expat: fix CVE-2022-25235
PATCH 1/2 expat: fix CVE-2022-25235
From: Kai Kang <[email protected]>
Backport patch to fix CVE-2022-25235 for expat.
CVE: CVE-2022-25235
--- .../expat/expat/CVE-2022-25235.patch | 261 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.10.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 262 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25235.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25235.patch new file +261 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,261 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/306b721] +CVE: CVE-2022-25235 + +The commit is a merge commit, and this patch is created by: + +$ git show -m -p --stat 306b72134f157bbfd1637b20a22cabf4acfa136a + +Remove modification for expat/Changes which fails to be applied. + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> + +commit 306b72134f157bbfd1637b20a22cabf4acfa136a (from 2cc97e875ef84da4bcf55156c83599116f7523b4) +Merge: 2cc97e87 c16300f0 +Author: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]> +Date: Fri Feb 18 20:12:32 2022 +0100 + + Merge pull request #562 from libexpat/utf8-security + + [CVE-2022-25235] lib: Protect against malformed encoding (e.g. malformed UTF-8) +--- + expat/Changes | 7 ++++ + expat/lib/xmltok.c | 5 --- + expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 18 ++++---- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 109 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 4 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmltok.c b/lib/xmltok.c +index a72200e8..3bddf125 100644 +--- a/lib/xmltok.c ++++ b/lib/xmltok.c +@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@ + + ((((byte)[1]) & 3) << 1) + ((((byte)[2]) >> 5) & 1)] \ + & (1u << (((byte)[2]) & 0x1F))) + +-#define UTF8_GET_NAMING(pages, p, n) \ +- ((n) == 2 \ +- ? UTF8_GET_NAMING2(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) \ +- : ((n) == 3 ? UTF8_GET_NAMING3(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) : 0)) +- + /* Detection of invalid UTF-8 sequences is based on Table 3.1B + of Unicode 3.2: http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr28/ + with the additional restriction of not allowing the Unicode +diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c +index 0430591b..84ff35f9 100644 +--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c ++++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c +@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ +- if (! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ + return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ + } \ +@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ +- if (! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ + return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ + } \ +@@ -1142,6 +1142,10 @@ PREFIX(prologTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + case BT_LEAD##n: \ + if (end - ptr < n) \ + return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \ ++ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ ++ *nextTokPtr = ptr; \ ++ return XML_TOK_INVALID; \ ++ } \ + if (IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \ + ptr += n; \ + tok = XML_TOK_NAME; \ +@@ -1270,7 +1274,7 @@ PREFIX(attributeValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) + LEAD_CASE(3) +@@ -1339,7 +1343,7 @@ PREFIX(entityValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) + LEAD_CASE(3) +@@ -1518,7 +1522,7 @@ PREFIX(getAtts)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, int attsMax, + state = inName; \ + } + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ +- case BT_LEAD##n: \ ++ case BT_LEAD##n: /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + START_NAME ptr += (n - MINBPC(enc)); \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) +@@ -1730,7 +1734,7 @@ PREFIX(nameLength)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr) { + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) + LEAD_CASE(3) +@@ -1775,7 +1779,7 @@ PREFIX(updatePosition)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end, + switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) { + # define LEAD_CASE(n) \ + case BT_LEAD##n: \ +- ptr += n; \ ++ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \ + pos->columnNumber++; \ + break; + LEAD_CASE(2) +diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c +index bc5344b1..9b155b82 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -5998,6 +5998,105 @@ START_TEST(test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2) { + } + END_TEST + ++START_TEST(test_utf8_in_start_tags) { ++ struct test_case { ++ bool goodName; ++ bool goodNameStart; ++ const char *tagName; ++ }; ++ ++ // The idea with the tests below is this: ++ // We want to cover 1-, 2- and 3-byte sequences, 4-byte sequences ++ // go to isNever and are hence not a concern. ++ // ++ // We start with a character that is a valid name character ++ // (or even name-start character, see XML 1.0r4 spec) and then we flip ++ // single bits at places where (1) the result leaves the UTF-8 encoding space ++ // and (2) we stay in the same n-byte sequence family. ++ // ++ // The flipped bits are highlighted in angle brackets in comments, ++ // e.g. "[<1>011 1001]" means we had [0011 1001] but we now flipped ++ // the most significant bit to 1 to leave UTF-8 encoding space. ++ struct test_case cases[] = { ++ // 1-byte UTF-8: [0xxx xxxx] ++ {true, true, "\x3A"}, // [0011 1010] = ASCII colon ':' ++ {false, false, "\xBA"}, // [<1>011 1010] ++ {true, false, "\x39"}, // [0011 1001] = ASCII nine '9' ++ {false, false, "\xB9"}, // [<1>011 1001] ++ ++ // 2-byte UTF-8: [110x xxxx] [10xx xxxx] ++ {true, true, "\xDB\xA5"}, // [1101 1011] [1010 0101] = ++ // Arabic small waw U+06E5 ++ {false, false, "\x9B\xA5"}, // [1<0>01 1011] [1010 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xDB\x25"}, // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xDB\xE5"}, // [1101 1011] [1<1>10 0101] ++ {true, false, "\xCC\x81"}, // [1100 1100] [1000 0001] = ++ // combining char U+0301 ++ {false, false, "\x8C\x81"}, // [1<0>00 1100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xCC\x01"}, // [1100 1100] [<0>000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xCC\xC1"}, // [1100 1100] [1<1>00 0001] ++ ++ // 3-byte UTF-8: [1110 xxxx] [10xx xxxx] [10xxxxxx] ++ {true, true, "\xE0\xA4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101] = ++ // Devanagari Letter A U+0905 ++ {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x85"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x05"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0101] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC5"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0101] ++ {true, false, "\xE0\xA4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001] = ++ // combining char U+0901 ++ {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x81"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x01"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0001] ++ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC1"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0001] ++ }; ++ const bool atNameStart[] = {true, false}; ++ ++ size_t i = 0; ++ char doc[1024]; ++ size_t failCount = 0; ++ ++ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) { ++ size_t j = 0; ++ for (; j < sizeof(atNameStart) / sizeof(atNameStart[0]); j++) { ++ const bool expectedSuccess ++ = atNameStart[j] ? cases[i].goodNameStart : cases[i].goodName; ++ sprintf(doc, "<%s%s><!--", atNameStart[j] ? "" : "a", cases[i].tagName); ++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL); ++ ++ const enum XML_Status status ++ = XML_Parse(parser, doc, (int)strlen(doc), /*isFinal=*/XML_FALSE); ++ ++ bool success = true; ++ if ((status == XML_STATUS_OK) != expectedSuccess) { ++ success = false; ++ } ++ if ((status == XML_STATUS_ERROR) ++ && (XML_GetErrorCode(parser) != XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN)) { ++ success = false; ++ } ++ ++ if (! success) { ++ fprintf( ++ stderr, ++ "FAIL case %2u (%sat name start, %u-byte sequence, error code %d)\n", ++ (unsigned)i + 1u, atNameStart[j] ? " " : "not ", ++ (unsigned)strlen(cases[i].tagName), XML_GetErrorCode(parser)); ++ failCount++; ++ } ++ ++ XML_ParserFree(parser); ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (failCount > 0) { ++ fail("UTF-8 regression detected"); ++ } ++} ++END_TEST ++ + /* Test trailing spaces in elements are accepted */ + static void XMLCALL + record_element_end_handler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name) { +@@ -6175,6 +6274,14 @@ START_TEST(test_bad_doctype) { + } + END_TEST + ++START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf8) { ++ const char *text = "<!DOCTYPE \xDB\x25" ++ "doc><doc/>"; // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101] ++ expect_failure(text, XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN, ++ "Invalid UTF-8 in DOCTYPE not faulted"); ++} ++END_TEST ++ + START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf16) { + const char text[] = + /* <!DOCTYPE doc [ \x06f2 ]><doc/> +@@ -11870,6 +11977,7 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_ext_entity_utf8_non_bom); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2); ++ tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_start_tags); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_trailing_spaces_in_elements); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_attribute); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_second_attr); +@@ -11878,6 +11986,7 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword_utf16); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype); ++ tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf8); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf16); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_plus); + tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_star);
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.10.bb +1 -0
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/download/R_${VERSION_TA file://CVE-2021-46143.patch \ file://CVE-2022-23852.patch \ file://CVE-2022-23990.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25235.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
PATCH 2/2 expat: fix CVE-2022-25236
From: Kai Kang <[email protected]>
Backport patches to fix CVE-2022-25236 for expat.
CVE: CVE-2022-25236
--- .../expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-1.patch | 116 +++++++++ .../expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-2.patch | 232 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.10.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 350 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-1.patch create mode 100644 meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-2.patch
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-1.patch new file +116 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/2cc97e87] +CVE: CVE-2022-25236 + +The commit is a merge commit, and this patch is created by: + +$ git diff -p --stat 2cc97e87~ 2cc97e87 + +Remove modification for expat/Changes which fails to be applied. + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> + +commit 2cc97e875ef84da4bcf55156c83599116f7523b4 (from d477fdd284468f2ab822024e75702f2c1b254f42) +Merge: d477fdd2 e4d7e497 +Author: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]> +Date: Fri Feb 18 18:01:27 2022 +0100 + + Merge pull request #561 from libexpat/namesep-security + + [CVE-2022-25236] lib: Protect against insertion of namesep characters into namespace URIs + +--- + expat/Changes | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index 7376aab1..c98e2e9f 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -718,8 +718,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) { + + XML_Parser XMLCALL + XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = nsSep; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0}; + return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp); + } + +@@ -1344,8 +1343,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context, + would be otherwise. + */ + if (parser->m_ns) { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0}; + parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd); + } else { + parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd); +@@ -3761,6 +3759,17 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, + if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS + && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len])) + isXMLNS = XML_FALSE; ++ ++ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986, ++ // we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of ++ // Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into ++ // 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused ++ // by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters ++ // into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to ++ // be expected. ++ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) { ++ return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX; ++ } + } + isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen; + isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen; +diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c +index d07203f2..bc5344b1 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -7220,6 +7220,35 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) { + } + END_TEST + ++START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) { ++ struct test_case { ++ enum XML_Status expectedStatus; ++ const char *doc; ++ }; ++ struct test_case cases[] = { ++ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />"}, ++ {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one
two' />"}, ++ }; ++ ++ size_t i = 0; ++ size_t failCount = 0; ++ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) { ++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, '\n'); ++ XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element); ++ if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc), ++ /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE) ++ != cases[i].expectedStatus) { ++ failCount++; ++ } ++ XML_ParserFree(parser); ++ } ++ ++ if (failCount) { ++ fail("Namespace separator handling is broken"); ++ } ++} ++END_TEST ++ + /* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully + * allocate */ + #define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1) +@@ -11905,6 +11934,7 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype); + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype); + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype); ++ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri); + + suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc); + tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown);
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-2.patch new file +232 -0
232 lines not on this page · raw message
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.10.bb +2 -0
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/download/R_${VERSION_TA file://CVE-2022-23852.patch \ file://CVE-2022-23990.patch \ file://CVE-2022-25235.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25236-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25236-2.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/"
Signature · 1 line
2.17.1
A message that is not in the archive (sent off-list or not yet received): [email protected]
Re: [oe] [hardknott][PATCH 2/2] expat: fix CVE-2022-25236
Quoted 7 lines · kai
From: Kai Kang <[email protected]>
Backport patches to fix CVE-2022-25236 for expat.
CVE: CVE-2022-25236
Signed-off-by Kai Kang <[email protected]>
Ooooops. Wrong mailllist.
Sorry for inconvenience.
Kai
Quoted 390 lines
--- .../expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-1.patch | 116 +++++++++ .../expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-2.patch | 232 ++++++++++++++++++ meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.10.bb | 2 + 3 files changed, 350 insertions(+)create mode 100644
meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-1.patchcreate mode 100644meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-2.patchmeta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-1.patch new file +116
-0@@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/2cc97e87] +CVE: CVE-2022-25236 + +The commit is a merge commit, and this patch is created by: + +$ git diff -p --stat 2cc97e87~ 2cc97e87 + +Remove modification for expat/Changes which fails to be applied. + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> + +commit 2cc97e875ef84da4bcf55156c83599116f7523b4 (from d477fdd284468f2ab822024e75702f2c1b254f42) +Merge: d477fdd2 e4d7e497 +Author: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]> +Date: Fri Feb 18 18:01:27 2022 +0100 + + Merge pull request #561 from libexpat/namesep-security + + [CVE-2022-25236] lib: Protect against insertion of namesep characters into namespace URIs + +--- + expat/Changes | 16 ++++++++++++++++ + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ + 3 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index 7376aab1..c98e2e9f 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -718,8 +718,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) { + + XML_Parser XMLCALL + XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = nsSep; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0}; + return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp); + } + +@@ -1344,8 +1343,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context, + would be otherwise. + */ + if (parser->m_ns) { +- XML_Char tmp[2]; +- *tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator; ++ XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0}; + parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd); + } else { + parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd); +@@ -3761,6 +3759,17 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, + if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS + && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len])) + isXMLNS = XML_FALSE; ++ ++ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986, ++ // we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of ++ // Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into ++ // 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused ++ // by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters ++ // into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to ++ // be expected. ++ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) { ++ return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX; ++ } + } + isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen; + isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen; +diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c +index d07203f2..bc5344b1 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -7220,6 +7220,35 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) { + } + END_TEST + ++START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) { ++ struct test_case { ++ enum XML_Status expectedStatus; ++ const char *doc; ++ }; ++ struct test_case cases[] = { ++ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />"}, ++ {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one
two' />"}, ++ }; ++ ++ size_t i = 0; ++ size_t failCount = 0; ++ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) { ++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, '\n'); ++ XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element); ++ if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc), ++ /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE) ++ != cases[i].expectedStatus) { ++ failCount++; ++ } ++ XML_ParserFree(parser); ++ } ++ ++ if (failCount) { ++ fail("Namespace separator handling is broken"); ++ } ++} ++END_TEST ++ + /* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully + * allocate */ + #define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1) +@@ -11905,6 +11934,7 @@ make_suite(void) { + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype); + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype); + tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype); ++ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri); + + suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc); + tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown);meta/recipes-core/expat/expat/CVE-2022-25236-2.patch new file +232
-0@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@ +Upstream-Status: Backport [https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/commit/f178826b] +CVE: CVE-2022-25236 + +The commit is a merge commit, and this patch is created by: + +$ git show -m -p --stat f178826b + +Remove changes for expat/Changes and reference.html which fail to be applied. + +Signed-off-by: Kai Kang <[email protected]> + +commit f178826bb1e9c8ee23202f1be55ad4ac7b649e84 (from c99e0e7f2b15b48848038992ecbb4480f957cfe9) +Merge: c99e0e7f 9579f7ea +Author: Sebastian Pipping <[email protected]> +Date: Fri Mar 4 18:43:39 2022 +0100 + + Merge pull request #577 from libexpat/namesep + + lib: Relax fix to CVE-2022-25236 with regard to RFC 3986 URI characters (fixes #572) +--- + expat/Changes | 16 ++++++ + expat/doc/reference.html | 8 +++ + expat/lib/expat.h | 11 ++++ + expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- + expat/tests/runtests.c | 8 ++- + 5 files changed, 171 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/lib/expat.h b/lib/expat.h +index 5ab493f7..181fc960 100644 +--- a/lib/expat.h ++++ b/lib/expat.h +@@ -239,6 +239,17 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encoding); + and the local part will be concatenated without any separator. + It is a programming error to use the separator '\0' with namespace + triplets (see XML_SetReturnNSTriplet). ++ If a namespace separator is chosen that can be part of a URI or ++ part of an XML name, splitting an expanded name back into its ++ 1, 2 or 3 original parts on application level in the element handler ++ may end up vulnerable, so these are advised against; sane choices for ++ a namespace separator are e.g. '\n' (line feed) and '|' (pipe). ++ ++ Note that Expat does not validate namespace URIs (beyond encoding) ++ against RFC 3986 today (and is not required to do so with regard to ++ the XML 1.0 namespaces specification) but it may start doing that ++ in future releases. Before that, an application using Expat must ++ be ready to receive namespace URIs containing non-URI characters. + */ + XMLPARSEAPI(XML_Parser) + XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encoding, XML_Char namespaceSeparator); +diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c +index 59da19c8..6fe2cf1e 100644 +--- a/lib/xmlparse.c ++++ b/lib/xmlparse.c +@@ -3705,6 +3705,117 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr, + return XML_ERROR_NONE; + } + ++static XML_Bool ++is_rfc3986_uri_char(XML_Char candidate) { ++ // For the RFC 3986 ANBF grammar see ++ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#appendix-A ++ ++ switch (candidate) { ++ // From rule "ALPHA" (uppercase half) ++ case 'A': ++ case 'B': ++ case 'C': ++ case 'D': ++ case 'E': ++ case 'F': ++ case 'G': ++ case 'H': ++ case 'I': ++ case 'J': ++ case 'K': ++ case 'L': ++ case 'M': ++ case 'N': ++ case 'O': ++ case 'P': ++ case 'Q': ++ case 'R': ++ case 'S': ++ case 'T': ++ case 'U': ++ case 'V': ++ case 'W': ++ case 'X': ++ case 'Y': ++ case 'Z': ++ ++ // From rule "ALPHA" (lowercase half) ++ case 'a': ++ case 'b': ++ case 'c': ++ case 'd': ++ case 'e': ++ case 'f': ++ case 'g': ++ case 'h': ++ case 'i': ++ case 'j': ++ case 'k': ++ case 'l': ++ case 'm': ++ case 'n': ++ case 'o': ++ case 'p': ++ case 'q': ++ case 'r': ++ case 's': ++ case 't': ++ case 'u': ++ case 'v': ++ case 'w': ++ case 'x': ++ case 'y': ++ case 'z': ++ ++ // From rule "DIGIT" ++ case '0': ++ case '1': ++ case '2': ++ case '3': ++ case '4': ++ case '5': ++ case '6': ++ case '7': ++ case '8': ++ case '9': ++ ++ // From rule "pct-encoded" ++ case '%': ++ ++ // From rule "unreserved" ++ case '-': ++ case '.': ++ case '_': ++ case '~': ++ ++ // From rule "gen-delims" ++ case ':': ++ case '/': ++ case '?': ++ case '#': ++ case '[': ++ case ']': ++ case '@': ++ ++ // From rule "sub-delims" ++ case '!': ++ case '$': ++ case '&': ++ case '\'': ++ case '(': ++ case ')': ++ case '*': ++ case '+': ++ case ',': ++ case ';': ++ case '=': ++ return XML_TRUE; ++ ++ default: ++ return XML_FALSE; ++ } ++} ++ + /* addBinding() overwrites the value of prefix->binding without checking. + Therefore one must keep track of the old value outside of addBinding(). + */ +@@ -3763,14 +3874,26 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, + && (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len])) + isXMLNS = XML_FALSE; + +- // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986, +- // we have to at least make sure that the XML processor on top of +- // Expat (that is splitting tag names by namespace separator into +- // 2- or 3-tuples (uri-local or uri-local-prefix)) cannot be confused +- // by an attacker putting additional namespace separator characters +- // into namespace declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to +- // be expected. +- if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)) { ++ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986 ++ // today (and is not REQUIRED to do so with regard to the XML 1.0 ++ // namespaces specification) we have to at least make sure, that ++ // the application on top of Expat (that is likely splitting expanded ++ // element names ("qualified names") of form ++ // "[uri sep] local [sep prefix] '\0'" back into 1, 2 or 3 pieces ++ // in its element handler code) cannot be confused by an attacker ++ // putting additional namespace separator characters into namespace ++ // declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to be expected. ++ // ++ // While the HTML API docs of function XML_ParserCreateNS have been ++ // advising against use of a namespace separator character that can ++ // appear in a URI for >20 years now, some widespread applications ++ // are using URI characters (':' (colon) in particular) for a ++ // namespace separator, in practice. To keep these applications ++ // functional, we only reject namespaces URIs containing the ++ // application-chosen namespace separator if the chosen separator ++ // is a non-URI character with regard to RFC 3986. ++ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator) ++ && ! is_rfc3986_uri_char(uri[len])) { + return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX; + } + } +diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c +index 60da868e..712706c4 100644 +--- a/tests/runtests.c ++++ b/tests/runtests.c +@@ -7406,16 +7406,18 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) { + struct test_case { + enum XML_Status expectedStatus; + const char *doc; ++ XML_Char namesep; + }; + struct test_case cases[] = { +- {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />"}, +- {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one
two' />"}, ++ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />", XCS('\n')}, ++ {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one
two' />", XCS('\n')}, ++ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one:two' />", XCS(':')}, + }; + + size_t i = 0; + size_t failCount = 0; + for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) { +- XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, '\n'); ++ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, cases[i].namesep); + XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element); + if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc), + /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE)meta/recipes-core/expat/expat_2.2.10.bb +2
-1@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ SRC_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/download/R_${VERSION_TA file://CVE-2022-23852.patch \ file://CVE-2022-23990.patch \ file://CVE-2022-25235.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25236-1.patch \ + file://CVE-2022-25236-2.patch \ " UPSTREAM_CHECK_URI = "https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/releases/" -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-Links: You receive all messages sent to this group.
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Kai Kang Wind River Linux