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eCryptfs version 0.1

Phillip Hellewell linux-fsdevel lkml 1 version In review

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  1. v1 Latest12 patches 29 repliesIn review

Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/12Makefile and Kconfig/fs/Kconfig /fs/Makefile+11 -07 replies
2/12DocumentationDocumentation/ecryptfs.txt+55 -00 replies
3/12Makefilefs/ecryptfs/Makefile+7 -00 replies
4/12Main module functionsfs/ecryptfs/main.c+973 -06 replies
5/12Header declarationsfs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h+523 -01 reply
6/12Superblock operationsfs/ecryptfs/super.c+246 -01 reply
7/12File operationsfs/ecryptfs/file.c+708 -01 reply
8/12Dentry operationsfs/ecryptfs/dentry.c+110 -00 replies
9/12Inode operationsfs/ecryptfs/inode.c+1492 -03 replies
10/12Mmap operationsfs/ecryptfs/mmap.c+1045 -02 replies
11/12Keystorefs/ecryptfs/keystore.c+860 -03 replies
12/12Crypto functionsfs/ecryptfs/crypto.c+822 -05 replies

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Cover letter [PATCH 0/12: eCryptfs] eCryptfs version 0.1

This set of patches constitutes eCryptfs version 0.1. We are presenting it to be reviewed and considered for inclusion into the kernel.

eCryptfs is a stackable filesystem that is based off of the Cryptfs that is generated by the FiST stackable filesystem framework written by Erez Zadok:

http://filesystems.org/

eCryptfs stores cryptographic metadata in the headers of each file; the headers contain OpenPGP-like packets (see RFC 2440). This allows the encrypted underlying files to be copied between hosts, and all of the information necessary to decrypt the files stays with the files themselves. eCryptfs aims to make the encryption and the decryption of each individual file completely transparent to userspace applications, so long as the recipient has the requisite key or passphrase to access the file available.

Michael Halcrow presented eCryptfs at the 2004 and the 2005 Ottawa Linux Symposiums; the high-level overview from this year's symposium starts on page 209 of the first half of the symposium proceedings:

http://www.linuxsymposium.org/2005/linuxsymposium_procv1.pdf

Note that this set of patches contains a considerably trimmed-down version of eCryptfs than what was sent to the LKML earlier this year. Release 0.1 includes mount-wide passphrase support only; this will make eCryptfs easier to analyze and debug before the more advanced policy and public key features are merged in.

eCryptfs performs well under a variety of tests, including FSX and Connectathon (Basic and General functional). There is a bug that crops up on a kernel compile. We would appreciate any insight that the VFS guru's could give us in tracking down and fixing any extant bugs.

eCryptfs utilizes David Howells' keyring; at mount, eCryptfs version 0.1 expects an existing authentication token in the user's session keyring. The tarball containing the code to do this is available from the eCryptfs SourceForge site (ecryptfs-v0_1.tar.bz2):

http://sourceforge.net/projects/ecryptfs/

Future releases will have policy support, which will entail per-file passphrase and per-file public key support. Those who are interested in looking at that code are welcome to obtain it from the eCryptfs CVS repository on SourceForge:

cvs -d:pserver:[email protected]:/cvsroot/ecryptfs login cvs -z3 -d:pserver:[email protected]:/cvsroot/ecryptfs \
co -P ecryptfs

Phillip