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bpf: Reject variable offset alu on PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS

PATCH Superseded Hao Sun 2 participants 3 messages Jan 9, 2024

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v1 of 4 Superseded Latest is v4 →

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Hao Sun

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#0 lore raw

PATCH 1/1 bpf: Reject variable offset alu on PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS

For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked.

The following prog is accepted:
func#0 @0
0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0

0: (bf) r6 = r1                       ; R1=ctx() R6_w=ctx()
1: (79) r7 = *(u64 *)(r6 +144)        ; R6_w=ctx() R7_w=flow_keys()
2: (b7) r8 = 1024                     ; R8_w=1024
3: (37) r8 /= 1                       ; R8_w=scalar()
4: (57) r8 &= 1024                    ; R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,

smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off=(0x0; 0x400))
5: (0f) r7 += r8
mark_precise: frame0: last_idx 5 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 4: (57) r8 &= 1024
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 3: (37) r8 /= 1
mark_precise: frame0: regs=r8 stack= before 2: (b7) r8 = 1024 6: R7_w=flow_keys(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024,var_off =(0x0; 0x400)) R8_w=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1024, var_off=(0x0; 0x400))
6: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r7 +0) ; R0_w=scalar()
7: (95) exit

This prog loads flow_keys to r7, and adds the variable offset r8 to r7, and finally causes out-of-bounds access:

BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90014c80038
...
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 bpf_dispatcher_nop_func include/linux/bpf.h:1231 [inline]
 __bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:651 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run include/linux/filter.h:658 [inline]
 bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu include/linux/filter.h:675 [inline]
 bpf_flow_dissect+0x15f/0x350 net/core/flow_dissector.c:991
 bpf_prog_test_run_flow_dissector+0x39d/0x620 net/bpf/test_run.c:1359
 bpf_prog_test_run kernel/bpf/syscall.c:4107 [inline]
 __sys_bpf+0xf8f/0x4560 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5475
 __do_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5561 [inline]
 __se_sys_bpf kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559 [inline]
 __x64_sys_bpf+0x73/0xb0 kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5559
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x3f/0x110 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x63/0x6b

Fix this by rejecting ptr alu with variable offset on flow_keys. Applying the patch makes the program rejected with "R7 pointer arithmetic on flow_keys prohibited"

Fixes d58e468b1112 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook")
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4 -0
index adbf330d364b..65f598694d55 100644
@@ -12826,6 +12826,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	}
 
 	switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
+	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
+		if (known)
+			break;
+		fallthrough;
 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
 		/* smin_val represents the known value */
 		if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)
Signature · 1 line
2.34.1
maintainer
#1 lore raw
Quoted 4 lines · Hao Sun

For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked.

[...]

Quoted 12 lines
Fixes d58e468b1112 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook")
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0 -0
index adbf330d364b..65f598694d55 100644

kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 12835

Quoted 10 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4 -0
@@ -12826,6 +12826,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	}
 
 	switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
+	case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
+		if (known)
+			break;
+		fallthrough;
 	case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
 		/* smin_val represents the known value */
 		if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)

This change makes sense, could you please add a testcase?

Also, this switch is written to explicitly disallow and implicitly allow pointer arithmetics, which might be a bit unsafe when new ptr types are added. Would it make more sense to instead rewrite it to explicitly allow? E.g. here is what it currently allows / disallows:

| Pointer type        | Arithmetics allowed |
|---------------------+---------------------|
| PTR_TO_CTX          | yes                 |
| CONST_PTR_TO_MAP    | conditionally       |
| PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE    | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_MAP_KEY      | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_STACK        | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_META  | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_PACKET       | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_END   | no                  |
| PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS    | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_SOCKET       | no                  |
| PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON  | no                  |
| PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK     | no                  |
| PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER    | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK     | no                  |
| PTR_TO_BTF_ID       | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_MEM          | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_BUF          | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_FUNC         | yes                 |
| CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | yes                 |

Of these PTR_TO_FUNC and CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (?) should not be allowed as well, probably (not sure if that could be exploited).

author
#2 lore raw
Quoted 21 lines · Eduard Zingerman
Quoted 4 lines · Hao Sun

For PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS, check_flow_keys_access() only uses fixed off for validation. However, variable offset ptr alu is not prohibited for this ptr kind. So the variable offset is not checked.

[...]

Quoted 14 lines
Fixes d58e468b1112 ("flow_dissector: implements flow dissector BPF hook")
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 ++++
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +0 -0
index adbf330d364b..65f598694d55 100644
@@ -12826,6 +12826,10 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
      }
 
Quoted 11 lines

kernel/bpf/verifier.c static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, · line 12835

Quoted 8 lines
kernel/bpf/verifier.c +4 -0
      switch (base_type(ptr_reg->type)) {
+     case PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS:
+             if (known)
+                     break;
+             fallthrough;
      case CONST_PTR_TO_MAP:
              /* smin_val represents the known value */
              if (known && smin_val == 0 && opcode == BPF_ADD)

This change makes sense, could you please add a testcase?

OK, will do it in the next version tomorrow.

Quoted 3 lines

Also, this switch is written to explicitly disallow and implicitly allow pointer arithmetics, which might be a bit unsafe when new ptr types are added. Would it make more sense to instead rewrite it to explicitly allow?

Yes, this sounds more safe and clear to me, should be done in another patch.

Quoted 13 lines

E.g. here is what it currently allows / disallows:

| Pointer type        | Arithmetics allowed |
|---------------------+---------------------|
| PTR_TO_CTX          | yes                 |
| CONST_PTR_TO_MAP    | conditionally       |
| PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE    | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_MAP_KEY      | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_STACK        | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_META  | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_PACKET       | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_PACKET_END   | no                  |
| PTR_TO_FLOW_KEYS    | yes                 |

This one should be conditionally, variable offset disallowed, fixed allowed.

Quoted 11 lines
| PTR_TO_SOCKET       | no                  |
| PTR_TO_SOCK_COMMON  | no                  |
| PTR_TO_TCP_SOCK     | no                  |
| PTR_TO_TP_BUFFER    | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_XDP_SOCK     | no                  |
| PTR_TO_BTF_ID       | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_MEM          | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_BUF          | yes                 |
| PTR_TO_FUNC         | yes                 |
| CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR | yes                 |
Quoted 2 lines

Of these PTR_TO_FUNC and CONST_PTR_TO_DYNPTR (?) should not be allowed as well, probably (not sure if that could be exploited).

I think both should be disallowed.

If alu sanitation is triggered, alu op on func and dynptr would be rejected by retrieve_ptr_limit();
otherwise, it could be dangerous.