src/t_attr_corruption: use security.capability instead of security.evm
PATCH 1/1 src/t_attr_corruption: use security.capability instead of security.evm
From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.
We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++ /opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad 2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permitted
This patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.
--- src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1 -1
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])if (ret)die ("set posix acl" ); - ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , buf,1 ,1 ); + ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.capability" , buf,1 ,1 );if (ret)die ("set evm" );
Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.
We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++/opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permittedThis patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.
Signed-off-by Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>--- src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0
src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79
Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1
-1@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])if (ret)die ("set posix acl" ); - ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , buf,1 ,1 ); + ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.capability" , buf,1 ,1 );
This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:
fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE) = -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)
Judging from fs/xattr.c it looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed by security/commoncap.c...
--D
Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0if (ret)die ("set evm" );Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.
We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++/opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permittedThis patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.
Signed-off-by Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>--- src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79
Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1
-1@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])if (ret)die ("set posix acl" ); - ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , buf,1 ,1 ); + ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.capability" , buf,1 ,1 );This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:
Quoted 4 lines
fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE)= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)Judging from
fs/xattr.cit looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed bysecurity/commoncap.c...
And now that I've figured out how to reproduce the xfs bug without a second attribute, NAK to this and I'll send a more complete fix shortly.
--D
Quoted 8 lines
--D
Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0if (ret)die ("set evm" );Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 36 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jeff Mahoney<[email protected]>
src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.
We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++/opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permittedThis patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.
Signed-off-by Jeff Mahoney<[email protected]>--- src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79
Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1
-1@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])if (ret)die ("set posix acl" ); - ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , buf,1 ,1 ); + ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.capability" , buf,1 ,1 );This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE)= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)Judging from
fs/xattr.cit looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed bysecurity/commoncap.c...And now that I've figured out how to reproduce the xfs bug without a second attribute, NAK to this and I'll send a more complete fix shortly.
--D
Hi Darrick, Jeff
It seems that fsetxattr() with an uninitialized buffer fell into the following xattr_data->type check at security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c in kernel:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len)
{
...
if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) {
if (!xattr_value_len)
return -EINVAL;
if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG &&
xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG)
return -EPERM;
}...
}
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps, we can skip this check by setting security.evm attribute to special value(e.g. EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG or EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) . For example:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
root/t_attr_corruption.c renamed from src/t_attr_corruption.c +2 -2
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])ssize_t sz;int fd;int ret; +int eval =0x03 ;if (argc >1 ) { ret =chdir (argv[1 ]);
@@ -76,7 +77,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])if (ret)die ("set posix acl" ); - ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , buf,1 ,1 ); + ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , &eval,sizeof (eval),1 ); ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Best Regards,
Xiao Yang
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
--D
Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0if (ret)die ("set evm" );Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 36 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jeff Mahoney<[email protected]>
src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.
We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++/opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permittedThis patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.
Signed-off-by Jeff Mahoney<[email protected]>--- src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79
Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1
-1@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])if (ret)die ("set posix acl" ); - ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , buf,1 ,1 ); + ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.capability" , buf,1 ,1 );This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE)= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)Judging from
fs/xattr.cit looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed bysecurity/commoncap.c...And now that I've figured out how to reproduce the xfs bug without a second attribute, NAK to this and I'll send a more complete fix shortly.
--D
Hi Darrick,
Sorry, i missed this comment. Your v2 patch is better and simpler to me.
Best Regards,
Xiao Yang
Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 8 lines
--D
Quoted 6 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0if (ret)die ("set evm" );Signature · 1 line
2.16.4
Quoted 37 lines · Darrick J. Wong
Quoted 28 lines · On Mon, Feb 25, 2019 at 02:10:52PM -0500, [email protected] wrote:
From: Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>
src/t_attr_corruption uses the security.evm extended attribute because it sorts before security.posix_acl_access. The security.evm attribute is a formatted structure and when passed an uninitialized buffer, it will fail with EPERM.
We see test failures like:
--- tests/generic/529.out2019-02-21 13:22:47.583406922 -0500
+++/opt/xfstests/results//generic/529.out.bad2019-02-21 13:57:31.967406922 -0500 @@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
QA output created by 529
-list attr: Numerical result out of range
+set evm: Operation not permittedThis patch uses security.capability which also sorts where it needs to do for the test and also accepts an unformatted buffer.
Signed-off-by Jeff Mahoney <[email protected]>--- src/t_attr_corruption.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)src/t_attr_corruption.c +0
-0src/t_attr_corruption.c int main(int argc, char *argv[]) · line 79
Quoted 5 lines
src/t_attr_corruption.c +1
-1@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])if (ret)die ("set posix acl" ); - ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.evm" , buf,1 ,1 ); + ret =fsetxattr (fd,"security.capability" , buf,1 ,1 );This fails for me both with and without EVM configured into my kernel:
Quoted 4 lines
fsetxattr(3, "security.capability", "\3", 1, XATTR_CREATE)= -1 EINVAL (Invalid argument)Judging from
fs/xattr.cit looks as though security.capability also has a defined format that's parsed bysecurity/commoncap.c...
Huh. Ok. That worked on my SLE12 SP3 host (4.4.x) but now that I test it on a 5.0-rc, I get EINVAL too. It looks like prior to v3 caps (v4.14), validation only happened when they were loaded as part of prepare_binprm.
-Jeff
Signature · 2 lines
Jeff Mahoney SUSE Labs