RFC smb: client: tighten validate_t2() offset bounds against actual buffer size
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| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/1 | smb: client: tighten validate_t2() offset bounds against actual buffer sizefs/ | +97 | 0 replies |
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Cover letter [RFC PATCH 0/1] smb: client: tighten validate_t2() offset bounds against actual buffer size
Hi all,
The accompanying patch tightens bounds checking in validate_t2(), the central validator called before all 21 SMB1 TRANSACT2 response sites. I'm posting it as an RFC to request review of design choices and the approach.
Background
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validate_t2() currently rejects ParameterOffset and DataOffset only when they exceed 1024. The actual allocated buffer size is CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE (~16468 bytes), so a server can supply an offset in [1025, 16468] and have callers dereference typed structs from uninitialized pool memory.
cifs_buf_get() clears only the first 207 bytes of each pool buffer on allocation; bytes beyond that retain stale data from prior uses. A response with DataOffset=15000, DataCount=0, BCC=40 produces a 94-byte received frame: 15000 + 0 <= 16468 passes the individual guard, yet the dereference lands far into the stale region. Raising the individual bound alone does not close this window; a joint offset+count check against the actual received frame extent is needed.
Approach
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Rather than adding ad-hoc bounds checks at each of the 21 call sites, the patch extends validate_t2() with two new parameters — min_param_size and min_data_size — that let callers declare the minimum struct size they need to read. validate_t2() verifies that the respective offset clears the fixed T2 response header and that offset + struct size fits within frame_end. Centralizing this in validate_t2() keeps the validation auditable in one place rather than scattered across 21 call sites.
Design choice 1: frame_end as the joint bound
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frame_end is computed as:
frame_end = sizeof(struct smb_hdr) + 2 * WordCount + sizeof(__le16) + BCC
This matches smbCalcSize() in smb1misc.c exactly. checkSMB() validates consistency between the RFC1001 length prefix and WordCount + BCC before validate_t2() is reached, so frame_end reflects the number of bytes actually received and is not purely server-controlled.
Note: struct smb_hdr opens with Protocol[4] at offset 0 — the RFC1001 length prefix is stripped by the receive path before the pool buffer is filled, so no subtraction from sizeof(struct smb_hdr) is needed. This is confirmed by smbCalcSize() using sizeof(struct smb_hdr) with no adjustment.
All joint offset+count checks use frame_end. The individual offset guards retain CIFSMaxBufSize + MAX_CIFS_HDR_SIZE as a buffer-overflow backstop.
A secondary benefit: the raised individual bound creates a new overflow vector — DataOffset=202 and DataCount=16387 each pass the bound separately but 202 + 16387 = 16589 overflows the 16588-byte buffer. The frame_end joint check catches this too.
Design choice 2: lnoff <= DataCount (not lnoff <= frame_end)
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CIFSFindFirst and CIFSFindNext use LastNameOffset (lnoff) as an offset within the data area. Rather than exporting frame_end from validate_t2() or recomputing it at the call site, the patch bounds lnoff against DataCount. Since validate_t2() has already verifieddata_off + DataCount <= frame_end, this transitively ensures data_off + lnoff <= frame_end. It is also semantically correct:
LastNameOffset is an offset within the declared data area, not an arbitrary buffer offset.
Design choice 3: CIFSSMBPosixLock small-buffer exception
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CIFSSMBPosixLock receives into a small buffer (MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE = 448 bytes). Passing a non-zero min_data_size to validate_t2() would be
wrong: validate_t2()'s large-buffer upper bound of ~16468 bytes would accept data_offset values that overflow the 448-byte allocation.
The patch passes (0, 0) to validate_t2() for the buffer-overflow backstop only, and follows with a per-call tight check:
if (data_offset < SMB_T2_MIN_OFFSET ||
data_offset + sizeof(struct cifs_posix_lock) > MAX_CIFS_SMALL_BUFFER_SIZE)
This is the only call site with this exception; all other T2 callers use the standard large buffer.
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I welcome any feedback on these design choices, or on the patch in general.
Frank Sorenson (1):
smb: client: tighten validate_t2() offset bounds against actual buffer
size
fs/smb/client/cifssmb.c | 133 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------- 1 file changed, 97 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.55.0