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src/t_attr_corruption: use security.capability instead of security.evm

PATCH In review [email protected] 3 participants 6 messages Feb 25, 2019 – Feb 26, 2019

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PATCH 1/1 src/t_attr_corruption: use security.capability instead of security.evm

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.

We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permitted

This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.

---
 src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1 -1
index f26611f9..0c229dbc 100644
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	if (ret)
 		die("set posix acl");
 
-	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
+	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 1, 1);
 	if (ret)
 		die("set evm");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
#1 lore raw
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.

We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permitted

This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.

---
 src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
index f26611f9..0c229dbc 100644

src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79

Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1 -1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	if (ret)
 		die("set posix acl");
 
-	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
+	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 1, 1);

This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:

fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

Judging from fs/xattr.c it looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed by security/commoncap.c...

--D

Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
 	if (ret)
 		die("set evm");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
#2 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.

We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permitted

This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.

---
 src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
index f26611f9..0c229dbc 100644

src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79

Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1 -1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	if (ret)
 		die("set posix acl");
 
-	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
+	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 1, 1);

This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:

Quoted 4 lines

fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

Judging from fs/xattr.c it looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed by security/commoncap.c...

And now that I've figured out how to reproduce the xfs bug without a second attribute, NAK to this and I'll send a more complete fix shortly.

--D

Quoted 8 lines

--D

Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
 	if (ret)
 		die("set evm");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
#3 lore raw
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 36 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:

From: Jeff Mahoney<[email protected]>

src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.

We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permitted

This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.

---
  src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
index f26611f9..0c229dbc 100644

src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79

Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1 -1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  	if (ret)
  		die("set posix acl");
 
-	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
+	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 1, 1);

This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

Judging from fs/xattr.c it looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed by security/commoncap.c...

And now that I've figured out how to reproduce the xfs bug without a second attribute, NAK to this and I'll send a more complete fix shortly.

--D

Hi Darrick, Jeff

It seems that fsetxattr() with an uninitialized buffer fell into the following xattr_data->type check at security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c in kernel:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
...

        if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
                if (!xattr_value_len)
                        return -EINVAL;
                if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
                    xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
                        return -EPERM;
        }

...
}
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Perhaps, we can skip this check by setting security.evm attribute to special value(e.g. EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG or EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) . For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

root/t_attr_corruption.c renamed from src/t_attr_corruption.c +2 -2
index 1fa5e41f..05ce5b46 100644
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        ssize_t sz;
        int fd;
        int ret;
+       int eval = 0x03;
 
        if (argc > 1) {
                ret = chdir(argv[1]);
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
        if (ret)
                die("set posix acl");
 
-       ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
+       ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", &eval, sizeof(eval), 1);
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 

Best Regards,
Xiao Yang

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines

--D

Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
  	if (ret)
  		die("set evm");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
#4 lore raw
In reply to Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 36 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:

From: Jeff Mahoney<[email protected]>

src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.

We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permitted

This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.

---
  src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +-
  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
index f26611f9..0c229dbc 100644

src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79

Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1 -1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
  	if (ret)
  		die("set posix acl");
 
-	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
+	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 1, 1);

This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:

Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines

fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

Judging from fs/xattr.c it looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed by security/commoncap.c...

And now that I've figured out how to reproduce the xfs bug without a second attribute, NAK to this and I'll send a more complete fix shortly.

--D

Hi Darrick,

Sorry, i missed this comment. Your v2 patch is better and simpler to me.

Best Regards,
Xiao Yang

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines

--D

Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
  	if (ret)
  		die("set evm");
 
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
#5 lore raw
In reply to Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:

From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>

src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.

We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permitted

This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.

---
 src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0 -0
index f26611f9..0c229dbc 100644

src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79

Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1 -1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 	if (ret)
 		die("set posix acl");
 
-	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.evm", buf, 1, 1);
+	ret = fsetxattr(fd, "security.capability", buf, 1, 1);

This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:

Quoted 4 lines

fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)

Judging from fs/xattr.c it looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed by security/commoncap.c...

Huh. Ok. That worked on my SLE12 SP3 host (4.4.x) but now that I test it on a 5.0-rc, I get EINVAL too. It looks like prior to v3 caps (v4.14), validation only happened when they were loaded as part of prepare_binprm.

-Jeff

Signature · 2 lines
Jeff Mahoney
SUSE Labs