciphername; c->options.authname = c->c1.authname; c->options.keysize = c->c1.keysize; + c->options.data_channel_use_ekm = false; }void
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1817,6 +1817,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) c->c2.push_request_received = true; } +#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL + o->data_channel_use_ekm = (proto &IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ); +#endif +/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ if (!o->ncp_enabled) {
src/openvpn/options.c +14 -0
@@ -7947,6 +7947,20 @@ add_option(struct options *options, } options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ]; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"key-derivation" ) && p[1 ]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_NCP) +#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL +if (streq (p[1 ],"tls-ekm" )) + { + options->data_channel_use_ekm = true; + } + else +#endif + { +msg (msglevel,"Unknown key-derivation method %s" , p[1 ]); + } + }else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-disable" ) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE );
src/openvpn/options.h +3 -0
@@ -648,6 +648,9 @@ struct options/* Useful when packets sent by openvpn itself are not subject * to the routing tables that would move packets into the tunnel. */ bool allow_recursive_routing; + +/* Use RFC 5705 key export */ +bool data_channel_use_ekm; };#define streq (x, y) (!strcmp((x), (y)))
src/openvpn/push.c +4 -1
@@ -479,7 +479,10 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc, {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"cipher %s" , o->ciphername); } - +if (o->data_channel_use_ekm) + { +push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); + }return true; }
src/openvpn/ssl.c +47 -3
83 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/ssl.h +2 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@* to wait for a push-request to send a push-reply */ #define IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH (1<<2) +/** Supports key derivation via TLS key material exporter [RFC5705] */ +#define IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT (1<<3)/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +2 -0
@@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ void key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl);void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl (struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,const char *crl_file,bool crl_inline); +#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys" +#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_EKM_SIZE (2 * (MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH + MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH))/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +2 -5
@@ -1158,11 +1158,8 @@ key_state_ssl_init(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl,#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL /* Initialize keying material exporter */ -if (session->opt->ekm_size) - { -mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb (ks_ssl->ssl_config, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_cb, session); - } +mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb (ks_ssl->ssl_config, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_cb, session);#endif /* Initialise SSL context */
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2 3/3] Implement generating data channel keys via EKM/RFC 5705
typos/grammar
Quoted 2 lines · Arne Schwabe
OpenVPN currently uses its own (based on TLS 1.0) key derivation mechansim to generate the 256 bytes key data in key2 struct that
mechansim -> mechanism
Quoted 4 lines
are then used used to generate encryption/hmac/iv vectors. While this mechanism is still secure, it is not state of the art.
Instead of modernisating our own approach, this commit implements
modernisating - > modernising
Quoted 11 lines
key derivation using the Keying Material Exporters API introduced by RFC 5705.
We also use an opportunistic approach of negotiating the use of EKM (exported key material) through an
IV_PROTOflag and prefer EKM to our own PRF if both client and server support it. The use of EKM is pushed to the client as part of NCP as key-derivation tls-ekm.We still exchange the random data (112 bytes from client to server and 64 byte from server to client) that for the OpenVPN PRF but
client) that for - unnecessary 'that'
Quoted 63 lines
do not use it. Removing that exchange would break the handshake and make a key-method 3 or similar necessary.
Side note: this commit breaks the (not yet merged) WolfSSL support as it claims to support EKM in the OpenSSL compat API but always returns an error if you try to use it.
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>Patch V2: rebase/change to V2 of EKM refactoring
--- Changes.rst | 11 +++++++ doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 15 ++++++++-- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 4 +++ src/openvpn/init.c | 1 + src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 +++ src/openvpn/options.c | 14 +++++++++ src/openvpn/options.h | 3 ++ src/openvpn/push.c | 5 +++- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 2 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 2 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 7 ++--- 12 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)Changes.rst +11
-0@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ +Overview of changes in 2.6 +========================== + + +New features +------------ +Keying Material Exporters (RFC 5705) based key generation + As part of the cipher negotiation OpenVPN will automatically prefer + the RFC5705 based key material generation to the current custom + OpenVPN PRF. This feature requires OpenSSL or mbed TLS 2.18+. + Overview of changes in 2.5 ==========================doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +6
-0@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@* * @subsection key_generation_method_2 Key method 2 * +* There are two methods for generating key data when using key method 2 +* the first is OpenVPN's traditional approach that exchanges random +* data and uses a PRF and the other is using the RFC5705 keying material +* exporter to generate the key material. For both methods the random +* data is exchange but only used in the traditional method. +* * -# The client generates random material in the following amounts: * - Pre-master secret: 48 bytes * - Client's PRF seed for master secret: 32 bytes @@ -73,8 +79,13 @@* server's random material.
doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h line 87
Quoted 10 lines
doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +6
-2* * %Key method 2 %key expansion is performed by the \c -* generate_key_expansion() function. Please refer to its source code for -* details of the %key expansion process. +* generate_key_expansion_oepnvpn_prf() function. Please refer to its source +* code for details of the %key expansion process. +* +* When the client sends the IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT and the server replies +* with `key-derivation tls-ekm` RFC5705 key material exporter with the label +* EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys is used for the key data.
Grammar: split the sentence by a 'then'.
Quoted 3 lines
doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +3
-0+* When the client sends the IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT and the server replies +* with `key-derivation tls-ekm` then RFC5705 key material exporter with the label +* EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys is used for the key data.
typo
Quoted 6 lines · Arne Schwabe
This refactors the common code between mbed SSL and OpenSSL into
export_user_keying_materialand also prepares the backend functions to export more than one key.Also fix checking the return value of
SSL_export_keying_materialonly 1 is a sucess, -1 is also an error.
sucess -> success
Hi,
Quoted 20 lines · Arne Schwabe
This refactors the common code between mbed SSL and OpenSSL into
export_user_keying_materialand also prepares the backend functions to export more than one key.Also fix checking the return value of
SSL_export_keying_materialonly 1 is a sucess, -1 is also an error.Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>Patch V2: Cache secrets for mbed TLS instead generating all ekms
in the call back functionSigned-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>---
[...]
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, · line 397
Quoted 4 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +1
-0@@ -394,13 +394,23 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,* derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be * used for a variety of purposes. * +*
This extra newline seems unneeded.
Quoted 9 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +7
-0* @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state info * @param session The session associated with the given key_state +* @param label The label to use when exporting the key +* @param label_size The size of the label to use when exporting the key +* +* @param gc gc_arena that might be used to allocate the string +* returned +* @returns The exported key material, the caller may zero the +* string but should not free it
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx, · line 413
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +5
-3*/ -void -key_state_export_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, -struct tls_session *session) __attribute__((nonnull)); +unsigned char * +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char * label,size_t label_size, +size_t ekm_size, +struct gc_arena *gc) __attribute__((nonnull));
(Quoting a former colleague:) comment is a lie! It does not match the actual function prototype.
All the code itself looks good to me. I *think* it could be made slightly better even, but these changes make sense for the intended goal, and look correct.
Tested both openssl and mbedtls builds (with -fsanitize=address), and verified that this indeed produces the same exported values for both builds and a build without this patch.
-Steffan
PATCH v3 1/3 Refactor key_state_export_keying_material functions
This refactors the common code between mbed SSL and OpenSSL into export_user_keying_material and also prepares the backend functions to export more than one key.
Also fix checking the return value of SSL_export_keying_material only 1 is a sucess, -1 is also an error.
Patch V2: Cache secrets for mbed TLS instead generating all ekms
in the call back function
Patch V3: comment is no longer a lie. (fixed doxygen)
--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++- src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 20 +++++++---- src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h | 12 +++++-- src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 43 +++++++++-------------- 5 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)
src/openvpn/ssl.c +35 -1
@@ -2412,6 +2412,40 @@ error:return false; } +static void +export_user_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ssl, +struct tls_session *session) +{ +if (session->opt->ekm_size >0 ) + { +unsigned int size = session->opt->ekm_size; +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +unsigned char *ekm; +if ((ekm =key_state_export_keying_material (session, + session->opt->ekm_label, + session->opt->ekm_label_size, + session->opt->ekm_size, + &gc))) + { +unsigned int len = (size *2 ) +2 ; + +const char *key =format_hex_ex (ekm, size, len,0 ,NULL , &gc); +setenv_str (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" , key); + +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED ,"%s: exported keying material: %s" , + __func__, key); +secure_memzero (ekm, size); + } +else + { +msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: Export keying material failed!" ); +setenv_del (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" ); + } +gc_free (&gc); + } +} +/** * Handle reading key data, peer-info, username/password, OCC * from the TLS control channel (cleartext).
@@ -2541,7 +2575,7 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessioif ((ks->authenticated >KS_AUTH_FALSE ) &&plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL )) { -key_state_export_keying_material (&ks->ks_ssl, session); +export_user_keying_material (&ks->ks_ssl, session);if (plugin_call (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL ,NULL ,NULL , session->opt->es) !=OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS ) {
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +14 -6
@@ -394,13 +394,21 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,* derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be * used for a variety of purposes. * -* @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state info * @param session The session associated with the given key_state -*/ - -void -key_state_export_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, -struct tls_session *session) __attribute__((nonnull)); +* @param label The label to use when exporting the key +* @param label_size The size of the label to use when exporting the key +* @param ekm_size THe size of the exported/returned key material +* @param gc gc_arena that might be used to allocate the string +* returned +* @returns The exported key material, the caller may zero the +* string but should not free it +*/ + +unsigned char * +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char * label,size_t label_size, +size_t ekm_size, +struct gc_arena *gc) __attribute__((nonnull));/**************************************************************************/ /** @addtogroup control_tls
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +38 -35
96 lines not on this page · raw message
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h +10 -2
@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@ struct external_context {void *sign_ctx; }; +/** struct to cache TLS secrets for keying material exporter (RFC 5705). +* The constants (64 and 48) are inherent to TLS version and +* the whole keying material export will likely change when they change */ +struct tls_key_cache { +unsigned char client_server_random[64 ]; +mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type; +unsigned char master_secret[48 ]; +}; +/** * Structure that wraps the TLS context. Contents differ depending on the * SSL library used.
@@ -114,8 +123,7 @@ struct key_state_ssl {mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx;/**< mbedTLS connection context */ bio_ctx *bio_ctx; -/** Keying material exporter cache (RFC 5705). */ -uint8_t *exported_key_material; +struct tls_key_cache tls_key_cache; };
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +17 -26
52 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Hi,
Quoted 289 lines · Arne Schwabe
This refactors the common code between mbed SSL and OpenSSL into
export_user_keying_materialand also prepares the backend functions to export more than one key.Also fix checking the return value of
SSL_export_keying_materialonly 1 is a sucess, -1 is also an error.Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>Patch V2: Cache secrets for mbed TLS instead generating all ekms
in the call back functionPatch V3: comment is no longer a lie. (fixed doxygen)
Signed-off-by Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>--- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++- src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 20 +++++++---- src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++------------------- src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h | 12 +++++-- src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 43 +++++++++-------------- 5 files changed, 114 insertions(+), 70 deletions(-)src/openvpn/ssl.c +35
-1@@ -2412,6 +2412,40 @@ error:return false; } +static void +export_user_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ssl, +struct tls_session *session) +{ +if (session->opt->ekm_size >0 ) + { +unsigned int size = session->opt->ekm_size; +struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); + +unsigned char *ekm; +if ((ekm =key_state_export_keying_material (session, + session->opt->ekm_label, + session->opt->ekm_label_size, + session->opt->ekm_size, + &gc))) + { +unsigned int len = (size *2 ) +2 ; + +const char *key =format_hex_ex (ekm, size, len,0 ,NULL , &gc); +setenv_str (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" , key); + +dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED ,"%s: exported keying material: %s" , + __func__, key); +secure_memzero (ekm, size); + } +else + { +msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: Export keying material failed!" ); +setenv_del (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" ); + } +gc_free (&gc); + } +} +/** * Handle reading key data, peer-info, username/password, OCC * from the TLS control channel (cleartext). @@ -2541,7 +2575,7 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessioif ((ks->authenticated >KS_AUTH_FALSE ) &&plugin_defined (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL )) { -key_state_export_keying_material (&ks->ks_ssl, session); +export_user_keying_material (&ks->ks_ssl, session);if (plugin_call (session->opt->plugins,OPENVPN_PLUGIN_TLS_FINAL ,NULL ,NULL , session->opt->es) !=OPENVPN_PLUGIN_FUNC_SUCCESS ) {src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +14
-6@@ -394,13 +394,21 @@ void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl(struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,* derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be * used for a variety of purposes. * -* @param ks_ssl The SSL channel's state info * @param session The session associated with the given key_state -*/ - -void -key_state_export_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl, -struct tls_session *session) __attribute__((nonnull)); +* @param label The label to use when exporting the key +* @param label_size The size of the label to use when exporting the key +* @param ekm_size THe size of the exported/returned key material +* @param gc gc_arena that might be used to allocate the string +* returned +* @returns The exported key material, the caller may zero the +* string but should not free it +*/ + +unsigned char * +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char * label,size_t label_size, +size_t ekm_size, +struct gc_arena *gc) __attribute__((nonnull));/**************************************************************************/ /** @addtogroup control_tls src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +38
-35@@ -206,51 +206,54 @@ mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_cb(void *p_expkey, const unsigned char *ms, {struct tls_session *session = p_expkey;struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].ks_ssl; -unsigned char client_server_random[64 ]; +struct tls_key_cache *cache = &ks_ssl->tls_key_cache; - ks_ssl->exported_key_material =gc_malloc (session->opt->ekm_size, - true,NULL ); +static_assert (sizeof (ks_ssl->ctx->session->master) + ==sizeof (cache->master_secret),"master size mismatch" ); -memcpy (client_server_random, client_random,32 ); -memcpy (client_server_random +32 , server_random,32 ); +memcpy (cache->client_server_random, client_random,32 ); +memcpy (cache->client_server_random +32 , server_random,32 ); +memcpy (cache->master_secret, ms,sizeof (cache->master_secret)); + cache->tls_prf_type = tls_prf_type; -const size_t ms_len =sizeof (ks_ssl->ctx->session->master); -int ret =mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf (tls_prf_type, ms, ms_len, - session->opt->ekm_label, client_server_random, -sizeof (client_server_random), ks_ssl->exported_key_material, - session->opt->ekm_size); - -if (!mbed_ok (ret)) - { -secure_memzero (ks_ssl->exported_key_material, session->opt->ekm_size); - } - -secure_memzero (client_server_random,sizeof (client_server_random)); - -return ret; +return true; } -#endif /* HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL */ -void -key_state_export_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ssl, -struct tls_session *session) +unsigned char * +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char * label,size_t label_size, +size_t ekm_size, +struct gc_arena *gc) { -if (ssl->exported_key_material) +ASSERT (strlen (label) == label_size); + +struct tls_key_cache *cache = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].ks_ssl.tls_key_cache; + +/* If the type is NONE, we either have no cached secrets or +* there is no PRF, in both cases we cannot generate key material */ +if (cache->tls_prf_type ==MBEDTLS_SSL_TLS_PRF_NONE ) { -unsigned int size = session->opt->ekm_size; -struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -unsigned int len = (size *2 ) +2 ; +return NULL ; + } -const char *key =format_hex_ex (ssl->exported_key_material, - size, len,0 ,NULL , &gc); -setenv_str (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" , key); +unsigned char *ekm = (unsigned char *)gc_malloc (ekm_size, true, gc); +int ret =mbedtls_ssl_tls_prf (cache->tls_prf_type, cache->master_secret, +sizeof (cache->master_secret), + label, cache->client_server_random, +sizeof (cache->client_server_random), + ekm, ekm_size); -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED ,"%s: exported keying material: %s" , - __func__, key); -gc_free (&gc); +if (mbed_ok (ret)) + { +return ekm; + } +else + { +secure_memzero (ekm, session->opt->ekm_size); +return NULL ; } } - +#endif /* HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL */ bool tls_ctx_set_options (struct tls_root_ctx *ctx,unsigned int ssl_flags)@@ -1178,7 +1181,7 @@ key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl) {if (ks_ssl) { -free (ks_ssl->exported_key_material); +CLEAR (ks_ssl->tls_key_cache);if (ks_ssl->ctx) {src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.h +10
-2@@ -82,6 +82,15 @@ struct external_context {void *sign_ctx; }; +/** struct to cache TLS secrets for keying material exporter (RFC 5705). +* The constants (64 and 48) are inherent to TLS version and +* the whole keying material export will likely change when they change */ +struct tls_key_cache { +unsigned char client_server_random[64 ]; +mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type; +unsigned char master_secret[48 ]; +}; +/** * Structure that wraps the TLS context. Contents differ depending on the * SSL library used. @@ -114,8 +123,7 @@ struct key_state_ssl {mbedtls_ssl_context *ctx;/**< mbedTLS connection context */ bio_ctx *bio_ctx; -/** Keying material exporter cache (RFC 5705). */ -uint8_t *exported_key_material; +struct tls_key_cache tls_key_cache; };src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +10
-26@@ -158,35 +158,26 @@ tls_ctx_initialised(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx)return NULL != ctx->ctx; } -void -key_state_export_keying_material (struct key_state_ssl *ssl, -struct tls_session *session) -{ -if (session->opt->ekm_size >0 ) - { -unsigned int size = session->opt->ekm_size; -struct gc_arena gc =gc_new (); -unsigned char *ekm = (unsigned char *)gc_malloc (size, true, &gc); +unsigned char * +key_state_export_keying_material (struct tls_session *session, +const char * label,size_t label_size, +size_t ekm_size, +struct gc_arena *gc) -if (SSL_export_keying_material (ssl->ssl, ekm, size, - session->opt->ekm_label, - session->opt->ekm_label_size, -NULL ,0 ,0 )) - { -unsigned int len = (size *2 ) +2 ; +{ +unsigned char *ekm = (unsigned char *)gc_malloc (ekm_size, true, gc); -const char *key =format_hex_ex (ekm, size, len,0 ,NULL , &gc); -setenv_str (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" , key); +SSL * ssl = session->key[KS_PRIMARY ].ks_ssl.ssl; -dmsg (D_TLS_DEBUG_MED ,"%s: exported keying material: %s" , - __func__, key); - } -else - { -msg (M_WARN ,"WARNING: Export keying material failed!" ); -setenv_del (session->opt->es,"exported_keying_material" ); - } -gc_free (&gc); +if (SSL_export_keying_material (ssl, ekm, ekm_size, label, + label_size,NULL ,0 ,0 ) ==1 )
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c tls_ctx_initialised(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx) · line 183
Quoted 10 lines
src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +7
-0+ { +return ekm; + } + else + { +secure_memzero (ekm, ekm_size); +return NULL ; } }
Thanks, looks good to me now. Changes wrt v2 in comments and whitespace only, so didn't re-test.
-Steffan
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
I have no idea what this all does (and not enough brain power to develop interest in finding out :-/ ) but if Steffan says it's good, so it is.
Also, t_client agrees :-)
commit 10abd656a3ae279cea7344055ce23637b7a62f6b (master)
Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Aug 14 16:51:53 2020 +0200
Refactor key_state_export_keying_material functions
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...>
Message-Id: <[email protected]...>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20739.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
Hi,
this commit seems to require a more recent mbedTLS version - it fails a number of my buildslaves with
gcc -DHAVE_CONFIG_H -I. -I../.. -I../../include -I../../include -I../../src/compat -DPLUGIN_LIBDIR=\"/usr/local/lib/openvpn/plugins\" -Wall -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-unused-function -Wno-stringop-truncation -g -O2 -std=c99 -MT auth_token.o -MD -MP -MF .deps/auth_token.Tpo -c -o auth_token.o auth_token.c
In file included from ssl_backend.h:41:0,
from ssl_common.h:38,
from ssl.h:43,
from openvpn.h:31,
from auth_token.c:12:
ssl_mbedtls.h:90:5: error: unknown type name 'mbedtls_tls_prf_types'
mbedtls_tls_prf_types tls_prf_type;
^- I think it *should* fail the configure phase if mbedTLS is too old, and clearly specify which version is required now (we have a check, but it's fairly unspecific, and only says "mbed TLS 2.y.z required").
I've opened a trac ticket to track this
https://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/ticket/1319
gert
Quoted 33 lines · Gert Doering
Your patch has been applied to the master branch.
I have no idea what this all does (and not enough brain power to develop interest in finding out :-/ ) but if Steffan says it's good, so it is.
Also,
t_clientagrees :-)commit
10abd656a3ae279cea7344055ce23637b7a62f6b(master)Author: Arne Schwabe Date: Fri Aug 14 16:51:53 2020 +0200Refactor key_state_export_keying_material functions Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...> Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <[email protected]...> Acked-by: Steffan Karger <[email protected]...> Message-Id: <[email protected]...> URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/[email protected]/msg20739.html Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <[email protected]...>--
kind regards,Gert Doering
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Signature · 6 lines
"If was one thing all people took for granted, was conviction that if you
feed honest figures into a computer, honest figures come out. Never doubted
it myself till I met a computer with a sense of humor."
Robert A. Heinlein, The Moon is a Harsh Mistress
Gert Doering - Munich, Germany [email protected]...PATCH v3 3/3 Implement generating data channel keys via EKM/RFC 5705
In reply to Arne SchwabeOpenVPN currently uses its own (based on TLS 1.0) key derivation mechanism to generate the 256 bytes key data in key2 struct that are then used used to generate encryption/hmac/iv vectors. While this mechanism is still secure, it is not state of the art.
Instead of modernising our own approach, this commit implements key derivation using the Keying Material Exporters API introduced by RFC 5705.
We also use an opportunistic approach of negotiating the use of EKM (exported key material) through an IV_PROTO flag and prefer EKM to our own PRF if both client and server support it. The use of EKM is pushed to the client as part of NCP as key-derivation tls-ekm.
We still exchange the random data (112 bytes from client to server and 64 byte from server to client) for the OpenVPN PRF but do not use it. Removing that exchange would break the handshake and make a key-method 3 or similar necessary.
As a side effect, this makes a little bit easier to have a FIPS compatible version of OpenVPN since we do not rely on calling MD5 anymore.
Side note: this commit breaks the (not yet merged) WolfSSL support as it claims to support EKM in the OpenSSL compat API but always returns an error if you try to use it.
Patch V2: rebase/change to V2 of EKM refactoring
Patch V3: add Changes.rst
--- Changes.rst | 11 +++++++ doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h | 14 ++++++-- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 4 +++ src/openvpn/init.c | 1 + src/openvpn/multi.c | 4 +++ src/openvpn/options.c | 14 ++++++++ src/openvpn/options.h | 3 ++ src/openvpn/push.c | 5 ++- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- src/openvpn/ssl.h | 2 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h | 2 ++ src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c | 7 ++-- 12 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Changes.rst +11 -0
@@ -1,3 +1,14 @@ +Overview of changes in 2.6 +========================== + + +New features +------------ +Keying Material Exporters (RFC 5705) based key generation + As part of the cipher negotiation OpenVPN will automatically prefer + the RFC5705 based key material generation to the current custom + OpenVPN PRF. This feature requires OpenSSL or mbed TLS 2.18+. + Overview of changes in 2.5 ==========================
doc/doxygen/doc_key_generation.h +12 -2
@@ -58,6 +58,12 @@* * @subsection key_generation_method_2 Key method 2 * +* There are two methods for generating key data when using key method 2 +* the first is OpenVPN's traditional approach that exchanges random +* data and uses a PRF and the other is using the RFC5705 keying material +* exporter to generate the key material. For both methods the random +* data is exchange but only used in the traditional method. +* * -# The client generates random material in the following amounts: * - Pre-master secret: 48 bytes * - Client's PRF seed for master secret: 32 bytes
@@ -73,8 +79,12 @@* server's random material. * * %Key method 2 %key expansion is performed by the \c -* generate_key_expansion() function. Please refer to its source code for -* details of the %key expansion process. +* generate_key_expansion_oepnvpn_prf() function. Please refer to its source +* code for details of the %key expansion process. +* +* When the client sends the IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT flag and the server replies +* with `key-derivation tls-ekm` the RFC5705 key material exporter with the +* label EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys is used for the key data. * * @subsection key_generation_random Source of random material *
src/openvpn/crypto.h +4 -0
@@ -254,6 +254,10 @@ struct crypto_options#define CO_MUTE_REPLAY_WARNINGS (1<<2)/**< Bit-flag indicating not to display * replay warnings. */ +#define CO_USE_TLS_KEY_MATERIAL_EXPORT (1<<3) +/**< Bit-flag indicating that key derivation +* is done using TLS keying material export [RFC5705] +*/ unsigned int flags;/**< Bit-flags determining behavior of * security operation functions. */ };
src/openvpn/init.c +1 -0
@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ restore_ncp_options(struct context *c) c->options.ciphername = c->c1.ciphername; c->options.authname = c->c1.authname; c->options.keysize = c->c1.keysize; + c->options.data_channel_use_ekm = false; }void
src/openvpn/multi.c +4 -0
@@ -1817,6 +1817,10 @@ multi_client_set_protocol_options(struct context *c) c->c2.push_request_received = true; } +#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL + o->data_channel_use_ekm = (proto &IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT ); +#endif +/* Select cipher if client supports Negotiable Crypto Parameters */ if (!o->ncp_enabled) {
src/openvpn/options.c +14 -0
@@ -7947,6 +7947,20 @@ add_option(struct options *options, } options->ncp_ciphers = p[1 ]; } +else if (streq (p[0 ],"key-derivation" ) && p[1 ]) + { + VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_NCP) +#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL +if (streq (p[1 ],"tls-ekm" )) + { + options->data_channel_use_ekm = true; + } + else +#endif + { +msg (msglevel,"Unknown key-derivation method %s" , p[1 ]); + } + }else if (streq (p[0 ],"ncp-disable" ) && !p[1 ]) {VERIFY_PERMISSION (OPT_P_GENERAL |OPT_P_INSTANCE );
src/openvpn/options.h +3 -0
@@ -648,6 +648,9 @@ struct options/* Useful when packets sent by openvpn itself are not subject * to the routing tables that would move packets into the tunnel. */ bool allow_recursive_routing; + +/* Use RFC 5705 key export */ +bool data_channel_use_ekm; };#define streq (x, y) (!strcmp((x), (y)))
src/openvpn/push.c +4 -1
@@ -479,7 +479,10 @@ prepare_push_reply(struct context *c, struct gc_arena *gc, {push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"cipher %s" , o->ciphername); } - +if (o->data_channel_use_ekm) + { +push_option_fmt (gc, push_list,M_USAGE ,"key-derivation tls-ekm" ); + }return true; }
src/openvpn/ssl.c +50 -5
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src/openvpn/ssl.h +2 -0
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@* to wait for a push-request to send a push-reply */ #define IV_PROTO_REQUEST_PUSH (1<<2) +/** Supports key derivation via TLS key material exporter [RFC5705] */ +#define IV_PROTO_TLS_KEY_EXPORT (1<<3)/* Default field in X509 to be username */ #define X509_USERNAME_FIELD_DEFAULT "CN"
src/openvpn/ssl_backend.h +2 -0
@@ -389,6 +389,8 @@ void key_state_ssl_free(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl);void backend_tls_ctx_reload_crl (struct tls_root_ctx *ssl_ctx,const char *crl_file,bool crl_inline); +#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_LABEL "EXPORTER-OpenVPN-datakeys" +#define EXPORT_KEY_DATA_EKM_SIZE (2 * (MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH + MAX_HMAC_KEY_LENGTH))/** * Keying Material Exporters [RFC 5705] allows additional keying material to be * derived from existing TLS channel. This exported keying material can then be
src/openvpn/ssl_mbedtls.c +2 -5
@@ -1158,11 +1158,8 @@ key_state_ssl_init(struct key_state_ssl *ks_ssl,#ifdef HAVE_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL /* Initialize keying material exporter */ -if (session->opt->ekm_size) - { -mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb (ks_ssl->ssl_config, - mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_cb, session); - } +mbedtls_ssl_conf_export_keys_ext_cb (ks_ssl->ssl_config, + mbedtls_ssl_export_keys_cb, session);#endif /* Initialise SSL context */
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2