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Error handling bug in fsys_rt_sigprocmask

PATCH Andreas Schwab 2 participants 5 messages May 15, 2004 – May 20, 2004

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#0 lore raw

When sigprocmask is called with an invalid first argument it still modifies the signal mask of the process.

Andreas.

arch/ia64/kernel/fsys.S renamed from arch/ia64/kernel/fsys.S.~1~ +4 -1
@@ -444,6 +444,9 @@ EX(.fail_efault, ld8 r14=[r33])			// r14
 (p7)	cmp.ne.or.andcm p6,p7=r18,r0		// p6/p7 <- signal pending
 	mov r19=0					// i must not leak kernel bits...
 (p6)	br.cond.dpnt.many .sig_pending
+
+	cmp.ne p9,p0=r8,r0			// check for bad HOW value
+(p9)	br.cond.spnt.few 2f
 	;;
 
 1:	ld4 r17=[r9]				// r17 <- current->thread_info->flags
@@ -458,11 +461,11 @@ EX(.fail_efault, ld8 r14=[r33])			// r14
 	cmp.ne p6,p0=r17,r14			// update failed?
 (p6)	br.cond.spnt.few 1b			// yes -> retry
 
+2:
 #ifdef CONFIG_SMP
 	st4.rel [r31]=r0			// release the lock
 #endif
 	ssm psr.i
-	cmp.ne p9,p0=r8,r0			// check for bad HOW value
 	;;
 
 	srlz.d					// ensure psr.i is set again
Signature · 4 lines
Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, [email protected]
SuSE Linux AG, Maxfeldstraße 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany
Key fingerprint = 58CA 54C7 6D53 942B 1756  01D3 44D5 214B 8276 4ED5
"And now for something completely different."
#1 lore raw
Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 1 line · Andreas Schwab

Andreas> When sigprocmask is called with an invalid first argument Andreas> it still modifies the signal mask of the process.

Indeed! Thanks for catching this.

There already is a check for a bad HOW value, but it comes too late. Your patch should be safe, but I'd like to fix it in a way that avoids the second (now unnecessary check). Let me see what I can come up with.

Thanks,

	--david
#2 lore raw
In reply to Andreas Schwab
Quoted 3 lines · David Mosberger

There already is a check for a bad HOW value, but it comes too late. Your patch should be safe, but I'd like to fix it in a way that avoids the second (now unnecessary check). Let me see what I can come up with.

I did remove the second check. But there is now an additional bundle and I couldn't find any way to avoid that.

Andreas.

Signature · 4 lines
Andreas Schwab, SuSE Labs, [email protected]
SuSE Linux AG, Maxfeldstraße 5, 90409 Nürnberg, Germany
Key fingerprint = 58CA 54C7 6D53 942B 1756  01D3 44D5 214B 8276 4ED5
"And now for something completely different."
#3 lore raw
In reply to Andreas Schwab
Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 1 line · Andreas Schwab

Andreas> I did remove the second check. But there is now an Andreas> additional bundle and I couldn't find any way to avoid Andreas> that.

Yeah, we may have to live with that. It's not really a big deal (in real life performance, it's not going to make any difference) but it sure bugs me... ;-)

	--david
#4 lore raw
In reply to Andreas Schwab
Quoted 1 line
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Quoted 1 line
Quoted 1 line · Andreas Schwab

Andreas> I did remove the second check. But there is now an Andreas> additional bundle and I couldn't find any way to avoid Andreas> that.

I think I'm going to go with the attached patch --- unless you find something wrong with it.

	--david

=== arch/ia64/kernel/fsys.S 1.24 vs edited ==--- 1.24/arch/ia64/kernel/fsys.S Thu May 6 17:46:45 2004
+++ edited/arch/ia64/kernel/fsys.S Wed May 19 16:32:39 2004
@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@
ld8 r31=[r31] // r31 <- current->sighand
#endif
and r9=TIF_ALLWORK_MASK,r9
- tnat.nz p6,p0=r32
+ cmp4.ltu p6,p0=SIG_SETMASK,r32
;;
cmp.ne p7,p0=0,r9
tnat.nz.or p6,p0=r35
@@ -370,6 +370,7 @@
;;
cmp.ne p15,p0=r0,r34 // oset != NULL?
cmp.ne.or p6,p0=_NSIG_WORDS*8,r35
+ tnat.nz.or p6,p0=r32
tnat.nz.or p8,p0=r33

(p6) br.spnt.few .fail_einval // fail with EINVAL
@@ -462,12 +463,10 @@
st4.rel [r31]=r0 // release the lock
#endif
ssm psr.i
- cmp.ne p9,p0=r8,r0 // check for bad HOW value
;;

srlz.d // ensure psr.i is set again
mov r18=0 // i must not leak kernel bits...
-(p9) br.spnt.few .fail_einval // bail out for bad HOW value

.store_mask:
EX(.fail_efault, (p15) probe.w.fault r34, 3) // verify user has write-access to *oset