CVE-2020-4788: Speculation on incompletely validated data on IBM Power9
Subsystems (3)
cover CVE-2020-4788: Speculation on incompletely validated data on IBM Power9
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This series flushes the cache on kernel entry and after kernel user accesses.
Thanks to Nick Piggin, Russell Currey, Christopher M. Riedl, Michael Ellerman and Spoorthy S for their work in developing, optimising, testing and backporting these fixes, and to the many others who helped behind the scenes.
Daniel Axtens (3):
selftests/powerpc: entry flush test selftests/powerpc: refactor entry and rfi_flush tests powerpc/64s: rename pnv|pseries_setup_rfi_flush to
_setup_security_mitigations
Michael Ellerman (1):
powerpc: Only include kup-radix.h for 64-bit Book3S
Nicholas Piggin (2):
powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry
powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
Russell Currey (1):
selftests/powerpc: rfi_flush: disable entry flush if present
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 7 + .../powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h | 66 ++++++--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 12 +- arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 19 +++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 26 +++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 7 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 4 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 80 +++++----- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 122 ++++++++++++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall_64.c | 2 +- arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 14 ++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 104 +++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 24 ++- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c | 4 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 15 +- .../testing/selftests/powerpc/include/utils.h | 5 + .../selftests/powerpc/security/.gitignore | 1 + .../selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile | 4 +- .../selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c | 139 ++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.c | 70 +++++++++ .../selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.h | 17 +++ .../selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c | 96 ++++-------- 23 files changed, 693 insertions(+), 147 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.h
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 1/7 selftests/powerpc: rfi_flush: disable entry flush if present
From: Russell Currey <[email protected]>
We are about to add an entry flush. The rfi (exit) flush test measures the number of L1D flushes over a syscall with the RFI flush enabled and disabled. But if the entry flush is also enabled, the effect of enabling and disabling the RFI flush is masked.
If there is a debugfs entry for the entry flush, disable it during the RFI flush and restore it later.
--- .../selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c | 35 +++++++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c +29 -6
@@ -85,19 +85,33 @@ int rfi_flush_test(void)__u64 l1d_misses_total =0 ;unsigned long iterations =100000 , zero_size =24 *1024 ;unsigned long l1d_misses_expected; -int rfi_flush_org, rfi_flush; +int rfi_flush_orig, rfi_flush; +int have_entry_flush, entry_flush_orig;SKIP_IF (geteuid () !=0 );// The PMU event we use only works on Power7 or later SKIP_IF (!have_hwcap (PPC_FEATURE_ARCH_2_06 )); -if (read_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , &rfi_flush_org)) { +if (read_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , &rfi_flush_orig) <0 ) {perror ("Unable to read powerpc/rfi_flush debugfs file" );SKIP_IF (1 ); } - rfi_flush = rfi_flush_org; +if (read_debugfs_file ("powerpc/entry_flush" , &entry_flush_orig) <0 ) { + have_entry_flush =0 ; + }else { + have_entry_flush =1 ; + +if (entry_flush_orig !=0 ) { +if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/entry_flush" ,0 ) <0 ) { +perror ("error writing to powerpc/entry_flush debugfs file" ); +return 1 ; + } + } + } + + rfi_flush = rfi_flush_orig; fd =perf_event_open_counter (PERF_TYPE_RAW ,/* L1d miss */ 0x400f0 ,-1 );FAIL_IF (fd <0 );
@@ -106,6 +120,7 @@ int rfi_flush_test(void)FAIL_IF (perf_event_enable (fd)); +// disable L1 prefetching set_dscr (1 ); iter = repetitions;
@@ -147,8 +162,8 @@ again: repetitions * l1d_misses_expected /2 , passes, repetitions); -if (rfi_flush == rfi_flush_org) { - rfi_flush = !rfi_flush_org; +if (rfi_flush == rfi_flush_orig) { + rfi_flush = !rfi_flush_orig;if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , rfi_flush) <0 ) {perror ("error writing to powerpc/rfi_flush debugfs file" );return 1 ;
@@ -164,11 +179,19 @@ again:set_dscr (0 ); -if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , rfi_flush_org) <0 ) { +if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/rfi_flush" , rfi_flush_orig) <0 ) {perror ("unable to restore original value of powerpc/rfi_flush debugfs file" );return 1 ; } +if (have_entry_flush) { +if (write_debugfs_file ("powerpc/entry_flush" , entry_flush_orig) <0 ) { +perror ("unable to restore original value of powerpc/entry_flush " +"debugfs file" ); +return 1 ; + } + } +return rc; }
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 2/7 powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry
In reply to Daniel AxtensFrom: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache on kernel entry.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 9 ++- arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 10 ++++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 4 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 37 ++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 60 ++++++++++++++++++- arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 +++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 11 ++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 4 ++ 11 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +3 -0
@@ -2875,6 +2875,7 @@ mds=off [X86] tsx_async_abort=off [X86] kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] + no_entry_flush [PPC] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on
@@ -3203,6 +3204,8 @@ noefi Disable EFI runtime services support. + no_entry_flush [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache when entering the kernel. + noexec [IA-64] noexec [X86]
arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h +8 -1
@@ -57,11 +57,18 @@nop ; \ nop +#define ENTRY_FLUSH_SLOT \ + ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION; \ + nop; \ + nop; \ + nop; +/* * r10 must be free to use, r13 must be paca */ #define INTERRUPT_TO_KERNEL \ - STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT + STF_ENTRY_BARRIER_SLOT; \ + ENTRY_FLUSH_SLOT/* * Macros for annotating the expected destination of (h)rfid
arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h +10 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ label##3: \ FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b; \ .popsection; +#define ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ +957: \ + .pushsection __entry_flush_fixup,"a"; \ + .align 2; \ +958: \ + FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 957b-958b; \ + .popsection; +#define RFI_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ 951: \ .pushsection __rfi_flush_fixup,"a"; \
@@ -237,8 +245,10 @@ label##3: \#include <linux/types.h> extern long stf_barrier_fallback; +extern long entry_flush_fallback;extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup; +extern long __start___entry_flush_fixup, __stop___entry_flush_fixup;extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;extern long __start___barrier_nospec_fixup, __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup;extern long __start__btb_flush_fixup, __stop__btb_flush_fixup;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h +4 -0
@@ -86,12 +86,16 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(u64 feature)// Software required to flush link stack on context switch #define SEC_FTR_FLUSH_LINK_STACK 0x0000000000001000ull +// The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY 0x0000000000004000ull +// Features enabled by default #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \ (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV | \ SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \ SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \ + SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \ SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h +3 -0
@@ -52,12 +52,15 @@ enum l1d_flush_type { };void setup_rfi_flush (enum l1d_flush_type ,bool enable); +void setup_entry_flush (bool enable); +void setup_uaccess_flush (bool enable);void do_rfi_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BARRIER_NOSPEC void setup_barrier_nospec (void );#else static inline void setup_barrier_nospec (void ) { };#endif +void do_entry_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);void do_barrier_nospec_fixups (bool enable);extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +37 -0
@@ -2951,6 +2951,43 @@ TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(stf_barrier_fallback) .endr blr +TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(entry_flush_fallback) + std r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + std r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + std r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + mfctr r9 + ld r10,PACA_RFI_FLUSH_FALLBACK_AREA(r13) + ld r11,PACA_L1D_FLUSH_SIZE(r13) + srdi r11,r11,(7 + 3) /* 128 byte lines, unrolled 8x */ + mtctr r11 + DCBT_BOOK3S_STOP_ALL_STREAM_IDS(r11) /* Stop prefetch streams */ + + /* order ld/st prior to dcbt stop all streams with flushing */ + sync + + /* + * The load addresses are at staggered offsets within cachelines, + * which suits some pipelines better (on others it should not + * hurt). + */ +1: + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*0(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*1(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*2(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*3(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*4(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*5(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*6(r10) + ld r11,(0x80 + 8)*7(r10) + addi r10,r10,0x80*8 + bdnz 1b + + mtctr r9 + ld r9,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R9(r13) + ld r10,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R10(r13) + ld r11,PACA_EXRFI+EX_R11(r13) + blr + TRAMP_REAL_BEGIN(rfi_flush_fallback) SET_SCRATCH0(r13); GET_PACA(r13);
arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +59 -1
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arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +7 -0
@@ -131,6 +131,13 @@ SECTIONS __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .; } + . = ALIGN(8); + __entry_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__entry_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___entry_flush_fixup = .; + *(__entry_flush_fixup) + __stop___entry_flush_fixup = .; + } + . = ALIGN(8); __stf_exit_barrier_fixup : AT(ADDR(__stf_exit_barrier_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup = .;
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c +54 -0
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arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +11 -0
@@ -122,12 +122,23 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void) type =L1D_FLUSH_ORI ; } +/* +* If we are non-Power9 bare metal, we don't need to flush on kernel +* entry: it fixes a P9 specific vulnerability. +*/ +if (!pvr_version_is (PVR_POWER9 )) +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && \ (security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR ) || \security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_HV ));setup_rfi_flush (type, enable);setup_count_cache_flush (); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); +setup_entry_flush (enable); }static void __init pnv_check_guarded_cores (void )
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +4 -0
@@ -579,6 +579,10 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void)setup_rfi_flush (types, enable);setup_count_cache_flush (); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); +setup_entry_flush (enable); }#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 3/7 powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
In reply to Daniel AxtensFrom: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 + .../powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h | 66 ++++++++------ arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 9 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 19 +++-- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 85 ++++++------------- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 62 ++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 50 +++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 10 ++- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 4 + 13 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +4 -0
@@ -2876,6 +2876,7 @@ tsx_async_abort=off [X86] kvm.nx_huge_pages=off [X86] no_entry_flush [PPC] + no_uaccess_flush [PPC] Exceptions: This does not have any effect on
@@ -3255,6 +3256,9 @@ nospec_store_bypass_disable [HW] Disable all mitigations for the Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability + no_uaccess_flush + [PPC] Don't flush the L1-D cache after accessing user data. + noxsave [BUGS=X86] Disables x86 extended register state save and restore using xsave. The kernel will fallback to enabling legacy floating-point and sse state.
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +42 -24
104 lines not on this page · raw message
arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h +3 -0
@@ -144,6 +144,9 @@RFSCV ; \ b rfscv_flush_fallback +#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ +/* Prototype for function defined in exceptions-64s.S */ +void do_uaccess_flush (void );#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */ #endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_EXCEPTION_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h +9 -0
@@ -205,6 +205,14 @@ label##3: \ FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 955b-956b; \ .popsection; +#define UACCESS_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ +959: \ + .pushsection __uaccess_flush_fixup,"a"; \ + .align 2; \ +960: \ + FTR_ENTRY_OFFSET 959b-960b; \ + .popsection; +#define ENTRY_FLUSH_FIXUP_SECTION \ 957: \ .pushsection __entry_flush_fixup,"a"; \
@@ -248,6 +256,7 @@ extern long stf_barrier_fallback;extern long entry_flush_fallback;extern long __start___stf_entry_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup;extern long __start___stf_exit_barrier_fixup, __stop___stf_exit_barrier_fixup; +extern long __start___uaccess_flush_fixup, __stop___uaccess_flush_fixup;extern long __start___entry_flush_fixup, __stop___entry_flush_fixup;extern long __start___rfi_flush_fixup, __stop___rfi_flush_fixup;extern long __start___barrier_nospec_fixup, __stop___barrier_nospec_fixup;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h +14 -5
@@ -53,17 +53,26 @@ static inline void setup_kuep(bool disabled) { }void setup_kuap (bool disabled);#else static inline void setup_kuap (bool disabled) { } + +static inline bool +bad_kuap_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address,bool is_write) +{ +return false; +} + +/* +* book3s/64/kup-radix.h defines these functions for the !KUAP case to flush +* the L1D cache after user accesses. Only include the empty stubs for other +* platforms. +*/ +#ifndef CONFIG_PPC64 static inline void allow_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { }static inline void prevent_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { }static inline unsigned long prevent_user_access_return (void ) {return 0UL ; }static inline void restore_user_access (unsigned long flags) { } -static inline bool -bad_kuap_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address,bool is_write) -{ -return false; -} +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ static inline void allow_read_from_user (const void __user *from,unsigned long size)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h +3 -0
@@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(u64 feature)// The L1-D cache should be flushed when entering the kernel #define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY 0x0000000000004000ull +// The L1-D cache should be flushed after user accesses from the kernel +#define SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS 0x0000000000008000ull// Features enabled by default #define SEC_FTR_DEFAULT \
@@ -96,6 +98,7 @@ static inline bool security_ftr_enabled(u64 feature) SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR | \ SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR | \ SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY | \ + SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS | \ SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY)#endif /* _ASM_POWERPC_SECURITY_FEATURES_H */
arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h +1 -0
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ void setup_barrier_nospec(void);#else static inline void setup_barrier_nospec (void ) { };#endif +void do_uaccess_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);void do_entry_flush_fixups (enum l1d_flush_type types);void do_barrier_nospec_fixups (bool enable);extern bool barrier_nospec_enabled;
arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S +26 -59
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arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c +62 -0
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arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +7 -0
@@ -131,6 +131,13 @@ SECTIONS __stop___stf_entry_barrier_fixup = .; } + . = ALIGN(8); + __uaccess_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__uaccess_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { + __start___uaccess_flush_fixup = .; + *(__uaccess_flush_fixup) + __stop___uaccess_flush_fixup = .; + } + . = ALIGN(8); __entry_flush_fixup : AT(ADDR(__entry_flush_fixup) - LOAD_OFFSET) { __start___entry_flush_fixup = .;
arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c +50 -0
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arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +8 -2
@@ -124,10 +124,12 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void)/* * If we are non-Power9 bare metal, we don't need to flush on kernel -* entry: it fixes a P9 specific vulnerability. +* entry or after user access: they fix a P9 specific vulnerability. */ -if (!pvr_version_is (PVR_POWER9 )) +if (!pvr_version_is (PVR_POWER9 )) {security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY ); +security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ); + } enable = security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY) && \ (security_ftr_enabled(SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_PR) || \
@@ -139,6 +141,10 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY );setup_entry_flush (enable); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ); +setup_uaccess_flush (enable); }static void __init pnv_check_guarded_cores (void )
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +4 -0
@@ -583,6 +583,10 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_ENTRY );setup_entry_flush (enable); + + enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) && +security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS ); +setup_uaccess_flush (enable); }#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
Re: [PATCH 3/7] powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
Quoted 25 lines · Daniel Axtens
From: Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>
IBM Power9 processors can speculatively operate on data in the L1 cache before it has been completely validated, via a way-prediction mechanism. It is not possible for an attacker to determine the contents of impermissible memory using this method, since these systems implement a combination of hardware and software security measures to prevent scenarios where protected data could be leaked.
However these measures don't address the scenario where an attacker induces the operating system to speculatively execute instructions using data that the attacker controls. This can be used for example to speculatively bypass "kernel user access prevention" techniques, as discovered by Anthony Steinhauser of Google's Safeside Project. This is not an attack by itself, but there is a possibility it could be used in conjunction with side-channels or other weaknesses in the privileged code to construct an attack.
This issue can be mitigated by flushing the L1 cache between privilege boundaries of concern. This patch flushes the L1 cache after user accesses.
This is part of the fix for CVE-2020-4788.
Signed-off-by Nicholas Piggin <[email protected]>Signed-off-by Daniel Axtens <[email protected]>
Quoted 15 lines
--- .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 + .../powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h | 66 ++++++++------ arch/powerpc/include/asm/exception-64s.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/feature-fixups.h | 9 ++ arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 19 +++-- arch/powerpc/include/asm/security_features.h | 3 + arch/powerpc/include/asm/setup.h | 1 + arch/powerpc/kernel/exceptions-64s.S | 85 ++++++------------- arch/powerpc/kernel/setup_64.c | 62 ++++++++++++++ arch/powerpc/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 7 ++ arch/powerpc/lib/feature-fixups.c | 50 +++++++++++ arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 10 ++- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 4 + 13 files changed, 233 insertions(+), 90 deletions(-)
[]
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h
Quoted 4 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +0
-0
[]
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h static inline void set_kuap(unsigned long value) · line 142
Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +7
-0+static inline bool +bad_kuap_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address,bool is_write) +{ +return WARN (mmu_has_feature (MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP ) && + (regs->kuap & (is_write ?AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_WRITE :AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_READ )), +"Bug: %s fault blocked by AMR!" , is_write ?"Write" :"Read" ); +}
A simple "echo t > /proc/sysrq-trigger" will trigger this warning almost endlessly on Power8 NV.
.config:
https://cailca.coding.net/public/linux/mm/git/files/master/powerpc.config
[ 391.734028][ T1986] Bug: Read fault blocked by AMR! [ 391.734032][ T1986] WARNING: CPU: 80 PID: 1986 at arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h:145 do_page_fault+0x8fc/0xb70 [ 391.734232][ T1986] Modules linked in: kvm_hv kvm ip_tables x_tables sd_mod ahci libahci tg3 libata firmware_class libphy dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod [ 391.734425][ T1986] CPU: 80 PID: 1986 Comm: bash Tainted: G W 5.10.0-rc6-next-20201203+ #3 [ 391.734535][ T1986] NIP: c00000000004dd1c LR: c00000000004dd18 CTR: 0000000000000000 [ 391.734648][ T1986] REGS: c00020003a0bf3a0 TRAP: 0700 Tainted: G W (5.10.0-rc6-next-20201203+) [ 391.734768][ T1986] MSR: 9000000000021033 <SF,HV,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48222284 XER: 00000000 [ 391.734906][ T1986] CFAR: c0000000000bb05c IRQMASK: 1 [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR00: c00000000004dd18 c00020003a0bf630 c000000007fe0d00 000000000000001f [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR04: c000000000f1cc58 0000000000000003 0000000000000027 c000201cc6207218 [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR08: 0000000000000023 0000000000000002 c00020004753bd80 c000000007f1cee8 [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR12: 0000000000002000 c000201fff7f8380 0000000040000000 0000000110929798 [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR16: 0000000110929724 00000001108c6988 000000011085f290 000000011092d568 [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR20: 00000001229f1f80 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 c000000000aa8dc8 [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR24: c000000000ab4a00 c00020001cc8c880 0000000000000000 0000000000000000 [ 391.734906][ T1986] GPR28: c00000000801aa18 0000000000000160 c00020003a0bf760 0000000000000300 [ 391.735865][ T1986] NIP [c00000000004dd1c] do_page_fault+0x8fc/0xb70 [ 391.735947][ T1986] LR [c00000000004dd18] do_page_fault+0x8f8/0xb70 [ 391.736033][ T1986] Call Trace: [ 391.736072][ T1986] [c00020003a0bf630] [c00000000004dd18] do_page_fault+0x8f8/0xb70 (unreliable) [ 391.736181][ T1986] [c00020003a0bf6f0] [c00000000000c1b8] handle_page_fault+0x10/0x2c [ 391.736294][ T1986] --- interrupt: 300 at copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x68/0x190 [ 391.736294][ T1986] LR = copy_from_kernel_nofault+0x40/0x190 [ 391.736441][ T1986] [c00020003a0bf9f0] [c00020003a0bfa30] 0xc00020003a0bfa30 (unreliable) [ 391.736565][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfa30] [c0000000000edd98] print_worker_info+0xe8/0x1c0 [ 391.736672][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfaf0] [c000000000104b0c] sched_show_task+0x2dc/0x350 [ 391.736807][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfb70] [c000000000112cd8] show_state_filter+0x148/0x320 [ 391.736899][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfbe0] [c00000000070a3f4] sysrq_handle_showstate+0x24/0x40 [ 391.736995][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfc00] [c00000000070add4] __handle_sysrq+0x164/0x280 [ 391.737111][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfca0] [c00000000070b03c] write_sysrq_trigger+0xfc/0x13c [ 391.737233][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfce0] [c0000000004c579c] proc_reg_write+0x10c/0x1b0 [ 391.737327][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfd10] [c0000000003e5ec4] vfs_write+0xf4/0x480 [ 391.737431][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfd70] [c0000000003e642c] ksys_write+0x7c/0x140 [ 391.737536][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfdc0] [c00000000002c578] system_call_exception+0xf8/0x1d0 [ 391.737623][ T1986] [c00020003a0bfe20] [c00000000000d1c8] system_call_common+0xe8/0x218 [ 391.737708][ T1986] Instruction dump: [ 391.737777][ T1986] 60000000 2fbb0000 e93e0168 419e007c 2fa90000 3c82f8ac 388467a0 409cfed4 [ 391.737913][ T1986] 3c62f8ac 386368a8 4806d2e1 60000000 <0fe00000> e80100d0 3ae0000b eb410090 [ 391.738041][ T1986] irq event stamp: 126198 [ 391.738077][ T1986] hardirqs last enabled at (126197): [<c00000000002cbf4>] interrupt_exit_kernel_prepare+0xb4/0x250 [ 391.738196][ T1986] hardirqs last disabled at (126198): [<c00000000000897c>] data_access_common_virt+0x16c/0x180 [ 391.738327][ T1986] softirqs last enabled at (126196): [<c000000000948f08>] __do_softirq+0x388/0x704 [ 391.738427][ T1986] softirqs last disabled at (126191): [<c0000000000c75b8>] irq_exit+0x198/0x1c0 [ 392.177827][ T1986] ---[ end trace 8eaf99b33f09def0 ]--- [ 392.177934][ T1986] Workqueue: 0x0 (mm_percpu_wq) [ 392.177994][ T1986] Call Trace: [ 392.178048][ T1986] [c00000002afbf9d0] [c000000000ab0ee8] __func__.4060+0x125178/0x185
Re: [PATCH 3/7] powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
Quoted 2 lines · Qian Cai
A simple "echo t >
/proc/sysrq-trigger" will trigger this warning almost endlessly on Power8 NV.
Correction -- POWER9 NV.
Re: [PATCH 3/7] powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
In reply to Qian CaiQuoted 11 lines · Qian Cai
[]
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h static inline void set_kuap(unsigned long value) · line 142
Quoted 7 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +7
-0+static inline bool +bad_kuap_fault (struct pt_regs *regs,unsigned long address,bool is_write) +{ +return WARN (mmu_has_feature (MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP ) && + (regs->kuap & (is_write ?AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_WRITE :AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_READ )), +"Bug: %s fault blocked by AMR!" , is_write ?"Write" :"Read" ); +}A simple "echo t >
/proc/sysrq-trigger" will trigger this warning almost endlessly on POWER9 NV.
I have just realized the patch just moved this warning around, so the issue was pre-existent. Since I have not tested sysrq-t regularly, I am not sure when it started to break. So far, I have reverted some of those for testing which did not help, i.e., the sysrq-t issue remains.
16852975f0f Revert "powerpc/64s: Use early_mmu_has_feature() in set_kuap()" 129e240ead32 Revert "powerpc: Implement user_access_save() and user_access_restore()" edb0046c842c Revert "powerpc/64s/kuap: Add missing isync to KUAP restore paths" 2d46ee87ce44 Revert "powerpc/64/kuap: Conditionally restore AMR in interrupt exit" c1e0e805fc57 Revert "powerpc/64s/kuap: Conditionally restore AMR in kuap_restore_amr asm" 7f30b7aaf23a Revert "selftests/powerpc: rfi_flush: disable entry flush if present" bc9b9967a100 Revert "powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry"b77e7b54f5eb Revert "powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses"22dddf532c64 Revert "powerpc: Only include kup-radix.h for 64-bit Book3S" 2679d155c46a Revert "selftests/powerpc: entry flush test"87954b9b4243 Revert "selftests/powerpc: refactor entry and rfi_flush tests" 342d82bd4c5d Revert "powerpc/64s: rename pnv|pseries_setup_rfi_flush to _setup_security_mitigations"
Re: [PATCH 3/7] powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses
Quoting Qian Cai <[email protected]>:
Quoted 20 lines · Qian Cai
Quoted 8 lines
[]
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+static inline bool +bad_kuap_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, bool
is_write)arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h static inline void set_kuap(unsigned long value)
Quoted 3 lines
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +3
-0+{ + return WARN(mmu_has_feature(MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP) && + (regs->kuap & (is_write ? AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_WRITE :
AMR_KUAP_BLOCK_READ)),Quoted 5 lines
Review
Quoted 2 lines
(quoted diff) +2
-0+ "Bug: %s fault blocked by AMR!", is_write ? "Write" : "Read"); +}A simple "echo t >
/proc/sysrq-trigger" will trigger this warning almost endlessly on POWER9 NV.I have just realized the patch just moved this warning around, so the issue was pre-existent. Since I have not tested sysrq-t regularly, I am not sure when it started to break. So far, I have reverted some of those for testing which did not help, i.e., the sysrq-t issue remains.
Quoted 12 lines
16852975f0fRevert "powerpc/64s: Useearly_mmu_has_feature()inset_kuap()"129e240ead32Revert "powerpc: Implementuser_access_save()anduser_access_restore()"edb0046c842cRevert "powerpc/64s/kuap: Add missing isync to KUAP restore paths"2d46ee87ce44Revert "powerpc/64/kuap: Conditionally restore AMR in interrupt exit"c1e0e805fc57Revert "powerpc/64s/kuap: Conditionally restore AMR inkuap_restore_amrasm"7f30b7aaf23aRevert "selftests/powerpc:rfi_flush: disable entry flush if present"bc9b9967a100Revert "powerpc/64s: flush L1D on kernel entry"b77e7b54f5ebRevert "powerpc/64s: flush L1D after user accesses"22dddf532c64Revert "powerpc: Only includekup-radix.hfor 64-bit Book3S"2679d155c46aRevert "selftests/powerpc: entry flush test"87954b9b4243Revert "selftests/powerpc: refactor entry andrfi_flushtests"342d82bd4c5dRevert "powerpc/64s: rename pnv|pseries_setup_rfi_flush to_setup_security_mitigations"
I also hit that WARNING in the same way earlier this week.
I think it has been broken by commit c33165253492 ("powerpc: use non-set_fs based maccess routines")
IIUC we should provide copy_from_kernel_nofault_allowed() to avoid that.
Christophe
PATCH 4/7 powerpc: Only include kup-radix.h for 64-bit Book3S
In reply to Daniel AxtensFrom: Michael Ellerman <[email protected]>
In kup.h we currently include kup-radix.h for all 64-bit builds, which includes Book3S and Book3E. The latter doesn't make sense, Book3E never uses the Radix MMU.
This has worked up until now, but almost by accident, and the recent uaccess flush changes introduced a build breakage on Book3E because of the bad structure of the code.
So disentangle things so that we only use kup-radix.h for Book3S. This requires some more stubs in kup.h and fixing an include in syscall_64.c.
--- arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h | 4 ++-- arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h | 11 ++++++++--- arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall_64.c | 2 +- 3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/include/asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h +2 -2
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@#endif .endm +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUAP .macro kuap_check_amr gpr1, gpr2#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUAP_DEBUG BEGIN_MMU_FTR_SECTION_NESTED (67 )
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@END_MMU_FTR_SECTION_NESTED_IFSET (MMU_FTR_RADIX_KUAP ,67 ) #endif .endm +#endif .macro kuap_save_amr_and_lock gpr1, gpr2, use_cr, msr_pr_cr #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_KUAP
@@ -148,8 +150,6 @@ static inline unsigned long kuap_get_and_check_amr(void)return 0UL ; } -static inline void kuap_check_amr (void ) { } -static inline unsigned long get_kuap (void ) {return AMR_KUAP_BLOCKED ;
arch/powerpc/include/asm/kup.h +8 -3
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@#define KUAP_CURRENT_WRITE 8#define KUAP_CURRENT (KUAP_CURRENT_READ | KUAP_CURRENT_WRITE) -#ifdef CONFIG_PPC64 +#ifdef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 #include <asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h> #endif #ifdef CONFIG_PPC_8xx
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ .macro kuap_check current, gpr .endm +.macro kuap_check_amr gpr1, gpr2 +.endm +#endif #else /* !__ASSEMBLY__ */
@@ -60,19 +63,21 @@ bad_kuap_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long address, bool is_write) return false; } +static inline void kuap_check_amr (void ) { } +/* * book3s/64/kup-radix.h defines these functions for the !KUAP case to flush * the L1D cache after user accesses. Only include the empty stubs for other * platforms. */ -#ifndef CONFIG_PPC64 +#ifndef CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 static inline void allow_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { }static inline void prevent_user_access (void __user *to,const void __user *from,unsigned long size,unsigned long dir) { }static inline unsigned long prevent_user_access_return (void ) {return 0UL ; }static inline void restore_user_access (unsigned long flags) { } -#endif /* CONFIG_PPC64 */ +#endif /* CONFIG_PPC_BOOK3S_64 */ #endif /* CONFIG_PPC_KUAP */ static inline void allow_read_from_user (const void __user *from,unsigned long size)
arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall_64.c +1 -1
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@#include <linux/err.h> #include <asm/asm-prototypes.h> -#include <asm/book3s/64/kup-radix.h> +#include <asm/kup.h> #include <asm/cputime.h> #include <asm/hw_irq.h> #include <asm/kprobes.h>
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 5/7 selftests/powerpc: entry flush test
In reply to Daniel AxtensAdd a test modelled on the RFI flush test which counts the number of L1D misses doing a simple syscall with the entry flush on and off.
For simplicity of backporting, this test duplicates a lot of code from rfi_flush. We clean that up in the next patch.
--- .../selftests/powerpc/security/.gitignore | 1 + .../selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile | 2 +- .../selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c | 198 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 200 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/.gitignore +1 -0
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only rfi_flush +entry_flush
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile +1 -1
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ -TEST_GEN_PROGS := rfi_flush spectre_v2 +TEST_GEN_PROGS := rfi_flush entry_flush spectre_v2 top_srcdir = ../../../../.. CFLAGS += -I../../../../../usr/include
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c new file +198 -0
198 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 6/7 selftests/powerpc: refactor entry and rfi_flush tests
In reply to Daniel AxtensFor simplicity in backporting, the original entry_flush test contained a lot of duplicated code from the rfi_flush test. De-duplicate that code.
--- .../testing/selftests/powerpc/include/utils.h | 5 ++ .../selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile | 2 + .../selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c | 61 +--------------- .../selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.c | 70 +++++++++++++++++++ .../selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.h | 17 +++++ .../selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c | 61 +--------------- 6 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 120 deletions(-) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.c create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.h
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/include/utils.h +5 -0
@@ -42,6 +42,11 @@ int perf_event_enable(int fd);int perf_event_disable (int fd);int perf_event_reset (int fd); +struct perf_event_read { +__u64 nr; +__u64 l1d_misses; +}; +#if !defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) || !__GLIBC_PREREQ (2 ,30 )#include <unistd.h> #include <sys/syscall.h>
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/Makefile +2 -0
@@ -11,3 +11,5 @@ $(TEST_GEN_PROGS): ../harness.c ../utils.c $(OUTPUT)/spectre_v2: CFLAGS += -m64 $(OUTPUT)/spectre_v2: ../pmu/event.c branch_loops.S +$(OUTPUT)/rfi_flush: flush_utils.c +$(OUTPUT)/entry_flush: flush_utils.c
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/entry_flush.c +1 -60
67 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.c new file +70 -0
70 lines not on this page · raw message
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/flush_utils.h new file +17 -0
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0+ */ + +/* +* Copyright 2018 IBM Corporation. +*/ + +#ifndef _SELFTESTS_POWERPC_SECURITY_FLUSH_UTILS_H +#define _SELFTESTS_POWERPC_SECURITY_FLUSH_UTILS_H + +#define CACHELINE_SIZE 128 + +void syscall_loop (char *p,unsigned long iterations, +unsigned long zero_size); + +void set_dscr (unsigned long val); + +#endif /* _SELFTESTS_POWERPC_SECURITY_FLUSH_UTILS_H */
tools/testing/selftests/powerpc/security/rfi_flush.c +1 -60
72 lines not on this page · raw message
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1
PATCH 7/7 powerpc/64s: rename pnv|pseries_setup_rfi_flush to _setup_security_mitigations
In reply to Daniel Axtenspseries|pnv_setup_rfi_flush already does the count cache flush setup, and we just added entry and uaccess flushes. So the name is not very accurate any more. In both platforms we then also immediately setup the STF flush.
Rename them to _setup_security_mitigations and fold the STF flush in.
--- arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c | 7 ++++--- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c | 4 ++-- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h | 2 +- arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c | 7 ++++--- 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
arch/powerpc/platforms/powernv/setup.c +4 -3
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static void init_fw_feat_flags(struct device_node *np)security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ); } -static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush (void ) +static void pnv_setup_security_mitigations (void ) {struct device_node *np, *fw_features;enum l1d_flush_type type;
@@ -145,6 +145,8 @@ static void pnv_setup_rfi_flush(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS );setup_uaccess_flush (enable); + +setup_stf_barrier (); }static void __init pnv_check_guarded_cores (void )
@@ -173,8 +175,7 @@ static void __init pnv_setup_arch(void) {set_arch_panic_timeout (10 ,ARCH_PANIC_TIMEOUT ); -pnv_setup_rfi_flush (); -setup_stf_barrier (); +pnv_setup_security_mitigations ();/* Initialize SMP */ pnv_smp_init ();
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/mobility.c +2 -2
@@ -349,8 +349,8 @@ void post_mobility_fixup(void)cpus_read_unlock (); -/* Possibly switch to a new RFI flush type */ -pseries_setup_rfi_flush (); +/* Possibly switch to a new L1 flush type */ +pseries_setup_security_mitigations ();/* Reinitialise system information for hv-24x7 */ read_24x7_sys_info ();
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pseries.h +1 -1
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ static inline unsigned long cmo_get_page_size(void)int dlpar_workqueue_init (void ); -void pseries_setup_rfi_flush (void ); +void pseries_setup_security_mitigations (void );void pseries_lpar_read_hblkrm_characteristics (void );#endif /* _PSERIES_PSERIES_H */
arch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/setup.c +4 -3
@@ -542,7 +542,7 @@ static void init_cpu_char_feature_flags(struct h_cpu_char_result *result)security_ftr_clear (SEC_FTR_BNDS_CHK_SPEC_BAR ); } -void pseries_setup_rfi_flush (void ) +void pseries_setup_security_mitigations (void ) {struct h_cpu_char_result result;enum l1d_flush_type types;
@@ -587,6 +587,8 @@ void pseries_setup_rfi_flush(void) enable =security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_FAVOUR_SECURITY ) &&security_ftr_enabled (SEC_FTR_L1D_FLUSH_UACCESS );setup_uaccess_flush (enable); + +setup_stf_barrier (); }#ifdef CONFIG_PCI_IOV
@@ -776,8 +778,7 @@ static void __init pSeries_setup_arch(void)fwnmi_init (); -pseries_setup_rfi_flush (); -setup_stf_barrier (); +pseries_setup_security_mitigations ();pseries_lpar_read_hblkrm_characteristics ();/* By default, only probe PCI (can be overridden by rtas_pci) */
Signature · 1 line
2.25.1