RFC ipe support for anonymous memory and memfd
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Changes in v2 from the cover letter
* Update test suite to include anonymous memory tests
* Fix property implementation and add memfd support
Patches in v2 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | memfd,lsm: add a security hook to memfd_create()include/ include/ mm/ +1 more | +24 | 0 replies | |
| 2/2 | ipe: add 'anonymous_memory' property for policy decisionsDocumentation/ Documentation/ security/ +8 more | +95 | 0 replies |
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Cover letter [RFC PATCH v2 0/2] ipe support for anonymous memory and memfd
From: Fan Wu <[email protected]>
This patchset adds support for anonymous memory and memfd to the IPE LSM. Currently, the IPE policy language can only allow or deny a physical file from an integrity-verified source. However, for events triggered by anonymous memory, either created via mmap() with MAP_ANONYMOUS or via memfd_create(), IPE provides no mechanism to explicitly allow or deny these events.
Execution from anonymous memory is a common use case in modern applications. For example, JIT compilers store generated code in such regions. This patchset introduces a new IPE property, anonymous_memory, to let administrators explicitly allow or deny events triggered by anonymous memory.
For example, the following policy:
policy_name=example_policy policy_version=0.0.0
DEFAULT action=DENY
op=EXECUTE dmverity_signature=TRUE action=ALLOW
op=EXECUTE anonymous_memory=TRUE action=ALLOW
will allow execution of files from a signed dm-verity volume and also execution from anonymous memory.
In the current design, the anonymous_memory property covers both memory regions created by mmap() with MAP_ANONYMOUS and those allocated by memfd_create(), as both share the same semantics [1]. However, because regular files on tmpfs, shmemfs, or hugetlbfs are also backed by anonymous memory, the policy language might not be entirely clear to users. An alternative approach would be to define two separate properties, one covering MAP_ANONYMOUS and another covering memfd_create().
Nonetheless, allowing execution from anonymous memory does increase the attack surface. Future work will add additional properties to the IPE policy language to provide more fine-grained control. For instance, one possibility is to permit only processes with certain security attributes, such as specific SELinux labels, to execute code from anonymous memory.
The ipe test suite has been updated to include anonymous memory tests:
https://github.com/microsoft/ipe/tree/test-suite
[1] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/memfd_create.2.html
Previous Postings
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v1: https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/T/
Changelog
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V2:
* Update test suite to include anonymous memory tests
* Fix property implementation and add memfd support
Fan Wu (2):
memfd,lsm: add a security hook to memfd_create()
ipe: add 'anonymous_memory' property for policy decisions
Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/ipe.rst | 12 ++++++++++ Documentation/security/ipe.rst | 9 +++---- include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 3 +++ include/linux/security.h | 8 +++++++ mm/memfd.c | 2 ++ security/ipe/Kconfig | 10 ++++++++ security/ipe/audit.c | 2 ++ security/ipe/eval.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- security/ipe/eval.h | 13 ++++++---- security/ipe/hooks.c | 12 ++++++++++ security/ipe/hooks.h | 4 ++++ security/ipe/ipe.c | 7 ++++-- security/ipe/policy.h | 2 ++ security/ipe/policy_parser.c | 4 ++++ security/security.c | 11 +++++++++ 15 files changed, 119 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.47.1