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ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability

PATCH Applied Gustavo A. R. Silva 2 participants 2 messages Mar 20, 2019 – Mar 21, 2019 Sound

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PATCH 1/1 ALSA: rawmidi: Fix potential Spectre v1 vulnerability

info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index rmidi->streams.

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

---
 sound/core/rawmidi.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
sound/core/rawmidi.c +2 -0
index ee601d7f0926..c0690d1ecd55 100644
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include <linux/module.h>
 #include <linux/delay.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/nospec.h>
 #include <sound/rawmidi.h>
 #include <sound/info.h>
 #include <sound/control.h>
@@ -601,6 +602,7 @@ static int __snd_rawmidi_info_select(struct snd_card *card,
 		return -ENXIO;
 	if (info->stream < 0 || info->stream > 1)
 		return -EINVAL;
+	info->stream = array_index_nospec(info->stream, 2);
 	pstr = &rmidi->streams[info->stream];
 	if (pstr->substream_count == 0)
 		return -ENOENT;
Signature · 1 line
2.21.0
Applied
#1 lore raw
Quoted 11 lines · Gustavo A. R. Silva

info->stream is indirectly controlled by user-space, hence leading to a potential exploitation of the Spectre variant 1 vulnerability.

This issue was detected with the help of Smatch:

sound/core/rawmidi.c:604 __snd_rawmidi_info_select() warn: potential spectre issue 'rmidi->streams' [r] (local cap)

Fix this by sanitizing info->stream before using it to index rmidi->streams.

Quoted 8 lines

Notice that given that speculation windows are large, the policy is to kill the speculation on the first load and not worry if it can be completed with a dependent load/store [1].

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/

Applied, thanks.

Takashi