Skip to content

isofs: hardening for crafted CE and NFS-handle paths

Michael Bommarito linux-fsdevel lkml stable 1 version In review

Get series with b4
b4 am [email protected]

Versions newest first

  1. v1 Latest2 patches 1 replyIn review

Patches in v1 No applies recorded yet

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/2isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume sizefs/isofs/rock.c+9 -00 replies
2/2isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_igetfs/isofs/export.c+1 -10 replies

Reviews trailers per patch

No Reviewed-by, Acked-by or Tested-by trailers for v1 yet.

Read the v1 thread

Cover letter [PATCH 0/2] isofs: hardening for crafted CE and NFS-handle paths

Two small defensive bounds checks for the ISO 9660 filesystem, one in Rock Ridge CE continuation handling and one in the NFS export path. Both surfaced while looking for missing bounds checks adjacent to recently-landed isofs fixes (0405d4b63d08, f54e18f1b831). Neither is a memory-safety bug on its own; the existing sb_bread() / isofs_iget() paths handle out-of-range blocks cleanly. These patches reject the malformed input at the earliest point it is known to be out of range.

1/2: rock_continue() reads rs->cont_extent from the Rock Ridge CE record and calls sb_bread() on it without validating the block number against ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones. commit e595447e177b (2005) added the cont_offset and cont_size rejection but left the extent number unchecked; commit f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries") later capped the CE chain at RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again did not address the block number. The reachable attacker model is a crafted ISO auto-mounted via udisks2 / polkit on a desktop session; sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly, so there is no memory-safety issue, and the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records rather than returned verbatim via readlink().

2/2: isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass attacker-controlled block numbers from the NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which rejects block == 0 but not out-of-range block numbers. commit 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid", CVE-2025-37780) added fh_len checks but left the block number itself unchecked. An authenticated NFS peer with a crafted fid can drive reads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device into iso_inode_info fields reaching the client as dentry metadata. Deployment surface is narrow (isofs-over-NFS); impact is primarily EIO / ESTALE with a weak info-leak channel.

Both patches are one-line (or close to it) additions; the existing out-of-range-block check in isofs_iget() / sb_bread() handles the read-side cleanly, so these are strictly belt-and-suspenders rejection at the earliest point we know the input is out of range.

Build-tested W=1 against 7.0-rc7 with CONFIG_ISO9660_FS=y, CONFIG_JOLIET=y, CONFIG_ZISOFS=y.

Michael Bommarito (2):
isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size
isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget

 fs/isofs/export.c | 2 +-
 fs/isofs/rock.c   | 9 +++++++++
 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0