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Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time

Mel Gorman linux-hardening lkml 3 versions – Applied

Status from this message: Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!

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b4 am [email protected]

Versions newest first · linked by author and title

  1. v3 Latest4 patches 2 repliesApplied
  2. v24 patches 8 repliesSuperseded
  3. v13 patches 7 repliesSuperseded

Changes in v3 from the cover letter

o Default on
o Logic correction and simplification

Patches in v3 Applied

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/4mm: security: Move hardened usercopy under 'Kernel hardening options'security/Kconfig security/Kconfig.hardening+16 -120 replies
2/4mm: security: Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile timeDocumentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt mm/usercopy.c security/Kconfig.hardening+13 -20 replies
3/4mm: security: Check early if HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabledinclude/linux/thread_info.h mm/usercopy.c+14 -70 replies
4/4fortify: Move FORTIFY_SOURCE under 'Kernel hardening options'security/Kconfig security/Kconfig.hardening+9 -90 replies

Reviews trailers per patch

2 of 4 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.

PatchPaul Moore
1/4A-b
2/4
3/4
4/4A-b

Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.

Read the v3 thread

Cover letter [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time

Changelog since v2
o Default on
o Logic correction and simplification

Changelog since v1
o Menu section rename
o Make static branch usage similar to init_on_alloc
o Change ordering of menu options

Some hardening options like HARDENED_USERCOPY can be set at boot time and have negligible cost when disabled. The default for options like init_on_alloc= can be set at compile time but hardened usercopy is enabled by default if built in. This incurs overhead when a kernel wishes to provide optional hardening but the user does not necessarily care.

Hardening is desirable in some environments but ideally they would be opt-in by kernel command line as hardening is typically a deliberate decision whereas the performance overhead is not always obvious to all users. Patches 1 and 2 move HARDENED_USERCOPY to the Kconfig.hardening and default it to disabled. Patch 3 moves the static branch check to a fast path similar to init_on_*. Patch 4 moves FORTIFY_SOURCE to hardening only because the option is related to hardening and happened to be declared near HARDENED_USERCOPY.

Building HARDENED_USERCOPY but disabled at runtime has neligible effect within the noise. Enabling the option by default generally incurs 2-10% of overhead depending on the workload with some extreme outliers depending on the exact CPU. While the benchmarks are somewhat synthetic, the overhead IO-intensive and network-intensive is easily detectable but the root cause may not be obvious (e.g. 2-14% overhead for netperf TCP_STREAM running over localhost with different ranges depending on the CPU).

 .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         |  4 ++-
 include/linux/thread_info.h                   |  8 ++++-
 mm/usercopy.c                                 | 16 +++++----
 security/Kconfig                              | 21 ------------
 security/Kconfig.hardening                    | 33 +++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0