RFC Allow tasks to have their user stack pointer sanity checked
Get series with b4
b4 am [email protected]Versions newest first
- v1 RFC Latest4 patches 2 repliesIn review
Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/4 | mm: Check user stack pointer is mapped with MAP_STACKinclude/ include/ include/ +1 more | +60 | 0 replies | |
| 2/4 | mm: Expose user stack pointer checking via prctl()include/ include/ kernel/ +1 more | +37 | 0 replies | |
| 3/4 | mm: Add kconfig entries for user stack pointer checkingmm/ | +17 | 0 replies | |
| 4/4 | arm64: Check user stack pointer on syscall entryarch/ arch/ | +5 | 0 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
None of the 4 patches has a Reviewed-by or Acked-by of their own; the series has one for all of them.
| Patch | Kees Cook |
|---|---|
| Series | R-b |
| 1/4 | |
| 2/4 | |
| 3/4 | |
| 4/4 |
Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.
Cover letter [RFC PATCH 0/4] Allow tasks to have their user stack pointer sanity checked
Hi all,
I attended an interesting talk at LCA last month that described some of the security features deployed in OpenBSD [1]. One hardening feature that piqued my interest was, on syscall entry and page faults from userspace, checking that the user stack pointer for a task points at pages that were either allocated by the kernel for the initial process stack of mapped with mmap() using the MAP_STACK flag. This acts as a basic defense against stack pivoting attacks.
The problem with this checking is that it is a retrospective tightening of the ABI, but that hasn't stopped me hacking it together behind a couple of prctl() options.
Anyway, it was fun to implement so I figured I'd post it as an RFC.
Will
[1] https://2019.linux.conf.au/schedule/presentation/164/
--->8
Will Deacon (4):
mm: Check user stack pointer is mapped with MAP_STACK
mm: Expose user stack pointer checking via prctl()
mm: Add kconfig entries for user stack pointer checking
arm64: Check user stack pointer on syscall entry
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c | 4 +++ include/linux/mm.h | 15 +++++++++- include/linux/mman.h | 3 +- include/linux/sched.h | 4 +++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 5 ++++ kernel/sys.c | 5 ++++ mm/Kconfig | 17 ++++++++++++ mm/memory.c | 67 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 9 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.11.0