x86/mm/fault: Allow stack access below %rsp
PATCH v2 1/1 x86/mm/fault: Allow stack access below %rsp
The current x86 page fault handler allows stack access below the stack pointer if it is no more than 64k+256 bytes. Any access beyond the 64k+ limit will cause a segmentation fault.
The gcc -fstack-check option generates code to probe the stack for large stack allocation to see if the stack is accessible. The newer gcc does that while updating the %rsp simultaneously. Older gcc's like gcc4 doesn't do that. As a result, an application compiled with an old gcc and the -fstack-check option may fail to start at all.
% cat test.c
int main() {
char tmp[1024*128];
printf("### ok\n");
return 0;
}% gcc -fstack-check -g -o test test.c
% ./test
Segmentation fault
The old binary was working in older kernels where expand_stack() was somehow called before the check. But it is not working in newer kernels. Besides, the 64k+ limit check is kind of crude and will not catch a lot of mistakes that userspace applications may be misbehaving anyway. I think the kernel isn't the right place for this kind of tests. We should leave it to userspace instrumentation tools to perform them.
The 64k+ limit check is now removed to just let expand_stack() decide if a segmentation fault should happen, when the RLIMIT_STACK limit is exceeded, for example.
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +0 -12
@@ -1380,18 +1380,6 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address);return ; } -if (sw_error_code &X86_PF_USER ) { -/* -* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug. -* The large cushion allows instructions like enter -* and pusha to work. ("enter $65535, $31" pushes -* 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.) -*/ -if (unlikely (address +65536 +32 *sizeof (unsigned long ) < regs->sp)) { -bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address); -return ; - } - }if (unlikely (expand_stack (vma, address))) {bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address);return ;
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1
Quoted 49 lines · Waiman Long
The current x86 page fault handler allows stack access below the stack pointer if it is no more than 64k+256 bytes. Any access beyond the 64k+ limit will cause a segmentation fault.
The gcc -fstack-check option generates code to probe the stack for large stack allocation to see if the stack is accessible. The newer gcc does that while updating the %rsp simultaneously. Older gcc's like gcc4 doesn't do that. As a result, an application compiled with an old gcc and the -fstack-check option may fail to start at all.
% cat
test.cint main() { char tmp[1024*128]; printf("### ok\n"); return 0; }% gcc -fstack-check -g -o test
test.c
% ./test
Segmentation faultThe old binary was working in older kernels where
expand_stack()was somehow called before the check. But it is not working in newer kernels. Besides, the 64k+ limit check is kind of crude and will not catch a lot of mistakes that userspace applications may be misbehaving anyway. I think the kernel isn't the right place for this kind of tests. We should leave it to userspace instrumentation tools to perform them.The 64k+ limit check is now removed to just let
expand_stack()decide if a segmentation fault should happen, when theRLIMIT_STACKlimit is exceeded, for example.Signed-off-by Waiman Long <[email protected]>--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)arch/x86/mm/fault.c +0
-5@@ -1380,18 +1380,6 @@ void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs,bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address);return ; } -if (sw_error_code &X86_PF_USER ) { -/* -* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug. -* The large cushion allows instructions like enter -* and pusha to work. ("enter $65535, $31" pushes
arch/x86/mm/fault.c void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, · line 1385
Quoted 10 lines
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +0
-7-* 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.) -*/ -if (unlikely (address +65536 +32 *sizeof (unsigned long ) < regs->sp)) { -bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address); -return ; - } - }if (unlikely (expand_stack (vma, address))) {bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address);return ;
This v2 patch has no code change. I just updated the commit log to capture some of the conversion that I had with the reviewers.
Cheers,
Longman
tip-bot for Waiman Long
merge botx86/mm/fault: Allow stack access below %rsp
Commit-ID: 1d8ca3be86ebc6a38dad8236f45c7a9c61681e78 Gitweb: https://git.kernel.org/tip/1d8ca3be86ebc6a38dad8236f45c7a9c61681e78 Author: Waiman Long <[email protected]> AuthorDate: Tue, 6 Nov 2018 15:12:29 -0500 Committer: Ingo Molnar <[email protected]> CommitDate: Mon, 12 Nov 2018 11:06:19 +0100
x86/mm/fault: Allow stack access below %rsp
The current x86 page fault handler allows stack access below the stack pointer if it is no more than 64k+256 bytes. Any access beyond the 64k+ limit will cause a segmentation fault.
The gcc -fstack-check option generates code to probe the stack for large stack allocation to see if the stack is accessible. The newer gcc does that while updating the %rsp simultaneously. Older gcc's like gcc4 doesn't do that. As a result, an application compiled with an old gcc and the -fstack-check option may fail to start at all:
$ cat test.c
int main() {
char tmp[1024*128];
printf("### ok\n");
return 0;
}$ gcc -fstack-check -g -o test test.c
$ ./test Segmentation fault
The old binary was working in older kernels where expand_stack() was somehow called before the check. But it is not working in newer kernels. Besides, the 64k+ limit check is kind of crude and will not catch a lot of mistakes that userspace applications may be misbehaving anyway. I think the kernel isn't the right place for this kind of tests. We should leave it to userspace instrumentation tools to perform them.
The 64k+ limit check is now removed to just let expand_stack() decide if a segmentation fault should happen, when the RLIMIT_STACK limit is exceeded, for example.
--- arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 12 ------------ 1 file changed, 12 deletions(-)
arch/x86/mm/fault.c +0 -12
@@ -1380,18 +1380,6 @@ retry:bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address);return ; } -if (sw_error_code &X86_PF_USER ) { -/* -* Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug. -* The large cushion allows instructions like enter -* and pusha to work. ("enter $65535, $31" pushes -* 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.) -*/ -if (unlikely (address +65536 +32 *sizeof (unsigned long ) < regs->sp)) { -bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address); -return ; - } - }if (unlikely (expand_stack (vma, address))) {bad_area (regs, sw_error_code, address);return ;