Skip to contentSkip to conversation

integrity: improve user feedback for invalid bootparams

PATCH In review Bruno Meneguele 2 participants 10 messages Sep 4, 2020 – Sep 11, 2020

Subsystems (4)
lore
Share & tools
lore
#0 lore raw

v2 cover integrity: improve user feedback for invalid bootparams

Some boot paramenters under integrity/ don't report any feedback to the user in case an invalid/unknown option is passed. With this patch, try to be more informative about what went wrong, including a more strict secure boot feedback.

Bruno Meneguele (4):
ima: add check for enforced appraise option
integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback
ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise
integrity: prompt keyring name for unknown key request

 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 ++++++++--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c      |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c  | 27 ++++++++++++++++++--------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c      | 13 +++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c    |  2 ++
 5 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#1 lore raw

PATCH v2 1/4 ima: add check for enforced appraise option

The "enforce" string is allowed as an option for ima_appraise= kernel paramenter per kernel-paramenters.txt and should be considered on the parameter setup checking as a matter of completeness. Also it allows futher checking on the options being passed by the user.

---
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +2 -0
index 372d16382960..580b771e3458 100644
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
 		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
 		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
+		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
 #endif
 	return 1;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#2 lore raw

PATCH v2 2/4 integrity: invalid kernel parameters feedback

In reply to Bruno Meneguele

Don't silently ignore unknown or invalid ima_{policy,appraise,hash} and evm kernel boot command line options.

---
Changelog:
v2: update commit message (Mimi)

 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c     |  3 +++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c |  2 ++
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c     | 13 +++++++++----
 security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c   |  2 ++
 4 files changed, 16 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +3 -0
index 0d36259b690d..6ae00fee1d34 100644
@@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str)
 {
 	if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
 		evm_fixmode = 1;
+	else
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode);
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +2 -0
index 580b771e3458..2193b51c2743 100644
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
 		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
 		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+	else
+		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str);
 #endif
 	return 1;
 }
security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +9 -4
index 8a91711ca79b..2b22932b140d 100644
@@ -50,18 +50,23 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str)
 		return 1;
 
 	if (strcmp(template_desc->name, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME) == 0) {
-		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0)
+		if (strncmp(str, "sha1", 4) == 0) {
 			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1;
-		else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0)
+		} else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) {
 			ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5;
-		else
+		} else {
+			pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\" for template \"%s\"",
+				str, IMA_TEMPLATE_IMA_NAME);
 			return 1;
+		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 
 	i = match_string(hash_algo_name, HASH_ALGO__LAST, str);
-	if (i < 0)
+	if (i < 0) {
+		pr_err("invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", str);
 		return 1;
+	}
 
 	ima_hash_algo = i;
 out:
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +2 -0
index 07f033634b27..880d10887de8 100644
@@ -240,6 +240,8 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str)
 			ima_use_secure_boot = true;
 		else if (strcmp(p, "fail_securely") == 0)
 			ima_fail_unverifiable_sigs = true;
+		else
+			pr_err("policy \"%s\" not found", p);
 	}
 
 	return 1;
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
#3 lore raw

PATCH v2 3/4 ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise

In reply to Bruno Meneguele

Only prompt the unknown/invalid appraisal option if secureboot is enabled and if the current state differentiates from the original one.

---
Changelog:
v2:
- update commit message (Mimi)
- work with a temporary var instead of directly with ima_appraise (Mimi)

 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +16 -9
index 2193b51c2743..d17808245592 100644
@@ -19,22 +19,29 @@
 static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
-	if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
-		pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
-			str);
-		return 1;
-	}
+	bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot();
+	int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = 0;
+		appraisal_state = 0;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
 	else
 		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str);
+
+	/* If appraisal state was changed, but secure boot is enabled,
+	 * keep its default */
+	if (sb_state) {
+		if (!(appraisal_state & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option",
+				str);
+		else
+			ima_appraise = appraisal_state;
+	}
 #endif
 	return 1;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
maintainer
#4 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise

Hi Bruno,

Quoted 17 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +6 -4
+	bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot();
+	int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = 0;
+		appraisal_state = 0;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
 	else
 		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str);

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c line 44

Quoted 10 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +10 -0
+
+	/* If appraisal state was changed, but secure boot is enabled,
+	 * keep its default */
+	if (sb_state) {
+		if (!(appraisal_state & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option",
+				str);
+		else
+			ima_appraise = appraisal_state;
+	}

Shouldn't the "else" clause be here. No need to re-post the entire
patch set.

thanks,

Mimi

Quoted 3 lines

#endif
return 1;
}

#5 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v2 3/4] ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise

Quoted 24 lines · Mimi Zohar

Hi Bruno,

Quoted 22 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +11 -4
+	bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot();
+	int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = 0;
+		appraisal_state = 0;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
 	else
 		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str);
+
+	/* If appraisal state was changed, but secure boot is enabled,
+	 * keep its default */
+	if (sb_state) {
+		if (!(appraisal_state & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
Quoted 8 lines

security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c line 44

Quoted 5 lines
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +5 -0
+			pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option",
+				str);
+		else
+			ima_appraise = appraisal_state;
+	}

Shouldn't the "else" clause be here. No need to re-post the entire
patch set.

Yes, of course it should.
Sorry. Sending the v3 for this patch.

Quoted 10 lines

thanks,

Mimi

Quoted 3 lines

#endif
return 1;
}

Signature · 2 lines
bmeneg 
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt
#6 lore raw

PATCH v3 3/4 ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise

In reply to Bruno Meneguele

Only prompt the unknown/invalid appraisal option if secureboot is enabled and if the current appraisal state is different from the original one.

---
Changelog:
v3:
- fix sb_state conditional (Mimi)
v2:
- update commit message (Mimi)
- work with a temporary var instead of directly with ima_appraise (Mimi)

 security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +16 -9
index 2193b51c2743..4f028f6e8f8d 100644
@@ -19,22 +19,29 @@
 static int __init default_appraise_setup(char *str)
 {
 #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM
-	if (arch_ima_get_secureboot()) {
-		pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s boot parameter option",
-			str);
-		return 1;
-	}
+	bool sb_state = arch_ima_get_secureboot();
+	int appraisal_state = ima_appraise;
 
 	if (strncmp(str, "off", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = 0;
+		appraisal_state = 0;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "log", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_LOG;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "fix", 3) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_FIX;
 	else if (strncmp(str, "enforce", 7) == 0)
-		ima_appraise = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
+		appraisal_state = IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE;
 	else
 		pr_err("invalid \"%s\" appraise option", str);
+
+	/* If appraisal state was changed, but secure boot is enabled,
+	 * keep its default */
+	if (sb_state) {
+		if (!(appraisal_state & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
+			pr_info("Secure boot enabled: ignoring ima_appraise=%s option",
+				str);
+	} else {
+		ima_appraise = appraisal_state;
+	}
 #endif
 	return 1;
 }
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2
maintainer
#7 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise

Hi Bruno,

Quoted 4 lines · Bruno Meneguele

Only prompt the unknown/invalid appraisal option if secureboot is enabled and if the current appraisal state is different from the original one.

Thanks. I tweaked this patch description and that of 4/4. This patch set is in next-integrity-testing. Please take a look.

thanks,

Mimi

#8 lore raw

Re: [PATCH v3 3/4] ima: limit secure boot feedback scope for appraise

Quoted 11 lines · Mimi Zohar

Hi Bruno,

Quoted 4 lines · Bruno Meneguele

Only prompt the unknown/invalid appraisal option if secureboot is enabled and if the current appraisal state is different from the original one.

Thanks. I tweaked this patch description and that of 4/4. This patch set is in next-integrity-testing. Please take a look.

Thanks Mimi! Just checked in the branch and they're fine.

Quoted 4 lines

thanks,

Mimi

Signature · 2 lines
bmeneg 
PGP Key: http://bmeneg.com/pubkey.txt
#9 lore raw

PATCH v2 4/4 integrity: prompt keyring name for unknown key request

In reply to Bruno Meneguele

Depending on the IMA policy a key can be searched in multiple keyrings (e.g. .ima and .platform) and possibly failing for both. However, for the user not aware of the searching order it's not clear what's the keyring the kernel didn't find the key. With this patch we improve this feedback by printing the keyring "description" (name).

---
 security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c | 10 ++++++++--
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c +8 -2
index cfa4127d0518..14de98ef67f6 100644
@@ -55,8 +55,14 @@ static struct key *request_asymmetric_key(struct key *keyring, uint32_t keyid)
 	}
 
 	if (IS_ERR(key)) {
-		pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
-				   name, PTR_ERR(key));
+		if (keyring)
+			pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' in '%s' keyring. err %ld\n",
+					   name, keyring->description,
+					   PTR_ERR(key));
+		else
+			pr_err_ratelimited("Request for unknown key '%s' err %ld\n",
+					   name, PTR_ERR(key));
+
 		switch (PTR_ERR(key)) {
 			/* Hide some search errors */
 		case -EACCES:
Signature · 1 line
2.26.2