Add SEV-SNP BTB Isolation and IBPB-on-Entry guest features
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b4 am [email protected]Versions newest first · linked by author and title
- v5 Latest8 patches 13 repliesIn review
- v410 patches 13 repliesSuperseded
- v36 patches 3 repliesSuperseded
Earlier versions · 2
| Version | Posted | Patches | Replies | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2 | 3 patches | 3 replies | Superseded | |
| v1 | 3 patches | 3 replies | Superseded |
Changes in v5 from the cover letter
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
- Patch 1 ("x86/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs"): only prefer retpoline over AutoIBRS on SNP hosts when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is actually built in. This folds v4's patch 3 into the same condition and avoids the select-then-fall-back ping pong. Suggested in review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/lctyimdlenyb5kvfxarzajs2ggzkwn4yehxu233lojynqwa7ej@wjur3lh6szlr/
- Patch 2 ("x86/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel"): move the EFER.AUTOIBRS kexec cleanup out of spectre_v2_apply_mitigation() and up to the top of cpu_select_mitigations(), next to the existing SPEC_CTRL kexec cleanup, so stale state is dropped before mitigation selection rather than during it. spectre_v2_apply_mitigation() now only sets the bit, which keeps it much closer to its original shape. Suggested in review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ga63o6nf7xebndlo66qqasjx7axpopyph7ilkwhvx3enfaqs4w@r4qfr6eo6kcw/
- Subject prefix fixes, per review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260818232204.GBaoTpHK8k7wD9mMk4@fat_crate.local/
The two x86 patches go from "cpu/bugs:" to "x86/bugs:" to match the tip tree convention. Patch 3 goes from "KVM: SEV:" to "KVM: SVM:", since it only touches arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h.
- Tag cleanup, per review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260818232204.GBaoTpHK8k7wD9mMk4@fat_crate.local/
Dropped Cc: [email protected] from both x86/bugs patches. Patch 2 drops its Fixes: too -- it enables spectre_v2=ibrs on a vendor that never had a use for the option rather than fixing a bug anyone is hitting, so neither tag was right. Patch 1 drops the kernel test robot Reported-by:/Closes: pair; that report was against an earlier posting of this patch rather than against upstream, so there was nothing there for it to close. The part of patch 1 that is genuinely -stable material -- an SNP host with CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n booting with Spectre v2 unmitigated -- will be sent separately as a minimal backport once this lands.
- Dropped v4's patch 3 ("cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs"). Its fallback is now subsumed by the CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE test above.
- Dropped v4's patch 1 ("x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation"). After the rework above this series no longer needs it, but it still fixes a real spurious "no mitigation available!" on Intel + RETBleed with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY=y, CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n and spectre_v2=auto, where spectre_v2_update_mitigation() afterwards promotes SPECTRE_V2_NONE to SPECTRE_V2_IBRS. Being posted separately as a standalone fix:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Added Tom's Reviewed-by to patch 8
Patches in v5 No applies recorded yet
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/8 | x86/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrsarch/ arch/ | +15 | 7 replies | |
| 2/8 | x86/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intelarch/ arch/ | +35 | 6 replies | |
| 3/8 | KVM: SVM: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL()arch/ | +5 | 0 replies | |
| 4/8 | KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definitiontools/ | +1 | 0 replies | |
| 5/8 | KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a single maskarch/ arch/ tools/ | +10 | 0 replies | |
| 6/8 | KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVEarch/ arch/ tools/ | +11 | 0 replies | |
| 7/8 | KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entryarch/ arch/ arch/ +2 more | +11 | 0 replies | |
| 8/8 | KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolationarch/ arch/ tools/ | +12 | 0 replies |
Reviews trailers per patch
3 of 8 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.
| Patch | Tom Lendacky | Pawan Gupta |
|---|---|---|
| 1/8 | R-b | |
| 2/8 | R-b | |
| 3/8 | ||
| 4/8 | ||
| 5/8 | ||
| 6/8 | ||
| 7/8 | ||
| 8/8 | R-b |
Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.
Cover letter [PATCH v5 0/8] Add SEV-SNP BTB Isolation and IBPB-on-Entry guest features
This series advertises two SEV-SNP guest-selectable side-channel protections through KVM's vmsa_features ABI -- BTB Isolation (SEV_FEATURES bit 7) and IBPB-on-Entry (SEV_FEATURES bit 21) -- along with SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE, and fixes two x86 mitigation-selection bugs that stand in the way.
The cpu/bugs patches come first because they are prerequisites, not drive-by cleanups:
- Patch 1 fixes spectre_v2=eibrs silently selecting retpolines instead of AutoIBRS on SNP hosts. Commit acaa4b5c4c85 ("x86/speculation: Do not enable Automatic IBRS if SEV-SNP is enabled") suppressed AutoIBRS by never setting X86_FEATURE_IBRS_ENHANCED, which also disabled the explicit spectre_v2=eibrs request. Set the feature bit and move the SNP-prefers-retpoline decision into the default/auto case, where it belongs.
- Patch 2 allows spectre_v2=ibrs on non-Intel vendors. BTB Isolation uses legacy SPEC_CTRL.IBRS toggling to optimize the SNP VM exit-to-re-entry path, so AMD needs to be able to select it. It also makes EFER.AUTOIBRS explicitly track the selected mitigation, which matters across kexec since head_64.S preserves incoming EFER bits.
Patches 3-6 are small width/ABI cleanups and the SNP_ACTIVE and SNP-only-feature-mask groundwork, and patches 7-8 add IBPB-on-Entry and BTB Isolation themselves.
Note that BTB Isolation is advertised unconditionally on SNP-capable parts. That is deliberate: the APM defines it as architecturally present on every SEV-SNP-capable processor, so unlike IBPB-on-Entry there is no host enumeration bit to gate on. Patch 8 spells this out.
Changes since v4:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
- Patch 1 ("x86/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using spectre_v2=eibrs"): only prefer retpoline over AutoIBRS on SNP hosts when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is actually built in. This folds v4's patch 3 into the same condition and avoids the select-then-fall-back ping pong. Suggested in review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/lctyimdlenyb5kvfxarzajs2ggzkwn4yehxu233lojynqwa7ej@wjur3lh6szlr/
- Patch 2 ("x86/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel"): move the EFER.AUTOIBRS kexec cleanup out of spectre_v2_apply_mitigation() and up to the top of cpu_select_mitigations(), next to the existing SPEC_CTRL kexec cleanup, so stale state is dropped before mitigation selection rather than during it. spectre_v2_apply_mitigation() now only sets the bit, which keeps it much closer to its original shape. Suggested in review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/ga63o6nf7xebndlo66qqasjx7axpopyph7ilkwhvx3enfaqs4w@r4qfr6eo6kcw/
- Subject prefix fixes, per review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260818232204.GBaoTpHK8k7wD9mMk4@fat_crate.local/
The two x86 patches go from "cpu/bugs:" to "x86/bugs:" to match the tip tree convention. Patch 3 goes from "KVM: SEV:" to "KVM: SVM:", since it only touches arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h.
- Tag cleanup, per review:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20260818232204.GBaoTpHK8k7wD9mMk4@fat_crate.local/
Dropped Cc: [email protected] from both x86/bugs patches. Patch 2 drops its Fixes: too -- it enables spectre_v2=ibrs on a vendor that never had a use for the option rather than fixing a bug anyone is hitting, so neither tag was right. Patch 1 drops the kernel test robot Reported-by:/Closes: pair; that report was against an earlier posting of this patch rather than against upstream, so there was nothing there for it to close. The part of patch 1 that is genuinely -stable material -- an SNP host with CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n booting with Spectre v2 unmitigated -- will be sent separately as a minimal backport once this lands.
- Dropped v4's patch 3 ("cpu/bugs: Fall back to AutoIBRS when retpoline unavailable on SNP CPUs"). Its fallback is now subsumed by the CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE test above.
- Dropped v4's patch 1 ("x86/bugs: Only log missing retpoline when it's actually the missing mitigation"). After the rework above this series no longer needs it, but it still fixes a real spurious "no mitigation available!" on Intel + RETBleed with CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY=y, CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE=n and spectre_v2=auto, where spectre_v2_update_mitigation() afterwards promotes SPECTRE_V2_NONE to SPECTRE_V2_IBRS. Being posted separately as a standalone fix:
https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/[email protected]/
- Added Tom's Reviewed-by to patch 8
Kim Phillips (8):
x86/bugs: Allow forcing Automatic IBRS with SNP active using
spectre_v2=eibrs
x86/bugs: Allow spectre_v2=ibrs on x86 vendors other than Intel
KVM: SVM: Define SVM_SEV_FEAT_* flags using BIT_ULL()
KVM: selftests: sev_init2: Use BIT_ULL for VMSA feature bit definition
KVM: SEV: Disallow setting SNP-only features for non-SNP guests via a
single mask
KVM: SEV: Advertise SVM_SEV_FEAT_SNP_ACTIVE
KVM: SEV: Add support for IBPB-on-Entry
KVM: SEV: Add support for SNP BTB Isolation
arch/x86/Kconfig | 7 ++- arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/svm.h | 17 ++++-- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 59 ++++++++++++++----- arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 6 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c | 21 ++++++- tools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 1 + .../selftests/kvm/x86/sev_init2_tests.c | 20 +++++-- 8 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
base-commit: ec8477a492cb24f2c334847c8734ca56c7ffdd29
Signature · 1 line
2.43.0