Prevent buffer overflow in OSS load_mixer_volumes
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Takashi Iwai
AppliedAt Sat, 25 Dec 2010 16:23:40 -0500,
Quoted 11 lines · Dan Rosenberg
The
load_mixer_volumes()function, which can be triggered by unprivileged users via theSOUND_MIXER_SETLEVELSioctl, is vulnerable to a buffer overflow. Because the provided "name" argument isn't guaranteed to be NULL terminated at the expected 32 bytes, it's possible to overflow past the end of the last element in themixer_volsarray. Further exploitation can result in an arbitrary kernel write (via subsequent calls toload_mixer_volumes()) leading to privilege escalation, or arbitrary kernel reads viaget_mixer_levels(). In addition, thestrcmp()may leak bytes beyond themixer_volsarray.
Quoted 2 lines
Signed-off-by Dan Rosenberg <[email protected]>Cc stable <[email protected]>
Thanks, applied now to sound git tree.
I'll send a pull request to Linus today.
Takashi
Quoted 28 lines
--- sound/oss/soundcard.c | 4 ++-- 1 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)sound/oss/soundcard.c +2
-2@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present)int i, n;for (i =0 ; i < num_mixer_volumes; i++) { -if (strcmp (name, mixer_vols[i].name) ==0 ) { +if (strncmp (name, mixer_vols[i].name,32 ) ==0 ) {if (present) mixer_vols[i].num = i;return mixer_vols[i].levels;@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int *load_mixer_volumes(char *name, int *levels, int present) } n = num_mixer_volumes++; -strcpy (mixer_vols[n].name, name); +strncpy (mixer_vols[n].name, name,32 );if (present) mixer_vols[n].num = n;