arm64: harden shadow call stack pointer handling
Status from this message: Applied to arm64 (for-next/scs), thanks!
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b4 am [email protected]Versions newest first · linked by author and title
- v2 Latest2 patches 5 repliesApplied
- v12 patches 0 repliesSuperseded
Changes in v2 from the cover letter
- rebase onto v6.2-rc1
Patches in v2 Applied
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | arm64: Always load shadow stack pointer directly from the task structarch/ arch/ arch/ | +7 | 2 replies | |
| 2/2 | arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interruptarch/ | +5 | 2 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
All 2 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.
| Patch | Mark Rutland | Kees Cook |
|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | A-b | R-b |
| 2/2 | A-b | R-b |
Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.
Cover letter [PATCH v2 0/2] arm64: harden shadow call stack pointer handling
A couple of tweaks to the arm64 entry code to avoid loading the shadow call stack pointer in a way that could potentially be unsafe in the context of ROP attacks.
Changes since v1:
- rebase onto v6.2-rc1
Cc Sami Tolvanen <[email protected]>
Cc Kees Cook <[email protected]>
Ard Biesheuvel (2):
arm64: Always load shadow stack pointer directly from the task struct
arm64: Stash shadow stack pointer in the task struct on interrupt
arch/arm64/include/asm/scs.h | 7 ++++--- arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 16 +++++++--------- arch/arm64/kernel/head.S | 2 +- 3 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
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