ksmbd: harden ipc_validate_msg() and smb_check_perm_dacl()
Status from this message: Applied them to #ksmbd-for-next-next.
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- v2 Latest2 patches 1 replyApplied
- v13 patches 6 repliesSuperseded
Changes in v2 from the cover letter
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Patches in v2 Applied
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()fs/ fs/ | +13 | 0 replies | |
| 2/2 | ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()fs/ | +13 | 0 replies |
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Cover letter [PATCH v2 0/2] ksmbd: harden ipc_validate_msg() and smb_check_perm_dacl()
Two ksmbd hardening patches, respun from v1 [PATCH 0/3] per Namjae's review.
Patch 1 folds v1 1/3 and 2/3 into a single response-side validation change in ipc_validate_msg().
Patch 2 is v1 3/3 unchanged (minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()). Please let me know if there's anything on this 2/2 you want to think through or change.
Changes since v1
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v1 -> v2:
- 1/3 + 2/3 folded into a single patch (1/2) per Namjae.
- Dropped the hard KSMBD_IPC_MAX_PAYLOAD (4096) cap on RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST response paths. A 4096 cap would regress NetShareEnumAll and other NDR enumerations on servers with many shares -- userspace ksmbd-tools grows the response buffer in 4096-byte chunks via g_try_realloc(). Use check_add_overflow() instead so functional payload size is unconstrained but msg_sz cannot wrap unsigned int. [Namjae]
- LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT keeps the [0, NGROUPS_MAX] bound (POSIX semantic limit, not an IPC transport cap). Moved the pr_err() into ipc_validate_msg() so the error is reported at the IPC boundary. [Namjae]
- Removed the now-redundant ngroups check and pr_err() from ksmbd_alloc_user() in mgmt/user_config.c. Both call sites (ksmbd_login_user and the SPNEGO path in auth.c) reach ksmbd_alloc_user() through ksmbd_ipc_login_request_ext(), which now rejects negative ngroups at the IPC gate. [Namjae]
- SPNEGO_AUTHEN_REQUEST left untouched: session_key_len and spnego_blob_len are both __u16 so their sum cannot wrap the unsigned int msg_sz. [Namjae ack]
- 2/2 (smb_check_perm_dacl minimum ACE size) unchanged from
v1 3/3 -- no review yet.
Threading
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Sent --in-reply-to v1 [PATCH 0/3] cover
(Message-ID [email protected]) so v2 lives under the v1 thread.
Michael Bommarito (2):
ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()
ksmbd: require minimum ACE size in smb_check_perm_dacl()
fs/smb/server/mgmt/user_config.c | 6 ------ fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 17 +++++++++++++---- fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c | 16 +++++++++++++--- 3 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
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2.53.0