Skip to content

RFC SSP MITM protection

Timo Mueller linux-bluetooth 1 version In review

Get series with b4
b4 am [email protected]

Versions newest first

  1. v4 RFC Latest5 patches 1 replyIn review

Patches in v4 No applies recorded yet

#Subject and filesSizeRepliesApplied
1/5Bluetooth: Refactor hci_get_auth_req()net/bluetooth/hci_event.c+22 -150 replies
2/5Bluetooth: Refactor code for outgoing dedicated bondingnet/bluetooth/hci_event.c net/bluetooth/mgmt.c+9 -100 replies
3/5Bluetooth: Use MITM Protection when IO caps allow itnet/bluetooth/hci_event.c+2 -70 replies
4/5Bluetooth: Request MITM Protection when initiatornet/bluetooth/hci_event.c+4 -20 replies
5/5Bluetooth: Add management command to relax MITM Protectioninclude/net/bluetooth/hci.h include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h net/bluetooth/hci_event.c +1 more+62 -40 replies

Reviews trailers per patch

No Reviewed-by, Acked-by or Tested-by trailers for v4 yet.

Read the v4 thread

Cover letter [RFCv4 0/5] SSP MITM protection

From: Timo Mueller <[email protected]>

Hi,

this is a rebased version of the rfc v3. I've successfully tested these changes in the last couple of months at the UPF #46 in Vienna, with the CE4A golden device and the bluetooth PTS (where applicable).

At the UPF I've tested remotely initiated pairing with different io capabilities, as well locally initiated pairing. Regardless of the bonding mode, the protocol chosen in ssp has been consistent when being responder and also when being initiator. Pairing tests have been successful in all 22 test sessions.

The configuration I used for testing was as follows:
bluez: 5.9-154-gf7773c7
kernel: v3.12-rc3-65-gf927318
with the remaining patches from [RFC BlueZ v3 0/8] SSP MITM protection

I used the same configuration to test the patches with the CE4A golden device. Pairing here has been working as expected with all combinations of io capabilities, bonding mode and intiator role.

Lastly I've successfully ran the applicable GAP tests with the bluetooth PTS on this rebased version and the current head of bluez. Unfortunately the interesting bonding test cases are not yet implemented with the test suite. So I could only make sure general functionality is preserved.

from the original cover letter:
The way the kernel handles MITM Protection during pairing is
inconsistent: General Bonding and Dedicated Bonding are not treated equally.
<snip>
Therefore, the safest choice is to always request MITM Protection, also for General Bonding [1]. The proposal here is to do this for both incoming (patch 6/8) and outgoing (patch 7/8) procedures, as it was previously done for Dedicated Bonding. This "conservative" approach is smart enough to fall back to not using MITM Protection if the IO capabilities don't allow it (this policy already existed before for Dedicated Bonding, see patch 5/8).
<snip>

Best regards
Timo

Mikel Astiz (3):
Bluetooth: Refactor hci_get_auth_req()
Bluetooth: Refactor code for outgoing dedicated bonding
Bluetooth: Request MITM Protection when initiator

Timo Mueller (2):
Bluetooth: Use MITM Protection when IO caps allow it
Bluetooth: Add management command to relax MITM Protection

 include/net/bluetooth/hci.h  |  3 ++-
 include/net/bluetooth/mgmt.h |  3 +++
 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c    | 57 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c         | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 4 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
Signature · 1 line
1.8.3.1