KVM: x86: tell guests if the exposed SMT topology is trustworthy
Subsystems (5)
Vitaly Kuznetsov
reviewerRFC PATCH 1/1 KVM: x86: tell guests if the exposed SMT topology is trustworthy
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.
Add two feature bits to KVM: KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT with the meaning that KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT bit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
There were some offline discussions on whether this new feature bit should be complemented with a 're-enlightenment' mechanism for live migration (so it can change in guest's lifetime) but it doesn't seem to be very
practical: what a sane guest is supposed to do if it's told that SMT topology is about to become fake other than kill itself? Also, it seems to make little sense to do e.g. CPU pinning on the source but not on the destination.
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT imply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).
Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT is set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.
--- Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +19 -8
@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). + KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side per-cpu warps are expeced in kvmclock
@@ -97,11 +101,18 @@ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side Where ``flag`` here is defined as below: -================== ============ ================================= -flag value meaning -================== ============ ================================= -KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to - determine that vCPUs are never - preempted for an unlimited time - allowing optimizations -================== ============ ================================= +================================= =========== ================================= +flag value meaning +================================= =========== ================================= +KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to + determine that vCPUs are never + preempted for an unlimited time + allowing optimizations + +KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1 the bit is set when the exposed + SMT topology is trustworthy, this + means that two guest vCPUs will + never share a physical core + unless they are exposed as SMT + threads. +================================= =========== =================================
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2 -0
@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI 11#define KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL 12#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 +#define KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 +#define KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored.
arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +6 -1
@@ -712,7 +712,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );
@@ -720,6 +721,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, entry->ebx =0 ; entry->ecx =0 ; entry->edx =0 ; + +if (!cpu_smt_possible ()) + entry->edx |= (1 <<KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT ); +break ;case 0x80000000 : entry->eax =min (entry->eax,0x8000001f );
Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 12 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.
This is not only related to vulnerability mitigations.
It’s also important for guest to know if it’s SMT topology is trustworthy for various optimisation algorithms. E.g. Should it attempt to run tasks that share memory on same NUMA node?
Quoted 6 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
Agree.
Quoted 8 lines
There were some offline discussions on whether this new feature bit should be complemented with a 're-enlightenment' mechanism for live migration (so it can change in guest's lifetime) but it doesn't seem to be very
practical: what a sane guest is supposed to do if it's told that SMT topology is about to become fake other than kill itself? Also, it seems to make little sense to do e.g. CPU pinning on the source but not on the destination.
Agree.
Quoted 6 lines
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).
I don’t think KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT should indicate to guest whether it’s vCPU shares a CPU core with another guest. It should only expose to guest the fact that he can rely on it’s virtual SMT topology. i.e. That there is a relation between virtual SMT topology to which physical logical processors run which vCPUs.
Guest have nothing to do with the fact that he is now aware host doesn’t guarantee to him that one of it’s vCPU shares a CPU core with another guest vCPU. I don’t think we should have a CPUID bit that expose this information to guest.
Quoted 7 lines
Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.
Hmm… I’m not sure this is correct.
For example, it is possible to expose in virtual SMT topology that guest have 2 vCPUs running on single NUMA node, while in reality each vCPU task can be scheduled to run on different NUMA nodes. Therefore, making virtual SMT topology not trustworthy. i.e. Disabling SMT on host doesn’t mean that virtual SMT topology is reliable.
I think this CPUID bit should just be set from userspace when admin have guaranteed to guest that it have set vCPU task affinity properly. Without KVM attempting to set this bit by itself.
Note that we defined above KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT bit differently than “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing”. “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing” guarantees to guest that vCPUs of guest won’t share a physical CPU core unless they are defined as virtual SMT siblings. In contrast, KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT bit attempts to state that virtual SMT topology is a subset of how vCPUs are scheduled on physical SMT topology. i.e. It seems that Hyper-V bit is indeed only attempting to provide guest information related to security mitigations. While newly proposed KVM bit attempts to also assist guest to determine how to perform it’s internal scheduling decisions.
-Liran
Quoted 93 lines
Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>---
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +4
-0@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). +
KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT24 host will warn if no guest-side
per-cpu warps are expeced in kvmclockDocumentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +0
-0@@ -97,11 +101,18 @@ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-sideWhere ``flag`` here is defined as below:
-================== ============ =================================
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +15
-7-flag value meaning -================== ============ ================================= -KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to - determine that vCPUs are never - preempted for an unlimited time - allowing optimizations -================== ============ ================================= +================================= =========== ================================= +flag value meaning +================================= =========== ================================= +KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to + determine that vCPUs are never + preempted for an unlimited time + allowing optimizations + +KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1 the bit is set when the exposed + SMT topology is trustworthy, this + means that two guest vCPUs will + never share a physical core + unless they are exposed as SMT + threads. +================================= =========== =================================arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2
-0@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI 11#define KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL 12#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 +#define KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 +#define KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored. arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +6
-1@@ -712,7 +712,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );@@ -720,6 +721,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, entry->ebx =0 ; entry->ecx =0 ; entry->edx =0 ; + +if (!cpu_smt_possible ()) + entry->edx |= (1 <<KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT ); +break ;case 0x80000000 : entry->eax =min (entry->eax,0x8000001f );Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 71 lines · Liran Alon
Quoted 13 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.This is not only related to vulnerability mitigations.
It’s also important for guest to know if it’s SMT topology is trustworthy for various optimisation algorithms. E.g. Should it attempt to run tasks that share memory on same NUMA node?Quoted 6 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.Agree.
Quoted 8 lines
There were some offline discussions on whether this new feature bit should be complemented with a 're-enlightenment' mechanism for live migration (so it can change in guest's lifetime) but it doesn't seem to be very
practical: what a sane guest is supposed to do if it's told that SMT topology is about to become fake other than kill itself? Also, it seems to make little sense to do e.g. CPU pinning on the source but not on the destination.Agree.
Quoted 6 lines
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).I don’t think
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTshould indicate to guest whether it’s vCPU shares a CPU core with another guest. It should only expose to guest the fact that he can rely on it’s virtual SMT topology. i.e. That there is a relation between virtual SMT topology to which physical logical processors run which vCPUs.Guest have nothing to do with the fact that he is now aware host doesn’t guarantee to him that one of it’s vCPU shares a CPU core with another guest vCPU. I don’t think we should have a CPUID bit that expose this information to guest.
Quoted 7 lines
Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.Hmm… I’m not sure this is correct.
For example, it is possible to expose in virtual SMT topology that guest have 2 vCPUs running on single NUMA node, while in reality each vCPU task can be scheduled to run on different NUMA nodes. Therefore, making virtual SMT topology not trustworthy. i.e. Disabling SMT on host doesn’t mean that virtual SMT topology is reliable.I think this CPUID bit should just be set from userspace when admin have guaranteed to guest that it have set vCPU task affinity properly. Without KVM attempting to set this bit by itself.
Quoted 7 lines
Note that we defined above
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit differently than “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing”. “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing” guarantees to guest that vCPUs of guest won’t share a physical CPU core unless they are defined as virtual SMT siblings. In contrast,KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit attempts to state that virtual SMT topology is a subset of how vCPUs are scheduled on physical SMT topology. i.e. It seems that Hyper-V bit is indeed only attempting to provide guest information related to security mitigations. While newly proposed KVM bit attempts to also assist guest to determine how to perform it’s internal scheduling decisions.-Liran
Oh I later saw below that you defined KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT indeed as Microsoft defined “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing”. If you plan to go with this direction, than I suggest renaming to similar name as Hyper-V.
But I think having a general vSMT topology is trustworthy is also useful.
Maybe we should have separate bits for each.
-Liran
Quoted 95 lines
Quoted 94 lines
Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>---
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +4
-0@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). +
KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT24 host will warn if no guest-side
per-cpu warps are expeced in kvmclockDocumentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +0
-0@@ -97,11 +101,18 @@ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-sideWhere ``flag`` here is defined as below:
-================== ============ =================================
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +15
-7-flag value meaning -================== ============ ================================= -KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to - determine that vCPUs are never - preempted for an unlimited time - allowing optimizations -================== ============ ================================= +================================= =========== ================================= +flag value meaning +================================= =========== ================================= +KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to + determine that vCPUs are never + preempted for an unlimited time + allowing optimizations + +KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1 the bit is set when the exposed + SMT topology is trustworthy, this + means that two guest vCPUs will + never share a physical core + unless they are exposed as SMT + threads. +================================= =========== =================================arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2
-0@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI 11#define KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL 12#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 +#define KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 +#define KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored. arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +6
-1@@ -712,7 +712,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );@@ -720,6 +721,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, entry->ebx =0 ; entry->ecx =0 ; entry->edx =0 ; + +if (!cpu_smt_possible ()) + entry->edx |= (1 <<KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT ); +break ;case 0x80000000 : entry->eax =min (entry->eax,0x8000001f );Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 78 lines · Liran Alon
Quoted 78 lines · Liran Alon
Quoted 13 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.This is not only related to vulnerability mitigations.
It’s also important for guest to know if it’s SMT topology is trustworthy for various optimisation algorithms. E.g. Should it attempt to run tasks that share memory on same NUMA node?Quoted 6 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.Agree.
Quoted 8 lines
There were some offline discussions on whether this new feature bit should be complemented with a 're-enlightenment' mechanism for live migration (so it can change in guest's lifetime) but it doesn't seem to be very
practical: what a sane guest is supposed to do if it's told that SMT topology is about to become fake other than kill itself? Also, it seems to make little sense to do e.g. CPU pinning on the source but not on the destination.Agree.
Quoted 6 lines
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).I don’t think
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTshould indicate to guest whether it’s vCPU shares a CPU core with another guest. It should only expose to guest the fact that he can rely on it’s virtual SMT topology. i.e. That there is a relation between virtual SMT topology to which physical logical processors run which vCPUs.Guest have nothing to do with the fact that he is now aware host doesn’t guarantee to him that one of it’s vCPU shares a CPU core with another guest vCPU. I don’t think we should have a CPUID bit that expose this information to guest.
Quoted 7 lines
Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.Hmm… I’m not sure this is correct.
For example, it is possible to expose in virtual SMT topology that guest have 2 vCPUs running on single NUMA node, while in reality each vCPU task can be scheduled to run on different NUMA nodes. Therefore, making virtual SMT topology not trustworthy. i.e. Disabling SMT on host doesn’t mean that virtual SMT topology is reliable.I think this CPUID bit should just be set from userspace when admin have guaranteed to guest that it have set vCPU task affinity properly. Without KVM attempting to set this bit by itself.
Note that we defined above
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit differently than “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing”. “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing” guarantees to guest that vCPUs of guest won’t share a physical CPU core unless they are defined as virtual SMT siblings. In contrast,KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit attempts to state that virtual SMT topology is a subset of how vCPUs are scheduled on physical SMT topology. i.e. It seems that Hyper-V bit is indeed only attempting to provide guest information related to security mitigations. While newly proposed KVM bit attempts to also assist guest to determine how to perform it’s internal scheduling decisions.
Quoted 6 lines
Quoted 1 line
-Liran
Oh I later saw below that you defined
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTindeed as Microsoft defined “NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing”. If you plan to go with this direction, than I suggest renaming to similar name as Hyper-V.
But I think having a general vSMT topology is trustworthy is also useful.
Maybe we should have separate bits for each.
And perhaps a bit each for "vCCX topology is trustworthy" and "vNUMA topology is trustworthy"?
Quoted 98 lines
-Liran
Quoted 95 lines
Quoted 94 lines
Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>---
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +4
-0@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). +
KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT24 host will warn if no guest-side
per-cpu warps are expeced in kvmclockDocumentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +0
-0@@ -97,11 +101,18 @@ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-sideWhere ``flag`` here is defined as below:
-================== ============ =================================
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +15
-7-flag value meaning -================== ============ ================================= -KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to - determine that vCPUs are never - preempted for an unlimited time - allowing optimizations -================== ============ ================================= +================================= =========== ================================= +flag value meaning +================================= =========== ================================= +KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to + determine that vCPUs are never + preempted for an unlimited time + allowing optimizations + +KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1 the bit is set when the exposed + SMT topology is trustworthy, this + means that two guest vCPUs will + never share a physical core + unless they are exposed as SMT + threads. +================================= =========== =================================arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2
-0@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI 11#define KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL 12#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 +#define KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 +#define KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored. arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +6
-2@@ -712,7 +712,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );@@ -720,6 +721,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, entry->ebx =0 ; entry->ecx =0 ; entry->edx =0 ; + +if (!cpu_smt_possible ()) + entry->edx |= (1 <<KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT ); +break ;case 0x80000000 : entry->eax =min (entry->eax,0x8000001f ); --2.20.1
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.
Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
I'd stay away from "trustworthy", especially if this is controlled by userspace. Whether or not the hint is trustworthy is purely up to the guest. Right now it doesn't really matter, but that will change as we start moving pieces of the host out of the guest's TCB.
It may make sense to split the two (or even three?) cases, e.g. KVM_FEATURE_NO_SMT and KVM_FEATURE_ACCURATE_TOPOLOGY. KVM can easily enforce NO_SMT _today_, i.e. allow it to be set if and only if SMT is truly disabled. Verifying that the topology exposed to the guest is legit is a completely different beast.
If/when the kernel gains core scheduling, a new flag to communicate core sharing could be added, e.g. KVM_FEATURE_NO_NON_ARCH_CORE_SHARING.
Differentiating between host kernel and userspace doesn't add much unless the host kernel can attest itself to the guest, but splitting things up at least keeps that option open.
Quoted 8 lines
There were some offline discussions on whether this new feature bit should be complemented with a 're-enlightenment' mechanism for live migration (so it can change in guest's lifetime) but it doesn't seem to be very
practical: what a sane guest is supposed to do if it's told that SMT topology is about to become fake other than kill itself? Also, it seems to make little sense to do e.g. CPU pinning on the source but not on the destination.
Quoted 5 lines
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).
This is why I'd go with something like "accurate" instead of "trustworthy".
Quoted 99 lines
Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>--- Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +19
-8@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). + KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side per-cpu warps are expeced in kvmclock@@ -97,11 +101,18 @@ KVM_FEATURE_CLOCSOURCE_STABLE_BIT 24 host will warn if no guest-side Where ``flag`` here is defined as below: -================== ============ ================================= -flag value meaning -================== ============ ================================= -KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to - determine that vCPUs are never - preempted for an unlimited time - allowing optimizations -================== ============ ================================= +================================= =========== ================================= +flag value meaning +================================= =========== ================================= +KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 guest checks this feature bit to + determine that vCPUs are never + preempted for an unlimited time + allowing optimizations + +KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1 the bit is set when the exposed + SMT topology is trustworthy, this + means that two guest vCPUs will + never share a physical core + unless they are exposed as SMT + threads. +================================= =========== =================================arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h +2
-0@@ -31,8 +31,10 @@#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI 11#define KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL 12#define KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 +#define KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14#define KVM_HINTS_REALTIME 0 +#define KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 1/* The last 8 bits are used to indicate how to interpret the flags field * in pvclock structure. If no bits are set, all flags are ignored. arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c +6
-1@@ -712,7 +712,8 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_ASYNC_PF_VMEXIT ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SEND_IPI ) | (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_POLL_CONTROL ) | - (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ); + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD ) | + (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT );if (sched_info_on ()) entry->eax |= (1 <<KVM_FEATURE_STEAL_TIME );@@ -720,6 +721,10 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_entry2 *entry, u32 function, entry->ebx =0 ; entry->ecx =0 ; entry->edx =0 ; + +if (!cpu_smt_possible ()) + entry->edx |= (1 <<KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT ); +break ;case 0x80000000 : entry->eax =min (entry->eax,0x8000001f );Signature · 1 line
2.20.1
Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.I'd stay away from "trustworthy", especially if this is controlled by userspace. Whether or not the hint is trustworthy is purely up to the guest. Right now it doesn't really matter, but that will change as we start moving pieces of the host out of the guest's TCB.
Quoted 5 lines
It may make sense to split the two (or even three?) cases, e.g.
KVM_FEATURE_NO_SMTandKVM_FEATURE_ACCURATE_TOPOLOGY. KVM can easily enforceNO_SMT_today_, i.e. allow it to be set if and only if SMT is truly disabled. Verifying that the topology exposed to the guest is legit is a completely different beast.
Scratch the ACCURATE_TOPOLOGY idea, I doubt there's a real use case for setting ACCURATE_TOPOLOGY and not KVM_HINTS_REALTIME. A feature flag to state that SMT is disabled seems simple and useful.
Vitaly Kuznetsov
reviewerQuoted 28 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 21 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.I'd stay away from "trustworthy", especially if this is controlled by userspace. Whether or not the hint is trustworthy is purely up to the guest. Right now it doesn't really matter, but that will change as we start moving pieces of the host out of the guest's TCB.
Quoted 5 lines
It may make sense to split the two (or even three?) cases, e.g.
KVM_FEATURE_NO_SMTandKVM_FEATURE_ACCURATE_TOPOLOGY. KVM can easily enforceNO_SMT_today_, i.e. allow it to be set if and only if SMT is truly disabled. Verifying that the topology exposed to the guest is legit is a completely different beast.
Quoted 3 lines
Scratch the
ACCURATE_TOPOLOGYidea, I doubt there's a real use case for settingACCURATE_TOPOLOGYand notKVM_HINTS_REALTIME. A feature flag to state that SMT is disabled seems simple and useful.
You seem to have the most conservative ideas around)
I wasn't actually thinking about KVM enforcing anything here, my goal was to provide guest with enough information so it can adjust its SMT related settings accordingly. These could be:
- 'nosmt'
- STIBP
- Core scheduling (not yet upstream afaik)
- Manual vCPU pinning for certain tasks (including running nested guests). [E.g. nested Hyper-V hides 'md_clear' from its guests when it doesn't see 'NoNonarchitecturalCoreSharing' from the underlying hypervisor as it's pointless]
- (Liran's idea): Using SMT information for better scheduling
KVM_FEATURE_NO_SMT would cover one case, however, it's basically the same as not exposing hyperthreads by KVM userspace, just enforced. Do you think that such enforcement makes sense? What the guest is supposed to do when it sees the flag (compared to what's doing now)?
('KVM_HINTS_REALTIME' may actually imply what we want, however, judging by its name it may gain additional meaning in the future like 'always do busy polling everywhere')
Signature · 1 line
Vitaly
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Quoted 36 lines · Christophe de Dinechin
Quoted 33 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 26 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.I'd stay away from "trustworthy", especially if this is controlled by userspace. Whether or not the hint is trustworthy is purely up to the guest. Right now it doesn't really matter, but that will change as we start moving pieces of the host out of the guest's TCB.
It may make sense to split the two (or even three?) cases, e.g.
KVM_FEATURE_NO_SMTandKVM_FEATURE_ACCURATE_TOPOLOGY. KVM can easily enforceNO_SMT_today_, i.e. allow it to be set if and only if SMT is truly disabled. Verifying that the topology exposed to the guest is legit is a completely different beast.
Quoted 3 lines
Quoted 3 lines
Scratch the
ACCURATE_TOPOLOGYidea, I doubt there's a real use case for settingACCURATE_TOPOLOGYand notKVM_HINTS_REALTIME. A feature flag to state that SMT is disabled seems simple and useful.
A bit such as NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing can be set even when host SMT is enabled. For example, when host use core-scheduling to group together vCPUs that run as sibling hyperthreads. Therefore, I wouldn’t want to tie the feature-flag semantics to host SMT being enabled/disabled. It’s just true that this bit can be set when host SMT is disabled.
Quoted 15 lines
I share that concern about the naming, although I do see some value in exposing the
cpu_smt_possible()result. I think it’s easier to state that something does not work than to state something does work.Also, with respect to mitigation, we may want to split the two cases that Paolo outlined, i.e. have
KVM_HINTS_REALTIME,KVM_HINTS_CORES_CROSSTALKandKVM_HINTS_CORES_LEAKING,
whereCORES_CROSSTALKSindicates there may be some cross-talk between what the guest thinks are isolated cores, andCORES_LEAKINGindicates that cores may leak data
to some other guest.
Quoted 2 lines
The problem with my approach is that it is shouting “don’t trust me” a bit too loudly.
I don’t see a value in exposing CORES_LEAKING to guest. As guest have nothing to do with it.
-Liran
Quoted 24 lines · Liran Alon
Quoted 21 lines · Christophe de Dinechin
I share that concern about the naming, although I do see some value in exposing the
cpu_smt_possible()result. I think it’s easier to state that something does not work than to state something does work.Also, with respect to mitigation, we may want to split the two cases that Paolo outlined, i.e. have
KVM_HINTS_REALTIME,KVM_HINTS_CORES_CROSSTALKandKVM_HINTS_CORES_LEAKING,
whereCORES_CROSSTALKSindicates there may be some cross-talk between what the guest thinks are isolated cores, andCORES_LEAKINGindicates that cores may leak data
to some other guest.
Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The problem with my approach is that it is shouting “don’t trust me” a bit too loudly.
I don’t see a value in exposing
CORES_LEAKINGto guest. As guest have nothing to do with it.
The guest could display / expose the information to guest sysadmins and admin tools (e.g. through /proc).
While the kernel cannot mitigate, a higher-level product could for example have a policy about which workloads can be deployed on a system which may leak data to other VMs.
Christophe
Quoted 33 lines · Christophe de Dinechin
Quoted 25 lines · Liran Alon
Quoted 21 lines · Christophe de Dinechin
I share that concern about the naming, although I do see some value in exposing the
cpu_smt_possible()result. I think it’s easier to state that something does not work than to state something does work.Also, with respect to mitigation, we may want to split the two cases that Paolo outlined, i.e. have
KVM_HINTS_REALTIME,KVM_HINTS_CORES_CROSSTALKandKVM_HINTS_CORES_LEAKING,
whereCORES_CROSSTALKSindicates there may be some cross-talk between what the guest thinks are isolated cores, andCORES_LEAKINGindicates that cores may leak data
to some other guest.Quoted 4 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The problem with my approach is that it is shouting “don’t trust me” a bit too loudly.
I don’t see a value in exposing
CORES_LEAKINGto guest. As guest have nothing to do with it.
Quoted 8 lines
The guest could display / expose the information to guest sysadmins and admin tools (e.g. through /proc).
While the kernel cannot mitigate, a higher-level product could for example have a policy about which workloads can be deployed on a system which may leak data to other VMs.
Christophe
Honestly, I don’t think any sane cloud provider will schedule vCPUs of different guests on same physical CPU core and report this to guest. Therefore, I think this is only relevant for use-cases where the guest owner is also the host/hypervisor owner. And therefore, doesn’t need this information exposed in a CPUID bit.
I see your point regarding how in theory it could be used, but I think we should wait and see if such use-case exists before defining this interface.
-Liran
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.
Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
And I was under the impression we already had a bit for that (isn't it used to disable paravirt spinlocks and the like?). But I cannot seem to find it in a hurry.
So I would much rather you have a bit that indicates the 1:1 vcpu/cpu mapping and if that is set accept the topology information and otherwise completely ignore it.
Quoted 16 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
Quoted 6 lines
The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
And I was under the impression we already had a bit for that (isn't it used to disable paravirt spinlocks and the like?). But I cannot seem to find it in a hurry.
Yep, KVM_HINTS_REALTIME does what you describe.
Quoted 3 lines
So I would much rather you have a bit that indicates the 1:1 vcpu/cpu mapping and if that is set accept the topology information and otherwise completely ignore it.
Quoted 17 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 16 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 14 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 6 lines
The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
And I was under the impression we already had a bit for that (isn't it used to disable paravirt spinlocks and the like?). But I cannot seem to find it in a hurry.
Yep,
KVM_HINTS_REALTIMEdoes what you describe.
*sigh*, that's a pretty shit name for it :/
Hi Paolo,
Quoted 22 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 20 lines · Sean Christopherson
Quoted 19 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Quoted 3 lines
And I was under the impression we already had a bit for that (isn't it used to disable paravirt spinlocks and the like?). But I cannot seem to find it in a hurry.
Yep,
KVM_HINTS_REALTIMEdoes what you describe.*sigh*, that's a pretty shit name for it :/
My original commit name this to KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED, commit a4429e53c (KVM: Introduce paravirtualization hints and KVM_HINTS_DEDICATED), could we revert the KVM_HINTS_REALTIME renaming? A lot of guys confused by this renaming now, Peterz, Marcelo ("The previous definition was much better IMO: HINTS_DEDICATED".
https://lkml.org/lkml/2019/8/26/855).
Wanpeng
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 10 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 9 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
This is a subset of the requirements for "trustworthy" SMT. You can have:
- vCPUs pinned to two threads in the same core and exposed as multiple cores in the guest
- vCPUs from different guests pinned to two threads in the same core
and that would be okay as far as KVM_HINTS_REALTIME is concerned, but would still allow exploitation of side-channels, respectively within the VM and between VMs.
Paolo
Quoted 8 lines
And I was under the impression we already had a bit for that (isn't it used to disable paravirt spinlocks and the like?). But I cannot seem to find it in a hurry.
So I would much rather you have a bit that indicates the 1:1 vcpu/cpu mapping and if that is set accept the topology information and otherwise completely ignore it.
Quoted 17 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 16 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 14 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Virtualized guests may pick a different strategy to mitigate hardware vulnerabilities when it comes to hyper-threading: disable SMT completely, use core scheduling, or, for example, opt in for STIBP. Making the decision, however, requires an extra bit of information which is currently
missing: does the topology the guest see match hardware or if it is 'fake' and two vCPUs which look like different cores from guest's perspective can actually be scheduled on the same physical core. Disabling SMT or doing core scheduling only makes sense when the topology is trustworthy.Add two feature bits to KVM:
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTwith the meaning thatKVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTbit answers the question if the exposed SMT topology is actually trustworthy. It would, of course, be possible to get away with a single bit (e.g. 'KVM_FEATURE_FAKE_SMT') and not lose backwards compatibility but the current approach looks more straightforward.
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
This is a subset of the requirements for "trustworthy" SMT. You can have:
- vCPUs pinned to two threads in the same core and exposed as multiple cores in the guest
Why the .... would one do anything like that?
Quoted 5 lines
- vCPUs from different guests pinned to two threads in the same core
and that would be okay as far as
KVM_HINTS_REALTIMEis concerned, but would still allow exploitation of side-channels, respectively within the VM and between VMs.
Hardly, RT really rather would not have SMT. SMT is pretty crap for determinism.
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 9 lines · Peter Zijlstra
Quoted 7 lines
Quoted 2 lines
The only way virt topology can make any sense what so ever is if the vcpus are pinned to physical CPUs.
This is a subset of the requirements for "trustworthy" SMT. You can have:
- vCPUs pinned to two threads in the same core and exposed as multiple cores in the guest
Why the .... would one do anything like that?
If a vCPUs from a different guest could be pinned to a threads in the same core as this guest (e.g. guests with an odd number of vCPUs), then why not. Side-channel wise, you're screwed anyway.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 5 lines
- vCPUs from different guests pinned to two threads in the same core
and that would be okay as far as
KVM_HINTS_REALTIMEis concerned, but would still allow exploitation of side-channels, respectively within the VM and between VMs.Hardly, RT really rather would not have SMT. SMT is pretty crap for determinism.
True, but not a problem as long as the guest knows that - it can ignore one sibling for each core for RT tasks, and use hyperthreading for non-RT and housekeeping tasks.
Paolo
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 25 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>--- Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +0
-0
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit · line 92
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +4
-0@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). +
Instead of defining a one-off bit, can we make:
ecx = the set of known "hints" (defaults to edx if zero)
edx = the set of hints that apply to the virtual machine
Paolo
Quoted 36 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 25 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>--- Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +0
-0Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit · line 92
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +4
-0@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). +Instead of defining a one-off bit, can we make:
Quoted 3 lines
ecx = the set of known "hints" (defaults to edx if zero)
edx = the set of hints that apply to the virtual machine
Just to resurrect this thread, the guest could explicitly ACK a KVM_FEATURE_DYNAMIC_HINT at init. This would allow the host to change the hints whenever with the guest not needing to separately ACK the changed hints.
Ankur
Quoted 3 lines
Paolo
6
Vitaly Kuznetsov
reviewerQuoted 37 lines · Ankur Arora
Quoted 36 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 25 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>--- Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +0
-0Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit · line 92
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +4
-0@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). +Instead of defining a one-off bit, can we make:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
ecx = the set of known "hints" (defaults to edx if zero)
edx = the set of hints that apply to the virtual machine
Just to resurrect this thread, the guest could explicitly ACK a
KVM_FEATURE_DYNAMIC_HINTat init. This would allow the host to change the hints whenever with the guest not needing to separately ACK the changed hints.
(I apologize for dropping the ball on this, I'm intended to do RFCv2 in a nearby future)
Regarding this particular hint (let's call it 'no nonarchitectural coresharing' for now) I don't see much value in communicating change to guest when it happens. Imagine our host for some reason is not able to guarantee that anymore e.g. we've migrated to a host with less pCPUs and/or special restrictions and have to start sharing. What we, as a guest, are supposed to do when we receive a notification? "You're now insecure, deal with it!" :-) Equally, I don't see much value in pre-acking such change. "I'm fine with becoming insecure at some point".
If we, however, discuss other hints such 'pre-ACK' mechanism may make sense, however, I'd make it an option to a 'challenge/response'
protocol: if host wants to change a hint it notifies the guest and waits for an ACK from it (e.g. a pair of MSRs + an interrupt). I, however, have no good candidate from the existing hints which would require guest to ACK (e.g revoking PV EOI would probably do but why would we do that?) As I said before, challenge/response protocol is needed if we'd like to make TSC frequency change the way Hyper-V does it (required for updating guest TSC pages in nested case) but this is less and less important with the appearance of TSC scaling. I'm still not sure if this is an over-engineering or not. We can wait for the first good candidate to decide.
Signature · 1 line
Vitaly
Quoted 51 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
Quoted 37 lines · Ankur Arora
Quoted 36 lines · Paolo Bonzini
Quoted 25 lines · Vitaly Kuznetsov
There is also one additional piece of the information missing. A VM can be sharing physical cores with other VMs (or other userspace tasks on the host) so does
KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTimply that it's not the case or not? It is unclear if this changes anything and can probably be left out of scope (just don't do that).Similar to the already existent 'NoNonArchitecturalCoreSharing' Hyper-V enlightenment, the default value of
KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMTis set to !cpu_smt_possible(). KVM userspace is thus supposed to pass it to guest's CPUIDs in case it is '1' (meaning no SMT on the host at all) or do some extra work (like CPU pinning and exposing the correct topology) before passing '1' to the guest.Signed-off-by Vitaly Kuznetsov <[email protected]>--- Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst | 27 +++++++++++++++++++-------- arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm_para.h | 2 ++ arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 7 ++++++- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +0
-0Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit · line 92
Quoted 7 lines
Documentation/virt/kvm/cpuid.rst +4
-0@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ KVM_FEATURE_PV_SCHED_YIELD 13 guest checks this feature bit before using paravirtualized sched yield. +KVM_FEATURE_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT 14 set when host supports 'SMT + topology is trustworthy' hint + (KVM_HINTS_TRUSTWORTHY_SMT). +Instead of defining a one-off bit, can we make:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
ecx = the set of known "hints" (defaults to edx if zero)
edx = the set of hints that apply to the virtual machine
Just to resurrect this thread, the guest could explicitly ACK a
KVM_FEATURE_DYNAMIC_HINTat init. This would allow the host to change the hints whenever with the guest not needing to separately ACK the changed hints.(I apologize for dropping the ball on this, I'm intended to do RFCv2 in a nearby future)
Quoted 8 lines
Regarding this particular hint (let's call it 'no nonarchitectural coresharing' for now) I don't see much value in communicating change to guest when it happens. Imagine our host for some reason is not able to guarantee that anymore e.g. we've migrated to a host with less pCPUs and/or special restrictions and have to start sharing. What we, as a guest, are supposed to do when we receive a notification? "You're now insecure, deal with it!" :-) Equally, I don't see much value in pre-acking such change. "I'm fine with becoming insecure at some point".
True, for that use-case pre-ACK seems like exactly the thing you would not want.
I do see some value in the guest receiving the notification though. Maybe it could print a big fat printk or something :). Or, it could change to a different security-policy-that-I-just-made-up.
Quoted 4 lines
If we, however, discuss other hints such 'pre-ACK' mechanism may make sense, however, I'd make it an option to a 'challenge/response'
protocol: if host wants to change a hint it notifies the guest and waits for an ACK from it (e.g. a pair of MSRs + an interrupt). I, however,
My main reason for this 'pre-ACK' approach is some discomfort with changing the CPUID edx from under the guest.
The MSR+interrupt approach would work as well but then we have the same set of hints spread across CPUID and the MSR. What do you think is the right handling for a guest that refuses to ACK the MSR?
Quoted 8 lines
have no good candidate from the existing hints which would require guest to ACK (e.g revoking PV EOI would probably do but why would we do that?) As I said before, challenge/response protocol is needed if we'd like to make TSC frequency change the way Hyper-V does it (required for updating guest TSC pages in nested case) but this is less and less important with the appearance of TSC scaling. I'm still not sure if this is an over-engineering or not. We can wait for the first good candidate to decide.
As we've discussed offlist, the particular hint I'm interested in is KVM_HINT_REALTIME. That's not a particularly good candidate though because there's no correctness problem if the host does switch it off suddenly.
Ankur
Paolo Bonzini
maintainerQuoted 7 lines · Ankur Arora
Quoted 4 lines
If we, however, discuss other hints such 'pre-ACK' mechanism may make sense, however, I'd make it an option to a 'challenge/response'
protocol: if host wants to change a hint it notifies the guest and waits for an ACK from it (e.g. a pair of MSRs + an interrupt). I, however,My main reason for this 'pre-ACK' approach is some discomfort with changing the CPUID edx from under the guest.
Changing the CPUID is fine, if we document which CPUID can change. There are CPUID leaves that change at runtime, for example in leaf 0Dh (though in that case it's based on XCR0 and not on external circumstances).
Quoted 4 lines
As we've discussed offlist, the particular hint I'm interested in is
KVM_HINT_REALTIME. That's not a particularly good candidate though because there's no correctness problem if the host does switch it off suddenly.
Or perhaps it's a good candidate, exactly because there's no correctness problem. For SMT topology, there are security issues if the host doesn't respect it anymore, so making it changeable is of limited utility.
Paolo