32bit ARM branch predictor hardening
Get series with b4
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- v4 Latest0 of 6 patches 0 repliesNew
- v3 posting 2/20 of 6 patches 0 repliesSuperseded
- v3 posting 1/24 of 6 patches 0 repliesSuperseded
Earlier versions · 2
| Version | Posted | Patches | Replies | Status |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2 | 2 of 6 patches | 0 replies | Superseded | |
| v1 | 0 of 3 patches | 0 replies | Superseded |
Patches in v4 No applies recorded yet
None of the 6 patches the cover letter announces are in this archive.
Reviews trailers per patch
No Reviewed-by, Acked-by or Tested-by trailers for v4 yet.
Cover letter [PATCH v4 0/6] 32bit ARM branch predictor hardening
Hi Marc,
Quoted 20 lines · Marc Zyngier
This small series implements some basic BP hardening by invalidating the BTB on 32bit ARM CPUs that are known to be susceptible to aliasing attacks (Spectre variant 2). It doesn't help non-ARM 32bit CPUs, nor 32bit kernels that run on 64bit capable CPUs. This series doesn't mitigate Spectre variant 1 either.
These patches are closely modelled against what we do on arm64, although simpler as we can rely on an architected instruction to perform the invalidation. The notable exception is Cortex-A15, where BTB invalidation behaves like a NOP, and the only way to shoot the predictor down is to invalidate the icache *and* to have ACTLR[0] set to 1 (which is a secure-only operation).
The first patch reuses the Cortex-A8 BTB invalidation in
switch_mmand generalises it to be used on all affected CPUs. The second perform the same invalidation on prefetch abort outside of the userspace range. The third one nukes it on guest exit, and results in some major surgery as we cannot take a branch from the vectors (that, and Thumb2 being a massive pain).
Quoted 2 lines
Patches 4 to 6 are doing a similar thing for Cortex-A15, with the aforementioned ICIALLU.
I have not had a chance to integrate those patches into the different downstream branches that we maintain, including upstream, but that's the plan for next week, because there is nothing else besides spectre & meltdown anyway right now :)
I would still like to pursue the RFC patch posted to your v3 where the kernel, if running in secure PL1 tries to set ACTLR[0], except maybe, I won't try to be too smart and detect the 3 states (firmware set, kernel set, not set) and just check whether it is set, and if not *and* HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR is enabled, then issue a warning?
Quoted 61 lines
To sum up the requirements:
- Cortex-A15 need to have ACTLR.IBE (bit 0) set to 1 from secure mode. Cortex-A8 also needs to have ACTLR.IBE (bit 6) set, overlaping with
ARM_ERRATA_430973which also requires it.
- Cortex-A9, A12 and A17 do not require any extra configuration.Note 1: Contrary to the initial version, this new series relies on the arm64/kpti branch (I reuse the per-CPU vector hook for KVM).
Note 2: M-class CPUs are not affected and for R-class cores, the mitigation doesn't make much sense since we do not enforce user/kernel isolation.
[Christoffer: since the patches have significantly changed since v3, I've dropped your RB tags]
* From v3:
- Added configuration option
- Reorganized the proc-v7 code to be neater
- Make the Thumb2 KVM madness Thumb2 specific
- Cleanups all over* From v2:
- Fixed !MMU build
- Small KVM optimisation (suggested by Robin)
- Fixed register zeroing incpu_v7_btbinv_switch_mm(noticed by Andre)* From v1:
- Fixed brokenhyp_fiqvector (noticed by Ard)
- Fixed broken BTB invalidation in LPAEswitch_mm(reported by Andre)
- Revamped invalidation on PABT (noticed by James on arm64, suggested by Will)
- Rewrote the whole HYP sequence, as Thumb2 was pretty unhappy about arithmetic with the stack pointerMarc Zyngier (6):
arm: Add BTB invalidation onswitch_mmfor Cortex-A9, A12 and A17
arm: Invalidate BTB on prefetch abort outside of user mapping onCortex A8, A9, A12 and A17 arm: KVM: Invalidate BTB on guest exit for Cortex-A12/A17 arm: Add icache invalidation on switch_mm for Cortex-A15 arm: Invalidate icache on prefetch abort outside of user mapping on Cortex-A15arm: KVM: Invalidate icache on guest exit for Cortex-A15
arch/arm/include/asm/cp15.h | 3 ++ arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_asm.h | 2 - arch/arm/include/asm/kvm_mmu.h | 23 +++++++++- arch/arm/kvm/hyp/hyp-entry.S | 95 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- arch/arm/mm/Kconfig | 17 ++++++++ arch/arm/mm/fault.c | 29 +++++++++++++ arch/arm/mm/fsr-2level.c | 4 +- arch/arm/mm/fsr-3level.c | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-2level.S | 14 ++++++- arch/arm/mm/proc-v7-3level.S | 15 +++++++ arch/arm/mm/proc-v7.S | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++-- 11 files changed, 312 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
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Florian