ufs: harden the mount path against malformed images
Status from this message: Applied to the vfs.fixes branch of the vfs/vfs.git tree.
Get series with b4
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Patches in v1 Applied
| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | ufs: create the root dentry after loading cylinder metadatafs/ | +9 | 1 reply | |
| 2/2 | ufs: validate cylinder group metadata before caching itfs/ | +10 | 1 reply |
Reviews trailers per patch
All 2 patches have a Reviewed-by or Acked-by.
| Patch | Jan Kara |
|---|---|
| 1/2 | R-b |
| 2/2 | R-b |
Trailers given in replies are filled; those carried in the patches from earlier versions are outlined with dashes.
Cover letter [PATCH 0/2] ufs: harden the mount path against malformed images
Two robustness fixes for the ufs mount path, both reachable by mounting a crafted UFS image.
Patch 1 reorders ufs_fill_super() so the root dentry is created after the cylinder group metadata is loaded. Today a failure while reading the cylinder groups drops UFS_SB(sb) but leaves s_root installed, so the generic teardown oopses on a NULL pointer in ufs_sync_fs() and the put_super operation.
Patch 2 validates the cylinder group index and the rotor positions in ufs_read_cylinder() before they are cached. Unchecked, c_cgx indexes the cylinder summary array (a 32 bit write outside s_csp), and the rotors become bitmap scan offsets that can wrap an unsigned length and walk past the cylinder group buffers during an ordinary allocation.
Mounting a ufs image needs CAP_SYS_ADMIN and ufs is not unprivileged-mountable, so this is image-parsing hardening rather than a privilege boundary, handled in the open like the recent sibling work:
ufs: reject malformed cylinder summary geometry
https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/ ufs: reject oversized cylinder group metadata https://lore.kernel.org/all/[email protected]/
Those validate fs_cssize and fs_cgsize in ufs_fill_super(); the checks here live in ufs_read_cylinder() and do not overlap with them.
Both were reproduced under KASAN on an unpatched kernel by mounting a crafted UFS2 image.
Patch 1, an image whose first cylinder group fails the magic check, so ufs_read_cylinder_structures() fails after the root dentry is installed:
BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0 ufs_sync_fs+0x5b/0x6d0 BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000100
Patch 2, an image whose on-disk cg_cgx is out of range, followed by a write that allocates a block:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in adjust_free_blocks+0x1bf0/0x2510 adjust_free_blocks
With the patches applied, patch 1 loads the cylinder groups before publishing the root dentry and patch 2 rejects the mismatched cg_cgx in ufs_read_cylinder(), so neither faulting access is reached.
Ali Ahmet Memis (2):
ufs: create the root dentry after loading cylinder metadata
ufs: validate cylinder group metadata before caching it
fs/ufs/cylinder.c | 10 ++++++++++ fs/ufs/super.c | 17 +++++++++-------- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.54.0