smb: some potential bugfixes
Subsystems (2)
cover smb: some potential bugfixes
I spent the time exercising some new fuzzing tools on the ksmbd and smb code purely because it's something that is simple to set up and test locally with virtual machines, and in doing so, potentially found some minor problems for when you have an "untrusted" client.
Here's some fixes for what I happened to notice. They pass my very limited testing here, but please don't trust them at all and verify that I'm not just making this all up before accepting them.
thanks!
greg k-h
Greg Kroah-Hartman (2):
smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response
fs/smb/client/smb2file.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 2 +- 2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH 1/2 smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp() later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen. Isn't pointer math fun?
The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov.
Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds check.
An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +1 -1
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) nlen = ea->ea_name_length; vlen =le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length);if (nlen !=SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN || - (u8 *)ea + nlen +1 + vlen > end) + (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen +1 + vlen > end)return -EINVAL ;switch (vlen) {
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
ChenXiaoSong
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Sashiko reported another out-of-bounds issue: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/2026040635-banking-unsoiled-3250@gregkh
Should we add the following checks in check_wsl_eas()?
```
--- a/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c
@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov)
ea = (void *)((u8 *)rsp_iov->iov_base +
le16_to_cpu(rsp->OutputBufferOffset));
end = (u8 *)rsp_iov->iov_base + rsp_iov->iov_len;
+ if (ea + outlen > end)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
for (;;) {
if ((u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea))
return -EINVAL;
```Quoted 47 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but
ea_datasits at offsetsizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info)= 8 from ea, not at offset 0. Thestrncmp()later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end isea->ea_data+ nlen + 1
+ vlen. Isn't pointer math fun?The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end -
sizeof(*ea)only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov.Fix this mess all up by using
ea->ea_dataas the base for the bounds check.An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.
Cc Steve French <[email protected]>Cc Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>Cc Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>Cc Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>Cc Tom Talpey <[email protected]>Cc Bharath SM <[email protected]>Cc stable <[email protected]>Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>--- fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +1
-1@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) nlen = ea->ea_name_length; vlen =le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length);if (nlen !=SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN || - (u8 *)ea + nlen +1 + vlen > end) + (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen +1 + vlen > end)return -EINVAL ;switch (vlen) {
Signature · 3 lines
ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]> Chinese Homepage: chenxiaosong.com English Homepage: chenxiaosong.com/en
Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Quoted 9 lines · ChenXiaoSong
Sashiko reported another out-of-bounds issue:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/2026040635-banking-unsoiled-3250@gregkhShould we add the following checks in
check_wsl_eas()?```
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) · line 125
Quoted 5 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +2
-0@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) ea = (void *)((u8 *)rsp_iov->iov_base +le16_to_cpu (rsp->OutputBufferOffset)); end = (u8 *)rsp_iov->iov_base + rsp_iov->iov_len; +if (ea + outlen > end) +return -EINVAL ;
Then you would miss any "first" structures here, as I think the for loop catches this later on with the line:
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) · line 129
Quoted 4 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +1
-0+for (;;) {if ((u8 *)ea > end -sizeof (*ea))return -EINVAL ;
That one, right?
Or am I misreading this?
Pointer math is "fun" :(
thanks,
greg k-h
ChenXiaoSong
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
The for loop does not seem to catch cases where outlen is excessively large. In such cases, smb2_compound_op() would use this large outlen to memcpy(), which could lead to OOB.
```
smb2_compound_op()
{
...
size[0] = outlen; // very large
check_wsl_eas()
memcpy(..., outlen) // out-of-bounds
...
}
```Quoted 34 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 9 lines · ChenXiaoSong
Sashiko reported another out-of-bounds issue:
https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/2026040635-banking-unsoiled-3250@gregkhShould we add the following checks in
check_wsl_eas()?```
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) · line 125
Quoted 5 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +2
-0@@ -121,6 +121,9 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) ea = (void *)((u8 *)rsp_iov->iov_base +le16_to_cpu (rsp->OutputBufferOffset)); end = (u8 *)rsp_iov->iov_base + rsp_iov->iov_len; +if (ea + outlen > end) +return -EINVAL ;Then you would miss any "first" structures here, as I think the for loop catches this later on with the line:
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) · line 129
Quoted 4 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +1
-0+for (;;) {if ((u8 *)ea > end -sizeof (*ea))return -EINVAL ;That one, right?
Or am I misreading this?
Pointer math is "fun" :(
thanks,
greg k-h
Signature · 3 lines
ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]> Chinese Homepage: chenxiaosong.com English Homepage: chenxiaosong.com/en
Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Quoted 4 lines · ChenXiaoSong
The for loop does not seem to catch cases where
outlenis excessively large. In such cases,smb2_compound_op()would use this largeoutlentomemcpy(), which could lead to OOB.
Quoted 10 lines
```
smb2_compound_op()
{
...
size[0] = outlen; // very large
check_wsl_eas()
memcpy(..., outlen) // out-of-bounds
...
}
```Ah, I missed the caller site. Yeah, probably a good thing to check as well, want to make up a patch?
thanks,
greg k-h
ChenXiaoSong
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Could you send v2 with this check added?
I am currently reviewing another patch. Perhaps you could wait until I have finished reviewing it.
Quoted 2 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Ah, I missed the caller site. Yeah, probably a good thing to check as well, want to make up a patch?
Signature · 3 lines
ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]> Chinese Homepage: chenxiaosong.com English Homepage: chenxiaosong.com/en
Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Quoted 1 line · ChenXiaoSong
Could you send v2 with this check added?
Looks like this was already accepted, and the additional check would be just that, an additional check :)
Quoted 2 lines
I am currently reviewing another patch. Perhaps you could wait until I have finished reviewing it.
I have no problem waiting, but as you found this one, I want to give you proper credit for the find/fix.
thanks,
greg k-h
ChenXiaoSong
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Sashiko found it, I just checked and confirmed it.
Could you create another patch? I enjoy the review process more than creating patches :)
Quoted 15 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
Quoted 1 line · ChenXiaoSong
Could you send v2 with this check added?
Looks like this was already accepted, and the additional check would be just that, an additional check :)
Quoted 2 lines
I am currently reviewing another patch. Perhaps you could wait until I have finished reviewing it.
I have no problem waiting, but as you found this one, I want to give you proper credit for the find/fix.
thanks,
greg k-h
Signature · 3 lines
ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]> Chinese Homepage: chenxiaosong.com English Homepage: chenxiaosong.com/en
Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
Quoted 4 lines · ChenXiaoSong
Sashiko found it, I just checked and confirmed it.
Could you create another patch? I enjoy the review process more than creating patches :)
Will do, I'll add that to my queue, but might take a few days if someone wants to "beat" me to it, I'll have no objection at all :)
thanks,
greg k-h
ChenXiaoSong
reviewerRe: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanHi Steve,
Should we use get_unaligned_le32() to get unaligned data?
Quoted 20 lines
static inline
kuid_twsl_make_kuid(structcifs_sb_info*cifs_sb,
void *ptr){ u32 uid = le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)ptr); ... }Additionally, does parsing these extended attributes cause unaligned memory accesses?
When parsing WSL extended attributes, the code derives the value pointer at an offset ofea_name_length(which is 6) plus 1 fromea_data. Since ea is a 4-byte aligned structure, the value sits at an unaligned offset. Helper functions likewsl_make_kuid()explicitly cast this unaligned pointer to a 32-bit type and dereference it:le32_to_cpu(*(__le32 *)v);Could this trigger an unaligned access exception and crash the kernel on architectures with strict alignment requirements?
Signature · 3 lines
ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]> Chinese Homepage: chenxiaosong.com English Homepage: chenxiaosong.com/en
Re: [PATCH 1/2] smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()
In reply to Greg Kroah-Hartman[PATCH] smb: client: add bounds checks when iterating SMB1 WSL EAs
Add boundary and overflow checks when traversing extended attribute (EA) entries for SMB1 WSL reparse points in cifs_query_path_info(), to prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses from malformed next_entry_offset values.
This is necessary because SMB1 WSL EA iteration does not currently have any explicit bounds checking, unlike SMB2 path which has check_wsl_eas(). The new checks ensure the current EA pointer plus its size does not exceed the end of the EA buffer during iteration and before parsing.
--- fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smb1ops.c +10 -2
@@ -645,13 +645,17 @@ static int cifs_query_path_info(const unsigned int xid,if (!rc && data->reparse_point) {struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *ea;u32 next =0 ; +u8 *eas_end = data->wsl.eas + data->wsl.eas_len; ea = (struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *)data->wsl.eas;do { ea = (void *)((u8 *)ea + next); +if ((u8 *)ea +sizeof (*ea) > eas_end) +break ; next =le32_to_cpu (ea->next_entry_offset); }while (next); -if (le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length)) { +if ((u8 *)ea +sizeof (*ea) <= eas_end && +le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length)) { ea->next_entry_offset =cpu_to_le32 (ALIGN (sizeof (*ea) + ea->ea_name_length +1 +le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length),4 ));
@@ -691,13 +695,17 @@ static int cifs_query_path_info(const unsigned int xid,if (!rc && data->reparse_point) {struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *ea;u32 next =0 ; +u8 *eas_end = data->wsl.eas + data->wsl.eas_len; ea = (struct smb2_file_full_ea_info *)data->wsl.eas;do { ea = (void *)((u8 *)ea + next); +if ((u8 *)ea +sizeof (*ea) > eas_end) +break ; next =le32_to_cpu (ea->next_entry_offset); }while (next); -if (le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length)) { +if ((u8 *)ea +sizeof (*ea) <= eas_end && +le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length)) { ea->next_entry_offset =cpu_to_le32 (ALIGN (sizeof (*ea) + ea->ea_name_length +1 +le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length),4 ));
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0
Quoted 55 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA name and value, but
ea_datasits at offsetsizeof(struct smb2_file_full_ea_info)= 8 from ea, not at offset 0. Thestrncmp()later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end isea->ea_data+ nlen + 1
+ vlen. Isn't pointer math fun?The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end -
sizeof(*ea)only guarantees the 8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8 bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past the end of iov.Fix this mess all up by using
ea->ea_dataas the base for the bounds check.An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is interpreted as.
Cc Steve French <[email protected]>Cc Paulo Alcantara <[email protected]>Cc Ronnie Sahlberg <[email protected]>Cc Shyam Prasad N <[email protected]>Cc Tom Talpey <[email protected]>Cc Bharath SM <[email protected]>Cc stable <[email protected]>Assisted-by gregkh_clanker_t1000Signed-off-by Greg Kroah-Hartman <[email protected]>---
fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c| 2 +-1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)fs/smb/client/smb2inode.c +1
-1@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ static int check_wsl_eas(struct kvec *rsp_iov) nlen = ea->ea_name_length; vlen =le16_to_cpu (ea->ea_value_length);if (nlen !=SMB2_WSL_XATTR_NAME_LEN || - (u8 *)ea + nlen +1 + vlen > end) + (u8 *)ea->ea_data + nlen +1 + vlen > end)return -EINVAL ;switch (vlen) {Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
PATCH 2/2 smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response
In reply to Greg Kroah-HartmanWhen a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message() returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server.
symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p < end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset
0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7 bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits.
smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) + sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when ErrorContextCount == 0.
With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper, and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 + ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via readlink(2).
Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather than a fixed offset.
Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not overflow here with the new greater-than.
--- fs/smb/client/smb2file.c | 20 ++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
fs/smb/client/smb2file.c +12 -8
@@ -27,10 +27,11 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov) {struct smb2_err_rsp *err = iov->iov_base;struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *sym =ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +u8 *end = (u8 *)err + iov->iov_len;u32 len;if (err->ErrorContextCount) { -struct smb2_error_context_rsp *p, *end; +struct smb2_error_context_rsp *p; len = (u32)err->ErrorContextCount * (offsetof(struct smb2_error_context_rsp, ErrorContextData) +
@@ -39,8 +40,7 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov)return ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); p = (struct smb2_error_context_rsp *)err->ErrorData; - end = (struct smb2_error_context_rsp *)((u8 *)err + iov->iov_len); - do { +while ((u8 *)p +sizeof (*p) <= end) {if (le32_to_cpu (p->ErrorId) ==SMB2_ERROR_ID_DEFAULT ) { sym = (struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *)p->ErrorContextData;break ;
@@ -50,14 +50,16 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov) len =ALIGN (le32_to_cpu (p->ErrorDataLength),8 ); p = (struct smb2_error_context_rsp *)(p->ErrorContextData + len); - }while (p < end); + } }else if (le32_to_cpu (err->ByteCount) >=sizeof (*sym) && iov->iov_len >=SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE ) { sym = (struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *)err->ErrorData; } -if (!IS_ERR (sym) && (le32_to_cpu (sym->SymLinkErrorTag) !=SYMLINK_ERROR_TAG || -le32_to_cpu (sym->ReparseTag) !=IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK )) +if (!IS_ERR (sym) && + ((u8 *)sym +sizeof (*sym) > end || +le32_to_cpu (sym->SymLinkErrorTag) !=SYMLINK_ERROR_TAG || +le32_to_cpu (sym->ReparseTag) !=IO_REPARSE_TAG_SYMLINK )) sym =ERR_PTR (-EINVAL );return sym;
@@ -128,8 +130,10 @@ int smb2_parse_symlink_response(struct cifs_sb_info *cifs_sb, const struct kvec print_len =le16_to_cpu (sym->PrintNameLength); print_offs =le16_to_cpu (sym->PrintNameOffset); -if (iov->iov_len <SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE + sub_offs + sub_len || - iov->iov_len <SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE + print_offs + print_len) +if ((char *)sym->PathBuffer + sub_offs + sub_len > + (char *)iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len || + (char *)sym->PathBuffer + print_offs + print_len > + (char *)iov->iov_base + iov->iov_len)return -EINVAL ; return smb2_parse_native_symlink(path,
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0
ChenXiaoSong
reviewerRe: [PATCH 2/2] smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response
Sashiko reported the following out-of-bounds issue. I have checked and confirmed that this indeed causes an OOB access.
When create fails on symlink, len in smb2_check_message() may be smaller than calc_len. The function flow is as follows:
```
smb2_check_message()
// ensure StructureSize2 is 9
if (... pdu->StructureSize2 != SMB2_ERROR_STRUCTURE_SIZE2_LE ...) //
false
smb2_calc_size()
len = le16_to_cpu(shdr->StructureSize) == 64
len += le16_to_cpu(pdu->StructureSize2) == 64 + 9
smb2_get_data_area_len
if (shdr->StructureSize == 9) // true, return NULL
calc_len == 64 + 9
if (len != calc_len) { // true
/* create failed on symlink */
if (command == SMB2_CREATE_HE && shdr->Status ==
STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK) // true
```Should we add the following check? Or check it in symlink_data()?
```
-- a/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c
+++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2misc.c
@@ -241,7 +241,8 @@ smb2_check_message(char *buf, unsigned int pdu_len, unsigned int len,
if (len != calc_len) {
/* create failed on symlink */
if (command == SMB2_CREATE_HE &&
- shdr->Status == STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK)
+ shdr->Status == STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK &&
+ len > calc_len)
return 0;
/* Windows 7 server returns 24 bytes more */
if (calc_len + 24 == len && command ==
SMB2_OPLOCK_BREAK_HE)
```Quoted 16 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2file.c static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov) · line 33
Quoted 10 lines
fs/smb/client/smb2file.c +1
-0@@ -27,10 +27,11 @@ static struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *symlink_data(const struct kvec *iov) {struct smb2_err_rsp *err = iov->iov_base;struct smb2_symlink_err_rsp *sym =ERR_PTR (-EINVAL ); +u8 *end = (u8 *)err + iov->iov_len;u32 len;if (err->ErrorContextCount) {Since
smb2_check_message()returns success without length validation for the symlink error response, is it possible foriov->iov_lento be smaller thansizeof(struct smb2_err_rsp)?
If the buffer only contains the base SMB2 header (64 bytes), does accessingerr->ErrorContextCount(at offset 66) orerr->ByteCountlater in this function cause an out-of-bounds read?
Signature · 3 lines
ChenXiaoSong <[email protected]> Chinese Homepage: chenxiaosong.com English Homepage: chenxiaosong.com/en
Quoted 8 lines · Greg Kroah-Hartman
I spent the time exercising some new fuzzing tools on the ksmbd and smb code purely because it's something that is simple to set up and test locally with virtual machines, and in doing so, potentially found some minor problems for when you have an "untrusted" client.
Here's some fixes for what I happened to notice. They pass my very limited testing here, but please don't trust them at all and verify that I'm not just making this all up before accepting them.
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): CAH2r5mvXFzWxs70Jmg=yWddmcHs+Bpf8eiBUvyc4oOMLzdCY7w@mail.gmail.com
Quoted 1 line · Steve French
merged into cifs-2.6.git for-next
Thanks!