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xfrm: Introduce direction attribute for SA

PATCH Superseded Antony Antony 5 participants 11 messages Apr 26, 2024 – Apr 30, 2024

Subsystems (4)

v13 of 14 Superseded Latest is v14 →

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#0 lore raw

v13 cover xfrm: Introduce direction attribute for SA

Hi,

Inspired by the upcoming IP-TFS patch set, and confusions experienced in the past due to lack of direction attribute on SAs, add a new direction "dir" attribute. It aims to streamline the SA configuration process and enhance the clarity of existing SA attributes.

This patch set introduces the 'dir' attribute to SA, aka xfrm_state, ('in' for input or 'out' for output). Alsp add validations of existing direction-specific SA attributes during configuration and in the data path lookup.

This change would not affect any existing use case or way of configuring SA. You will notice improvements when the new 'dir' attribute is set.

v13 has one fix, minor documenation updates, and function renaming.

Antony Antony (4):
xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out
xfrm: Add dir validation to "out" data path lookup
xfrm: Add dir validation to "in" data path lookup
xfrm: Restrict SA direction attribute to specific netlink message
types

 Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst |   6 +
 include/net/xfrm.h                     |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/snmp.h              |   2 +
 include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h              |   6 +
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c                 |   7 ++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c                 |   7 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c                 |   6 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c                  |  11 ++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c                 |   6 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c                   |   2 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c                 |   3 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c                  |   8 ++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c                   | 149 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 13 files changed, 205 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

--
2.30.2

#1 lore raw

PATCH v13 1/4 xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out

This patch introduces the 'dir' attribute, 'in' or 'out', to the xfrm_state, SA, enhancing usability by delineating the scope of values based on direction. An input SA will restrict values pertinent to input, effectively segregating them from output-related values.
And an output SA will restrict attributes for output. This change aims to streamline the configuration process and improve the overall consistency of SA attributes during configuration.

This feature sets the groundwork for future patches, including the upcoming IP-TFS patch.

---
v12->v13:
- fix typos and white spaces
- allow UPDSA, using old userpace, to update new acquire with direction

v11->v12:
- fix typo in error messge for flag ICMP

v10->v11:
- set dir out for acquire state
- allow output state with ESN to set replay-window 0
- change XFRMA_SA_DIR using NLA_POLICY_RANGE()
- replace verify_sa_dir() with refactored code.

v9->v10:
- add more direction specific validations XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC, XFRM_SA_XFLAG_DONT_ENCAP_DSCP XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH
- refactor validations into a fuction.
- add dir to ALLOCSPI to support strongSwan updating SPI to "in" state

v8->v9:
- add validation XFRM_STATE_ICMP not allowed on OUT SA.

v7->v8:
- add extra validation check on replay window and seq
- XFRM_MSG_UPDSA old and new SA should match "dir"

v6->v7:
- add replay-window check non-esn 0 and ESN 1.
- remove :XFRMA_SA_DIR only allowed with HW OFFLOAD

v5->v6:
- XFRMA_SA_DIR only allowed with HW OFFLOAD

v4->v5:
- add details to commit message

v3->v4:
- improve HW OFFLOAD DIR check add the other direction

v2->v3:
- delete redundant XFRM_SA_DIR_USE
- use u8 for "dir"
- fix HW OFFLOAD DIR check

v1->v2:
- use .strict_start_type in struct nla_policy xfrma_policy
- delete redundant XFRM_SA_DIR_MAX enum

---
 include/net/xfrm.h        |   1 +
 include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h |   6 ++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c    |   7 ++-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c    |   6 ++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c    |   3 +-
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c     |   8 +++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c      | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 7 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
include/net/xfrm.h +1 -0
index 57c743b7e4fe..7c9be06f8302 100644
@@ -291,6 +291,7 @@ struct xfrm_state {
 	/* Private data of this transformer, format is opaque,
 	 * interpreted by xfrm_type methods. */
 	void			*data;
+	u8			dir;
 };
 
 static inline struct net *xs_net(struct xfrm_state *x)
include/uapi/linux/xfrm.h +6 -0
index 6a77328be114..18ceaba8486e 100644
@@ -141,6 +141,11 @@ enum {
 	XFRM_POLICY_MAX	= 3
 };
 
+enum xfrm_sa_dir {
+	XFRM_SA_DIR_IN	= 1,
+	XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT = 2
+};
+
 enum {
 	XFRM_SHARE_ANY,		/* No limitations */
 	XFRM_SHARE_SESSION,	/* For this session only */
@@ -315,6 +320,7 @@ enum xfrm_attr_type_t {
 	XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK,	/* __u32 */
 	XFRMA_IF_ID,		/* __u32 */
 	XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH,	/* __u32 in seconds for input SA */
+	XFRMA_SA_DIR,		/* __u8 */
 	__XFRMA_MAX
 
 #define XFRMA_OUTPUT_MARK XFRMA_SET_MARK	/* Compatibility */
net/xfrm/xfrm_compat.c +5 -2
index 655fe4ff8621..703d4172c7d7 100644
@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static const int compat_msg_min[XFRM_NR_MSGTYPES] = {
 };
 
 static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
+	[XFRMA_UNSPEC]          = { .strict_start_type = XFRMA_SA_DIR },
 	[XFRMA_SA]		= { .len = XMSGSIZE(compat_xfrm_usersa_info)},
 	[XFRMA_POLICY]		= { .len = XMSGSIZE(compat_xfrm_userpolicy_info)},
 	[XFRMA_LASTUSED]	= { .type = NLA_U64},
@@ -129,6 +130,7 @@ static const struct nla_policy compat_policy[XFRMA_MAX+1] = {
 	[XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[XFRMA_IF_ID]		= { .type = NLA_U32 },
 	[XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH]	= { .type = NLA_U32 },
+	[XFRMA_SA_DIR]          = NLA_POLICY_RANGE(NLA_U8, XFRM_SA_DIR_IN, XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT),
 };
 
 static struct nlmsghdr *xfrm_nlmsg_put_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
@@ -277,9 +279,10 @@ static int xfrm_xlate64_attr(struct sk_buff *dst, const struct nlattr *src)
 	case XFRMA_SET_MARK_MASK:
 	case XFRMA_IF_ID:
 	case XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH:
+	case XFRMA_SA_DIR:
 		return xfrm_nla_cpy(dst, src, nla_len(src));
 	default:
-		BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH);
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_SA_DIR);
 		pr_warn_once("unsupported nla_type %d\n", src->nla_type);
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
@@ -434,7 +437,7 @@ static int xfrm_xlate32_attr(void *dst, const struct nlattr *nla,
 	int err;
 
 	if (type > XFRMA_MAX) {
-		BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_MTIMER_THRESH);
+		BUILD_BUG_ON(XFRMA_MAX != XFRMA_SA_DIR);
 		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Bad attribute");
 		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
 	}
net/xfrm/xfrm_device.c +6 -0
index 6346690d5c69..2455a76a1cff 100644
@@ -253,6 +253,12 @@ int xfrm_dev_state_add(struct net *net, struct xfrm_state *x,
 		return -EINVAL;
 	}
 
+	if ((xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND && x->dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) ||
+	    (!(xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_INBOUND) && x->dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+		NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Mismatched SA and offload direction");
+		return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
 	is_packet_offload = xuo->flags & XFRM_OFFLOAD_PACKET;
 
 	/* We don't yet support UDP encapsulation and TFC padding. */
net/xfrm/xfrm_replay.c +2 -1
index ce56d659c55a..bc56c6305725 100644
@@ -778,7 +778,8 @@ int xfrm_init_replay(struct xfrm_state *x, struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 		}
 
 		if (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_ESN) {
-			if (replay_esn->replay_window == 0) {
+			if (replay_esn->replay_window == 0 &&
+			    (!x->dir || x->dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
 				NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "ESN replay window must be > 0");
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +8 -0
index 0c306473a79d..649bb739df0d 100644
@@ -1292,6 +1292,7 @@ xfrm_state_find(const xfrm_address_t *daddr, const xfrm_address_t *saddr,
 		if (km_query(x, tmpl, pol) == 0) {
 			spin_lock_bh(&net->xfrm.xfrm_state_lock);
 			x->km.state = XFRM_STATE_ACQ;
+			x->dir = XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT;
 			list_add(&x->km.all, &net->xfrm.state_all);
 			XFRM_STATE_INSERT(bydst, &x->bydst,
 					  net->xfrm.state_bydst + h,
@@ -1744,6 +1745,7 @@ static struct xfrm_state *xfrm_state_clone(struct xfrm_state *orig,
 	x->lastused = orig->lastused;
 	x->new_mapping = 0;
 	x->new_mapping_sport = 0;
+	x->dir = orig->dir;
 
 	return x;
 
@@ -1864,8 +1866,14 @@ int xfrm_state_update(struct xfrm_state *x)
 	}
 
 	if (x1->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ACQ) {
+		if (x->dir && x1->dir != x->dir)
+			goto out;
+
 		__xfrm_state_insert(x);
 		x = NULL;
+	} else {
+		if (x1->dir != x->dir)
+			goto out;
 	}
 	err = 0;
 
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +119 -6

216 lines not on this page · raw message

--
2.30.2

#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH ipsec-next v13 1/4] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out

Quoted 19 lines · Antony Antony
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +11 -0
index 810b520493f3..65948598be0b 100644
@@ -358,6 +383,64 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
 			err = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
+
+		if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+				       "MTIMER_THRESH attribute should not be set on output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+		if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_DECAP_DSCP) {

net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p, · line 406

Quoted 10 lines
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +10 -0
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag DECAP_DSCP should not be set for output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ICMP) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag ICMP should not be set for output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}

Maybe also XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV? It looks pretty "input" to me.

Quoted 22 lines
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +22 -0
+
+		if (p->replay_window) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replay window should be 0 for output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]) {
+			struct xfrm_replay_state *replay;
+
+			replay = nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]);
+
+			if (replay->seq || replay->bitmap) {
+				NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+					       "Replay seq and bitmap should be 0 for output SA");
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN) {

net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p, · line 438

Quoted 10 lines
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +10 -0
+		if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag NOPMTUDISC should not be set for input SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (attrs[XFRMA_SA_EXTRA_FLAGS]) {
+			u32 xflags = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_SA_EXTRA_FLAGS]);
+
+			if (xflags & XFRM_SA_XFLAG_DONT_ENCAP_DSCP) {

Shouldn't XFRM_SA_XFLAG_OSEQ_MAY_WRAP also be excluded on input?

Sorry I didn't check all the remaining flags until now.

Apart from that, the series looks good now, so I can also ack it and add those two extra flags as a follow-up patch. Steffen/Antony, let me know what you prefer.

Thanks.

Signature · 1 line
Sabrina
maintainer
#3 lore raw

Re: [PATCH ipsec-next v13 1/4] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out

Quoted 8 lines · Sabrina Dubroca

2024-04-26, 10:05:06 +0200, Antony Antony wrote:

Sorry I didn't check all the remaining flags until now.

Apart from that, the series looks good now, so I can also ack it and add those two extra flags as a follow-up patch. Steffen/Antony, let me know what you prefer.

It would be nice if we could merge the patchset without known issues. OTOH this might be the last chance to get in in during this release cycle.

Antony, can you provide an update today?

#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH ipsec-next v13 1/4] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out

Quoted 10 lines · Steffen Klassert via Devel
Quoted 8 lines · Sabrina Dubroca

2024-04-26, 10:05:06 +0200, Antony Antony wrote:

Sorry I didn't check all the remaining flags until now.

Apart from that, the series looks good now, so I can also ack it and add those two extra flags as a follow-up patch. Steffen/Antony, let me know what you prefer.

Quoted 5 lines

It would be nice if we could merge the patchset without known issues. OTOH this might be the last chance to get in in during this release cycle.

Antony, can you provide an update today?

yes. I just sent v14 with verification for the flags Sabrina proposed.

It would be be great to get this patch in this cycle.

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH ipsec-next v13 1/4] xfrm: Add Direction to the SA in or out

In reply to Sabrina Dubroca
Quoted 24 lines · Sabrina Dubroca via Devel
Quoted 23 lines · Antony Antony
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +15 -0
index 810b520493f3..65948598be0b 100644
@@ -358,6 +383,64 @@ static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p,
 			err = -EINVAL;
 			goto out;
 		}
+
+		if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+				       "MTIMER_THRESH attribute should not be set on output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+		if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_DECAP_DSCP) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag DECAP_DSCP should not be set for output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
Quoted 8 lines

net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p, · line 406

Quoted 6 lines
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +6 -0
+
+		if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_ICMP) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag ICMP should not be set for output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}

Maybe also XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV? It looks pretty "input" to me.

Now I think it is. I wasn't sure before. I have never seen this flag in use.

Quoted 27 lines
Quoted 27 lines
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +26 -0
+
+		if (p->replay_window) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Replay window should be 0 for output SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
+		}
+
+		if (attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]) {
+			struct xfrm_replay_state *replay;
+
+			replay = nla_data(attrs[XFRMA_REPLAY_VAL]);
+
+			if (replay->seq || replay->bitmap) {
+				NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack,
+					       "Replay seq and bitmap should be 0 for output SA");
+				err = -EINVAL;
+				goto out;
+			}
+		}
+	}
+
+	if (sa_dir == XFRM_SA_DIR_IN) {
+		if (p->flags & XFRM_STATE_NOPMTUDISC) {
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Flag NOPMTUDISC should not be set for input SA");
+			err = -EINVAL;
+			goto out;
Quoted 8 lines

net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c static int verify_newsa_info(struct xfrm_usersa_info *p, · line 438

Quoted 6 lines
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +6 -0
+		}
+
+		if (attrs[XFRMA_SA_EXTRA_FLAGS]) {
+			u32 xflags = nla_get_u32(attrs[XFRMA_SA_EXTRA_FLAGS]);
+
+			if (xflags & XFRM_SA_XFLAG_DONT_ENCAP_DSCP) {

Shouldn't XFRM_SA_XFLAG_OSEQ_MAY_WRAP also be excluded on input?

I aggree. this is odd flag:) me wonders who use it.

Quoted 6 lines

Sorry I didn't check all the remaining flags until now.

Apart from that, the series looks good now, so I can also ack it and add those two extra flags as a follow-up patch. Steffen/Antony, let me know what you prefer.

I just v4 lets see how it goes. Thanks Sabrina.

#6 lore raw

PATCH v13 2/4 xfrm: Add dir validation to "out" data path lookup

In reply to Antony Antony

Introduces validation for the x->dir attribute within the XFRM output data lookup path. If the configured direction does not match the expected direction, output, increment the XfrmOutStateDirError counter and drop the packet to ensure data integrity and correct flow handling.

grep -vw 0 /proc/net/xfrm_stat
XfrmOutPolError 1
XfrmOutStateDirError 1

---
v12 -> 13
- improve documentation in xfrm_proc.rst text

v11 -> 12
- add documentation in xfrm_proc.rst

v10 -> 11
- rename error s/XfrmOutDirError/XfrmOutStateDirError/
- fix possible dereferencing of x reported by Smatch

---
 Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst | 3 +++
 include/uapi/linux/snmp.h              | 1 +
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c                 | 6 ++++++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c                   | 1 +
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+)
Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst +3 -0
index 0a771c5a7399..5ac3acf4cf51 100644
@@ -111,3 +111,6 @@ XfrmOutPolError:
 
 XfrmOutStateInvalid:
 	State is invalid, perhaps expired
+
+XfrmOutStateDirError:
+        State direction mismatch (lookup found an input state on the output path, expected output or no direction)
include/uapi/linux/snmp.h +1 -0
index a0819c6a5988..23792b8412bd 100644
@@ -337,6 +337,7 @@ enum
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR,		/* XfrmFwdHdrError*/
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID,		/* XfrmOutStateInvalid */
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR,		/* XfrmAcquireError */
+	LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR,		/* XfrmOutStateDirError */
 	__LINUX_MIB_XFRMMAX
 };
 
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +6 -0
index 6affe5cd85d8..298b3a9eb48d 100644
@@ -2489,6 +2489,12 @@ xfrm_tmpl_resolve_one(struct xfrm_policy *policy, const struct flowi *fl,
 
 		x = xfrm_state_find(remote, local, fl, tmpl, policy, &error,
 				    family, policy->if_id);
+		if (x && x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_OUT) {
+			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR);
+			xfrm_state_put(x);
+			error = -EINVAL;
+			goto fail;
+		}
 
 		if (x && x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_VALID) {
 			xfrm[nx++] = x;
net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c +1 -0
index 5f9bf8e5c933..98606f1078f7 100644
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib xfrm_mib_list[] = {
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmFwdHdrError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMFWDHDRERROR),
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateInvalid", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID),
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmAcquireError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR),
+	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateDirError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR),
 	SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL
 };
 

--
2.30.2

Reviewed-by on v13 2/4
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH ipsec-next v13 2/4] xfrm: Add dir validation to "out" data path lookup

Le 26/04/2024 à 10:05, Antony Antony a écrit :

Quoted 10 lines

Introduces validation for the x->dir attribute within the XFRM output data lookup path. If the configured direction does not match the expected direction, output, increment the XfrmOutStateDirError counter and drop the packet to ensure data integrity and correct flow handling.

grep -vw 0 /proc/net/xfrm_stat
XfrmOutPolError 1
XfrmOutStateDirError 1

#8 lore raw

PATCH v13 3/4 xfrm: Add dir validation to "in" data path lookup

In reply to Antony Antony

Introduces validation for the x->dir attribute within the XFRM input data lookup path. If the configured direction does not match the expected direction, input, increment the XfrmInStateDirError counter and drop the packet to ensure data integrity and correct flow handling.

grep -vw 0 /proc/net/xfrm_stat
XfrmInStateDirError 1

---
v12 -> 13
- improve documentation in xfrm_proc.rst text

v11 -> 12
- add documentation in xfrm_proc.rst

v10->v11
- rename error s/XfrmInDirError/XfrmInStateDirError/

---
 Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst |  3 +++
 include/uapi/linux/snmp.h              |  1 +
 net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c                 |  7 +++++++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c                  | 11 +++++++++++
 net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c                   |  1 +
 5 files changed, 23 insertions(+)
Documentation/networking/xfrm_proc.rst +3 -0
index 5ac3acf4cf51..973d1571acac 100644
@@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ XfrmAcquireError:
 XfrmFwdHdrError:
 	Forward routing of a packet is not allowed
 
+XfrmInStateDirError:
+        State direction mismatch (lookup found an output state on the input path, expected input or no direction)
+
 Outbound errors
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 XfrmOutError:
include/uapi/linux/snmp.h +1 -0
index 23792b8412bd..adf5fd78dd50 100644
@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ enum
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID,		/* XfrmOutStateInvalid */
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR,		/* XfrmAcquireError */
 	LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR,		/* XfrmOutStateDirError */
+	LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR,		/* XfrmInStateDirError */
 	__LINUX_MIB_XFRMMAX
 };
 
net/ipv6/xfrm6_input.c +7 -0
index 2c6aeb090b7a..d5bac0d76b6e 100644
@@ -266,6 +266,13 @@ int xfrm6_input_addr(struct sk_buff *skb, xfrm_address_t *daddr,
 		if (!x)
 			continue;
 
+		if (unlikely(x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR);
+			xfrm_state_put(x);
+			x = NULL;
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		spin_lock(&x->lock);
 
 		if ((!i || (x->props.flags & XFRM_STATE_WILDRECV)) &&
net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c +11 -0
index 161f535c8b94..71b42de6e3c9 100644
@@ -466,6 +466,11 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 	if (encap_type < 0 || (xo && xo->flags & XFRM_GRO)) {
 		x = xfrm_input_state(skb);
 
+		if (unlikely(x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR);
+			goto drop;
+		}
+
 		if (unlikely(x->km.state != XFRM_STATE_VALID)) {
 			if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_ACQ)
 				XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR);
@@ -571,6 +576,12 @@ int xfrm_input(struct sk_buff *skb, int nexthdr, __be32 spi, int encap_type)
 			goto drop;
 		}
 
+		if (unlikely(x->dir && x->dir != XFRM_SA_DIR_IN)) {
+			XFRM_INC_STATS(net, LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR);
+			xfrm_state_put(x);
+			goto drop;
+		}
+
 		skb->mark = xfrm_smark_get(skb->mark, x);
 
 		sp->xvec[sp->len++] = x;
net/xfrm/xfrm_proc.c +1 -0
index 98606f1078f7..eeb984be03a7 100644
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ static const struct snmp_mib xfrm_mib_list[] = {
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateInvalid", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEINVALID),
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmAcquireError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMACQUIREERROR),
 	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmOutStateDirError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMOUTSTATEDIRERROR),
+	SNMP_MIB_ITEM("XfrmInStateDirError", LINUX_MIB_XFRMINSTATEDIRERROR),
 	SNMP_MIB_SENTINEL
 };
 

--
2.30.2

Reviewed-by on v13 3/4
#9 lore raw

Re: [PATCH ipsec-next v13 3/4] xfrm: Add dir validation to "in" data path lookup

Le 26/04/2024 à 10:05, Antony Antony a écrit :

Quoted 9 lines

Introduces validation for the x->dir attribute within the XFRM input data lookup path. If the configured direction does not match the expected direction, input, increment the XfrmInStateDirError counter and drop the packet to ensure data integrity and correct flow handling.

grep -vw 0 /proc/net/xfrm_stat
XfrmInStateDirError 1

#10 lore raw

PATCH v13 4/4 xfrm: Restrict SA direction attribute to specific netlink message types

In reply to Antony Antony

Reject the usage of the SA_DIR attribute in xfrm netlink messages when it's not applicable. This ensures that SA_DIR is only accepted for certain message types (NEWSA, UPDSA, and ALLOCSPI)

---
v12 -> 13
- renamed the function for clarity

v11 -> 12
- fix spd look up. This broke xfrm_policy tests

---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 24 insertions(+)
net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c +24 -0
index 65948598be0b..e606c3012471 100644
@@ -3200,6 +3200,24 @@ static const struct xfrm_link {
 	[XFRM_MSG_GETDEFAULT  - XFRM_MSG_BASE] = { .doit = xfrm_get_default   },
 };
 
+static int xfrm_reject_unused_attr(int type, struct nlattr **attrs,
+				   struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
+{
+	if (attrs[XFRMA_SA_DIR]) {
+		switch (type) {
+		case XFRM_MSG_NEWSA:
+		case XFRM_MSG_UPDSA:
+		case XFRM_MSG_ALLOCSPI:
+			break;
+		default:
+			NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "Invalid attribute SA_DIR");
+			return -EINVAL;
+		}
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 			     struct netlink_ext_ack *extack)
 {
@@ -3259,6 +3277,12 @@ static int xfrm_user_rcv_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh,
 	if (err < 0)
 		goto err;
 
+	if (!link->nla_pol || link->nla_pol == xfrma_policy) {
+		err = xfrm_reject_unused_attr((type + XFRM_MSG_BASE), attrs, extack);
+		if (err < 0)
+			goto err;
+	}
+
 	if (link->doit == NULL) {
 		err = -EINVAL;
 		goto err;

--
2.30.2