efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs
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- v1 Latest2 patches 46 repliesIn review
Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissionsfs/ | +2 | 35 replies | |
| 2/2 | efi: restrict top-level attribute permissionsdrivers/ | +6 | 0 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
1 of 2 patches has a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.
| Patch | Andy Lutomirski | Ard Biesheuvel |
|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | A-b | A-b |
| 2/2 |
Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.
Cover letter [PATCH 0/2] efivars: reading variables can generate SMIs
From: Joe Konno <[email protected]>
It was pointed out that normal, unprivileged users reading certain EFI variables (through efivarfs) can generate SMIs. Given these nodes are created with 0644 permissions, normal users could generate a lot of SMIs. By restricting permissions a bit (patch 1), we can make it harder for normal users to generate spurious SMIs.
A normal user could generate lots of SMIs by reading the efivarfs in a trivial loop:
```
while true; do
cat /sys/firmware/efi/evivars/* > /dev/null
done
```Patch 1 in this series limits read and write permissions on efivarfs to the owner/superuser. Group and world cannot access.
Patch 2 is for consistency and hygiene. If we restrict permissions for either efivarfs or efi/vars, the other interface should get the same treatment.
Joe Konno (2):
fs/efivarfs: restrict inode permissions
efi: restrict top-level attribute permissions
drivers/firmware/efi/efi.c | 10 ++++++---- fs/efivarfs/super.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.14.1