Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time
Status from this message: Applied to for-next/hardening, thanks!
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- v3 Latest4 patches 2 repliesApplied
- v24 patches 8 repliesSuperseded
- v13 patches 7 repliesSuperseded
Changes in v3 from the cover letter
o Default on
o Logic correction and simplification
Patches in v3 Applied
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/4 | mm: security: Move hardened usercopy under 'Kernel hardening options'security/ security/ | +16 | 0 replies | |
| 2/4 | mm: security: Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile timeDocumentation/ mm/ security/ | +13 | 0 replies | |
| 3/4 | mm: security: Check early if HARDENED_USERCOPY is enabledinclude/ mm/ | +14 | 0 replies | |
| 4/4 | fortify: Move FORTIFY_SOURCE under 'Kernel hardening options'security/ security/ | +9 | 0 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
2 of 4 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.
| Patch | Paul Moore |
|---|---|
| 1/4 | A-b |
| 2/4 | |
| 3/4 | |
| 4/4 | A-b |
Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.
Cover letter [PATCH v3 0/4] Allow default HARDENED_USERCOPY to be set at compile time
Changelog since v2
o Default on
o Logic correction and simplification
Changelog since v1
o Menu section rename
o Make static branch usage similar to init_on_alloc
o Change ordering of menu options
Some hardening options like HARDENED_USERCOPY can be set at boot time and have negligible cost when disabled. The default for options like init_on_alloc= can be set at compile time but hardened usercopy is enabled by default if built in. This incurs overhead when a kernel wishes to provide optional hardening but the user does not necessarily care.
Hardening is desirable in some environments but ideally they would be opt-in by kernel command line as hardening is typically a deliberate decision whereas the performance overhead is not always obvious to all users. Patches 1 and 2 move HARDENED_USERCOPY to the Kconfig.hardening and default it to disabled. Patch 3 moves the static branch check to a fast path similar to init_on_*. Patch 4 moves FORTIFY_SOURCE to hardening only because the option is related to hardening and happened to be declared near HARDENED_USERCOPY.
Building HARDENED_USERCOPY but disabled at runtime has neligible effect within the noise. Enabling the option by default generally incurs 2-10% of overhead depending on the workload with some extreme outliers depending on the exact CPU. While the benchmarks are somewhat synthetic, the overhead IO-intensive and network-intensive is easily detectable but the root cause may not be obvious (e.g. 2-14% overhead for netperf TCP_STREAM running over localhost with different ranges depending on the CPU).
.../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++- include/linux/thread_info.h | 8 ++++- mm/usercopy.c | 16 +++++---- security/Kconfig | 21 ------------ security/Kconfig.hardening | 33 +++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
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2.43.0