Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC
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| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/3 | landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXECinclude/ security/ security/ +2 more | +107 | 0 replies | |
| 2/3 | selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXECtools/ | +255 | 0 replies | |
| 3/3 | landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXECDocumentation/ | +20 | 0 replies |
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Cover letter [PATCH 0/3] Implement LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC
Good morning,
This series adds a new landlock_restrict_self(2) flag:LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC.
This flag stages a bit in the Landlock credentials indicating that the next successful execution will set the no_new_privs attribute while committing its new credentials.
Differences from prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS):
PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS takes effect immediately: it prevents gaining privileges through set-user-ID, set-group-ID and file capabilities starting with the very next execve(2).
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC instead only sets the task's no_new_privs attribute once the next execve(2) is guaranteed to succeed (past its point of no return, in bprm_committing_creds), after any privilege gain through set-user-ID, set-group-ID or file capabilities has already taken place. The executed program then runs with no_new_privs, so subsequent executions cannot gain privileges. A failed execve(2) leaves no_new_privs untouched.
Use cases:
Enforcing a Landlock ruleset requires that the calling process either already has no_new_privs set or possesses CAP_SYS_ADMIN. This series does not grant any exception to this rule; for a caller that already has no_new_privs set, the flag is effectively a no-op. It is therefore mostly useful for CAP_SYS_ADMIN callers that need to execute programs that legitimately escalate privileges (e.g. transition to another user), while ensuring that further executions cannot gain privileges.
Consider a sandbox launcher that depends on a set-user-ID helper, such as launching applications through bubblewrap on distributions where unprivileged user namespaces are disabled and bwrap is installed set-user-ID root. The launcher cannot set PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS before the execution, as that would neuter the very helper it depends on:
sandbox launcher (CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
|
| landlock_restrict_self(-1, LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC) V
/usr/bin/bwrap (set-user-ID root: honored for this execution;
| no_new_privs set once the execution is past its | point of no return)
V
sandboxed application (runs with no_new_privs; cannot gain
privileges through any further execution, and may enforce its own Landlock ruleset without CAP_SYS_ADMIN)
This flag also closes a gap for CAP_SYS_ADMIN callers of landlock_restrict_self(2) itself. The no_new_privs/CAP_SYS_ADMIN requirement exists to keep set-user-ID programs from running confused inside a sandbox they do not expect. However, a privileged process that enforces a domain without setting no_new_privs leaves that hole open for all of its descendants: anything running in the domain may still execute a set-user-ID binary, which then runs privileged under a restricted view of the system. A privileged process that needs one legitimate set-user-ID/set-group-ID transition currently has to choose between breaking that transition (setting no_new_privs first) or leaving the hole open for the lifetime of the domain. LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC allows the one intended transition and then closes the hole.
Design:
This flag is implemented simply: a bit is stored in the Landlock credential blob (struct landlock_cred_security) indicating whether the next execution should set no_new_privs when it commits its new credentials.
The bit is not coupled to any ruleset and, like LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_LOG_SUBDOMAINS_OFF, may be passed with no ruleset (i.e. ruleset_fd = -1). It may also be combined with LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC to propagate the staged state to sibling threads, each thread then setting no_new_privs at its own next execve(2).
The staged bit is inherited across fork(2) and persists in the credentials until the next successful execution. To consume it, Landlock handles the bprm_committing_creds hook, which runs while the credentials of the new program are being committed: if the bit is set, task_set_no_new_privs(current) is called and the bit is cleared.
Again, this flag does not bypass the requirement to either have CAP_SYS_ADMIN or no_new_privs already set to call landlock_restrict_self(2).
The Landlock ABI version is bumped to 11.
Test coverage:
The new nnp_on_exec fixture generates a shell script that reads the NoNewPrivs value from /proc/self/status and exits with it. The variants select the conditions under which the flag is tested (with and without a ruleset, with and without CAP_SYS_ADMIN/no_new_privs already set, with and without TSYNC, etc.), then compare no_new_privs before the execution and in the executed script. The ruleset variants also check that a ruleset passed along the flag is enforced immediately, unlike the staged no_new_privs.
Justin Suess (3):
landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC selftests/landlock: Test LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC
landlock: Document LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NNP_ON_EXEC
Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst | 21 +- include/uapi/linux/landlock.h | 36 ++- security/landlock/cred.c | 22 ++ security/landlock/cred.h | 8 + security/landlock/limits.h | 2 +- security/landlock/syscalls.c | 54 +++- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 259 ++++++++++++++++++- 7 files changed, 382 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
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2.54.0