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lsm: give BPF programs a way to query locked_down state

Justin Suess bpf linux-security-module lkml 1 version In review

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  1. v1 Latest2 patches 12 repliesIn review

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#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/2lsm: add bpf_security_locked_down() kfuncsecurity/Makefile security/lsm_kfuncs.c+85 -00 replies
2/2selftests/bpf: Test bpf_security_locked_down kfunctools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_kfuncs.c tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_kfuncs.c tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_kfuncs_fail.c+88 -00 replies

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Cover letter [PATCH bpf-next 0/2] lsm: give BPF programs a way to query locked_down state

Howdy,

BPF programs can attach to the locked_down LSM hook and contribute a verdict, but they have never been able to ask the locked_down question
themselves: there is no way for a program to invoke the hook and learn whether a given operation is locked down. (i.e be a caller of security_locked_down rather than a consumer).

Today the state has to be fed in out of band, for example userspace reading /sys/kernel/security/lockdown and writing the result into a map. That is a time-of-check/time-of-use race: a security_locked_down verdict can be raised at runtime, so the cached answer can be stale by the time the program acts on it.

Add a bpf_security_locked_down() kfunc that calls security_locked_down() and returns its verdict, letting LSM and syscall programs query locked_down state at decision time. Out-of-range reasons are rejected with -EINVAL before dispatching the hook, and the kfunc is refused to programs attached to the locked_down hook itself, which would recurse into the dispatch. (how the obvious recursion issue is addressed).

As this is the first pure-lsm-hook kfunc, add a new file security/lsm_kfuncs.c to host it.

This kfunc has no reliance on / relation to the Lockdown LSM, despite the similar naming. It is an LSM-agnostic caller of security_locked_down, and Lockdown just happens to be the only in-tree subscriber to this hook at the moment.

In fact, the test environment does not rely on CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN at all, and uses a BPF implementation of security_locked_down.

This kfunc can cause notices to be printed with kmsg if the Lockdown LSM is enabled due to this line in security/lockdown/lockdown.c:

pr_notice_ratelimited("Lockdown: %s: %s is restricted; see man kernel_lockdown.7\n",

				                 current->comm, lockdown_reasons[what]);

Patch 1 adds the kfunc, patch 2 the selftests. This is based on bpf-next/master, but applies cleanly to the lsm tree.

Justin

Justin Suess (2):
lsm: add bpf_security_locked_down() kfunc selftests/bpf: Test bpf_security_locked_down kfunc

 security/Makefile                             |  1 +
 security/lsm_kfuncs.c                         | 84 +++++++++++++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_kfuncs.c     | 28 +++++++
 .../testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_kfuncs.c  | 34 ++++++++
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_kfuncs_fail.c     | 26 ++++++
 5 files changed, 173 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 security/lsm_kfuncs.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/lsm_kfuncs.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_kfuncs.c
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/lsm_kfuncs_fail.c

base-commit: d82ebfc685c91e7f5623a8be949da1ddb767420b

Signature · 1 line
2.54.0