arm: cache: cp15: don't map reserved region with no-map property
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Cover letter [Uboot-stm32] [PATCH 0/7] arm: cache: cp15: don't map reserved region with no-map property
Quoted 132 lines · Patrick DELAUNAY
Hi Ard,
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From: Ard Biesheuvel <[email protected]>
Sent: mercredi 7 octobre 2020 15:16Quoted 10 lines · Ahmad Fatoum
Hello,
Quoted 3 lines · Ahmad Fatoum
My findings[1] back then were that U-Boot did set the eXecute Never bit only on OMAP, but not for other platforms. So I could imagine this being the root cause of Patrick's issues as well:
Rereading my own link, my memory is a little less fuzzy: eXecute Never was being set, but was without effect due Manager mode being set in the
DACR:
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The ARM Architecture Reference Manual notes[1]:
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When using the Short-descriptor translation table format, the XN attribute is not checked for domains marked as Manager. Therefore, the system must not include read-sensitive memory in domains marked as Manager, because the XN bit does not prevent speculative fetches from a Manager domain.
To avoid speculative access to read-sensitive memory-mapped peripherals on ARMv7, we'll need U-Boot to use client domain permissions, so the XN bit can function.
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This issue has come up before and was fixed in
de63ac278("ARM: mmu: Set domain permissions to client access") for OMAP2 only. It's equally applicable to all ARMv7-A platforms where caches are enabled.
[1]: B3.7.2 - Execute-never restrictions on instruction fetchingHope this helps,
AhmadIt most definitely does, thanks a lot.
U-boot's
mmu_setup()currently sets DACR to manager for all domains, so this is broken for all non-LPAE configurations running on v7 CPUs (except OMAP and perhaps others that fixed it individually). This affects all device mappings: not just secure DRAM for OP-TEE, but any MMIO register for any peripheral that is mapped into the CPU's address space.Patrick, could you please check whether this fixes the issue as well?
arch/arm/lib/cache-cp15.c static inline void mmu_setup(void) · line 209
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arch/arm/lib/cache-cp15.c +3
-2@@ -202,9 +202,9 @@ static inline void mmu_setup(void) asmvolatile ("mcr p15, 0, %0, c2, c0, 0" : :"r" (gd->arch.tlb_addr) :"memory" );#endif -/* Set the access control to all-supervisor */ +/* Set the access control to client (0b01) for each of the 16 +domains */ asmvolatile ("mcr p15, 0, %0, c3, c0, 0" - : :"r" (~0 )); + : :"r" (0x55555555 ));arm_init_domains ();The test will take some time to be sure that solve my remaining issue because issue is not always reproductible.
At fist chek, I wasn't sure of DACR bahavior, but I found in [1] the line :
The XN attribute is not checked for domains marked as Manager. Read-sensitive memory must not be included in domains marked as Manager, because the XN bit does not prevent prefetches in these cases.
So, I need to test your patch +
DCACHE_OFFinstead of INVALID (to map with XN the OP-TEE region) in my patchset.FYI: I found the same DACR configuration is done in:
arch/arm/cpu/armv7/ls102xa/cpu.c:199Patrick
For information:
At the beginning I wasn't sure that the current DACR configuration is an issue because in found in pseudo code of DDI0406B_arm_architecture_reference_manual_errata_markup_8_0.pdf
B3.13.3 Address translation
if CheckDomain(tlbrecord.domain, mva, tlbrecord.sectionnotpage, iswrite) then CheckPermission(tlbrecord.perms, mva, tlbrecord.sectionnotpage, iswrite, ispriv);B3.13.4 Domain checking
boolean CheckDomain(bits(4) domain, bits(32) mva, boolean sectionnotpage, boolean iswrite) bitpos = 2*UInt(domain); case DACR<bitpos+1:bitpos> of when ?00? DataAbort(mva, domain, sectionnotpage, iswrite, DAbort_Domain); when ?01? permissioncheck = TRUE; when ?10? UNPREDICTABLE; when ?11? permissioncheck = FALSE; return permissioncheck;B2.4.8 Access permission checking
// CheckPermission() // ================= CheckPermission(Permissions perms, bits(32) mva, boolean sectionnotpage, bits(4) domain, boolean iswrite, boolean ispriv) if SCTLR.AFE == ?0? then perms.ap<0> = ?1?; case perms.ap of when ?000? abort = TRUE; when ?001? abort = !ispriv; when ?010? abort = !ispriv && iswrite; when ?011? abort = FALSE; when ?100? UNPREDICTABLE; when ?101? abort = !ispriv || iswrite; when ?110? abort = iswrite; when ?111? if MemorySystemArchitecture() == MemArch_VMSA then abort = iswrite else UNPREDICTABLE; if abort then DataAbort(mva, domain, sectionnotpage, iswrite, DAbort_Permission); return;=> it seens only the read/write permission is checked here (perms.ap) => perms.xn is not used here
access_control = DRACR[r]; perms.ap = access_control<10:8>; perms.xn = access_control<12>;
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with AP[2:0], bits [10:8]
Access Permissions field. Indicates the read and write access permissions for unprivileged and privileged accesses to the memory region.But now it is clear with [1]
So, where did everything end up here? I specifically didn't grab this series as it sounded like there was concern the problem should be solved via another patch. Or would that be an in-addition-to? Thanks!
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