bpf: Add LDX/STX/ST sanitize in jited BPF progs
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Changes in v3 from the cover letter
fix missing-prototypes warning report by kernel test bot. simplify regs backing up and rewrite corresponding selftests.
Patches in v3 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/3 | bpf: Sanitize STX/ST in jited BPF progs with KASANkernel/ kernel/ | +126 | 0 replies | |
| 2/3 | bpf: Sanitize LDX in jited BPF progs with KASANkernel/ | +60 | 0 replies | |
| 3/3 | selftests/bpf: Add tests for LDX/STX/ST sanitizetools/ | +317 | 0 replies |
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Cover letter [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/3] bpf: Add LDX/STX/ST sanitize in jited BPF progs
The verifier sometimes makes mistakes[1][2] that may be exploited to achieve arbitrary read/write. Currently, syzbot is continuously testing bpf, and can find memory issues in bpf syscalls, but it can hardly find mischecking/bugs in the verifier. We need runtime checks like KASAN in BPF programs for this. This patch series implements address sanitize in jited BPF progs for testing purpose, so that tools like syzbot can find interesting bugs in the verifier automatically by, if possible, generating and executing BPF programs that bypass the verifier but have memory issues, then triggering this sanitizing.
The idea is to dispatch read/write addr of a BPF program to the kernel functions that are instrumented by KASAN, to achieve indirect checking. Indirect checking is adopted because this is much simple, instrument direct checking like compilers makes the jit much more complex. The main step is: back up all the scratch regs to extend BPF prog stack, store addr to R1, and then insert the checking function before load or store insns, during bpf_misc_fixup(). The stack size of BPF progs is extended by 64 bytes in this mode, to backup R1~R5 to make sure the checking funcs won't corrupt regs states. An extra Kconfig option is used to enable this, so normal use case won't be impacted at all.
Also, not all ldx/stx/st are instrumented. Insns rewrote by other fixup or conversion passes that use BPF_REG_AX are skipped, because that conflicts with us; insns whose access addr is specified by R10 are also skipped because they are trivial to verify.
Patch1 sanitizes st/stx insns, and Patch2 sanitizes ldx insns, Patch3 adds selftests for instrumentation in each possible case, and all new/existing selftests for the verifier can pass. Also, a BPF prog that also exploits CVE-2022-23222 to achieve OOB read is provided[3], this can be perfertly captured with this patch series.
[1] http://bit.do/CVE-2021-3490
[2] http://bit.do/CVE-2022-23222
[3] OOB-read: https://pastebin.com/raw/Ee1Cw492
v1 -> v2:
remove changes to JIT completely, backup regs to extended stack.
v2 -> v3:
fix missing-prototypes warning report by kernel test bot. simplify regs backing up and rewrite corresponding selftests.
Hao Sun (3):
bpf: Sanitize STX/ST in jited BPF progs with KASAN
bpf: Sanitize LDX in jited BPF progs with KASAN selftests/bpf: Add tests for LDX/STX/ST sanitize
kernel/bpf/Kconfig | 13 + kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 173 ++++++++++ .../selftests/bpf/verifier/sanitize_st_ldx.c | 317 ++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 503 insertions(+) create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/verifier/sanitize_st_ldx.c
base-commit: 2b3e8f6f5b939ceeb2e097339bf78ebaaf11dfe9
Signature · 1 line
2.38.1