Skip to contentSkip to conversation

unshare -m should not be a privileged option

DISCUSSION U.Mutlu 2 participants 8 messages Nov 16, 2015 – Nov 17, 2015 Util-Linux package

lore
Share & tools
lore

U.Mutlu

author
#0 lore raw

I'm proposing that "unshare -m" should not be a privileged option, because in practice it is IMO used like this:

unshare -m /bin/bash
now user can do his mounts (mostly via sudo)

The user should need the root permission (or CAP_ADMIN or whatever caps it needs) only for the mount and unmount cmds, but not for "unshare -m".

Therefore the -m option (and maybe even most of the other options) of unshare should be made to work for users, without needing root permission.

Maybe even better would be to define the users in a new conf file /etc/unshare.conf or so.

The other solution via user namespace is IMHO overkill and in my case impractical and irritating because user gets a root-prompt (#) eventhough it is only inside the user namespace.

I like "unshare -m", but it should work also for unprivileged users without needing sudo.

As said in previous postings of mine: "chmod u+s unshare" does what I need, but I don't know if that solution will continue working in newer versions.

...just my .02 cents from the field as admin and user

#1 lore raw
Quoted 1 line · U.Mutlu

I'm proposing that "unshare -m" should not be a privileged option,

what you're asking for is not coming from util-linux. unshare is merely an interface to the unshare() syscall. if you dislike the security semantics there, you can post to the namespace mailing list:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers

Quoted 2 lines

Therefore the -m option (and maybe even most of the other options) of unshare should be made to work for users, without needing root permission.

they do already -- with user namespaces. if you give people the ability to mount anything in the existing mount namespace, you open up attacks:
- create an ext2 fs as the user with some setuid programs
- create a new mount namespace
- mount that image
- instant root

Quoted 3 lines

The other solution via user namespace is IMHO overkill and in my case impractical and irritating because user gets a root-prompt (#) eventhough it is only inside the user namespace.

so remap it to your own user instead of to root

Quoted 1 line

As said in previous postings of mine: "chmod u+s unshare" does what I need,

i would like shell access to your systems please. free root is fun. -mike

author
#2 lore raw

user namespaces: user mapping

Mike Frysinger wrote on 11/16/2015 05:19 AM:

Quoted 7 lines · U.Mutlu
Quoted 4 lines

The other solution via user namespace is IMHO overkill and in my case impractical and irritating because user gets a root-prompt (#) eventhough it is only inside the user namespace.

so remap it to your own user instead of to root

Sorry, I forgot the dangers of mounting into existing mount namespace. Yes, user namespace seems to be the way to go, so I tried the sample from man user_namespaces:

$ ./userns_child_exec -v -p -m -U -z bash
./userns_child_exec: PID of child created by clone() is 2950
ERROR: write /proc/2950/gid_map: Operation not permitted
About to exec bash

Am I on the right track with the above method for user remapping?

It's maybe that under Debian another sysctl-setting is needed for this to work, I'll need to do some research on the net. If someone here knows the solution let me know pls.

author
#3 lore raw

Re: user namespaces: user mapping

U.Mutlu wrote on 11/16/2015 04:43 PM:

Quoted 18 lines

Mike Frysinger wrote on 11/16/2015 05:19 AM:

Quoted 7 lines · U.Mutlu
Quoted 4 lines

The other solution via user namespace is IMHO overkill and in my case impractical and irritating because user gets a root-prompt (#) eventhough it is only inside the user namespace.

so remap it to your own user instead of to root

Sorry, I forgot the dangers of mounting into existing mount namespace. Yes, user namespace seems to be the way to go, so I tried the sample from man user_namespaces:

$ ./userns_child_exec -v -p -m -U -z bash
./userns_child_exec: PID of child created by clone() is 2950
ERROR: write /proc/2950/gid_map: Operation not permitted
About to exec bash
Quoted 5 lines

Am I on the right track with the above method for user remapping?

It's maybe that under Debian another sysctl-setting is needed for this to work, I'll need to do some research on the net. If someone here knows the solution let me know pls.

I did some research on the net, and the findings are:
- user namespaces have their own security holes
- a workaround exists, but then a new problem happens: loop devices cannot
be accessed

Here's the output of a modified (fixed) version of the above pgm, but mount still not working, even with root-prompt inside the namespace:

$ ./userns_child_exec -v -m -U -z bash
uid=1003 gid=1006 pid=7728
./userns_child_exec: PID of child created by clone() is 7729
uid=1003 gid=1006 pid=7729
map_file=/proc/7729/setgroups map_val=deny
map_file=/proc/7729/uid_map map_val=0 1003 1
map_file=/proc/7729/gid_map map_val=0 1006 1
About to exec bash
# mount -o loop ../mount-test/theFile.img mnt
mount: /home/user/tmp/test/mount-test/theFile.img: failed to setup loop device: Permission denied
# ls -l /dev/loop*
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   0 Nov 16 20:01 /dev/loop0
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   1 Nov 16 20:14 /dev/loop1
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   2 Nov 16 15:29 /dev/loop2
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   3 Nov 16 15:29 /dev/loop3
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   4 Nov 16 15:29 /dev/loop4
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   5 Nov 16 15:29 /dev/loop5
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   6 Nov 16 15:29 /dev/loop6
brw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup  7,   7 Nov 16 15:29 /dev/loop7
crw-rw---- 1 nobody nogroup 10, 237 Nov 16 15:29 /dev/loop-control

Does the user need to create his own loop device(s)?

Hmm. it looks like there is (currently?) a big mess with user namespaces:
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=457362

#4 lore raw

Re: user namespaces: user mapping

Quoted 2 lines · U.Mutlu

I did some research on the net, and the findings are:
- user namespaces have their own security holes

there are no known security issues. like all new code, there were some edge cases in the original implementation, but they've been fixed since. the only thing left is that people don't like the new attack surface and inherently distrust it. but that's not the same thing as there being known security holes.

Quoted 2 lines

- a workaround exists, but then a new problem happens: loop devices cannot
be accessed

loop devices are merely files which are owned by the root user. not being able to open files owned by the "real" root is to be expected.

Quoted 1 line

Does the user need to create his own loop device(s)?

you need to have the system/root chown them as the user before doing anything else. sucks, but that's currently how it works. would be nice if someone looked into making it more accessible to users. maybe others on this list are aware of ongoing work.

Quoted 2 lines

Hmm. it looks like there is (currently?) a big mess with user namespaces:
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=457362

no, no there is not
-mike

author
#5 lore raw

Re: user namespaces: user mapping

Mike Frysinger wrote on 11/17/2015 05:32 AM:

Quoted 8 lines · U.Mutlu
Quoted 2 lines

I did some research on the net, and the findings are:
- user namespaces have their own security holes

there are no known security issues. like all new code, there were some edge cases in the original implementation, but they've been fixed since. the only thing left is that people don't like the new attack surface and inherently distrust it. but that's not the same thing as there being known security holes.

see below

Quoted 10 lines
Quoted 2 lines

- a workaround exists, but then a new problem happens: loop devices cannot
be accessed

loop devices are merely files which are owned by the root user. not being able to open files owned by the "real" root is to be expected.

Quoted 1 line

Does the user need to create his own loop device(s)?

you need to have the system/root chown them as the user before doing anything else. sucks, but that's currently how it works.

Come on, what about the other users and the system itself, as they need them too...

Quoted 8 lines

would be nice if someone
looked into making it more accessible to users. maybe others on this list are aware of ongoing work.

Quoted 2 lines

Hmm. it looks like there is (currently?) a big mess with user namespaces:
https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=457362

no, no there is not

This is an excerpt from a recent posting (Oct-17) in the containers newsgroup you posted the link here ( http://lists.linuxfoundation.org/pipermail/containers/2015-October/036333.html ), cite:

|>>> Linux 3.8 saw the introduction of unpriviledged user namespaces,
|>>> allowing unpriviledged users (without CAP_SYS_ADMIN) to be a "fake" root
|>>> inside a separate user namespace. Before that, any namespace creation
|>>> required CAP_SYS_ADMIN (or, in practice, the user had to be root).
|>>> Unfortunately, there have been some security-relevant bugs in the
|>>> meantime. Because of the fairly complex nature of user namespaces, it is
|>>> reasonable to say that future vulnerabilties can not be excluded. Some
|>>> distributions even wholly disable user namespaces because of this.

user namespaces is not mature yet.

#6 lore raw

Re: user namespaces: user mapping

this really isn't the place for logical fallacies. it is impossible to prove any code is entirely bug free (let's ignore the theoretical proof based systems as they're entirely irrelevant to this discussion). if you have any actual bugs to report, then do so. otherwise, you're wasting everyone's time.

i think we've all been pretty clear that making unshare, as-is, setuid is completely wrong and, frankly, stupid. it's trivial to leverage privilege escalation after that point.

as for enhancing unshare to be aware that it's setuid and thus drop root back once it's done making the unshare calls, i don't see the point. user namespaces work already and don't require setuid and are widely available. if you don't like userns, that's your choice, but not our problem.
-mike

author
#7 lore raw
In reply to Mike Frysinger

Mike Frysinger wrote on 11/16/2015 05:19 AM:

Quoted 11 lines · U.Mutlu
Quoted 1 line

I'm proposing that "unshare -m" should not be a privileged option,

what you're asking for is not coming from util-linux. unshare is merely an interface to the unshare() syscall. if you dislike the security semantics there, you can post to the namespace mailing list:
https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/containers

Quoted 2 lines

Therefore the -m option (and maybe even most of the other options) of unshare should be made to work for users, without needing root permission.

Quoted 6 lines

they do already -- with user namespaces. if you give people the ability to mount anything in the existing mount namespace, you open up attacks:
- create an ext2 fs as the user with some setuid programs
- create a new mount namespace
- mount that image
- instant root

I think there is a 'misunderstanding': it happens earlier, ie. when doing "unshare -m bash" then you already become root in the new shell. It has nothing to do with ext2 or the mount.

As I already said: solution to this problem is:
chmod u+s unshare
and starting the unshare cmd unpriviledged (ie. as user) and directly (ie. not via sudo).

But the bind-mount danger (vuln) still remains.