RFC stricter MLS policy constraints
Get series with b4
b4 am [email protected]Versions newest first
- v1 RFC Latest2 patches 9 repliesIn review
Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | stricter MLS policy constraintspolicy/ policy/ policy/ +1 more | +9 | 2 replies | |
| 2/2 | stricter MLS policy constraintspolicy/ policy/ | +11 | 0 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
No Reviewed-by, Acked-by or Tested-by trailers for v1 yet.
Cover letter [PATCH RFC 0/2] stricter MLS policy constraints
Hello,
this is a followup to a previous discussion about the MLS constraints in the reference policy:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=116327030930738&w=2
Darrel Goeddel's explained that these MLS constraints are based on "ranged objects" for container objects such as directories, and for sockets, allowing writes if the subject low level is within the object's low-high range:
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=116414826605626&w=2
These ranged objects unfortunately violate the Bell-LaPadula rules, and can lead to information leaks. For example, a low subject may be able to see names created in a ranged directory by a higher subject. Such ranged directories should not be needed thanks to polyinstantiation.
The following patches attempt to get the system closer to the Bell-LaPadula model expressed in the LSPP by permitting only "write equal" for unprivileged subjects. The old behavior is still available by giving attributes to the subjects that need it. (LSPP accepts privileged programs that can override the information flow rules, so these attributes can be given fairly liberally, but the default user types must not have them.)
Patch 1: Rename the "mlsfilewriteinrange" attribute with no functional changes. The reason for the renaming is that this is an object attribute (like "mlstrustedobject"), and it's confusing to use the naming scheme usually used for subject attributes for it. It's currently only used for the printer device object.
Patch 2: For untrusted subjects, permit write operations on ranged objects only when the subject effective level equals the object low level. Introduce new subject attributes "mlsfilewriteranged" and "mlsnetwriteranged" that give these privileged subjects the right to use the old ranged-write behavior.
I haven't prepared a patch yet to provide interfaces for setting the new attributes - that's easy to do once we've identified subjects that need these privileges.
The patches are very lightly tested (the policy builds, and permits unlabeled ssh login in enforcing mode) -- can the people doing labeled networking tests please test it?
-Klaus
--
This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to [email protected] with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.