netfilter: nf_tables: fib: Drop IPV6 packages if IPv6 is disabled on boot
Subsystems (3)
PATCH v2 1/1 netfilter: nf_tables: fib: Drop IPV6 packages if IPv6 is disabled on boot
If IPv6 is disabled on boot (ipv6.disable=1), but nft_fib_inet ends up dealing with a IPv6 package, it causes a kernel panic in fib6_node_lookup_1(), crashing in bad_page_fault.
The panic is caused by trying to deference a very low address (0x38 in ppc64le), due to ipv6.fib6_main_tbl = NULL.
BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038
Fix this behavior by dropping IPv6 packages if !ipv6_mod_enabled().
---
Changes from v1:
- Move drop logic from nft_fib_inet_eval() to nft_fib6_eval{,_type} so it can affect other usages of these functions.
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c +10 -0
@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ void nft_fib6_eval_type(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs,u32 *dest = ®s->data[priv->dreg];struct ipv6hdr *iph, _iph; +if (!ipv6_mod_enabled ()) { + regs->verdict.code =NF_DROP ; +return ; + } + iph =skb_header_pointer (pkt->skb, noff,sizeof (_iph), &_iph);if (!iph) { regs->verdict.code =NFT_BREAK ;
@@ -150,6 +155,11 @@ void nft_fib6_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs,struct rt6_info *rt;int lookup_flags; +if (!ipv6_mod_enabled ()) { + regs->verdict.code =NF_DROP ; +return ; + } +if (priv->flags &NFTA_FIB_F_IIF ) oif =nft_in (pkt);else if (priv->flags &NFTA_FIB_F_OIF )
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 3 lines · Leonardo Bras
If IPv6 is disabled on boot (ipv6.disable=1), but
nft_fib_inetends up dealing with a IPv6 package, it causes a kernel panic infib6_node_lookup_1(), crashing inbad_page_fault.
Q: How do you get to see IPv6 packets if IPv6 module is disable?
Quoted 5 lines
The panic is caused by trying to deference a very low address (
0x38in ppc64le), due to ipv6.fib6_main_tbl = NULL.BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038Fix this behavior by dropping IPv6 packages if !ipv6_mod_enabled().
I'd suggest: s/package/packet/
[...]
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c void nft_fib6_eval_type(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs, · line 129
Quoted 10 lines
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c +2
-0@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ void nft_fib6_eval_type(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs,u32 *dest = ®s->data[priv->dreg];struct ipv6hdr *iph, _iph; +if (!ipv6_mod_enabled ()) { + regs->verdict.code =NF_DROP ;
NFT_BREAK instead to stop evaluating this rule, this results in a mismatch, so you let the user decide what to do with packets that do not match your policy.
The drop case at the bottom of the fib eval function never actually never happens.
Quoted 6 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 3 lines · Leonardo Bras
If IPv6 is disabled on boot (ipv6.disable=1), but
nft_fib_inetends up dealing with a IPv6 package, it causes a kernel panic infib6_node_lookup_1(), crashing inbad_page_fault.Q: How do you get to see IPv6 packets if IPv6 module is disable?
I could reproduce this bug on a host ('ipv6.disable=1') starting a guest with a virtio-net interface with 'filterref' over a virtual bridge. It crashes the host during guest boot (just before login).
By that I could understand that a guest IPv6 network traffic (viavirtio-net) may cause this kernel panic.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The panic is caused by trying to deference a very low address (
0x38in ppc64le), due to ipv6.fib6_main_tbl = NULL.BUG: Kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0x00000038Fix this behavior by dropping IPv6 packages if !ipv6_mod_enabled().
I'd suggest: s/package/packet/
Sure, I will make sure to put it on v3.
(Sorry, I am not very used to net subsystem.)
Quoted 10 lines
[...]
Quoted 8 lines
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c +0
-0@@ -125,6 +125,11 @@ void nft_fib6_eval_type(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs,u32 *dest = ®s->data[priv->dreg];struct ipv6hdr *iph, _iph;
Quoted 6 lines
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c void nft_fib6_eval_type(const struct nft_expr *expr, struct nft_regs *regs, · line 129
Quoted 2 lines
net/ipv6/netfilter/nft_fib_ipv6.c +2
-0+if (!ipv6_mod_enabled ()) { + regs->verdict.code =NF_DROP ;
NFT_BREAKinstead to stop evaluating this rule, this results in a mismatch, so you let the user decide what to do with packets that do not match your policy.
Ok, I will replace for v3.
Quoted 3 lines
The drop case at the bottom of the fib eval function never actually never happens.
Which one do you mean?
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 1 line · Leonardo Bras
On Tue, 2019-08-27 at 12:35 +0200, Pablo Neira Ayuso wrote:
[...]
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
NFT_BREAKinstead to stop evaluating this rule, this results in a mismatch, so you let the user decide what to do with packets that do not match your policy.Ok, I will replace for v3.
Thanks.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The drop case at the bottom of the fib eval function never actually never happens.
Which one do you mean?
Line 31 of net/netfilter/nft_fib_inet.c.
Quoted 6 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The drop case at the bottom of the fib eval function never actually never happens.
Which one do you mean?
Line 31 of
net/netfilter/nft_fib_inet.c.
Oh, yeah, I was thinking about that when I wrote the patch. Thanks for explaining :)
I will send the v3 in a few minutes.
Best regards,
David Miller
maintainerFrom: Leonardo Bras <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 14:34:14 -0300
Quoted 6 lines
I could reproduce this bug on a host ('ipv6.disable=1') starting a guest with a virtio-net interface with 'filterref' over a virtual bridge. It crashes the host during guest boot (just before login).
By that I could understand that a guest IPv6 network traffic (viavirtio-net) may cause this kernel panic.
Really this is bad and I suspected bridging to be involved somehow.
If ipv6 is disabled ipv6 traffic should not pass through the machine by any means whatsoever. Otherwise there is no point to the knob and we will keep having to add hack checks all over the tree instead of fixing the fundamental issue.
Florian Westphal
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · David Miller
From: Leonardo Bras <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 14:34:14 -0300Quoted 6 lines
I could reproduce this bug on a host ('ipv6.disable=1') starting a guest with a virtio-net interface with 'filterref' over a virtual bridge. It crashes the host during guest boot (just before login).
By that I could understand that a guest IPv6 network traffic (viavirtio-net) may cause this kernel panic.
Really this is bad and I suspected bridging to be involved somehow.
Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the
"net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on?
As much as i'd like to send a patch to remove br_netfilter, I fear we can't even stop passing ipv6 packets up to netfilter if ipv6.disable=1 is set because users might be using ip6tables for bridged traffic.
Pablo Neira Ayuso
maintainerQuoted 13 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 11 lines · David Miller
From: Leonardo Bras <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 14:34:14 -0300Quoted 6 lines
I could reproduce this bug on a host ('ipv6.disable=1') starting a guest with a virtio-net interface with 'filterref' over a virtual bridge. It crashes the host during guest boot (just before login).
By that I could understand that a guest IPv6 network traffic (viavirtio-net) may cause this kernel panic.
Really this is bad and I suspected bridging to be involved somehow.
Quoted 7 lines
Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the
"net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on?As much as i'd like to send a patch to remove
br_netfilter, I fear we can't even stop passing ipv6 packets up to netfilter if ipv6.disable=1 is set because users might be using ip6tables for bridged traffic.
If the br_netfilter module is in placed, then it's probably better to perform this check from there.
Florian Westphal
maintainerQuoted 17 lines · Pablo Neira Ayuso
Quoted 16 lines · Florian Westphal
Quoted 11 lines · David Miller
From: Leonardo Bras <[email protected]>
Date: Tue, 27 Aug 2019 14:34:14 -0300Quoted 6 lines
I could reproduce this bug on a host ('ipv6.disable=1') starting a guest with a virtio-net interface with 'filterref' over a virtual bridge. It crashes the host during guest boot (just before login).
By that I could understand that a guest IPv6 network traffic (viavirtio-net) may cause this kernel panic.
Really this is bad and I suspected bridging to be involved somehow.
Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the
"net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on?
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 4 lines
As much as i'd like to send a patch to remove
br_netfilter, I fear we can't even stop passing ipv6 packets up to netfilter if ipv6.disable=1 is set because users might be using ip6tables for bridged traffic.If the
br_netfiltermodule is in placed, then it's probably better to perform this check from there.
ipt6tables won't work for filtering anymore, so I don't think this is something we can do. Anyway, lets wait for Leonardo to confirm, else this is pointless speculation :-)
Quoted 2 lines
Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the
"net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on?
Running
# sudo sysctl -a I can see: net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 1
So this packets are sent to host iptables for processing?
(Sorry for the delay, I did not received the previous e-mails. Please include me in to/cc.)
Florian Westphal
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Leonardo Bras
Quoted 2 lines
Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the
"net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on?Running
# sudo sysctl -a I can see: net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 1So this packets are sent to host iptables for processing?
Yes, this is an hold hack that was made because ebtables is very feature-limited.
However, as I mentioned before I don't think there is anything we can do here except audit all affected nft expressions and ip6tables matches and add this check where needed. ip6t_rpfilter.c comes to mind.
In any case your patch looks ok to me.
Quoted 2 lines
(Sorry for the delay, I did not received the previous e-mails. Please include me in to/cc.)
Sorry about that.
Quoted 7 lines · Leonardo Bras
Quoted 2 lines
Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the
"net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on?Running
# sudo sysctl -a I can see: net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 1
Also, doing
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/bridge/bridge-nf-call-ip6tables And then trying to boot the guest will not crash the host.
Which would make sense, since host iptables is not dealing with guest IPv6 packets.
So, the real cause of this bug is the bridge making host ip6tables deal with guest IPv6 packets ?
If so, would it be ok if write a patch testing ipv6_mod_enabled() before passing guest ipv6 packets to host ip6tables?
Best regards,
Quoted 6 lines
So this packets are sent to host iptables for processing?
(Sorry for the delay, I did not received the previous e-mails. Please include me in to/cc.)
Florian Westphal
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Leonardo Bras
Quoted 7 lines · Leonardo Bras
Quoted 2 lines
Thats a good point -- Leonardo, is the
"net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables" sysctl on?Running
# sudo sysctl -a I can see: net.bridge.bridge-nf-call-ip6tables = 1
Quoted 6 lines
Also, doing
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/net/bridge/bridge-nf-call-ip6tables And then trying to boot the guest will not crash the host.Which would make sense, since host iptables is not dealing with guest IPv6 packets.
Yes.
Quoted 4 lines
So, the real cause of this bug is the bridge making host ip6tables deal with guest IPv6 packets ?
If so, would it be ok if write a patch testingipv6_mod_enabled()before passing guest ipv6 packets to host ip6tables?
I'm not sure. This switch is very old, it was added 10 years ago in v2.6.31-rc1.
Even if we disable call-ip6tables in br_netfilter we will at least in addition need a patch for nft_fib_netdev.c.
From a "avoid calls to ipv6 stack when its disabled" standpoint, the safest fix is to disable call-ip6tables functionality if ipv6 module is off *and* fix nft_fib_netdev.c to BREAK in ipv6 is off case.
I started to place a list of suspicous modules here, but that got out of hand quickly.
So, given I don't want to plaster ipv6_mod_enabled() everywhere, I would suggest this course of action:
1. add a patch to BREAK in nft_fib_netdev.c for !ipv6_mod_enabled()
2. change net/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c, br_nf_pre_routing() to make sure ipv6_mod_enabled() is true before doing the ipv6 stack "emulation".
Makes sense?
Thanks,
Florian
Quoted 1 line · Florian Westphal
In any case your patch looks ok to me.
Great! Please give your feedback on v3:
http://patchwork.ozlabs.org/patch/1154040/
[...]
Quoted 14 lines
Even if we disable call-ip6tables in
br_netfilterwe will at least in addition need a patch fornft_fib_netdev.c.From a "avoid calls to ipv6 stack when its disabled" standpoint, the safest fix is to disable call-ip6tables functionality if ipv6 module is off *and* fix
nft_fib_netdev.cto BREAK in ipv6 is off case.I started to place a list of suspicous modules here, but that got out of hand quickly.
So, given I don't want to plaster
ipv6_mod_enabled()everywhere, I would suggest this course of action:
Quoted 6 lines
1. add a patch to BREAK in
nft_fib_netdev.cfor !ipv6_mod_enabled()
2. changenet/bridge/br_netfilter_hooks.c,br_nf_pre_routing()to make sureipv6_mod_enabled()is true before doing the ipv6 stack "emulation".Makes sense?
IMHO sure.
Shortly, I will send a couple patches proposing the above changes. (Or my best understanding about them :) )
Quoted 3 lines
Thanks,
Florian
Thank you,
Leonardo Bras
On Thu, 2019-08-29 at 22:58 +0200, Florian Westphal wrote:
[...]
Quoted 1 line
1. add a patch to BREAK in
nft_fib_netdev.cfor !ipv6_mod_enabled()
[...]
But this is still needed? I mean, in nft_fib_netdev_eval there are only 2 functions being called for IPv6 protocol : nft_fib6_eval and nft_fib6_eval_type. Both are already protected by this current patch.
Is your 1st suggestion about this patch, or you think it's better to move this change to nft_fib_netdev_eval ?
Best regards,
Leonardo Bras
Florian Westphal
maintainerQuoted 11 lines · Leonardo Bras
On Thu, 2019-08-29 at 22:58 +0200, Florian Westphal wrote:
[...]Quoted 1 line
1. add a patch to BREAK in
nft_fib_netdev.cfor !ipv6_mod_enabled()[...]
But this is still needed? I mean, in
nft_fib_netdev_evalthere are only 2 functions being called for IPv6 protocol :nft_fib6_evalandnft_fib6_eval_type. Both are already protected by this current patch.Is your 1st suggestion about this patch, or you think it's better to move this change to
nft_fib_netdev_eval?
Ah, it was the latter.
Making bridge netfilter not pass packets up with ipv6 off closes the problem for fib_ipv6 and inet, so only _netdev.c needs fixing.
Quoted 3 lines · Florian Westphal
Ah, it was the latter.
Making bridge netfilter not pass packets up with ipv6 off closes the problem forfib_ipv6and inet, so only_netdev.cneeds fixing.
Ok then, preparing a v4.
https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/30/843