arch/x86: Set XSS while handling #VC intercept for CPUID
PATCH 1/1 arch/x86: Set XSS while handling #VC intercept for CPUID
According to [1], while handling the #VC intercept for CPUID leaf 0x0000_000D, we need to supply the value of XSS in the GHCB page. If this value is not provided then a spec compliant hypervisor can fail the GHCB request and kill the guest.
--- arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 1 + arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c | 3 +++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+)
arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h +1 -0
@@ -678,5 +678,6 @@ DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_1) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_exit_info_2) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(sw_scratch) DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xcr0) +DEFINE_GHCB_ACCESSORS(xss)#endif
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +3 -0
@@ -880,6 +880,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,if (snp_cpuid_ret != -EOPNOTSUPP )return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +if (regs->ax ==0xD && regs->cx ==0x1 ) +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb,0 ); +ghcb_set_rax (ghcb, regs->ax);ghcb_set_rcx (ghcb, regs->cx);
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
Quoted 6 lines · Jinank Jain
According to [1], while handling the #VC intercept for CPUID leaf 0x0000_000D, we need to supply the value of XSS in the GHCB page. If this value is not provided then a spec compliant hypervisor can fail the GHCB request and kill the guest.
URL doesn't seem to exist, I get redirected to AMD's 404 page.
Thanks,
Ingo
On 10/3/23 02:28, Jinank Jain wrote:
...
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, · line 884
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +2
-0@@ -880,6 +880,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,if (snp_cpuid_ret != -EOPNOTSUPP )return ES_VMM_ERROR ; +if (regs->ax ==0xD && regs->cx ==0x1 ) +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb,0 );
The spec talks about leaf 0xD, but not the subleaf:
Quoted 2 lines
XSS is only required to besupplied when a request forCPUID 0000_000D is made andthe guest supports the XSS
MSR(0x0000_0DA0).
Why restrict this to subleaf (regx->cx) 1?
Second, XCR0 is being supplied regardless of the CPUID leaf. Why should XSS be restricted to 0xD while XCR0 is universally supplied?
Third, why is it OK to supply a garbage (0) value? If the GHCB field is required it's surely because the host *NEEDS* the value to do something.
Won't a garbage value potentially confuse the host?
Quoted 10 lines · Dave Hansen
On 10/3/23 02:28, Jinank Jain wrote:
...Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +0
-0@@ -880,6 +880,9 @@ static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb,if (snp_cpuid_ret != -EOPNOTSUPP )return ES_VMM_ERROR ;
Quoted 8 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c static enum es_result vc_handle_cpuid(struct ghcb *ghcb, · line 884
Quoted 2 lines
arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c +2
-0+if (regs->ax ==0xD && regs->cx ==0x1 ) +ghcb_set_xss (ghcb,0 );The spec talks about leaf
0xD, but not the subleaf:Quoted 2 lines
XSS is only required to besupplied when a request forCPUID 0000_000D is made andthe guest supports the XSS
MSR(0x0000_0DA0).Why restrict this to subleaf (
regx->cx) 1?
Today, only subleaf 1 deals with XSS, but we could do just what you say and set it for any 0xD subleaf to be safe.
Quoted 3 lines
Second, XCR0 is being supplied regardless of the CPUID leaf. Why should XSS be restricted to
0xDwhile XCR0 is universally supplied?
XCR0 is really only required for 0xD, I'm not sure why it is being setting all the time (unless similar to above, it becomes required for some other CPUID leaf in the future?)
Quoted 4 lines
Third, why is it OK to supply a garbage (0) value? If the GHCB field is required it's surely because the host *NEEDS* the value to do something.
Won't a garbage value potentially confuse the host?
Ideally, the guest should be checking if XSAVES is enabled, which requires checking CPUID leaf 0xD, subleaf 1. So a bit of a chicken and egg thing going on the very first time. And then the guest should read MSR_IA32_XSS to get the actual value. This MSR is virtualized, so the hypervisor needs to not intercept access in order for the guest to actually set/get a value. Today, KVM/SVM doesn't support that since XSS is used (mainly/only) for shadow stack and KVM shadow stack support is only getting looked at now.
So the guest support for XSS and ES/SNP guests needs to be thought out a bit more.
Thanks,
Tom