/proc/kmsg permissions, take three
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- v1 Latest4 patches 5 repliesIn review
Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/4 | Add <linux/klog.h>fs/ include/ include/ +1 more | +47 | 2 replies | |
| 2/4 | permission mapping for sys_syslog operationsinclude/ kernel/ security/ +2 more | +45 | 3 replies | |
| 3/4 | Refactor do_syslog interfacefs/ include/ kernel/ | +139 | 0 replies | |
| 4/4 | Distinguish /proc/kmsg access from sys_syslogfs/ include/ security/ +1 more | +20 | 0 replies |
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Cover letter [patch 0/4] /proc/kmsg permissions, take three
Here's a re-revised version of my patch set to allow klogd to drop privileges and continue reading from /proc/kmsg (currently, even if klogd has a legitimately opened fd on /proc/kmsg, it cannot read from it unless it has CAP_SYS_ADMIN asserted). SELinux's pickier and finer-grained privilege rules for /proc/kmsg are unchanged.
The major change from the previous patchset
[q.v. http://comments.gmane.org/gmane.linux.kernel/466034 ] is that, as Arjan van de Ven requested, the new header linux/klog.h contains only userspace-visible definitions (the constants for sys_syslog()). Thanks to Alexey Dobriyan for telling me the proper place to put the KLOGSEC_* constants (now renamed LSM_KLOG_* in keeping with other such constants). They have also been rediffed versus yesterday's git. They should be applied in sequence; each step compiles, and the complete set has been booted and tested to work as intended.
Any comments, as usual, appreciated. I would very much like to see this in 2.6.20.
zw