Mitigations against spectre-v1 in the arm64 Linux kernel
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- v1 Latest9 patches 0 repliesNew
Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/9 | arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value predictionarch/ arch/ | +8 | 0 replies | |
| 2/9 | arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec()arch/ | +21 | 0 replies | |
| 3/9 | arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limitarch/ arch/ arch/ +1 more | +33 | 0 replies | |
| 4/9 | arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculationarch/ | +23 | 0 replies | |
| 5/9 | arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculationarch/ arch/ | +13 | 0 replies | |
| 6/9 | arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limitarch/ | +7 | 0 replies | |
| 7/9 | arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_userarch/ | +32 | 0 replies | |
| 8/9 | arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_userarch/ arch/ arch/ +1 more | +30 | 0 replies | |
| 9/9 | arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereferencearch/ | +6 | 0 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
5 of 9 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.
| Patch | Mark Rutland | Robin Murphy |
|---|---|---|
| 1/9 | R-b | |
| 2/9 | R-b | |
| 3/9 | ||
| 4/9 | ||
| 5/9 | R-b | |
| 6/9 | R-b | |
| 7/9 | R-b | |
| 8/9 | ||
| 9/9 |
Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.
Cover letter [PATCH 0/9] Mitigations against spectre-v1 in the arm64 Linux kernel
Hi all,
This series implements some mitigations against spectre-v1 for arm64. It broadly follows the work that has been done for x86, by implementing:
* A back-end version of array_index_mask_nospec() to suppress any compiler optimisations that could introduce unwanted speculative paths
* Masking of the syscall number to restrict speculation through the syscall table
* Masking of __user pointers prior to deference in uaccess routines
The latter introduces complications in access_ok and set_fs which are also handled in this series.
Cheers,
Will
--->8
Robin Murphy (3):
arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec()
arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit
arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation
Will Deacon (6):
arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction
arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under
speculation
arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit
arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in
__{get,put}_user arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user
arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference
arch/arm64/include/asm/assembler.h | 18 +++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/barrier.h | 22 ++++++ arch/arm64/include/asm/futex.h | 9 ++- arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 3 + arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 155 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------------ arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 +- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 6 +- arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 5 +- arch/arm64/mm/fault.c | 4 +- 10 files changed, 170 insertions(+), 62 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
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