MAINTAINERS: add security quotient field
cover MAINTAINERS: add security quotient field
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
Hello,
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
Recently we received multiple security issue reports against VVFAT and VirtFS host directory sharing system. After discussing with the respective maintainers, it turned out that
* VVFAT -> https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1883083
VVFAT is quite old and is available for testing purposes only. Ie. It is not suitable for production environments.
* VirtFS/9pfs -> https://wiki.qemu.org/Documentation/9psetup
VirtFS implementation though better, it is most commonly used for automated testing under sand-boxed server environments, ie. no malicious party there. It is also not mature enough for cloud services. It is supported on 'Odd Fixes' basis atm.
So these turned out to be issues which can be fixed as regular bugs.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
This patch introduces the CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field in the MAINTAINERS file. It tries to capture the security sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the QEMU's code base.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
If Quotient == High, triage issues as potential security ones.
if Quotient == Low, triage issues as regular non-security bugs.I have tagged each section in the MAINTAINERS file as High or Low on best guess basis. I request respective maintainers to kindly review it please.
If you have any inputs/suggestions, I'd really appreciate them.
Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit (1):
MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
MAINTAINERS | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 324 insertions(+)
--
2.26.2
PATCH 1/1 MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
--- MAINTAINERS | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 324 insertions(+)
MAINTAINERS +324 -0
@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ Descriptions of section entries: Obsolete: Old code. Something tagged obsolete generally means it has been replaced by a better system and you should be using that. + C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE. F: Files and directories with wildcard patterns. A trailing slash includes all files and subdirectory files. F: drivers/net/ all files in and below drivers/net
@@ -87,6 +95,7 @@ S390 general architecture support M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: default-configs/s390x-softmmu.mak F: gdb-xml/s390*.xml F: hw/char/sclp*.[hc]
@@ -115,6 +124,7 @@ Overall TCG CPUs M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: softmmu/cpus.c F: cpus-common.c F: exec.c
@@ -134,6 +144,7 @@ M: Aurelien Jarno <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: fpu/ F: include/fpu/ F: tests/fp/
@@ -141,6 +152,7 @@ F: tests/fp/ Alpha TCG CPUs M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/alpha/ F: tests/tcg/alpha/ F: disas/alpha.c
@@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ ARM TCG CPUs M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/arm/ F: tests/tcg/arm/ F: tests/tcg/aarch64/
@@ -164,6 +177,7 @@ ARM SMMU M: Eric Auger <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/arm/smmu* F: include/hw/arm/smmu*
@@ -171,6 +185,7 @@ AVR TCG CPUs M: Michael Rolnik <[email protected]> R: Sarah Harris <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: gdb-xml/avr-cpu.xml F: target/avr/ F: tests/acceptance/machine_avr6.py
@@ -178,6 +193,7 @@ F: tests/acceptance/machine_avr6.py CRIS TCG CPUs M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/cris/ F: hw/cris/ F: include/hw/cris/
@@ -187,6 +203,7 @@ F: disas/cris.c HPPA (PA-RISC) TCG CPUs M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/hppa/ F: hw/hppa/ F: disas/hppa.c
@@ -196,6 +213,7 @@ F: include/hw/net/lasi_82596.h LM32 TCG CPUs R: Michael Walle <[email protected]> S: Orphan +C: Low F: target/lm32/ F: disas/lm32.c F: hw/lm32/
@@ -209,12 +227,14 @@ F: tests/tcg/lm32/ M68K TCG CPUs M: Laurent Vivier <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/m68k/ F: disas/m68k.c MicroBlaze TCG CPUs M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/microblaze/ F: hw/microblaze/ F: disas/microblaze.c
@@ -224,6 +244,7 @@ M: Aleksandar Markovic <[email protected]> R: Aurelien Jarno <[email protected]> R: Aleksandar Rikalo <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/mips/ F: default-configs/*mips* F: disas/*mips*
@@ -244,6 +265,7 @@ K: ^Subject:.*(?i)mips Moxie TCG CPUs M: Anthony Green <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/moxie/ F: disas/moxie.c F: hw/moxie/
@@ -253,6 +275,7 @@ NiosII TCG CPUs M: Chris Wulff <[email protected]> M: Marek Vasut <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/nios2/ F: hw/nios2/ F: hw/intc/nios2_iic.c
@@ -262,6 +285,7 @@ F: default-configs/nios2-softmmu.mak OpenRISC TCG CPUs M: Stafford Horne <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: target/openrisc/ F: hw/openrisc/ F: tests/tcg/openrisc/
@@ -270,6 +294,7 @@ PowerPC TCG CPUs M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: target/ppc/ F: hw/ppc/ F: include/hw/ppc/
@@ -282,6 +307,7 @@ M: Sagar Karandikar <[email protected]> M: Bastian Koppelmann <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: target/riscv/ F: hw/riscv/ F: include/hw/riscv/
@@ -291,12 +317,14 @@ F: linux-user/host/riscv64/ RENESAS RX CPUs M: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/rx/ S390 TCG CPUs M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> M: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: target/s390x/ F: hw/s390x/ F: disas/s390.c
@@ -306,6 +334,7 @@ L: [email protected] SH4 TCG CPUs M: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: target/sh4/ F: hw/sh4/ F: disas/sh4.c
@@ -315,6 +344,7 @@ SPARC TCG CPUs M: Mark Cave-Ayland <[email protected]> M: Artyom Tarasenko <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/sparc/ F: hw/sparc/ F: hw/sparc64/
@@ -324,6 +354,7 @@ F: disas/sparc.c UniCore32 TCG CPUs M: Guan Xuetao <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/unicore32/ F: hw/unicore32/ F: include/hw/unicore32/
@@ -333,6 +364,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> M: Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: target/i386/ F: tests/tcg/i386/ F: tests/tcg/x86_64/
@@ -345,6 +377,7 @@ Xtensa TCG CPUs M: Max Filippov <[email protected]> W: http://wiki.osll.ru/doku.php?id=etc:users:jcmvbkbc:qemu-target-xtensa S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/xtensa/ F: hw/xtensa/ F: tests/tcg/xtensa/
@@ -355,6 +388,7 @@ F: default-configs/xtensa*.mak TriCore TCG CPUs M: Bastian Koppelmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/tricore/ F: hw/tricore/ F: include/hw/tricore/
@@ -362,6 +396,7 @@ F: include/hw/tricore/ Multiarch Linux User Tests M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tests/tcg/multiarch/ Guest CPU Cores (KVM)
@@ -370,6 +405,7 @@ Overall KVM CPUs M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: */*/kvm* F: accel/kvm/ F: accel/stubs/kvm-stub.c
@@ -381,16 +417,19 @@ ARM KVM CPUs M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: target/arm/kvm.c MIPS KVM CPUs M: Aleksandar Markovic <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: target/mips/kvm.c PPC KVM CPUs M: David Gibson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: target/ppc/kvm.c S390 KVM CPUs
@@ -398,6 +437,7 @@ M: Halil Pasic <[email protected]> M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: target/s390x/kvm.c F: target/s390x/kvm_s390x.h F: target/s390x/kvm-stub.c
@@ -421,6 +461,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> M: Marcelo Tosatti <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: target/i386/kvm.c F: scripts/kvm/vmxcap
@@ -430,6 +471,7 @@ Overall M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: include/sysemu/accel.h F: accel/accel.c F: accel/Makefile.objs
@@ -440,6 +482,7 @@ M: Cameron Esfahani <[email protected]> M: Roman Bolshakov <[email protected]> W: https://wiki.qemu.org/Features/HVF S: Maintained +C: Low F: accel/stubs/hvf-stub.c F: target/i386/hvf/ F: include/sysemu/hvf.h
@@ -447,6 +490,7 @@ F: include/sysemu/hvf.h WHPX CPUs M: Sunil Muthuswamy <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: target/i386/whpx-all.c F: target/i386/whp-dispatch.h F: accel/stubs/whpx-stub.c
@@ -460,6 +504,7 @@ M: Anthony Perard <[email protected]> M: Paul Durrant <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: */xen* F: accel/xen/* F: hw/9pfs/xen-9p*
@@ -486,6 +531,7 @@ M: Colin Xu <[email protected]> L: [email protected] W: https://github.com/intel/haxm/issues S: Maintained +C: Low F: accel/stubs/hax-stub.c F: include/sysemu/hax.h F: target/i386/hax-*
@@ -497,12 +543,14 @@ M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: linux-headers/ F: scripts/update-linux-headers.sh POSIX M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: os-posix.c F: include/sysemu/os-posix.h F: util/*posix*.c
@@ -511,16 +559,19 @@ F: include/qemu/*posix*.h NETBSD M: Kamil Rytarowski <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High K: ^Subject:.*(?i)NetBSD OPENBSD M: Brad Smith <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High K: ^Subject:.*(?i)OpenBSD W32, W64 M: Stefan Weil <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: *win32* F: */*win32* F: include/*/*win32*
@@ -531,6 +582,7 @@ Alpha Machines -------------- M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/alpha/ F: hw/isa/smc37c669-superio.c F: tests/tcg/alpha/system/
@@ -542,6 +594,7 @@ M: Beniamino Galvani <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/*/allwinner* F: include/hw/*/allwinner* F: hw/arm/cubieboard.c
@@ -550,6 +603,7 @@ Allwinner-h3 M: Niek Linnenbank <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/allwinner-h3* F: include/hw/*/allwinner-h3* F: hw/arm/orangepi.c
@@ -559,6 +613,7 @@ ARM PrimeCell and CMSDK devices M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/char/pl011.c F: include/hw/char/pl011.h F: hw/display/pl110*
@@ -593,6 +648,7 @@ ARM cores M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/intc/arm* F: hw/intc/gic_internal.h F: hw/misc/a9scu.c
@@ -614,6 +670,7 @@ M: Igor Mitsyanko <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/*/exynos* F: include/hw/arm/exynos4210.h
@@ -622,6 +679,7 @@ M: Rob Herring <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/highbank.c F: hw/net/xgmac.c
@@ -630,6 +688,7 @@ M: Antony Pavlov <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: include/hw/arm/digic.h F: hw/*/digic* F: include/hw/*/digic*
@@ -640,6 +699,7 @@ M: Anup Patel <[email protected]> M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/rtc/goldfish_rtc.c F: include/hw/rtc/goldfish_rtc.h
@@ -648,6 +708,7 @@ M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/gumstix.c i.MX25 PDK
@@ -655,6 +716,7 @@ M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> R: Jean-Christophe Dubois <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/fsl-imx25.c F: hw/arm/imx25_pdk.c F: hw/misc/imx25_ccm.c
@@ -668,6 +730,7 @@ M: Peter Chubb <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/kzm.c F: hw/*/imx_* F: hw/*/*imx31*
@@ -678,6 +741,7 @@ Integrator CP M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/integratorcp.c F: hw/misc/arm_integrator_debug.c F: include/hw/misc/arm_integrator_debug.h
@@ -689,6 +753,7 @@ M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> R: Jean-Christophe Dubois <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/mcimx6ul-evk.c F: hw/arm/fsl-imx6ul.c F: hw/misc/imx6ul_ccm.c
@@ -700,6 +765,7 @@ M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> R: Andrey Smirnov <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/mcimx7d-sabre.c F: hw/arm/fsl-imx7.c F: hw/misc/imx7_*.c
@@ -712,6 +778,7 @@ MPS2 M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/mps2.c F: hw/arm/mps2-tz.c F: hw/misc/mps2-*.c
@@ -734,6 +801,7 @@ Musca M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/musca.c F: docs/system/arm/musca.rst
@@ -742,6 +810,7 @@ M: Jan Kiszka <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/musicpal.c F: docs/system/arm/musicpal.rst
@@ -750,6 +819,7 @@ M: Andrzej Zaborowski <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/nseries.c F: hw/display/blizzard.c F: hw/input/lm832x.c
@@ -767,6 +837,7 @@ M: Andrzej Zaborowski <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/palm.c F: hw/input/tsc210x.c F: include/hw/input/tsc2xxx.h
@@ -778,6 +849,7 @@ R: Andrew Baumann <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/raspi.c F: hw/arm/raspi_platform.h F: hw/*/bcm283*
@@ -788,6 +860,7 @@ Real View M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/realview* F: hw/cpu/realview_mpcore.c F: hw/intc/realview_gic.c
@@ -799,6 +872,7 @@ M: Andrzej Zaborowski <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/mainstone.c F: hw/arm/spitz.c F: hw/arm/tosa.c
@@ -820,6 +894,7 @@ M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> R: Jean-Christophe Dubois <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/sabrelite.c F: hw/arm/fsl-imx6.c F: hw/misc/imx6_*.c
@@ -836,12 +911,14 @@ M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> R: Leif Lindholm <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/sbsa-ref.c Sharp SL-5500 (Collie) PDA M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/arm/collie.c F: hw/arm/strongarm*
@@ -849,6 +926,7 @@ Stellaris M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/stellaris* F: include/hw/input/gamepad.h F: docs/system/arm/stellaris.rst
@@ -857,6 +935,7 @@ Versatile Express M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/vexpress.c F: docs/system/arm/vexpress.rst
@@ -864,6 +943,7 @@ Versatile PB M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/versatile* F: include/hw/i2c/arm_sbcon_i2c.h F: hw/misc/arm_sysctl.c
@@ -873,6 +953,7 @@ Virt M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/virt* F: include/hw/arm/virt.h
@@ -882,6 +963,7 @@ M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/xilinx_* F: hw/*/cadence_* F: hw/misc/zynq*
@@ -894,6 +976,7 @@ M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/xlnx*.c F: include/hw/*/xlnx*.h F: include/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.h
@@ -904,6 +987,7 @@ ARM ACPI Subsystem M: Shannon Zhao <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/virt-acpi-build.c STM32F205
@@ -911,6 +995,7 @@ M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/stm32f205_soc.c F: hw/misc/stm32f2xx_syscfg.c F: hw/char/stm32f2xx_usart.c
@@ -924,6 +1009,7 @@ M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/stm32f405_soc.c F: hw/misc/stm32f4xx_syscfg.c F: hw/misc/stm32f4xx_exti.c
@@ -933,6 +1019,7 @@ M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/netduino2.c Netduino Plus 2
@@ -940,6 +1027,7 @@ M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/netduinoplus2.c SmartFusion2
@@ -947,6 +1035,7 @@ M: Subbaraya Sundeep <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/msf2-soc.c F: hw/misc/msf2-sysreg.c F: hw/timer/mss-timer.c
@@ -963,6 +1052,7 @@ M: Subbaraya Sundeep <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/arm/msf2-som.c ASPEED BMCs
@@ -972,6 +1062,7 @@ R: Andrew Jeffery <[email protected]> R: Joel Stanley <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/*aspeed* F: hw/misc/pca9552.c F: include/hw/*/*aspeed*
@@ -984,6 +1075,7 @@ M: Joel Stanley <[email protected]> M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/nrf51*.c F: hw/*/microbit*.c F: include/hw/*/nrf51*.h
@@ -997,6 +1089,7 @@ AVR MCUs M: Michael Rolnik <[email protected]> R: Sarah Harris <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: default-configs/avr-softmmu.mak F: hw/avr/ F: include/hw/char/avr_usart.h
@@ -1010,6 +1103,7 @@ Arduino M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> R: Sarah Harris <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/avr/arduino.c CRIS Machines
@@ -1017,6 +1111,7 @@ CRIS Machines Axis Dev88 M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/cris/axis_dev88.c F: hw/*/etraxfs_*.c
@@ -1026,6 +1121,7 @@ HP B160L M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> R: Helge Deller <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: default-configs/hppa-softmmu.mak F: hw/hppa/ F: pc-bios/hppa-firmware.img
@@ -1035,11 +1131,13 @@ LM32 Machines EVR32 and uclinux BSP R: Michael Walle <[email protected]> S: Orphan +C: Low F: hw/lm32/lm32_boards.c milkymist R: Michael Walle <[email protected]> S: Orphan +C: Low F: hw/lm32/milkymist.c M68K Machines
@@ -1047,12 +1145,14 @@ M68K Machines an5206 M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/m68k/an5206.c F: hw/m68k/mcf5206.c mcf5208 M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/m68k/mcf5208.c F: hw/m68k/mcf_intc.c F: hw/char/mcf_uart.c
@@ -1062,6 +1162,7 @@ F: include/hw/m68k/mcf*.h NeXTcube M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/m68k/next-*.c F: hw/display/next-fb.c F: include/hw/m68k/next-cube.h
@@ -1069,6 +1170,7 @@ F: include/hw/m68k/next-cube.h q800 M: Laurent Vivier <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/m68k/q800.c F: hw/misc/mac_via.c F: hw/nubus/*
@@ -1085,12 +1187,14 @@ MicroBlaze Machines petalogix_s3adsp1800 M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/microblaze/petalogix_s3adsp1800_mmu.c F: include/hw/char/xilinx_uartlite.h petalogix_ml605 M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/microblaze/petalogix_ml605_mmu.c MIPS Machines
@@ -1099,6 +1203,7 @@ Jazz M: Hervé Poussineau <[email protected]> R: Aleksandar Rikalo <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/mips/jazz.c F: hw/display/jazz_led.c F: hw/dma/rc4030.c
@@ -1108,6 +1213,7 @@ M: Aleksandar Markovic <[email protected]> M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> R: Aurelien Jarno <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/isa/piix4.c F: hw/acpi/piix4.c F: hw/mips/malta.c
@@ -1120,6 +1226,7 @@ Mipssim M: Aleksandar Markovic <[email protected]> R: Aleksandar Rikalo <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/mips/mipssim.c F: hw/net/mipsnet.c
@@ -1128,6 +1235,7 @@ M: Aleksandar Markovic <[email protected]> R: Aurelien Jarno <[email protected]> R: Aleksandar Rikalo <[email protected]> S: Obsolete +C: Low F: hw/mips/r4k.c Fuloong 2E
@@ -1136,6 +1244,7 @@ M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> M: Aleksandar Markovic <[email protected]> R: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/mips/fuloong2e.c F: hw/isa/vt82c686.c F: hw/pci-host/bonito.c
@@ -1145,12 +1254,14 @@ Loongson-3 virtual platforms M: Huacai Chen <[email protected]> R: Jiaxun Yang <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/intc/loongson_liointc.c Boston M: Paul Burton <[email protected]> R: Aleksandar Rikalo <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/core/loader-fit.c F: hw/mips/boston.c F: hw/pci-host/xilinx-pcie.c
@@ -1161,6 +1272,7 @@ OpenRISC Machines or1k-sim M: Jia Liu <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/openrisc/openrisc_sim.c PowerPC Machines
@@ -1169,6 +1281,7 @@ PowerPC Machines M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/ppc/ppc405_boards.c Bamboo
@@ -1181,6 +1294,7 @@ e500 M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/ppc/e500* F: hw/gpio/mpc8xxx.c F: hw/i2c/mpc_i2c.c
@@ -1194,6 +1308,7 @@ mpc8544ds M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/ppc/mpc8544ds.c F: hw/ppc/mpc8544_guts.c
@@ -1202,6 +1317,7 @@ M: Mark Cave-Ayland <[email protected]> R: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/ppc/mac_newworld.c F: hw/pci-host/uninorth.c F: hw/pci-bridge/dec.[hc]
@@ -1221,6 +1337,7 @@ M: Mark Cave-Ayland <[email protected]> R: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/ppc/mac_oldworld.c F: hw/pci-host/grackle.c F: hw/misc/macio/
@@ -1234,6 +1351,7 @@ PReP M: Hervé Poussineau <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/ppc/prep.c F: hw/ppc/prep_systemio.c F: hw/ppc/rs6000_mc.c
@@ -1250,6 +1368,7 @@ sPAPR M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: hw/*/spapr* F: include/hw/*/spapr* F: hw/*/xics*
@@ -1267,6 +1386,7 @@ M: Cédric Le Goater <[email protected]> M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/ppc/pnv* F: hw/intc/pnv* F: hw/intc/xics_pnv.c
@@ -1280,12 +1400,14 @@ virtex_ml507 M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/ppc/virtex_ml507.c sam460ex M: BALATON Zoltan <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/ppc/sam460ex.c F: hw/ppc/ppc440_pcix.c F: hw/display/sm501*
@@ -1301,6 +1423,7 @@ OpenTitan M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: hw/riscv/opentitan.c F: hw/char/ibex_uart.c F: hw/intc/ibex_plic.c
@@ -1313,6 +1436,7 @@ RX Machines rx-gdbsim M: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: docs/system/target-rx.rst F: hw/rx/rx-gdbsim.c F: tests/acceptance/machine_rx_gdbsim.py
@@ -1323,6 +1447,7 @@ R2D M: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> R: Magnus Damm <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/sh4/r2d.c F: hw/intc/sh_intc.c F: include/hw/sh4/sh_intc.h
@@ -1331,6 +1456,7 @@ Shix M: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> R: Magnus Damm <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/sh4/shix.c F: hw/intc/sh_intc.c F: include/hw/sh4/sh_intc.h
@@ -1340,6 +1466,7 @@ SPARC Machines Sun4m M: Mark Cave-Ayland <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/sparc/sun4m.c F: hw/sparc/sun4m_iommu.c F: hw/display/cg3.c
@@ -1355,6 +1482,7 @@ F: pc-bios/openbios-sparc32 Sun4u M: Mark Cave-Ayland <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/sparc64/sun4u.c F: hw/sparc64/sun4u_iommu.c F: include/hw/sparc/sun4u_iommu.h
@@ -1368,6 +1496,7 @@ F: tests/acceptance/machine_sparc64_sun4u.py Sun4v M: Artyom Tarasenko <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/sparc64/niagara.c F: hw/rtc/sun4v-rtc.c F: include/hw/rtc/sun4v-rtc.h
@@ -1376,6 +1505,7 @@ Leon3 M: Fabien Chouteau <[email protected]> M: KONRAD Frederic <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/sparc/leon3.c F: hw/*/grlib* F: include/hw/*/grlib*
@@ -1388,6 +1518,7 @@ M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Halil Pasic <[email protected]> M: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/char/sclp*.[hc] F: hw/char/terminal3270.c F: hw/s390x/
@@ -1403,6 +1534,7 @@ S390-ccw boot M: Christian Borntraeger <[email protected]> M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/s390x/ipl.* F: pc-bios/s390-ccw/ F: pc-bios/s390-ccw.img
@@ -1413,6 +1545,7 @@ L: [email protected] S390 PCI M: Matthew Rosato <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/s390x/s390-pci* L: [email protected]
@@ -1421,6 +1554,7 @@ UniCore32 Machines PKUnity-3 SoC initramfs-with-busybox M: Guan Xuetao <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/puv3* F: hw/unicore32/
@@ -1430,6 +1564,7 @@ PC M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: Marcel Apfelbaum <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/hw/i386/ F: hw/i386/ F: hw/pci-host/i440fx.c
@@ -1455,6 +1590,7 @@ PC Chipset M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/char/debugcon.c F: hw/char/parallel* F: hw/char/serial*
@@ -1487,6 +1623,7 @@ microvm M: Sergio Lopez <[email protected]> M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: docs/microvm.rst F: hw/i386/microvm.c F: include/hw/i386/microvm.h
@@ -1496,6 +1633,7 @@ Machine core M: Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]> M: Marcel Apfelbaum <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/core/cpu.c F: hw/core/machine-qmp-cmds.c F: hw/core/machine.c
@@ -1515,16 +1653,19 @@ Xtensa Machines sim M: Max Filippov <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/xtensa/sim.c virt M: Max Filippov <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/xtensa/virt.c XTFPGA (LX60, LX200, ML605, KC705) M: Max Filippov <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/xtensa/xtfpga.c F: hw/net/opencores_eth.c
@@ -1533,12 +1674,14 @@ Devices EDU M: Jiri Slaby <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/misc/edu.c IDE M: John Snow <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: include/hw/ide.h F: include/hw/ide/ F: hw/ide/
@@ -1554,6 +1697,7 @@ T: git https://github.com/jnsnow/qemu.git ide IPMI M: Corey Minyard <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: include/hw/ipmi/* F: hw/ipmi/* F: hw/smbios/smbios_type_38.c
@@ -1564,6 +1708,7 @@ Floppy M: John Snow <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: hw/block/fdc.c F: include/hw/block/fdc.h F: tests/qtest/fdc-test.c
@@ -1573,12 +1718,14 @@ OMAP M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/*/omap* F: include/hw/arm/omap.h IPack M: Alberto Garcia <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/char/ipoctal232.c F: hw/ipack/
@@ -1586,6 +1733,7 @@ PCI M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: Marcel Apfelbaum <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/hw/pci/* F: hw/misc/pci-testdev.c F: hw/pci/*
@@ -1598,6 +1746,7 @@ ACPI/SMBIOS M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: Igor Mammedov <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/hw/acpi/* F: include/hw/firmware/smbios.h F: hw/mem/*
@@ -1614,6 +1763,7 @@ R: Dongjiu Geng <[email protected]> R: Xiang Zheng <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/acpi/ghes.c F: include/hw/acpi/ghes.h F: docs/specs/acpi_hest_ghes.rst
@@ -1622,6 +1772,7 @@ ppc4xx M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/ppc/ppc4*.c F: hw/i2c/ppc4xx_i2c.c F: include/hw/ppc/ppc4xx.h
@@ -1631,11 +1782,13 @@ Character devices M: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: High F: hw/char/ Network devices M: Jason Wang <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: High F: hw/net/ F: include/hw/net/ F: tests/qtest/virtio-net-test.c
@@ -1646,6 +1799,7 @@ Parallel NOR Flash devices M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> T: git https://gitlab.com/philmd/qemu.git pflash-next S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/block/pflash_cfi*.c F: include/hw/block/flash.h
@@ -1653,6 +1807,7 @@ SCSI M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> R: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/hw/scsi/* F: hw/scsi/* F: tests/qtest/virtio-scsi-test.c
@@ -1661,6 +1816,7 @@ T: git https://github.com/bonzini/qemu.git scsi-next SSI M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/ssi/* F: hw/block/m25p80.c F: include/hw/ssi/ssi.h
@@ -1670,11 +1826,13 @@ F: tests/qtest/m25p80-test.c Xilinx SPI M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/ssi/xilinx_* SD (Secure Card) M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: include/hw/sd/sd* F: hw/sd/core.c F: hw/sd/sd*
@@ -1684,6 +1842,7 @@ F: tests/qtest/sd* USB M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/usb/* F: tests/qtest/usb-*-test.c F: docs/usb2.txt
@@ -1696,11 +1855,13 @@ USB (serial adapter) M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> M: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/usb/dev-serial.c VFIO M: Alex Williamson <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/vfio/* F: include/hw/vfio/
@@ -1708,6 +1869,7 @@ vfio-ccw M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Eric Farman <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/vfio/ccw.c F: hw/s390x/s390-ccw.c F: include/hw/s390x/s390-ccw.h
@@ -1721,6 +1883,7 @@ M: Tony Krowiak <[email protected]> M: Halil Pasic <[email protected]> M: Pierre Morel <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/s390x/ap-device.c F: hw/s390x/ap-bridge.c F: include/hw/s390x/ap-device.h
@@ -1732,6 +1895,7 @@ L: [email protected] vhost M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/*/*vhost* F: docs/interop/vhost-user.json F: docs/interop/vhost-user.rst
@@ -1742,6 +1906,7 @@ F: include/sysemu/vhost-user-backend.h virtio M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/*/virtio* F: hw/virtio/Makefile.objs F: hw/virtio/trace-events
@@ -1752,6 +1917,7 @@ virtio-balloon M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/virtio/virtio-balloon*.c F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-balloon.h F: softmmu/balloon.c
@@ -1761,6 +1927,7 @@ virtio-9p M: Greg Kurz <[email protected]> M: Christian Schoenebeck <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: hw/9pfs/ X: hw/9pfs/xen-9p* F: fsdev/
@@ -1772,6 +1939,7 @@ virtio-blk M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: hw/block/virtio-blk.c F: hw/block/dataplane/* F: tests/qtest/virtio-blk-test.c
@@ -1781,6 +1949,7 @@ virtio-ccw M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Halil Pasic <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/s390x/virtio-ccw*.[hc] F: hw/s390x/vhost-vsock-ccw.c T: git https://github.com/cohuck/qemu.git s390-next
@@ -1791,6 +1960,7 @@ virtiofs M: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]> M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: tools/virtiofsd/* F: hw/virtio/vhost-user-fs* F: include/hw/virtio/vhost-user-fs.h
@@ -1799,6 +1969,7 @@ F: docs/interop/virtiofsd.rst virtio-input M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/input/vhost-user-input.c F: hw/input/virtio-input*.c F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-input.h
@@ -1807,6 +1978,7 @@ F: contrib/vhost-user-input/* virtio-iommu M: Eric Auger <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/virtio/virtio-iommu*.c F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-iommu.h
@@ -1814,6 +1986,7 @@ virtio-serial M: Laurent Vivier <[email protected]> R: Amit Shah <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/char/virtio-serial-bus.c F: hw/char/virtio-console.c F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-serial.h
@@ -1823,6 +1996,7 @@ virtio-rng M: Laurent Vivier <[email protected]> R: Amit Shah <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/virtio/virtio-rng.c F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-rng.h F: include/sysemu/rng*.h
@@ -1832,6 +2006,7 @@ F: tests/qtest/virtio-rng-test.c virtio-crypto M: Gonglei <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.c F: hw/virtio/virtio-crypto-pci.c F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.h
@@ -1839,6 +2014,7 @@ F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-crypto.h virtio-mem M: David Hildenbrand <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High W: https://virtio-mem.gitlab.io/ F: hw/virtio/virtio-mem.c F: hw/virtio/virtio-mem-pci.h
@@ -1849,6 +2025,7 @@ nvme M: Keith Busch <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: hw/block/nvme* F: tests/qtest/nvme-test.c
@@ -1856,6 +2033,7 @@ megasas M: Hannes Reinecke <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: hw/scsi/megasas.c F: hw/scsi/mfi.h F: tests/qtest/megasas-test.c
@@ -1863,6 +2041,7 @@ F: tests/qtest/megasas-test.c Network packet abstractions M: Dmitry Fleytman <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: include/net/eth.h F: net/eth.c F: hw/net/net_rx_pkt*
@@ -1871,6 +2050,7 @@ F: hw/net/net_tx_pkt* Vmware M: Dmitry Fleytman <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/net/vmxnet* F: hw/scsi/vmw_pvscsi* F: tests/qtest/vmxnet3-test.c
@@ -1878,6 +2058,7 @@ F: tests/qtest/vmxnet3-test.c Rocker M: Jiri Pirko <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/net/rocker/ F: tests/rocker/ F: docs/specs/rocker.txt
@@ -1885,6 +2066,7 @@ F: docs/specs/rocker.txt NVDIMM M: Xiao Guangrong <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/acpi/nvdimm.c F: hw/mem/nvdimm.c F: include/hw/mem/nvdimm.h
@@ -1893,27 +2075,32 @@ F: docs/nvdimm.txt e1000x M: Dmitry Fleytman <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/net/e1000x* e1000e M: Dmitry Fleytman <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/net/e1000e* eepro100 M: Stefan Weil <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/net/eepro100.c tulip M: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/net/tulip.c F: hw/net/tulip.h Generic Loader M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/core/generic-loader.c F: include/hw/core/generic-loader.h F: docs/generic-loader.txt
@@ -1921,12 +2108,14 @@ F: docs/generic-loader.txt Intel Hexadecimal Object File Loader M: Su Hang <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tests/qtest/hexloader-test.c F: tests/data/hex-loader/test.hex CHRP NVRAM M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/nvram/chrp_nvram.c F: include/hw/nvram/chrp_nvram.h F: tests/qtest/prom-env-test.c
@@ -1934,6 +2123,7 @@ F: tests/qtest/prom-env-test.c VM Generation ID M: Ben Warren <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/acpi/vmgenid.c F: include/hw/acpi/vmgenid.h F: docs/specs/vmgenid.txt
@@ -1944,6 +2134,7 @@ Unimplemented device M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: include/hw/misc/unimp.h F: hw/misc/unimp.c
@@ -1951,12 +2142,14 @@ Empty slot M: Artyom Tarasenko <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: include/hw/misc/empty_slot.h F: hw/misc/empty_slot.c Standard VGA M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/display/vga* F: hw/display/bochs-display.c F: include/hw/display/vga.h
@@ -1965,12 +2158,14 @@ F: include/hw/display/bochs-vbe.h ramfb M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/display/ramfb*.c F: include/hw/display/ramfb.h virtio-gpu M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/display/virtio-gpu* F: hw/display/virtio-vga.* F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-gpu.h
@@ -1978,6 +2173,7 @@ F: include/hw/virtio/virtio-gpu.h vhost-user-blk M: Raphael Norwitz <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: contrib/vhost-user-blk/ F: contrib/vhost-user-scsi/ F: hw/block/vhost-user-blk.c
@@ -1991,6 +2187,7 @@ vhost-user-gpu M: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: docs/interop/vhost-user-gpu.rst F: contrib/vhost-user-gpu F: hw/display/vhost-user-*
@@ -1998,12 +2195,14 @@ F: hw/display/vhost-user-* Cirrus VGA M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low W: https://www.kraxel.org/blog/2014/10/qemu-using-cirrus-considered-harmful/ F: hw/display/cirrus* EDID Generator M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/display/edid* F: include/hw/display/edid.h F: qemu-edid.c
@@ -2012,6 +2211,7 @@ PIIX4 South Bridge (i82371AB) M: Hervé Poussineau <[email protected]> M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/isa/piix4.c F: include/hw/southbridge/piix.h
@@ -2020,6 +2220,7 @@ M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> R: Laszlo Ersek <[email protected]> R: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: docs/specs/fw_cfg.txt F: hw/nvram/fw_cfg.c F: stubs/fw_cfg.c
@@ -2034,6 +2235,7 @@ M: David Gibson <[email protected]> M: Cédric Le Goater <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: hw/*/*xive* F: include/hw/*/*xive* F: docs/*/*xive*
@@ -2042,6 +2244,7 @@ Renesas peripherals M: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> R: Magnus Damm <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/char/renesas_sci.c F: hw/char/sh_serial.c F: hw/timer/renesas_*.c
@@ -2053,6 +2256,7 @@ F: include/hw/timer/renesas_*.h Renesas RX peripherals M: Yoshinori Sato <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/intc/rx_icu.c F: hw/rx/ F: include/hw/intc/rx_icu.h
@@ -2063,6 +2267,7 @@ Subsystems Audio M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: audio/ F: hw/audio/ F: include/hw/audio/
@@ -2075,6 +2280,7 @@ M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> M: Max Reitz <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block* F: block/ F: hw/block/
@@ -2093,6 +2299,7 @@ M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: util/async.c F: util/aio-*.c F: util/aio-*.h
@@ -2109,6 +2316,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> R: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: include/scsi/* F: scsi/*
@@ -2116,6 +2324,7 @@ Block Jobs M: John Snow <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: blockjob.c F: include/block/blockjob.h F: job.c
@@ -2131,6 +2340,7 @@ T: git https://github.com/jnsnow/qemu.git jobs Block QAPI, monitor, command line M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: blockdev.c F: blockdev-hmp-cmds.c F: block/qapi.c
@@ -2144,6 +2354,7 @@ M: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <[email protected]> R: John Snow <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: include/qemu/hbitmap.h F: include/block/dirty-bitmap.h F: block/monitor/bitmap-qmp-cmds.c
@@ -2159,6 +2370,7 @@ Character device backends M: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: chardev/ F: include/chardev/ F: qapi/char.json
@@ -2166,11 +2378,13 @@ F: qapi/char.json Character Devices (Braille) M: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: chardev/baum.c Command line option argument parsing M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/qemu/option.h F: tests/test-keyval.c F: tests/test-qemu-opts.c
@@ -2180,22 +2394,26 @@ F: util/qemu-option.c Coverity model M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: scripts/coverity-model.c Coverity Scan integration M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: scripts/coverity-scan/ Device Tree M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> R: David Gibson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: device_tree.c F: include/sysemu/device_tree.h Dump S: Supported +C: Low M: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> F: dump/ F: hw/misc/vmcoreinfo.c
@@ -2210,6 +2428,7 @@ F: stubs/dump.c Error reporting M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/qapi/error.h F: include/qemu/error-report.h F: qapi/error.json
@@ -2226,12 +2445,14 @@ GDB stub M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: gdbstub* F: gdb-xml/ Memory API M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/exec/ioport.h F: include/exec/memop.h F: include/exec/memory.h
@@ -2246,6 +2467,7 @@ F: scripts/coccinelle/memory-region-housekeeping.cocci SPICE M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: include/ui/qemu-spice.h F: include/ui/spice-display.h F: ui/spice-*.c
@@ -2257,6 +2479,7 @@ F: docs/spice-port-fqdn.txt Graphics M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: ui/ F: include/ui/ F: qapi/ui.json
@@ -2265,11 +2488,13 @@ F: util/drm.c Cocoa graphics M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: ui/cocoa.m Main loop M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: include/qemu/main-loop.h F: include/sysemu/runstate.h F: util/main-loop.c
@@ -2283,6 +2508,7 @@ F: qapi/run-state.json Human Monitor (HMP) M: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: monitor/monitor-internal.h F: monitor/misc.c F: monitor/monitor.c
@@ -2297,6 +2523,7 @@ F: util/qemu-print.c Network device backends M: Jason Wang <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: net/ F: include/net/ F: qemu-bridge-helper.c
@@ -2309,12 +2536,14 @@ M: Giuseppe Lettieri <[email protected]> M: Vincenzo Maffione <[email protected]> W: http://info.iet.unipi.it/~luigi/netmap/ S: Maintained +C: High F: net/netmap.c Host Memory Backends M: Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]> M: Igor Mammedov <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: backends/hostmem*.c F: include/sysemu/hostmem.h T: git https://github.com/ehabkost/qemu.git machine-next
@@ -2322,6 +2551,7 @@ T: git https://github.com/ehabkost/qemu.git machine-next Cryptodev Backends M: Gonglei <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: include/sysemu/cryptodev*.h F: backends/cryptodev*.c
@@ -2329,6 +2559,7 @@ Python scripts M: Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]> M: Cleber Rosa <[email protected]> S: Odd fixes +C: Low F: python/qemu/*py F: scripts/*.py F: tests/*.py
@@ -2336,12 +2567,14 @@ F: tests/*.py Benchmark util M: Vladimir Sementsov-Ogievskiy <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: scripts/simplebench/ QAPI M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> M: Michael Roth <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: qapi/ X: qapi/*.json F: include/qapi/
@@ -2361,12 +2594,14 @@ QAPI Schema M: Eric Blake <[email protected]> M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: qapi/*.json T: git https://repo.or.cz/qemu/armbru.git qapi-next QObject M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: qobject/ F: include/qapi/qmp/ X: include/qapi/qmp/dispatch.h
@@ -2385,6 +2620,7 @@ T: git https://repo.or.cz/qemu/armbru.git qapi-next QEMU Guest Agent M: Michael Roth <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: qga/ F: docs/interop/qemu-ga.rst F: scripts/qemu-guest-agent/
@@ -2397,6 +2633,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> R: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> R: Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: docs/qdev-device-use.txt F: hw/core/qdev* F: hw/core/bus.c
@@ -2415,6 +2652,7 @@ F: tests/test-qdev-global-props.c QMP M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: monitor/monitor-internal.h F: monitor/qmp* F: monitor/misc.c
@@ -2432,6 +2670,7 @@ M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> M: Laurent Vivier <[email protected]> R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: softmmu/qtest.c F: accel/qtest.c F: tests/qtest/
@@ -2443,12 +2682,14 @@ R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> R: Bandan Das <[email protected]> R: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tests/qtest/fuzz/ F: scripts/oss-fuzz/ Register API M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/core/register.c F: include/hw/register.h F: include/hw/registerfields.h
@@ -2456,6 +2697,7 @@ F: include/hw/registerfields.h SLIRP M: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: slirp/ F: net/slirp.c F: include/net/slirp.h
@@ -2464,17 +2706,20 @@ T: git https://people.debian.org/~sthibault/qemu.git slirp Streams M: Edgar E. Iglesias <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/core/stream.c F: include/hw/stream.h Stubs M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: stubs/ Tracing M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: trace/ F: trace-events F: docs/qemu-option-trace.rst.inc
@@ -2488,6 +2733,7 @@ T: git https://github.com/stefanha/qemu.git tracing TPM M: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tpm.c F: stubs/tpm.c F: hw/tpm/*
@@ -2500,12 +2746,14 @@ T: git https://github.com/stefanberger/qemu-tpm.git tpm-next Checkpatch S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: scripts/checkpatch.pl Migration M: Juan Quintela <[email protected]> M: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/core/vmstate-if.c F: include/hw/vmstate-if.h F: include/migration/
@@ -2519,6 +2767,7 @@ F: qapi/migration.json D-Bus M: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: backends/dbus-vmstate.c F: tests/dbus-vmstate* F: util/dbus.c
@@ -2529,12 +2778,14 @@ F: docs/interop/dbus-vmstate.rst Seccomp M: Eduardo Otubo <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: qemu-seccomp.c F: include/sysemu/seccomp.h Cryptography M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: crypto/ F: include/crypto/ F: tests/test-crypto-*
@@ -2547,6 +2798,7 @@ Coroutines M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: util/*coroutine* F: include/qemu/coroutine* F: tests/test-coroutine.c
@@ -2554,12 +2806,14 @@ F: tests/test-coroutine.c Buffers M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> S: Odd fixes +C: Low F: util/buffer.c F: include/qemu/buffer.h I/O Channels M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: io/ F: include/io/ F: tests/test-io-*
@@ -2567,6 +2821,7 @@ F: tests/test-io-* User authorization M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: authz/ F: qapi/authz.json F: include/authz/
@@ -2576,6 +2831,7 @@ Sockets M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: include/qemu/sockets.h F: util/qemu-sockets.c F: qapi/sockets.json
@@ -2583,6 +2839,7 @@ F: qapi/sockets.json File monitor M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> S: Odd fixes +C: Low F: util/filemonitor*.c F: include/qemu/filemonitor.h F: tests/test-util-filemonitor.c
@@ -2590,6 +2847,7 @@ F: tests/test-util-filemonitor.c Throttling infrastructure M: Alberto Garcia <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: block/throttle-groups.c F: include/block/throttle-groups.h F: include/qemu/throttle*.h
@@ -2601,6 +2859,7 @@ L: [email protected] UUID M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: util/uuid.c F: include/qemu/uuid.h F: tests/test-uuid.c
@@ -2608,6 +2867,7 @@ F: tests/test-uuid.c COLO Framework M: zhanghailiang <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: migration/colo* F: include/migration/colo.h F: include/migration/failover.h
@@ -2617,6 +2877,7 @@ COLO Proxy M: Zhang Chen <[email protected]> M: Li Zhijian <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: docs/colo-proxy.txt F: net/colo* F: net/filter-rewriter.c
@@ -2627,6 +2888,7 @@ M: Pavel Dovgalyuk <[email protected]> R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> W: https://wiki.qemu.org/Features/record-replay S: Supported +C: High F: replay/* F: block/blkreplay.c F: net/filter-replay.c
@@ -2638,17 +2900,20 @@ F: tests/acceptance/replay_kernel.py IOVA Tree M: Peter Xu <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: include/qemu/iova-tree.h F: util/iova-tree.c elf2dmp M: Viktor Prutyanov <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: contrib/elf2dmp/ I2C and SMBus M: Corey Minyard <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/i2c/core.c F: hw/i2c/smbus_slave.c F: hw/i2c/smbus_master.c
@@ -2662,6 +2927,7 @@ EDK2 Firmware M: Laszlo Ersek <[email protected]> M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: pc-bios/descriptors/??-edk2-*.json F: pc-bios/edk2-* F: roms/Makefile.edk2
@@ -2677,6 +2943,7 @@ M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: Peter Xu <[email protected]> R: Jason Wang <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: hw/i386/intel_iommu.c F: hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h F: include/hw/i386/intel_iommu.h
@@ -2686,17 +2953,20 @@ Usermode Emulation Overall usermode emulation M: Riku Voipio <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: thunk.c F: accel/tcg/user-exec*.c BSD user S: Orphan +C: Low F: bsd-user/ F: default-configs/*-bsd-user.mak Linux user M: Laurent Vivier <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: linux-user/ F: default-configs/*-linux-user.mak F: scripts/qemu-binfmt-conf.sh
@@ -2709,12 +2979,14 @@ Tiny Code Generator (TCG) Common TCG code M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tcg/ F: include/tcg/ TCG Plugins M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: docs/devel/tcg-plugins.rst F: plugins/ F: tests/plugin
@@ -2722,6 +2994,7 @@ F: tests/plugin AArch64 TCG target M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low L: [email protected] F: tcg/aarch64/ F: disas/arm-a64.cc
@@ -2730,6 +3003,7 @@ F: disas/libvixl/ ARM TCG target M: Andrzej Zaborowski <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low L: [email protected] F: tcg/arm/ F: disas/arm.c
@@ -2737,6 +3011,7 @@ F: disas/arm.c i386 TCG target M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tcg/i386/ F: disas/i386.c
@@ -2745,11 +3020,13 @@ M: Aleksandar Markovic <[email protected]> R: Aurelien Jarno <[email protected]> R: Aleksandar Rikalo <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tcg/mips/ PPC TCG target M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: tcg/ppc/ F: disas/ppc.c
@@ -2758,24 +3035,28 @@ M: Palmer Dabbelt <[email protected]> M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: tcg/riscv/ F: disas/riscv.c S390 TCG target M: Richard Henderson <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tcg/s390/ F: disas/s390.c L: [email protected] SPARC TCG target S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: tcg/sparc/ F: disas/sparc.c TCI TCG target M: Stefan Weil <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tcg/tci/ F: tcg/tci.c F: disas/tci.c
@@ -2786,12 +3067,14 @@ VMDK M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/vmdk.c RBD M: Jason Dillaman <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/rbd.c Sheepdog
@@ -2799,18 +3082,21 @@ M: Liu Yuan <[email protected]> L: [email protected] L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: block/sheepdog.c VHDX M: Jeff Cody <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/vhdx* VDI M: Stefan Weil <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: block/vdi.c iSCSI
@@ -2819,6 +3105,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> M: Peter Lieven <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: block/iscsi.c F: block/iscsi-opts.c
@@ -2826,6 +3113,7 @@ Network Block Device (NBD) M: Eric Blake <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: block/nbd* F: nbd/ F: include/block/nbd*
@@ -2839,45 +3127,53 @@ NFS M: Peter Lieven <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: block/nfs.c SSH M: Richard W.M. Jones <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/ssh.c CURL L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: block/curl.c GLUSTER L: [email protected] L: [email protected] S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: block/gluster.c Null Block Driver M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: block/null.c NVMe Block Driver M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: block/nvme* Bootdevice M: Gonglei <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: bootdevice.c Quorum M: Alberto Garcia <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: block/quorum.c L: [email protected]
@@ -2885,30 +3181,35 @@ blklogwrites M: Ari Sundholm <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/blklogwrites.c blkverify M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/blkverify.c bochs M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: block/bochs.c cloop M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: block/cloop.c dmg M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/dmg.c parallels
@@ -2916,6 +3217,7 @@ M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> M: Denis V. Lunev <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/parallels.c F: docs/interop/parallels.txt
@@ -2923,12 +3225,14 @@ qed M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/qed.c raw M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/linux-aio.c F: include/block/raw-aio.h F: block/raw-format.c
@@ -2942,6 +3246,7 @@ M: Julia Suvorova <[email protected]> M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: block/io_uring.c F: stubs/io_uring.c
@@ -2950,6 +3255,7 @@ M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> M: Max Reitz <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/qcow2* F: docs/interop/qcow2.txt
@@ -2957,6 +3263,7 @@ qcow M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/qcow.c blkdebug
@@ -2964,30 +3271,35 @@ M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> M: Max Reitz <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/blkdebug.c vpc M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: block/vpc.c vvfat M: Kevin Wolf <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: block/vvfat.c Image format fuzzer M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: Low F: tests/image-fuzzer/ Replication M: Wen Congyang <[email protected]> M: Xie Changlong <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: replication* F: block/replication.c F: tests/test-replication.c
@@ -2997,6 +3309,7 @@ PVRDMA M: Yuval Shaia <[email protected]> M: Marcel Apfelbaum <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/rdma/* F: hw/rdma/vmw/* F: docs/pvrdma.txt
@@ -3006,6 +3319,7 @@ F: qapi/rdma.json Semihosting M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: hw/semihosting/ F: include/hw/semihosting/
@@ -3016,6 +3330,7 @@ M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: .github/lockdown.yml F: .travis.yml F: scripts/travis/
@@ -3031,6 +3346,7 @@ FreeBSD Hosted Continuous Integration M: Ed Maste <[email protected]> M: Li-Wen Hsu <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: .cirrus.yml W: https://cirrus-ci.com/github/qemu/qemu
@@ -3040,12 +3356,14 @@ M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> R: Wainer dos Santos Moschetta <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: .gitlab-ci.yml Guest Test Compilation Support M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tests/tcg/Makefile F: tests/tcg/Makefile.include
@@ -3055,6 +3373,7 @@ R: Cleber Rosa <[email protected]> R: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> R: Wainer dos Santos Moschetta <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: tests/acceptance/ Documentation
@@ -3062,11 +3381,13 @@ Documentation Build system architecture M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: docs/devel/build-system.txt GIT Data Mining Config M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: gitdm.config F: contrib/gitdm/*
@@ -3079,6 +3400,7 @@ Build System GIT submodules M: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: Low F: scripts/git-submodule.sh UI translations
@@ -3088,6 +3410,7 @@ F: po/*.po Sphinx documentation configuration and build machinery M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: docs/conf.py F: docs/*/conf.py
@@ -3096,4 +3419,5 @@ Miscellaneous Performance Tools and Tests M: Ahmed Karaman <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: scripts/performance/
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 15 lines · P J P
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
Quoted 5 lines
The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
How does this interact with the way we already document our level of security support in docs/system/security.rst ?
MAINTAINERS Descriptions of section entries: · line 43
Quoted 8 lines
MAINTAINERS +8
-0+ C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE.
The difficulty with this is that MAINTAINERS is not set up with a split between "security issues" and "non-security issues". For instance this stanza:
MAINTAINERS ARM TCG CPUs · line 167
Quoted 8 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ ARM TCG CPUs M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/arm/ F: tests/tcg/arm/ F: tests/tcg/aarch64/
you have marked "Low", but the files it covers include both ones used by TCG (not security-critical) and ones used by KVM (security-critical).
Also, MAINTAINERS is not user-facing. If we want to say that vvfat or 9pfs are not suitable for use on a security boundary and that we do not consider bugs in them to be security issues, we should do that in the user-facing documentation.
Broadly speaking, it feels like you're trying to come up with an automatic way to say "does this patch touch a security-relevant part of the code", and I'm not sure that that's possible.
Quoted 2 lines
GIT Data Mining Config
M: Alex Bennée <[email protected]>
Something in your patch workflow is mangling UTF-8 characters, incidentally.
thanks
-- PMM
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 57 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 15 lines · P J P
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
Quoted 5 lines
The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
How does this interact with the way we already document our level of security support in
docs/system/security.rst?MAINTAINERS Descriptions of section entries: · line 43
Quoted 8 lines
MAINTAINERS +8
-0+ C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE.The difficulty with this is that
MAINTAINERSis not set up with a split between "security issues" and "non-security issues". For instance this stanza:MAINTAINERS ARM TCG CPUs · line 167
Quoted 8 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ ARM TCG CPUs M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/arm/ F: tests/tcg/arm/ F: tests/tcg/aarch64/you have marked "Low", but the files it covers include both ones used by TCG (not security-critical) and ones used by KVM (security-critical).
Also,
MAINTAINERSis not user-facing. If we want to say that vvfat or 9pfs are not suitable for use on a security boundary and that we do not consider bugs in them to be security issues, we should do that in the user-facing documentation.
Quoted 4 lines
Broadly speaking, it feels like you're trying to come up with an automatic way to say "does this patch touch a security-relevant part of the code", and I'm not sure that that's possible.
I agree that it isn't possible in the MAINTAINERS file, as the level of granularity is a very poor match for what we want to express.
My high level thought would be that we should ultimately be able to have a build flag to request only security-critical code is built into the binaries.
This is probably a bit too much of a stretch goal right now, but it at least points towards maintaining the information on a per-file level of granularity. There might be some individual files which currently contain a mix security-critical/not-security critical code. Either they can be split eventually, or we can simply declare that the entire file is none the less security critical.
We could perhaps have a magic comment at the top of each file that is security critical. eg
/* @security: maintained */
we don't need any comment in files we consider non-maintained from a security POV. Eventually we could do some (insert hand waving) magic in meson to pull out this list of comments and use it to exclude build of files that are not security critical. Maybe we find out that using a magic comment isn't the best option, but at least if we start now by keeping a per-file comment, we can probably do an automated transformation to any other data storage later.
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 63 lines · Daniel P. Berrangé
Quoted 57 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 15 lines · P J P
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
Quoted 5 lines
The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
How does this interact with the way we already document our level of security support in
docs/system/security.rst?MAINTAINERS Descriptions of section entries: · line 43
Quoted 8 lines
MAINTAINERS +8
-0+ C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE.The difficulty with this is that
MAINTAINERSis not set up with a split between "security issues" and "non-security issues". For instance this stanza:MAINTAINERS ARM TCG CPUs · line 167
Quoted 8 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ ARM TCG CPUs M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/arm/ F: tests/tcg/arm/ F: tests/tcg/aarch64/you have marked "Low", but the files it covers include both ones used by TCG (not security-critical) and ones used by KVM (security-critical).
Also,
MAINTAINERSis not user-facing. If we want to say that vvfat or 9pfs are not suitable for use on a security boundary and that we do not consider bugs in them to be security issues, we should do that in the user-facing documentation.Quoted 4 lines
Broadly speaking, it feels like you're trying to come up with an automatic way to say "does this patch touch a security-relevant part of the code", and I'm not sure that that's possible.
Quoted 6 lines
I agree that it isn't possible in the
MAINTAINERSfile, as the level of granularity is a very poor match for what we want to express.My high level thought would be that we should ultimately be able to have a build flag to request only security-critical code is built into the binaries.
And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue if it reproduces with -security=low".
Quoted 26 lines
This is probably a bit too much of a stretch goal right now, but it at least points towards maintaining the information on a per-file level of granularity. There might be some individual files which currently contain a mix security-critical/not-security critical code. Either they can be split eventually, or we can simply declare that the entire file is none the less security critical.
We could perhaps have a magic comment at the top of each file that is security critical. eg
/* @security: maintained */
we don't need any comment in files we consider non-maintained from a security POV. Eventually we could do some (insert hand waving) magic in meson to pull out this list of comments and use it to exclude build of files that are not security critical. Maybe we find out that using a magic comment isn't the best option, but at least if we start now by keeping a per-file comment, we can probably do an automated transformation to any other data storage later.
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue if it reproduces with -security=low".
I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security researchers' lives a bit easier".
thanks
-- PMM
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 7 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue if it reproduces with -security=low".
Quoted 8 lines
I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security researchers' lives a bit easier".
thanks
-- PMM
True. And I guess downstreams can also force the option to high or set the default to high rather easily if they want to.
So the option would be:
-security level
Set minimal required security level of QEMU.
high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against
malicious guests.
low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security
against malicious guests.
Default would be -security low.
Does this look reasonable?
Just a correction to what I wrote: I no longer think it's reasonable to classify the severity of a security issue automatically. E.g. a qemu crash in virtio code is a high severity security issue if it triggers with platform_iommu=on since it is then driver from guest userspace, and low severity one without since then it's driven from a guest driver.
So I think we can add something like this to security.rst and to the wiki:
only a security issue if it
reproduces with -security high, a regular bug if it only reproduces with -security low
Prasad?
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MST
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Hello all,
Thank you so much for the comments and inptus, I appreciate it.
+-- On Tue, 14 Jul 2020, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote --+ | On Tue, Jul 14, 2020 at 11:22:28AM +0100, Peter Maydell wrote: | > On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 at 11:12, Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> wrote: | > > And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like | > > Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. | > > We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue | > > if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue | > > if it reproduces with -security=low". | > | > I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it | > easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I | > didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful | > for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security | > researchers' lives a bit easier".
* General consensus seems to be that MAINTAINERS file is not best suited for such security related annotation.
* We generally ask researchers if the issue is reproducible with '-enable-kvm', so it excludes TCG use cases.
| -security level | Set minimal required security level of QEMU. | | high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against | malicious guests.
secure -> insecure, I think?
| low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security | against malicious guests. | | Default would be -security low. | | Does this look reasonable? | | Just a correction to what I wrote: I no longer think it's reasonable to | classify the severity of a security issue automatically. E.g. a qemu | crash in virtio code is a high severity security issue if it triggers | with platform_iommu=on since it is then driver from guest userspace, and | low severity one without since then it's driven from a guest driver. | | So I think we can add something like this to security.rst and to | the wiki: | | only a security issue if it | reproduces with -security high, a regular bug if it only reproduces with | -security low | | Prasad?
IIUC:
* QEMU would abort(3), if a user attempts to start QEMU with insecure options like say -virtfs OR -fda fat:floopy OR -netdev user OR -device tulip ?
* One way could be to abort(3) at options parsing stage, if 'security' flag is set to high(1) and continue further if it is low(0).
* ie. for each option we'd need do define if it is safe or not?
Does that seem right? OR do we maintain a run time list of features/options deemed to be safe? Either way, we need to define some place, which QEMU functions/devices/backends etc. are safe.
Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
8685 545E B54C 486B C6EB 271E E285 8B5A F050 DE8D
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 18:40:11 +0530 (IST)
P J P <[email protected]> wrote:
<just commenting on this one>
Quoted 5 lines
* QEMU would abort(3), if a user attempts to start QEMU with insecure options like say -virtfs OR -fda fat:floopy OR -netdev user OR -device tulip ?
* One way could be to abort(3) at options parsing stage, if 'security' flag is set to high(1) and continue further if it is low(0).
Failing to start (with a message that explains why) if one of the command line options is not covered by a specified security policy is not unreasonable (after all, we fail to start for other cases of incompatible command line options as well.) However, we also need to cover dynamically-added devices. Aborting seems very bad there, just failing to add the device seems like what we'd want.
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 11 lines · Cornelia Huck
On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 18:40:11 +0530 (IST)
P J P <[email protected]> wrote:<just commenting on this one>
Quoted 5 lines
* QEMU would abort(3), if a user attempts to start QEMU with insecure options like say -virtfs OR -fda fat:floopy OR -netdev user OR -device tulip ?
* One way could be to abort(3) at options parsing stage, if 'security' flag is set to high(1) and continue further if it is low(0).
Quoted 6 lines
Failing to start (with a message that explains why) if one of the command line options is not covered by a specified security policy is not unreasonable (after all, we fail to start for other cases of incompatible command line options as well.) However, we also need to cover dynamically-added devices. Aborting seems very bad there, just failing to add the device seems like what we'd want.
Yep, aborting is simply not an option for the inner code. It all has to propagate to a proper Error **errp object. The ultimate entry-point at the CLI vs QMP then decides whether to turn the error into an abort or feed back to the client app.
Regards,
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
+-- On Thu, 16 Jul 2020, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote --+ | > Failing to start (with a message that explains why) if one of the command | > line options is not covered by a specified security policy is not | > unreasonable (after all, we fail to start for other cases of incompatible | > command line options as well.)
Yes, that's right.
| > However, we also need to cover dynamically-added devices. Aborting seems | > very bad there, just failing to add the device seems like what we'd want. | | Yep, aborting is simply not an option for the inner code. It all has to | propagate to a proper Error **errp object. The ultimate entry-point at the | CLI vs QMP then decides whether to turn the error into an abort or feed back | to the client app.
True, handling dynamic devices is tricky.
Though it seems kind of uniform workflow to check for '--security' flag at options parsing OR while handling dynamic devices at run time; It is a huge task to cover all options/use-cases for all QEMU emulators across various architectures.
* If this approach is reasonable, I'll try to make an initial patch towards it.
* We'd still need to figure out similar way for compile time option, to exclude building insecure features at build time.
Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
8685 545E B54C 486B C6EB 271E E285 8B5A F050 DE8D
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 16 lines · P J P
+-- On Thu, 16 Jul 2020, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote --+ | > Failing to start (with a message that explains why) if one of the command | > line options is not covered by a specified security policy is not | > unreasonable (after all, we fail to start for other cases of incompatible | > command line options as well.)Yes, that's right.
| > However, we also need to cover dynamically-added devices. Aborting seems | > very bad there, just failing to add the device seems like what we'd want. | | Yep, aborting is simply not an option for the inner code. It all has to | propagate to a proper Error **errp object. The ultimate entry-point at the | CLI vs QMP then decides whether to turn the error into an abort or feed back | to the client app.
Quoted 6 lines
True, handling dynamic devices is tricky.
Though it seems kind of uniform workflow to check for '--security' flag at options parsing OR while handling dynamic devices at run time; It is a huge task to cover all options/use-cases for all QEMU emulators across various architectures.
Yes, I mentioned earlier in the thread that doing this security check at runtime is going to be a huge amount of work, because it will need to be wired up across a wide range of subsystems and APIS and implemnetations in the QEMU codebase.
I don't think option parsing time will be the place you want a check at all. You need to parse the --security flag, but once that's done I think everything else needs to be done at time of object creation, not config parsing. That ensures the check is present in all possible codepaths that lead to the functionality being used.
Quoted 5 lines
* If this approach is reasonable, I'll try to make an initial patch towards it.
* We'd still need to figure out similar way for compile time option, to exclude building insecure features at build time.
My suggestion is to do compile time stuff first, as that ought to be a simpler problem. Having said that, if Paolo's work on meson is likely to arrive any time soon, then it might make sense to wait for that, instead of implementing something for Make and then throwing it away a release later and doing it from scratch in Meson.
Regards,
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
In reply to P J PQuoted 20 lines · On Donnerstag, 16. Juli 2020 11:21:55 CEST P J P wrote:
+-- On Thu, 16 Jul 2020, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote --+
| > Failing to start (with a message that explains why) if one of the | > command | > line options is not covered by a specified security policy is not | > unreasonable (after all, we fail to start for other cases of | > incompatible | > command line options as well.)Yes, that's right.
| > However, we also need to cover dynamically-added devices. Aborting seems | > very bad there, just failing to add the device seems like what we'd | > want. | | Yep, aborting is simply not an option for the inner code. It all has to | propagate to a proper Error **errp object. The ultimate entry-point at the | CLI vs QMP then decides whether to turn the error into an abort or feed | back to the client app.
Quoted 6 lines
True, handling dynamic devices is tricky.
Though it seems kind of uniform workflow to check for '--security' flag at options parsing OR while handling dynamic devices at run time; It is a huge task to cover all options/use-cases for all QEMU emulators across various architectures.
My concern here is that just distinguishing between either 'low' or 'high' is a far too rough classification.
In our preceding communication regarding 9pfs, I made clear that a) we do care about security relevant 9pfs issues, and only b) the avarage use cases (as far we know) for 9pfs are above a certain trust level.
However b) does not imply 9pfs being 'unsafe', nor that we want users to refrain using it in a security relevant environment. So 9pfs would actually be somewhere in between.
Best regards,
Christian Schoenebeck
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 31 lines · Christian Schoenebeck
Quoted 20 lines · On Donnerstag, 16. Juli 2020 11:21:55 CEST P J P wrote:
+-- On Thu, 16 Jul 2020, Daniel P. Berrangé wrote --+
| > Failing to start (with a message that explains why) if one of the | > command | > line options is not covered by a specified security policy is not | > unreasonable (after all, we fail to start for other cases of | > incompatible | > command line options as well.)Yes, that's right.
| > However, we also need to cover dynamically-added devices. Aborting seems | > very bad there, just failing to add the device seems like what we'd | > want. | | Yep, aborting is simply not an option for the inner code. It all has to | propagate to a proper Error **errp object. The ultimate entry-point at the | CLI vs QMP then decides whether to turn the error into an abort or feed | back to the client app.Quoted 6 lines
True, handling dynamic devices is tricky.
Though it seems kind of uniform workflow to check for '--security' flag at options parsing OR while handling dynamic devices at run time; It is a huge task to cover all options/use-cases for all QEMU emulators across various architectures.
My concern here is that just distinguishing between either 'low' or 'high' is a far too rough classification.
Quoted 7 lines
In our preceding communication regarding 9pfs, I made clear that a) we do care about security relevant 9pfs issues, and only b) the avarage use cases (as far we know) for 9pfs are above a certain trust level.
However b) does not imply 9pfs being 'unsafe', nor that we want users to refrain using it in a security relevant environment. So 9pfs would actually be somewhere in between.
We shouldn't overthink this and invent many classification levels.
This is essentially about distinguishing code that is written with the intent of protecting from a malicous guest, from code that assumes a non-malicious guest. That is a pretty clear demarcation on when it is reasonable to use any given feature in QEMU.
Within the set of code that is assuming a malicious guest, there are still going to be varying levels of quality, and that is ok. We don't need to express that programatically, the docs are still there to describe the fine nuances of any given feature. We're just saying that in general, this set of code is acceptable to use in combination with a malicious guest, and if you find bugs we'll triage them as security flaws.
9p is generally written from the POV of protecting against a malicious guest, so it would be considered part of the high security set, and flaws will be treated as CVEs. We don't need to be break it down into any more detail than that.
Regards,
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 18 lines · On Donnerstag, 16. Juli 2020 12:01:57 CEST Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
Quoted 10 lines
My concern here is that just distinguishing between either 'low' or 'high' is a far too rough classification.
In our preceding communication regarding 9pfs, I made clear that a) we do care about security relevant 9pfs issues, and only b) the avarage use cases (as far we know) for 9pfs are above a certain trust level.
However b) does not imply 9pfs being 'unsafe', nor that we want users to refrain using it in a security relevant environment. So 9pfs would actually be somewhere in between.
We shouldn't overthink this and invent many classification levels.
This is essentially about distinguishing code that is written with the intent of protecting from a malicous guest, from code that assumes a non-malicious guest. That is a pretty clear demarcation on when it is reasonable to use any given feature in QEMU.
Quoted 7 lines
Within the set of code that is assuming a malicious guest, there are still going to be varying levels of quality, and that is ok. We don't need to express that programatically, the docs are still there to describe the fine nuances of any given feature. We're just saying that in general, this set of code is acceptable to use in combination with a malicious guest, and if you find bugs we'll triage them as security flaws.
Yes, that would be a base consideration for any security classification. And it applies to 9pfs hence it would suggest 'high' for 9pfs, but ...
Quoted 4 lines
9p is generally written from the POV of protecting against a malicious guest, so it would be considered part of the high security set, and flaws will be treated as CVEs. We don't need to be break it down into any more detail than that.
... this is where it already differs from reality, as 9pfs security issues were both handled as CVEs as well as normal reports for years, which nobody objected.
So I wonder how helpful it would be trying to either put 9pfs into either 'high' or 'low', because another observed problematic with 9pfs is that the degree of participation is so low, that if you try to impose certain formal minimum requirements to contributors, you usually never hear from them again.
And BTW Prasad actually suggested the opposite classification:
Quoted 11 lines
(quoted diff) +1
-0@@ -1761,6 +1927,7 @@ virtio-9p M: Greg Kurz <[email protected]> M: Christian Schoenebeck <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: LowF: hw/9pfs/
X: hw/9pfs/xen-9p*
F: fsdev/
Even though we discussed this issue with him in detail before, which probably shows that a simple binary security classification is too coarse and too ambiguous.
Best regards,
Christian Schoenebeck
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 30 lines · Christian Schoenebeck
Quoted 18 lines · On Donnerstag, 16. Juli 2020 12:01:57 CEST Daniel P. Berrangé wrote:
Quoted 10 lines
My concern here is that just distinguishing between either 'low' or 'high' is a far too rough classification.
In our preceding communication regarding 9pfs, I made clear that a) we do care about security relevant 9pfs issues, and only b) the avarage use cases (as far we know) for 9pfs are above a certain trust level.
However b) does not imply 9pfs being 'unsafe', nor that we want users to refrain using it in a security relevant environment. So 9pfs would actually be somewhere in between.
We shouldn't overthink this and invent many classification levels.
This is essentially about distinguishing code that is written with the intent of protecting from a malicous guest, from code that assumes a non-malicious guest. That is a pretty clear demarcation on when it is reasonable to use any given feature in QEMU.
Quoted 7 lines
Within the set of code that is assuming a malicious guest, there are still going to be varying levels of quality, and that is ok. We don't need to express that programatically, the docs are still there to describe the fine nuances of any given feature. We're just saying that in general, this set of code is acceptable to use in combination with a malicious guest, and if you find bugs we'll triage them as security flaws.
Yes, that would be a base consideration for any security classification. And it applies to 9pfs hence it would suggest 'high' for 9pfs, but ...
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
9p is generally written from the POV of protecting against a malicious guest, so it would be considered part of the high security set, and flaws will be treated as CVEs. We don't need to be break it down into any more detail than that.
... this is where it already differs from reality, as 9pfs security issues were both handled as CVEs as well as normal reports for years, which nobody objected.
Even if something is classified as "high", we still have the freedom to decide whether each specific issue is worthy of a CVE or not.
Quoted 6 lines
So I wonder how helpful it would be trying to either put 9pfs into either 'high' or 'low', because another observed problematic with 9pfs is that the degree of participation is so low, that if you try to impose certain formal minimum requirements to contributors, you usually never hear from them again.
And BTW Prasad actually suggested the opposite classification:
I don't personally mind whether 9p is classified high or low. It is really upto the maintainers to decide which classification best fits. I'm just saying that I think the simple binary choice is sufficient for our needs.
Regards,
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
In reply to Michael S. TsirkinQuoted 25 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 7 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 5 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue if it reproduces with -security=low".
Quoted 8 lines
I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security researchers' lives a bit easier".
thanks
-- PMMTrue. And I guess downstreams can also force the option to high or set the default to high rather easily if they want to.
So the option would be:
-security level
Set minimal required security level of QEMU.
Quoted 8 lines
high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against
malicious guests.
low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security
against malicious guests.Default would be -security low.
Does this look reasonable?
The challenge I see is that wiring up a runtime flag into every relevant part of the QEMU codebase is an pretty large amount of work. Every device, every machine type, every backend type, every generic subsystem will all need checks for this flag. It is possible, but it isn't going to be quick or easy, especially with poor error reporting support in many areas.
Regards,
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Am 14.07.2020 um 15:30 hat Daniel P. Berrangé geschrieben:
Quoted 33 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 32 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 7 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines
And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue if it reproduces with -security=low".
Quoted 8 lines
I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security researchers' lives a bit easier".
thanks
-- PMMTrue. And I guess downstreams can also force the option to high or set the default to high rather easily if they want to.
So the option would be:
-security level
Set minimal required security level of QEMU.high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against
malicious guests.
low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security
against malicious guests.Default would be -security low.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 1 line
Does this look reasonable?
The challenge I see is that wiring up a runtime flag into every relevant part of the QEMU codebase is an pretty large amount of work. Every device, every machine type, every backend type, every generic subsystem will all need checks for this flag. It is possible, but it isn't going to be quick or easy, especially with poor error reporting support in many areas.
Would it make more sense as a configure flag that decides whether or not to compile in potentially problematic devices/backends?
Kevin
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 36 lines · Kevin Wolf
Am 14.07.2020 um 15:30 hat Daniel P. Berrangé geschrieben:
Quoted 35 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 33 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 7 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines
And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue if it reproduces with -security=low".
Quoted 8 lines
I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security researchers' lives a bit easier".
thanks
-- PMMTrue. And I guess downstreams can also force the option to high or set the default to high rather easily if they want to.
So the option would be:
-security level
Set minimal required security level of QEMU.high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against
malicious guests.
low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security
against malicious guests.Default would be -security low.
Does this look reasonable?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
The challenge I see is that wiring up a runtime flag into every relevant part of the QEMU codebase is an pretty large amount of work. Every device, every machine type, every backend type, every generic subsystem will all need checks for this flag. It is possible, but it isn't going to be quick or easy, especially with poor error reporting support in many areas.
Would it make more sense as a configure flag that decides whether or not to compile in potentially problematic devices/backends?
I guess there are users for both. Some people prefer to compile their reduced QEMU binary (remember Nemu?), while the users from the normal Linux distros might benefit more from a runtime switch, I guess.
I wonder whether it's somehow possible to unify both approaches, so that we could mark the secure/insecure objects in the Makefiles already and then either don't link them for the Nema-style users, or mark the objects via some linker magic (?) as insecure, so we could flag them during runtime if a certain parameter has been used...? No clue whether that's possible at all, I'm just brainstorming...
Thomas
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 14 lines · On Dienstag, 14. Juli 2020 15:56:24 CEST Thomas Huth wrote:
Quoted 9 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The challenge I see is that wiring up a runtime flag into every relevant part of the QEMU codebase is an pretty large amount of work. Every device,
every machine type, every backend type, every generic subsystem will all need checks for this flag. It is possible, but it isn't going to be quick or easy, especially with poor error reporting support in many areas.Would it make more sense as a configure flag that decides whether or not to compile in potentially problematic devices/backends?
I guess there are users for both. Some people prefer to compile their reduced QEMU binary (remember Nemu?), while the users from the normal Linux distros might benefit more from a runtime switch, I guess.
Quoted 6 lines
I wonder whether it's somehow possible to unify both approaches, so that we could mark the secure/insecure objects in the Makefiles already and then either don't link them for the Nema-style users, or mark the objects via some linker magic (?) as insecure, so we could flag them during runtime if a certain parameter has been used...? No clue whether that's possible at all, I'm just brainstorming...
Then what about new (i.e. experimental) features? Those would then need to be moved into separate objects for that, otherwise they would be handled with the same (high) security level. Moving them to other units complicates patches.
It might make sense being able to mark the security level of a unit, while also being able to override the security level of individual functions (i.e. by some magic macro, similar to existing macro 'coroutine_fn').
However despite the details, that concept in general has the limitation of being a somewhat undeterministic runtime feature; i.e. it might abort immediately (good) or who knows when (bad). Hence being able to also associate a security level with runtime parameters would be beneficial to cause the abortion to happen rather immediately.
Best regards,
Christian Schoenebeck
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
In reply to Kevin WolfQuoted 36 lines · Kevin Wolf
Am 14.07.2020 um 15:30 hat Daniel P. Berrangé geschrieben:
Quoted 35 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 33 lines · Peter Maydell
Quoted 7 lines · Michael S. Tsirkin
Quoted 5 lines
And for people who want to build QEMU with lots of functionality (like Fedora does), I think a -security flag would be a useful addition. We can then tell security researchers "only a high security issue if it reproduces with -security=high, only a security issue if it reproduces with -security=low".
Quoted 8 lines
I think a -security option would also be useful to users -- it makes it easier for them to check "is this configuration using something that I didn't realize was not intended to be secure". For me, something useful for our users is much more compelling than "this might make security researchers' lives a bit easier".
thanks
-- PMMTrue. And I guess downstreams can also force the option to high or set the default to high rather easily if they want to.
So the option would be:
-security level
Set minimal required security level of QEMU.high: block use of QEMU functionality which is intended to be secure against
malicious guests.
low: allow use of all QEMU functionality, best effort security
against malicious guests.Default would be -security low.
Does this look reasonable?
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
The challenge I see is that wiring up a runtime flag into every relevant part of the QEMU codebase is an pretty large amount of work. Every device, every machine type, every backend type, every generic subsystem will all need checks for this flag. It is possible, but it isn't going to be quick or easy, especially with poor error reporting support in many areas.
Would it make more sense as a configure flag that decides whether or not to compile in potentially problematic devices/backends?
In the perfect world I think we need both because they satisfy different scenarios.
There are people who are so paranoid they don't want the insecure code compiled at all. They want a binary guaranteed to only have the trustworthy code.
Then there are the people who just want protection against making silly mistakes in their configuration, but want to be able choose between the features at runtime.
For security researchers reporting issues, I think we already do enough by documenting what we consider in / out of scope. In most cases we can quickly identify whether the reported flaw is in or out of scope. So I wouldn't think too much about what to do for security researchers.
It is more productive to focus on what our real users needs.
Regards,
Daniel
Signature · 3 lines
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
In reply to P J PHi Prasad,
Quoted 32 lines · P J P
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
Suggested-by Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>--- MAINTAINERS | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 324 insertions(+)MAINTAINERS +0
-0@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ Descriptions of section entries: Obsolete: Old code. Something tagged obsolete generally means
MAINTAINERS Descriptions of section entries: · line 43
Quoted 10 lines
MAINTAINERS +8
-0it has been replaced by a better system and you should be using that. + C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE.
I'm not sure we need this separation of good/bad citizen.
We already have the 'S' flag:
S: Status, one of the following:
Supported: Someone is actually paid to look after this.
Maintained: Someone actually looks after it.
Odd Fixes: It has a maintainer but they don't have time to
do much other than throw the odd patch in. See below.
Orphan: No current maintainer [but maybe you could take
the role as you write your new code].
Obsolete: Old code. Something tagged obsolete generally
means it has been replaced by a better system and you should be using that.
I think the 'Supported' status already describes a feature that important enough to a company to have an employee looking at it.
If a section is not 'Supported', it is unlikely the maintainer have time to deal with security issues.
I disagree with the High/Low tag, but I still reviewed the rest.
Quoted 13 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0F: Files and directories with wildcard patterns. A trailing slash includes all files and subdirectory files. F: drivers/net/ all files in and below drivers/net@@ -87,6 +95,7 @@ S390 general architecture support M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: default-configs/s390x-softmmu.mak F: gdb-xml/s390*.xml F: hw/char/sclp*.[hc]
MAINTAINERS ARM TCG CPUs · line 165
Quoted 5 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -149,6 +161,7 @@ ARM TCG CPUs M: Peter Maydell <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: Low F: target/arm/
There is KVM code there.
Quoted 10 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0F: tests/tcg/arm/ F: tests/tcg/aarch64/@@ -164,6 +177,7 @@ ARM SMMU M: Eric Auger <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/arm/smmu* F: include/hw/arm/smmu*
...
MAINTAINERS PowerPC TCG CPUs · line 297
Quoted 5 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -270,6 +294,7 @@ PowerPC TCG CPUs M: David Gibson <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Maintained +C: High
You might want to split this section in 2 to keep various areas in Low.
Quoted 3 lines
MAINTAINERS +0
-0F: target/ppc/ F: hw/ppc/ F: include/hw/ppc/
...
MAINTAINERS F: include/sysemu/hvf.h · line 493
Quoted 13 lines
MAINTAINERS +2
-0@@ -440,6 +482,7 @@ M: Cameron Esfahani <[email protected]> M: Roman Bolshakov <[email protected]> W: https://wiki.qemu.org/Features/HVF S: Maintained +C: Low F: accel/stubs/hvf-stub.c F: target/i386/hvf/ F: include/sysemu/hvf.h@@ -447,6 +490,7 @@ F: include/sysemu/hvf.h WHPX CPUs M: Sunil Muthuswamy <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low
I think this is High.
Quoted 12 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0F: target/i386/whpx-all.c F: target/i386/whp-dispatch.h F: accel/stubs/whpx-stub.c@@ -460,6 +504,7 @@ M: Anthony Perard <[email protected]> M: Paul Durrant <[email protected]> L: [email protected] S: Supported +C: High F: */xen* F: accel/xen/* F: hw/9pfs/xen-9p*
MAINTAINERS M: Colin Xu <[email protected]> · line 534
Quoted 4 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -486,6 +531,7 @@ M: Colin Xu <[email protected]> L: [email protected] W: https://github.com/intel/haxm/issues S: Maintained +C: Low
Ditto.
Quoted 10 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0F: accel/stubs/hax-stub.c F: include/sysemu/hax.h F: target/i386/hax-*@@ -497,12 +543,14 @@ M: Michael S. Tsirkin <[email protected]> M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: linux-headers/ F: scripts/update-linux-headers.sh
...
Quoted 4 lines
MAINTAINERS +0
-0@@ -1631,11 +1782,13 @@ Character devices M: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]> R: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes
MAINTAINERS Character devices · line 1794
Quoted 10 lines
MAINTAINERS +2
-0+C: High F: hw/char/ Network devices M: Jason Wang <[email protected]> S: Odd Fixes +C: High F: hw/net/ F: include/hw/net/ F: tests/qtest/virtio-net-test.c
These two don't make sense to me. You can not be low class citizen only maintained for 'Odd Fixes' and aim for security. Choose one.
MAINTAINERS F: tests/qtest/sd* · line 1846
Quoted 13 lines
SD (Secure Card)
M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]>
S: Odd FixesMAINTAINERS +2
-0+C: Low F: include/hw/sd/sd* F: hw/sd/core.c F: hw/sd/sd*@@ -1684,6 +1842,7 @@ F: tests/qtest/sd* USB M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/usb/*
Similarly to PPC, you might want to split this one to reduce coverage.
Quoted 8 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0F: tests/qtest/usb-*-test.c F: docs/usb2.txt@@ -1696,11 +1855,13 @@ USB (serial adapter) M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]> M: Samuel Thibault <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/usb/dev-serial.c
...
Quoted 4 lines
tulip
M: Sven Schnelle <[email protected]>
S: Maintained
+C: High
Low.
Quoted 10 lines
F:
hw/net/tulip.c
F:hw/net/tulip.hGeneric Loader
M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]>
S: Maintained
+C: High
F:hw/core/generic-loader.c
F:include/hw/core/generic-loader.h
F:docs/generic-loader.txt
I'm not sure about this one.
Quoted 7 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -1921,12 +2108,14 @@ F: docs/generic-loader.txt Intel Hexadecimal Object File Loader M: Su Hang <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low F: tests/qtest/hexloader-test.c F: tests/data/hex-loader/test.hex
...
Quoted 7 lines
EDID Generator
M: Gerd Hoffmann <[email protected]>
S: Maintained
+C: Low
F: hw/display/edid*
F:include/hw/display/edid.h
F:qemu-edid.c
I'm not sure, but maybe.
MAINTAINERS PIIX4 South Bridge (i82371AB) · line 2214
Quoted 5 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -2012,6 +2211,7 @@ PIIX4 South Bridge (i82371AB) M: Hervé Poussineau <[email protected]> M: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High
No, this one is low (which is why it has is own section, to not bother MST).
Quoted 2 lines
MAINTAINERS +0
-0F: hw/isa/piix4.c F: include/hw/southbridge/piix.h
...
Quoted 7 lines
Device Tree
M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]>
R: David Gibson <[email protected]>
S: Maintained
+C: Low
F:device_tree.c
F:include/sysemu/device_tree.h
This one is consumed by the Virt machine, maybe High?
Quoted 7 lines
Dump
S: Supported
+C: Low
M: Marc-André Lureau <[email protected]>
F: dump/
F:hw/misc/vmcoreinfo.c
...
Quoted 7 lines
QObject
M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]>
S: Supported
+C: Low
F: qobject/
F:include/qapi/qmp/
X:include/qapi/qmp/dispatch.h
Low? Odd.
MAINTAINERS T: git https://repo.or.cz/qemu/armbru.git qapi-next · line 2623
Quoted 5 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -2385,6 +2620,7 @@ T: git https://repo.or.cz/qemu/armbru.git qapi-next QEMU Guest Agent M: Michael Roth <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low
Odd too.
Quoted 11 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0F: qga/ F: docs/interop/qemu-ga.rst F: scripts/qemu-guest-agent/@@ -2397,6 +2633,7 @@ M: Paolo Bonzini <[email protected]> R: Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]> R: Eduardo Habkost <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High F: docs/qdev-device-use.txt F: hw/core/qdev* F: hw/core/bus.c
...
Quoted 4 lines
Register API
M: Alistair Francis <[email protected]>
S: Maintained
+C: High
No, Low.
Quoted 4 lines
F:
hw/core/register.c
F:include/hw/register.h
F:include/hw/registerfields.hMAINTAINERS +0
-0@@ -2456,6 +2697,7 @@ F: include/hw/registerfields.h
...
Quoted 4 lines
Tracing
M: Stefan Hajnoczi <[email protected]>
S: Maintained
+C: Low
Some backends are High.
MAINTAINERS T: git https://github.com/stefanha/qemu.git tracing · line 2736
Quoted 8 lines
F: trace/
F: trace-events
F: docs/qemu-option-trace.rst.incMAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -2488,6 +2733,7 @@ T: git https://github.com/stefanha/qemu.git tracing TPM M: Stefan Berger <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: Low
High!!!
Quoted 4 lines
MAINTAINERS +0
-0F: tpm.c F: stubs/tpm.c F: hw/tpm/*@@ -2500,12 +2746,14 @@ T: git https://github.com/stefanberger/qemu-tpm.git tpm-next
...
MAINTAINERS L: [email protected] · line 2862
Quoted 5 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -2601,6 +2859,7 @@ L: [email protected] UUID M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low
High?
Quoted 4 lines
MAINTAINERS +0
-0F: util/uuid.c F: include/qemu/uuid.h F: tests/test-uuid.c@@ -2608,6 +2867,7 @@ F: tests/test-uuid.c
...
Quoted 5 lines
Null Block Driver
M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]>
L: [email protected]
S: Supported
+C: Low
High?
Quoted 7 lines
F:
block/null.cNVMe Block Driver
M: Fam Zheng <[email protected]>
L: [email protected]
S: Supported
+C: Low
Certainly High.
Quoted 7 lines
F:
block/nvme*Bootdevice
M: Gonglei <[email protected]>
S: Maintained
+C: Low
F:bootdevice.c
...
Quoted 5 lines
Replication
M: Wen Congyang <[email protected]>
M: Xie Changlong <[email protected]>
S: Supported
+C: Low
High?
Quoted 11 lines
F: replication*
F:block/replication.c
F:tests/test-replication.cMAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -2997,6 +3309,7 @@ PVRDMA M: Yuval Shaia <[email protected]> M: Marcel Apfelbaum <[email protected]> S: Maintained +C: High F: hw/rdma/* F: hw/rdma/vmw/* F: docs/pvrdma.txt
...
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
In reply to P J PQuoted 26 lines · On Tue, 14 Jul 2020 14:06:31 +0530 P J P <[email protected]> wrote:
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
Suggested-by Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>--- MAINTAINERS | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 324 insertions(+)
(...)
MAINTAINERS S390 general architecture support · line 98
Quoted 5 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0@@ -87,6 +95,7 @@ S390 general architecture support M: Cornelia Huck <[email protected]> M: Thomas Huth <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: High
Just to reiterate what others have previously stated:
The granularity in MAINTAINERS and how it is organized does not really work well with what you are trying to do with this classification.
If I pick just this entry as an example: It covers *all* s390x-related code, and this covers both things like support for protected virtualization (definitely critical) and virtio-9p-ccw (definitely not critical). It is important that somebody is looking after s390x overall (hence the "Supported" state), but not all s390x-related code is equally critical.
I see the main purpose of the MAINTAINERS file to find the right contacts for an area; other approaches like tagging of devices and features seem to be better suited for figuring out which areas are deemed critical.
Quoted 3 lines
MAINTAINERS +0
-0F: default-configs/s390x-softmmu.mak F: gdb-xml/s390*.xml F: hw/char/sclp*.[hc]
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
In reply to P J PQuoted 32 lines · * P J P ([email protected]) wrote:
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It also offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
The CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field tries to capture this sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the code.
It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
Suggested-by Daniel P. Berrange <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>--- MAINTAINERS | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 324 insertions(+)MAINTAINERS +0
-0@@ -33,6 +33,14 @@ Descriptions of section entries: Obsolete: Old code. Something tagged obsolete generally means
MAINTAINERS Descriptions of section entries: · line 43
Quoted 10 lines
MAINTAINERS +8
-0it has been replaced by a better system and you should be using that. + C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE.
That's a lot of OR's and it causes problems;
....
MAINTAINERS F: tests/test-qdev-global-props.c · line 2658
Quoted 7 lines
MAINTAINERS +1
-0QMP M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> S: Supported +C: Low F: monitor/monitor-internal.h F: monitor/qmp* F: monitor/misc.c
QMP is critical to many uses, so you wouldn't want to exclude it from a secure build; any security issue with it (e.g. misparsing an argument) would be very serious and would need to be looked at; but QMP is expected to be talking to another trusted endpoint.
Dave
--
Dr. David Alan Gilbert / [email protected] / Manchester, UK
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
+-- On Thu, 16 Jul 2020, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote --+ | > + C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient | > + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted | > + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with | > + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. | > + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental | > + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well | > + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed | > + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE. | | That's a lot of OR's and it causes problems; | ....
Yes, I started with the MAINTAINERS file thinking at least some segregation
would be a step forward than nothing.
| > QMP | > M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> | > S: Supported | > +C: Low | > F: monitor/monitor-internal.h | > F: monitor/qmp* | > F: monitor/misc.c | | QMP is critical to many uses, so you wouldn't want to exclude it from a secure build; | any security issue with it (e.g. misparsing an argument) would be very | serious and would need to be looked at;
No, High OR Low was not for excluding it from any build. It was merely an
indication to a user to decide whether an issue should be treated as a CVE one or can be fixed as regular bug.
| but QMP is expected to be talking to another trusted endpoint.
True; I set it to Low as QMP interface access is mostly given to privileged
trusted users.
Thank you.
--
Prasad J Pandit / Red Hat Product Security Team
8685 545E B54C 486B C6EB 271E E285 8B5A F050 DE8D
Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Quoted 28 lines · P J P
+-- On Thu, 16 Jul 2020, Dr. David Alan Gilbert wrote --+ | > + C: CVE/Security/Trust Quotient | > + H:High - Feature (or code) is meant to be safe and used by untrusted | > + guests. So any potential security issue must be processed with | > + due care and be considered as a CVE issue. | > + L:Low - Feature (or code) is not meant to be safe OR is experimental | > + OR is used in trusted environments only OR is not well | > + maintained. So any potential security issue can be processed | > + and fixed as regular non-security bug. No need for a CVE. | | That's a lot of OR's and it causes problems; | ....Yes, I started with the
MAINTAINERSfile thinking at least some segregation
would be a step forward than nothing.| > QMP | > M: Markus Armbruster <[email protected]> | > S: Supported | > +C: Low | > F: monitor/monitor-internal.h | > F: monitor/qmp* | > F: monitor/misc.c | | QMP is critical to many uses, so you wouldn't want to exclude it from a secure build; | any security issue with it (e.g. misparsing an argument) would be very | serious and would need to be looked at;
Quoted 8 lines
No, High OR Low was not for excluding it from any build. It was merely an
indication to a user to decide whether an issue should be treated as a CVE one or can be fixed as regular bug.| but QMP is expected to be talking to another trusted endpoint.
True; I set it to Low as QMP interface access is mostly given to privileged
trusted users.
It needs to consider that the classification will eventually be used to decide what features are enabled at build time. If QMP is marked as "low" and someone does a build "only high", then QMP won't get compiled, and thus QEMU will be useless for mgmt apps.
Also bear in the mind the documented security classification is that approx anything relevant for use with KVM based deployment is to be considered part of the trusted code set, and anything that only makes sense for use with TCG is part of the untrusted code set.
This implies that much general purpose common infrastructure in QEMU is going to be part of the trusted code set. So that automatically includes QMP.
NB, the build time classification won't be perfect, but that's largely because we don't have sufficient granularity in what we build. For example, although we only care about QMP, IIUC, we can't turn off HMP at build time. So we might consider HMP to be "low", despite the fact that it is impossible to disable when building "only high features".
Regards,
Daniel
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Re: [PATCH 1/1] MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient field
Daniel P. Berrangé <[email protected]> writes:
[...]
Quoted 4 lines
NB, the build time classification won't be perfect, but that's largely because we don't have sufficient granularity in what we build. For example, although we only care about QMP, IIUC, we can't turn off HMP at build time.
It could be made compile-time optional. Matter of coding. But I doubt it would buy us much. Like QMP, it should only ever be exposed to trusted parties.
Quoted 2 lines
So we might consider HMP to be "low", despite the fact
that it is impossible to disable when building "only high features".
I'm sure we could find more examples where the current granularity is too coarse for a clean sorting into "low" and "high" buckets.
Quoted 42 lines · P J P
From: Prasad J Pandit <[email protected]>
Hello,
QEMU supports numerous virtualisation and emulation use cases. It offers many features to support guest's function(s).
All of these use cases and features are not always security relevant. Because some maybe used in trusted environments only. Some may still be in experimental stage. While other could be very old and not used or maintained actively.
Recently we received multiple security issue reports against VVFAT and VirtFS host directory sharing system. After discussing with the respective maintainers, it turned out that
* VVFAT -> https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1883083
VVFAT is quite old and is available for testing purposes only. Ie. It is not suitable for production environments.* VirtFS/9pfs -> https://wiki.qemu.org/Documentation/9psetup
VirtFS implementation though better, it is most commonly used for automated testing under sand-boxed server environments, ie. no malicious party there. It is also not mature enough for cloud services. It is supported on 'Odd Fixes' basis atm.So these turned out to be issues which can be fixed as regular bugs.
For security bug analysis we generally consider use cases wherein QEMU is used in conjunction with the KVM hypervisor, which enables guest to use hardware processor's virtualisation features.
This patch introduces the CVE (or Security or Trust) Quotient field in the
MAINTAINERSfile. It tries to capture the security sensitivity pertaining to a feature or section of the QEMU's code base.It indicates whether a potential issue should be treated as a security one OR it could be fixed as a regular non-security bug.
If Quotient == High, triage issues as potential security ones. if Quotient == Low, triage issues as regular non-security bugs.
Quoted 6 lines
I have tagged each section in the
MAINTAINERSfile as High or Low on best guess basis. I request respective maintainers to kindly review it please.If you have any inputs/suggestions, I'd really appreciate them.
Thank you.
So this attempts to specify a security aspect of specific files. Which works for some use-cases (e.g. devices) but not others (common utility functions).
I'd like to propose add a flag that limits QEMU to a secured subset of functionality at runtime instead.
Then we can just tell security researchers "reproduce this with -security=high or it's not a security issue".
Quoted 9 lines
--
Prasad J Pandit (1):
MAINTAINERS: introduce cve or security quotient fieldMAINTAINERS | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 324 insertions(+)--
2.26.2