Permit filesystem local caching and NFS superblock sharing
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- v1 Latest17 of 19 patches 36 repliesIn review
17 of 19 patches are in this archive. The cover letter announces 19.
Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2/19 | FS-Cache: Provide a filesystem-specific sync'able page bitfs/ fs/ fs/ +8 more | +59 | 0 replies | |
| 3/19 | FS-Cache: Release page->private after failed readaheadmm/ | +38 | 0 replies | |
| 4/19 | FS-Cache: Make kAFS use FS-Cachefs/ fs/ fs/ +16 more | +673 | 0 replies | |
| 5/19 | NFS: Use local cachingfs/ fs/ fs/ +14 more | +1029 | 6 replies | |
| 6/19 | FS-Cache: NFS: Only obtain cache cookies on file open, not on inode readfs/ fs/ include/ | +40 | 1 reply | |
| 7/19 | CacheFiles: Add missing copy_page export for ia64arch/ | +1 | 0 replies | |
| 8/19 | CacheFiles: Add a function to write a single page of data to an inodeinclude/ mm/ | +89 | 0 replies | |
| 9/19 | CacheFiles: Permit the page lock state to be monitoredinclude/ mm/ | +24 | 0 replies | |
| 10/19 | CacheFiles: Export things for CacheFilesfs/ fs/ kernel/ | +5 | 0 replies | |
| 12/19 | CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overriddeninclude/ security/ security/ | +65 | 15 replies | |
| 13/19 | CacheFiles: Add an act-as SID override in task_security_structinclude/ security/ security/ +4 more | +148 | 0 replies | |
| 14/19 | CacheFiles: Permit an inode's security ID to be obtainedinclude/ security/ security/ | +27 | 0 replies | |
| 15/19 | CacheFiles: Get the SID under which the CacheFiles module should operateinclude/ security/ security/ | +34 | 0 replies | |
| 16/19 | CacheFiles: Deal with LSM when accessing the cacheDocumentation/ fs/ fs/ +5 more | +304 | 1 reply | |
| 17/19 | CacheFiles: Use the VFS wrappers for inode opsfs/ fs/ fs/ +2 more | +31 | 0 replies | |
| 18/19 | CacheFiles: Use VFS lookup servicesfs/ | +34 | 0 replies | |
| 19/19 | CacheFiles: Permit daemon to probe inuseness of a cache filefs/ fs/ fs/ | +246 | 2 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
No Reviewed-by, Acked-by or Tested-by trailers for v1 yet.
Cover letter [PATCH 00/19] Permit filesystem local caching and NFS superblock sharing
These patches add local caching for network filesystems such as NFS and AFS.
I've addressed all but one of Christoph's objections. The one objection I haven't yet dealt with is the addition of a new operation for writing a page of the file, but that's controversial, and I'd like feedback on what I've done so far.
The main thing that I've dealt with is the security issue in CacheFiles:
CacheFiles now calls the VFS wrappers for invoking filesystem operations, such as vfs_mkdir(). It does not call any of the inode operations directly anymore.
This means, however, that it has to deal with SELinux, especially when in enforcing mode.
The cachefilesd RPM installs a policy for labelling and accessing the files in the cache, and for providing a security ID for the cachefilesd daemon to run as. It _also_ provides a security ID for the cachefiles module to act as when it is accessing the filesystem on behalf of the process.
The way this is done is that one of the patches:
CacheFiles: Add an act-as SID override in task_security_struct
permits the module to temporarily change the security ID as which a process _acts_. It does _not_ change the process's actual security ID, and so does not interfere with signals, ptraces, /proc/pid/ accesses aimed at that process.
Furthermore, following consultations with Stephen Smalley and others of the SELinux project, it was deemed correct to override fsuid and fsgid of the host process whilst accessing the cache, so these are also modified temporarily by the module during such accesses.
Finally, the file creation SID is also temporarily overridden whilst the module accesses the cache.
All this permits the ownership and accessibility of files in the cache to preclude ordinary access by all processes running on the system, with the exception of cachefilesd. When SELinux is in enforcing mode, the daemon may not read or write the files in the cache according to the policy.
Thanks to Dan Walsh and Karl MacMillan for helping me get the SELinux policy working. There is documentation on this in the patches and in the cachefilesd SRPM/tarball.
Additionally, sysctls are no longer used. Some parameters are modifiable via sysfs. CacheFiles parameters pertaining to the cache are still only modifiable by sending commands to the module over its control interface, though the control interface is now a character device (following GregKH's suggestion).
---
The kernel patches are committed to a GIT tree based on Linus's:
git://git.infradead.org/users/dhowells/fscache-2.6.git
Which can be viewed through:
http://git.infradead.org/?p=users/dhowells/fscache-2.6.git;a=summary
A tarball of patches is available at:
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/patches/nfs+fscache-19.tar.bz2
To use this version of CacheFiles, the cachefilesd-0.8 is also required. It is available as an SRPM:
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/cachefilesd-0.8-15.fc7.src.rpm
Or as individual bits:
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/cachefilesd-0.8.tar.bz2
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/cachefilesd.fc
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/cachefilesd.if
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/cachefilesd.te
http://people.redhat.com/~dhowells/fscache/cachefilesd.spec
David
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