md: fix bblog_size-driven OOB read in md_write_metadata()
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| # | Subject and files | Size | Replies | Applied |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1/2 | md: fix bblog_size-driven OOB read in super_1_load() and super_1_sync()drivers/ | +6 | 4 replies | |
| 2/2 | md: add defensive bounds check for bio in md_write_metadata()drivers/ | +3 | 1 reply |
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Cover letter [PATCH 0/2] md: fix bblog_size-driven OOB read in md_write_metadata()
Hi,
This series fixes an out-of-bounds read in the md badblocks log (bblog) write path. The on-disk bblog_size field is taken verbatim from the member device superblock and used as the bio length in md_write_metadata(), without any check against the size of the page that actually backs the write.
This is a different issue from CVE-2026-89557, which fixed the bblog_shift overflow. The bblog_size path is still unfixed.
Introduced by commit 2699b67223ac ("md: load/store badblock list from v1.x metadata").
Mechanism:
super_1_load() reads sb->bblog_size (__le16) from the member device and stores it in rdev->badblocks.size via super_1_sync() (md.c:2316). md_update_sb() then calls
md_write_metadata(mddev, rdev, rdev->badblocks.sector,
rdev->badblocks.size << 9, rdev->bb_page, 0); (md.c:2944-2948). bb->size is sector_t, so 0xFFFF << 9 = 33553920 does not wrap. md_write_metadata() passes that length to __bio_add_page() with a single 4 KiB page:
__bio_add_page(bio, page, size, 0)
__bio_add_page() is the no-check variant: after a WARN_ON_ONCE() it unconditionally records bvec_set_page(page, size, offset) and bumps bi_size/bi_vcnt. bio_full()'s second clause is
"bi_size > BIO_MAX_SIZE - len", with bi_size == 0 and BIO_MAX_SIZE == UINT_MAX, so it is false and not even the WARN fires. The 4 KiB page is recorded as a bvec with bv_len == 33553920.
Downstream bvec iteration (nth_page, bio_split_to_limits, etc.) then reads past the end of the page, into whatever follows in the linear map. KASAN reports slab-out-of-bounds or slab-use-after-free, and the data is written to the attacker-controlled member device.
Reproducer (CONTROL/ATTACK, only bblog_size differs):
CONTROL bblog_size = 8 -> 4096 bytes land, out-of-range stays
at the fill pattern
ATTACK bblog_size = 0xFFFF -> 33553920 bytes land, KASAN reports
slab-out-of-bounds in copy_folio_from_iter_atomic(), and ~33.5 MB of kernel memory is copied into the member device image
The harness creates the on-disk superblock by hand, attaches the loop device, binds it to a new md array via sysfs, adds one bad block, and then writes "writemostly" to the member state attribute to force an md_update_sb(). Both runs share the same kernel, the same md module and the same code path; the only difference is the bblog_size field in the on-disk superblock.
Patch 1 adds an upper bound for bb->size in super_1_sync(), matching the existing guard in super_1_load().
Patch 2 is a defensive check in md_write_metadata() itself, so that any future caller that passes an oversized length is caught before the bio is built. Only one of the two is strictly needed to fix the immediate issue; I'm sending both because the checks cover different layers.
I can send the harness and full dmesg logs if useful.
Thanks.
zjamg (2):
md: fix bblog_size-driven OOB read in super_1_load() and
super_1_sync()
md: add defensive bounds check for bio in md_write_metadata()
drivers/md/md.c | 11 +++++++++-- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
2.53.0