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xfrm: two fixes around use_time

PATCH In review Eric Dumazet 3 participants 6 messages Jan 26, 2023 – Jan 30, 2023

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#0 lore raw

cover xfrm: two fixes around use_time

First patch fixes a long/time64_t mismatch,
found while addressing a syzbot report.

Second patch adds annotations to reads and writes of (struct xfrm_lifetime_cur)->use_time field.

Eric Dumazet (2):
xfrm: consistently use time64_t in xfrm_timer_handler()
xfrm: annotate data-race around use_time

 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 11 +++++++----
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  | 18 +++++++++---------
 2 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1.456.gfc5497dd1b-goog
#1 lore raw

PATCH 1/2 xfrm: consistently use time64_t in xfrm_timer_handler()

For some reason, blamed commit did the right thing in xfrm_policy_timer() but did not in xfrm_timer_handler()

Fixes 386c5680e2e8 ("xfrm: use time64_t for in-kernel timestamps")
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c | 8 ++++----
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +4 -4
index 89c731f4f0c7283e28fc7697c8729a5d1064da97..5f03d1fbb98ed79900f61c783eba34dbfd99abfe 100644
@@ -577,7 +577,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart xfrm_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *me)
 	if (x->km.state == XFRM_STATE_EXPIRED)
 		goto expired;
 	if (x->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds) {
-		long tmo = x->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds +
+		time64_t tmo = x->lft.hard_add_expires_seconds +
 			x->curlft.add_time - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0) {
 			if (x->xflags & XFRM_SOFT_EXPIRE) {
@@ -594,7 +594,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart xfrm_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *me)
 			next = tmo;
 	}
 	if (x->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds) {
-		long tmo = x->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds +
+		time64_t tmo = x->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds +
 			(x->curlft.use_time ? : now) - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0)
 			goto expired;
@@ -604,7 +604,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart xfrm_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *me)
 	if (x->km.dying)
 		goto resched;
 	if (x->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds) {
-		long tmo = x->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds +
+		time64_t tmo = x->lft.soft_add_expires_seconds +
 			x->curlft.add_time - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0) {
 			warn = 1;
@@ -616,7 +616,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart xfrm_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *me)
 		}
 	}
 	if (x->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds) {
-		long tmo = x->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds +
+		time64_t tmo = x->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds +
 			(x->curlft.use_time ? : now) - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0)
 			warn = 1;
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1.456.gfc5497dd1b-goog
Acked-by on v1 1/2
#2 lore raw

Re: [PATCH net 1/2] xfrm: consistently use time64_t in xfrm_timer_handler()

Quoted 7 lines · Eric Dumazet

For some reason, blamed commit did the right thing in xfrm_policy_timer() but did not in xfrm_timer_handler()

Fixes 386c5680e2e8 ("xfrm: use time64_t for in-kernel timestamps")
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
Cc Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>

I don't remember anything about this one. I thought that perhaps it was using 'long' for a relative value that is guaranteed to fit but needs an otherwise expensive 64-bit division. I don't see any of that though, it looks like an obvious bug.

Thanks for fixing it,

#3 lore raw

PATCH 2/2 xfrm: annotate data-race around use_time

In reply to Eric Dumazet

KCSAN reported multiple cpus can update use_time
at the same time.

Adds READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Note that 32bit arches are not fully protected, but they will probably no longer be supported/used in 2106.

BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __xfrm_policy_check / __xfrm_policy_check

write to 0xffff88813e7ec108 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:

__xfrm_policy_check+0x6ae/0x17f0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3664
__xfrm_policy_check2 include/net/xfrm.h:1174 [inline]
xfrm_policy_check include/net/xfrm.h:1179 [inline]
xfrm6_policy_check+0x2e9/0x320 include/net/xfrm.h:1189
udpv6_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x48/0xa30 net/ipv6/udp.c:703
udpv6_queue_rcv_skb+0x2d6/0x310 net/ipv6/udp.c:792
udp6_unicast_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x190 net/ipv6/udp.c:935
__udp6_lib_rcv+0x84b/0x9b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1020
udpv6_rcv+0x4b/0x50 net/ipv6/udp.c:1133
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x99e/0x1020 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:439
ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:484 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:302 [inline]
ip6_input+0xca/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:493
dst_input include/net/dst.h:454 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x1e9/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:302 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x85/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5482 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x8b/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5596
process_backlog+0x23f/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:5924
__napi_poll+0x65/0x390 net/core/dev.c:6485
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6552 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x37e/0x730 net/core/dev.c:6663
__do_softirq+0xf2/0x2c7 kernel/softirq.c:571
do_softirq+0xb1/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:472
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x6f/0x80 kernel/softirq.c:396
__raw_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:257 [inline]
_raw_read_unlock_bh+0x17/0x20 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:284
wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0x107/0x120 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:184
wg_packet_create_data_done drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:251 [inline]
wg_packet_tx_worker+0x142/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:276
process_one_work+0x3d3/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x618/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x1a9/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308

write to 0xffff88813e7ec108 of 8 bytes by interrupt on cpu 1:

__xfrm_policy_check+0x6ae/0x17f0 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c:3664
__xfrm_policy_check2 include/net/xfrm.h:1174 [inline]
xfrm_policy_check include/net/xfrm.h:1179 [inline]
xfrm6_policy_check+0x2e9/0x320 include/net/xfrm.h:1189
udpv6_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x48/0xa30 net/ipv6/udp.c:703
udpv6_queue_rcv_skb+0x2d6/0x310 net/ipv6/udp.c:792
udp6_unicast_rcv_skb+0x16b/0x190 net/ipv6/udp.c:935
__udp6_lib_rcv+0x84b/0x9b0 net/ipv6/udp.c:1020
udpv6_rcv+0x4b/0x50 net/ipv6/udp.c:1133
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x99e/0x1020 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:439
ip6_input_finish net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:484 [inline]
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:302 [inline]
ip6_input+0xca/0x180 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:493
dst_input include/net/dst.h:454 [inline]
ip6_rcv_finish+0x1e9/0x2d0 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:79
NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:302 [inline]
ipv6_rcv+0x85/0x140 net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:309
__netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5482 [inline]
__netif_receive_skb+0x8b/0x1b0 net/core/dev.c:5596
process_backlog+0x23f/0x3b0 net/core/dev.c:5924
__napi_poll+0x65/0x390 net/core/dev.c:6485
napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6552 [inline]
net_rx_action+0x37e/0x730 net/core/dev.c:6663
__do_softirq+0xf2/0x2c7 kernel/softirq.c:571
do_softirq+0xb1/0xf0 kernel/softirq.c:472
__local_bh_enable_ip+0x6f/0x80 kernel/softirq.c:396
__raw_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rwlock_api_smp.h:257 [inline]
_raw_read_unlock_bh+0x17/0x20 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:284
wg_socket_send_skb_to_peer+0x107/0x120 drivers/net/wireguard/socket.c:184
wg_packet_create_data_done drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:251 [inline]
wg_packet_tx_worker+0x142/0x360 drivers/net/wireguard/send.c:276
process_one_work+0x3d3/0x720 kernel/workqueue.c:2289
worker_thread+0x618/0xa70 kernel/workqueue.c:2436
kthread+0x1a9/0x1e0 kernel/kthread.c:376
ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:308

value changed: 0x0000000063c62d6f -> 0x0000000063c62d70

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:

CPU: 1 PID: 4185 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G W 6.2.0-rc4-syzkaller-00009-gd532dd102151-dirty #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 10/26/2022
Workqueue: wg-crypt-wg0 wg_packet_tx_worker
Fixes 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc Steffen Klassert <[email protected]>
Cc Arnd Bergmann <[email protected]>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c | 11 +++++++----
 net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c  | 10 +++++-----
 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
net/xfrm/xfrm_policy.c +7 -4
index e9eb82c5457d03727ff7fff30e2f8493ea23fd05..47d3a485b8659768af6e675d60ddb13b7377ff34 100644
@@ -336,7 +336,7 @@ static void xfrm_policy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 	}
 	if (xp->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds) {
 		time64_t tmo = xp->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds +
-			(xp->curlft.use_time ? : xp->curlft.add_time) - now;
+			(READ_ONCE(xp->curlft.use_time) ? : xp->curlft.add_time) - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0)
 			goto expired;
 		if (tmo < next)
@@ -354,7 +354,7 @@ static void xfrm_policy_timer(struct timer_list *t)
 	}
 	if (xp->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds) {
 		time64_t tmo = xp->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds +
-			(xp->curlft.use_time ? : xp->curlft.add_time) - now;
+			(READ_ONCE(xp->curlft.use_time) ? : xp->curlft.add_time) - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0) {
 			warn = 1;
 			tmo = XFRM_KM_TIMEOUT;
@@ -3661,7 +3661,8 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 		return 1;
 	}
 
-	pol->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+	/* This lockless write can happen from different cpus. */
+	WRITE_ONCE(pol->curlft.use_time, ktime_get_real_seconds());
 
 	pols[0] = pol;
 	npols++;
@@ -3676,7 +3677,9 @@ int __xfrm_policy_check(struct sock *sk, int dir, struct sk_buff *skb,
 				xfrm_pol_put(pols[0]);
 				return 0;
 			}
-			pols[1]->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+			/* This write can happen from different cpus. */
+			WRITE_ONCE(pols[1]->curlft.use_time,
+				   ktime_get_real_seconds());
 			npols++;
 		}
 	}
net/xfrm/xfrm_state.c +5 -5
index 5f03d1fbb98ed79900f61c783eba34dbfd99abfe..00afe831c71c49cde41625e7960a8441d0be69ab 100644
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart xfrm_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *me)
 	}
 	if (x->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds) {
 		time64_t tmo = x->lft.hard_use_expires_seconds +
-			(x->curlft.use_time ? : now) - now;
+			(READ_ONCE(x->curlft.use_time) ? : now) - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0)
 			goto expired;
 		if (tmo < next)
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ static enum hrtimer_restart xfrm_timer_handler(struct hrtimer *me)
 	}
 	if (x->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds) {
 		time64_t tmo = x->lft.soft_use_expires_seconds +
-			(x->curlft.use_time ? : now) - now;
+			(READ_ONCE(x->curlft.use_time) ? : now) - now;
 		if (tmo <= 0)
 			warn = 1;
 		else if (tmo < next)
@@ -1906,7 +1906,7 @@ int xfrm_state_update(struct xfrm_state *x)
 
 		hrtimer_start(&x1->mtimer, ktime_set(1, 0),
 			      HRTIMER_MODE_REL_SOFT);
-		if (x1->curlft.use_time)
+		if (READ_ONCE(x1->curlft.use_time))
 			xfrm_state_check_expire(x1);
 
 		if (x->props.smark.m || x->props.smark.v || x->if_id) {
@@ -1940,8 +1940,8 @@ int xfrm_state_check_expire(struct xfrm_state *x)
 {
 	xfrm_dev_state_update_curlft(x);
 
-	if (!x->curlft.use_time)
-		x->curlft.use_time = ktime_get_real_seconds();
+	if (!READ_ONCE(x->curlft.use_time))
+		WRITE_ONCE(x->curlft.use_time, ktime_get_real_seconds());
 
 	if (x->curlft.bytes >= x->lft.hard_byte_limit ||
 	    x->curlft.packets >= x->lft.hard_packet_limit) {
Signature · 1 line
2.39.1.456.gfc5497dd1b-goog
Acked-by on v1 2/2
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH net 2/2] xfrm: annotate data-race around use_time

Quoted 8 lines · Eric Dumazet

KCSAN reported multiple cpus can update use_time
at the same time.

Adds READ_ONCE()/WRITE_ONCE() annotations.

Note that 32bit arches are not fully protected, but they will probably no longer be supported/used in 2106.

maintainer
#5 lore raw
In reply to Eric Dumazet
Quoted 9 lines · Eric Dumazet

First patch fixes a long/time64_t mismatch,
found while addressing a syzbot report.

Second patch adds annotations to reads and writes of (struct xfrm_lifetime_cur)->use_time field.

Eric Dumazet (2):
xfrm: consistently use time64_t in xfrm_timer_handler()
xfrm: annotate data-race around use_time

Both applied, thanks a lot Eric!