io_uring: don't audit the capability check in io_uring_create()
Subsystems (3)
PATCH 1/1 io_uring: don't audit the capability check in io_uring_create()
The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
Since not having the capability merely means that the created io_uring context will be accounted against the current user's RLIMIT_MEMLOCK limit, we can disable auditing of denials for this check by using ns_capable_noaudit() instead of capable().
--- io_uring/io_uring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
io_uring/io_uring.c +1 -1
@@ -3870,7 +3870,7 @@ static __cold int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p, ctx->syscall_iopoll =1 ; ctx->compat =in_compat_syscall (); -if (!capable (CAP_IPC_LOCK )) +if (!ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns,CAP_IPC_LOCK )) ctx->user =get_uid (current_user ());/*
Signature · 1 line
2.41.0
Hi, Ondrej,
Quoted 10 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
Since not having the capability merely means that the created
io_uringcontext will be accounted against the current user'sRLIMIT_MEMLOCKlimit, we can disable auditing of denials for this check by usingns_capable_noaudit()instead ofcapable().
Could you add a comment, or add some documentation to ns_capable_noaudit() about when it should be used? It wasn't apparent to me, at least, before this explanation.
Quoted 12 lines
Fixes 2b188cc1bb85 ("Add io_uring IO interface")Signed-off-by Ondrej Mosnacek <[email protected]>--- io_uring/io_uring.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)io_uring/io_uring.c +0
-0
io_uring/io_uring.c static __cold int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p, · line 3876
Quoted 8 lines
io_uring/io_uring.c +1
-1@@ -3870,7 +3870,7 @@ static __cold int io_uring_create(unsigned entries, struct io_uring_params *p, ctx->syscall_iopoll =1 ; ctx->compat =in_compat_syscall (); -if (!capable (CAP_IPC_LOCK )) +if (!ns_capable_noaudit (&init_user_ns,CAP_IPC_LOCK )) ctx->user =get_uid (current_user ());/*
Quoted 11 lines · Jeff Moyer
Hi, Ondrej,
Quoted 6 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
Quoted 8 lines
Quoted 4 lines
Since not having the capability merely means that the created
io_uringcontext will be accounted against the current user'sRLIMIT_MEMLOCKlimit, we can disable auditing of denials for this check by usingns_capable_noaudit()instead ofcapable().Could you add a comment, or add some documentation to
ns_capable_noaudit()about when it should be used? It wasn't apparent to me, at least, before this explanation.
This has been requested before, so I finally forced myself to look into it and only now I realized that there is a subtle difference between the has_capability and capable helpers. As the docstrings say, the former doesn't set the PF_SUPERPRIV on the task when the check succeeds, while the latter does. The problem is that I don't know what the exact implications are and thus I'm not able to document which helper should be used in what situation... It is possible some of the existing call sites use the wrong helper in the noaudit case (possibly including ones that I added/suggested).
The comment at its declaration says "Used super-user privileges" and it seems to be used only to propagate into the ASU flag in task accounting information. But in the case of capability checks that do not fail the syscall it is not easy to tell if "super-user privileges" were "used" or not (or, rather, whether the task should be accounted as such or not after a successful check).
If anyone is reading this and has a better understanding of the PF_SUPERPRIV flag semantics, I'd be thankful for a clarification so that we can sort out this mess :)
--
Ondrej Mosnacek
Senior Software Engineer, Linux Security - SELinux kernel Red Hat, Inc.
Quoted 6 lines · Ondrej Mosnacek
The check being unconditional may lead to unwanted denials reported by LSMs when a process has the capability granted by DAC, but denied by an LSM. In the case of SELinux such denials are a problem, since they can't be effectively filtered out via the policy and when not silenced, they produce noise that may hide a true problem or an attack.
Quoted 6 lines
Since not having the capability merely means that the created
io_uringcontext will be accounted against the current user'sRLIMIT_MEMLOCKlimit, we can disable auditing of denials for this check by usingns_capable_noaudit()instead ofcapable().[...]
Applied, thanks!
[1/1] io_uring: don't audit the capability check in io_uring_create()
commit: 6adc2272aaaf84f34b652cf77f770c6fcc4b8336
Best regards,
Signature · 1 line
Jens Axboe